

INDIA


*STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1947-1967*

EDITED BY

A. APPADORAI



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1 October 1967

FOREWORD

PANDIT HRIDAY NATH KUNZRU is one of those illustrious Indians of our generation who have contributed in various ways to the advancement of our nation and helped to enrich the quality of our public life. A man of intense liberal convictions and of remarkable catholicity of outlook, Pandit Kunzru represents in his person the best of India's composite cultural heritage. For almost half a century, as a leading parliamentarian and public man of this country, he has applied his keen and incisive mind to such diverse subjects as India's constitutional and political problems, its foreign relations and defence, its cultural and educational progress, and the tasks of undertaking social reforms.

Various institutions and public organizations have grown under the direction of Pandit Kunzru and have had the benefit of the constructive efforts of his versatile mind. The Indian Council of World Affairs, the Indian School of International Studies, the Anjuman Taraqqi Urdu Hind, the Servants of India Society, and the Bharat Scouts and Guides are some of these organizations. He has represented India with distinction in many international conferences and has taken keen interest in the development of India's relations with other countries.

In the history of the growth of parliamentary institutions in India, Pandit Kunzru's contribution will be regarded as of particular importance. The Parliament of free India had, in its formative years, the benefit of the great experience he had accumulated ever since he joined the UP Legislative Council in 1921. He contributed greatly not only to the deliberations on major national issues in Parliament but also to the evolution of healthy conventions and practices. Several official and non-official committees and commissions of great importance were helped by Pandit Kunzru, and his services as a member of the States Reorganization Commission deserve special mention.

The selfless dedication and the quiet dignity with which Pandit Kunzru has functioned in public life have been a source of

inspiration for many. If there is one lesson which the lives of persons like him teach us, it is that, in the ultimate analysis, the progress and the maturity of a nation depend on the serious application of minds to national problems.

It is, indeed, in the fitness of things that this volume of essays is being brought out by some of India's leading scholars as their tribute to this great Indian of our times. The volume contains learned papers on social, economic, and political problems of India—problems in which Pandit Kunzru has always been keenly interested. A section on India's external relations focusses attention on some of our foreign policy problems. I am sure that the volume will make a lasting contribution to the study of these subjects while conveying the tribute of the scholarly world to Pandit Kunzru on the occasion of his eightieth birthday.

ZAKIR HUSAIN

Rashtrapati Bhavan

New Delhi

25 July 1967

PREFACE

THE PREPARATION of this presentation volume was part of a programme decided upon by a committee of distinguished Indian citizens with Dr Zakir Husain as President and Dr Mohan Sinha Mehta as Secretary to honour Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru on the occasion of his eightieth birth anniversary. The impact of the personality of this great servant of India is visible in many aspects of our contemporary social and political life. It was, therefore, natural for the Committee to choose free India's social and political development as the central theme of the volume to be presented to him. In the time available, only some significant aspects of the theme could be studied. Even so, it is hoped that the book will be a useful contribution to the understanding of contemporary India and will also be worthy of the great personality in whose honour it has been prepared.

On behalf of the Committee, the Editor would like to thank (1) the contributors who have at short notice, and as a labour of love, responded to the Committee's invitation to them to write for the volume; (2) Sisir Gupta, Director of Studies, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, for assisting him in many ways, especially by preparing a short biography of Pandit Kunzru from notes supplied to him; (3) A.S. Hebbar, Editor of Publications, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, for using his professional skill in preparing the material for the press and correcting the proofs; and (4) Asia Publishing House for undertaking to publish the volume.

New Delhi
28 July 1967

A. APPADORAI
Editor

PANDIT H. N. KUNZRU

PANDIT HRIDAY NATH KUNZRU was born in a distinguished Kashmiri Brahmin family of Delhi at a time when the first signs of the resurgence of a new India were becoming visible. His father, Pandit Ajodhia Nath, had a brief but highly distinguished public life and was known as the "Lion of the United Provinces". Within a year of the birth of his second son Hriday Nath (on 1 October 1887), Pandit Ajodhia Nath successfully organized the fourth session of the Indian National Congress at Allahabad, very largely at his own expense and in the face of opposition from Sir Auckland Colvin, the then Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, and Sir Syed Ahmed, the Muslim opponent of the Congress. Only three years later, he died a premature death at the age of fifty-one. The impact of Pandit Ajodhia Nath, however, was great on the development of the personality of Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru who inherited his patriotism, love of public life, fearlessness, and various qualities of leadership.

Pandit Kunzru grew up along with India's national struggle for self-expression, of which its love for modern democratic values in public life was an integral part. He studied at the Agra College and passed the B.A. and B.Sc. examinations of the Allahabad University in 1905. He went up for higher studies and passed his first D.Sc. examination, but ill health prevented him from completing them. In 1909, at the early age of twenty-two, Pandit Kunzru joined the Servants of India Society, deciding to lead a hard life in the service of the nation. Members of the Society were required to take a vow to dedicate their lives to the nation and its cause and be content with whatever allowance the Society might pay them. The renowned Indian leader, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, soon discovered Pandit Kunzru's potentialities, and when H.S.L. Polak, Gandhi's colleague in South Africa, visited India, he deputed young Hriday Nath to tour India with the distinguished visitor. Polak persuaded Gokhale to send Hriday Nath to study at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he had the good fortune of studying

the social sciences under such famous professors as Alfred Marshall, Westermarck, and J.M. Keynes.

Pandit Kunzru took active part in political life and later served as one of the Secretaries of the Indian National Congress. But when the Liberal Party was formed in 1918, he, along with some other leading members of the Congress and the Servants of India Society, joined the National Liberal Federation. Ever since his first appearance in public life, Pandit Kunzru has been a vigorous figure in Indian politics. He presided over the National Liberal Federation in 1934 and was elected President of the Servants of India Society in 1936. In the pre-Independence period there was hardly an important political convention at the national level or a meeting of all-India parties in which Pandit Kunzru did not participate.

The versatile genius of Pandit Kunzru has found expression in his deep interest in various aspects of the awakening of India. His contribution to the enrichment of Indian society has been most outstanding in three fields: as a legislator, Pandit Kunzru has made a lasting and valuable impact on the evolution of healthy parliamentary procedures and conventions; as an educationist, Pandit Kunzru has helped existing institutions to grow and created new ones for the advancement of Indian education; and as a public man devoted to social service, Pandit Kunzru has imparted vigour and a sense of purpose to various social service institutions in the country.

Pandit Kunzru's legislative career began in 1921 when he was elected to the reformed UP Legislative Council. Shortly afterwards, in 1926, he was elected to the Central Legislative Assembly. He resigned his membership in 1930 as a protest against the Government of India's repressive policy. He was elected again to the Council of State in 1936 and continued to be a member of it till the dissolution of that body. He was a member of the Constituent Assembly of India (1946-50) and also of the Provisional Parliament (1950-52). He was elected a member of the Upper House of the Central Legislature—the Council of States—in 1952 and remained a member till 1964. He is perhaps the most distinguished parliamentarian living in the country.

Pandit Kunzru has been representing India in Inter-Parliamentary Conferences held under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Apart from being an outstanding parliamentarian whose speeches and interventions always reflected deep deliberation and

study, Pandit Kunzru rendered valuable service to the nation through his participation in various parliamentary committees like the Armed Forces Nationalization Committee. Of the many other committees and commissions of which Pandit Kunzru has been a member or chairman, mention must be made of the Indian Railways Enquiry Committee and the States Reorganization Commission.

Pandit Kunzru has been associated with various Indian universities like Allahabād, Delhi, Banaras, and Agra. It was largely on Pandit Kunzru's initiative that the systematic study of international affairs in India was conceived and started. He founded, along with Mr P.N. Sapru, the Indian Council of World Affairs in 1943. Since 1949, Pandit Kunzru has been the President of the Council. The Council's aim is to promote the objective study of Indian and international problems and create a body of informed opinion on world affairs. Pandit Kunzru is also the President of the Board of Governors of the Indian School of International Studies, an academic institution started in 1955 for advanced studies in international relations. Pandit Kunzru's keen interest in international affairs, particularly in matters relating to India's foreign relations, led to his participation in various international conferences in India and abroad. Particular mention should be made of his great interest in the question of the people of Indian origin abroad.

Pandit Kunzru was awarded the honorary LL.D. Degree of the University of Allahabad in 1936.

Pandit Kunzru's work in the social field has been equally substantial and of enduring value. Indeed, in him one finds a rare and fine combination of political and social career. He has been the General Secretary of the All India Seva Samiti of Allahabad, founded by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya in 1914, since its inception. He has been connected with the Boy Scout movement and was the National Commissioner of the Bharat Scouts and Guides. Another fact which further illustrates Pandit Kunzru's deep interest in the various aspects of public life is that he is the President of the Film Cultural Association of Delhi and has been actively associated with the Children's Film Society of India. And, further, Pandit Kunzru has been the President of the UP Harijan Sevak Sangh and a member of the Executive Committee of the Bharatiya Adimjati Sevak Sangh.

Even at his age, Pandit Kunzru continues actively to direct the work of the many institutions with which he is associated. Never does he fail or hesitate to express his firm and well-thought-out opinions on controversial national and international issues. Those who have had the benefit of working with Pandit Kunzru are deeply impressed and inspired by his high intellectual powers, integrity, and devotion to public well-being, as also his capacity for hard, relentless pursuit of knowledge and his fearlessness in public life. India is fortunate in that in the last one hundred years a large number of its distinguished sons have made service to the nation the only ambition of their lives. The resurgence and renaissance of India has had many aspects—political, cultural, social, and economic—and these great and distinguished figures of modern India will be remembered by future generations for their contribution in these fields. In that galaxy of stalwarts, Pandit Kunzru will always continue to occupy a prominent position. Indeed, he is one of those Indians whose contribution to our progress would be regarded as solid and long-lasting, if not as spectacular, as of many of his contemporaries.

This account of Pandit Kunzru's life and work may best be summed up in the following words of the late C.Y. Chintamani:

He [Pandit Kunzru] is a patriot every inch of him. He devotes the whole of his time and every day of the year to the country's work in the sphere of politics, education and social service. A better informed man there is not in the whole country in any part or community. And with knowledge wide and varied are combined a powerful brain and untiring industry. His character is of the highest. Of his erudition the late Sir Ashutosh Mukerji said that he felt happy to be assured that after his death there would be one man to write correct English and that man is Hriday Nath Kunzru.

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Social Problems

S.R. VENKATARAMAN

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA 1947-1966 A REVIEW OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION

ONE NOTICEABLE FEATURE of the laws enacted since 1947 is that among the enactments those dealing with Hindu Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, Rights to Property, Succession, Women and Children, and the Social Evils are the most significant. These laws come under the category of Social Legislation, as they are calculated to remove some of the prevailing social and economic disabilities and inequalities among the Hindus in general and women and children in particular. This is in conformity with the objectives adumbrated in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution, which says:

We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation; . . . give to ourselves this Constitution.¹

These objectives are more fully spelt out in Part III of the Constitution dealing with Fundamental Rights² and Part IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy.³

Article 17,⁴ under Fundamental Rights, abolishes untouchability, and its practice in any form is forbidden and liable for punishment. Article 15⁵ guarantees that the State shall not discriminate on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them, and that no citizen of India will on the very same grounds

Mr Venkataraman is Secretary, Servants of India Society, Madras. His publications include *Temple Entry Legislation: A Review* (Madras, 1946) and *Harijans through the Ages* (Madras, 1946).

¹Durga Das Basu, *Shorter Constitution of India* (Calcutta, 1958), p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 16.

³Ibid., p. 134.

⁴Ibid., p. 40.

⁵Ibid., p. 34.

be subject to any disability, liability, restriction, or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hostels, and places of public entertainments; or with regard to the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads, and places of public resort, maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.

Under the Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 39⁶) the State is obliged to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice—social, economic, and political—shall inform the conduct of its members as well as of its institutions and the larger national life.

The State has power under Article 245⁷ to legislate for implementing the intentions embodied under the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy and thus to hasten the establishment of a Welfare State. The distribution of legislative powers between the Union Government and the States is defined in the Seventh Schedule⁸ governing Article 246 in Part II of the Indian Constitution.

The Schedule contains three lists, List I⁹ (the Union List), List II¹⁰ (the State List), and List III¹¹ (the Concurrent List). Both the Indian Parliament and the State Legislatures can enact laws on all the subjects mentioned in List III such as Marriage, Divorce, Infants, Minors, Adoption, Joint Family, etc., Trusts and Trustees, Vagrancy, Nomadic and Migratory Tribes, Economic and Social Planning, Social Security and Social Welfare, Employment and Unemployment, Welfare of Labour (including conditions of work, provident fund, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old-age pensions, maternity benefits, relief, and rehabilitation), Charitable Institutions, Religious Endowments, and Religious Institutions.

In this article it is proposed to deal only with the enactments of the Union Parliament since 1947 in respect of social matters.

SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954

The Special Marriage Act, 1954 ignores the faith of the parties for the purpose of marriage. That is to say, persons could marry

⁶Ibid., p. 136.

⁷Ibid., p. 354.

⁸Ibid., pp. 561-600.

⁹Ibid., p. 561.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 576.

¹¹Ibid., p. 593.

under the Act by disowning their personal religion. This provision is in consonance with a Directive Principle of State Policy which enjoins upon the State to evolve a uniform civil code for the country as a whole. Persons marrying under the Act are registered under it, and in respect of divorce, inheritance, and succession they would be governed by the provisions in the Act, and not by their personal law. The Act merely endeavours to meet the changed and changing conditions in society and the growing reformist attitude among a section of Indians. The Act does not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Provisions relating to the solemnization of special marriages lay down conditions under which marriage between any two persons can be solemnized. They are: (a) Neither party has a spouse living; (b) neither is an idiot or a lunatic; (c) the male has completed the age of twenty-one years and the female the age of eighteen years; (d) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship; and (e) where the marriage is solemnized outside the territories to which this Act extends, both parties are citizens of India domiciled in the said territories.¹²

Parties intending to get married should give notice of it to the Marriage Officer, who maintains a Marriage Notice Book, which any person may inspect without any fee. The Marriage Officer has to see that notice of the marriage is given sufficient publicity. Objections to the marriage on the ground of contravention of one or more of the conditions relating to the solemnization of a marriage under the Act will have to be made within thirty days from the date on which the notice is published. The marriage can be solemnized after that period if no objection has been raised. Marriage can be solemnized in any form which the parties choose to adopt. But it shall not be complete and binding on the parties unless each party says to the other in the presence of the Marriage Officer and three witnesses and in the language understood by the parties: "I take thee to be my lawful wife (or husband)." The Marriage Certificate Book will be maintained by the Marriage Officer. The parties to the marriage and the three witnesses will sign the certificate which will serve as conclusive evidence of the solemnization of the marriage.

Registration of marriages celebrated before or after the commence-

¹²*Special Marriage Act, 1954*, ch. 2, sec. 4.

ment of the Act under some other form or custom of marriage may be permitted on the fulfilment of all the conditions laid down in the Act, so that doubts if any about the validity of those marriages may be removed. Registration would further facilitate the enforcement of a uniform kind of law of divorce and succession. It would ensure monogamy for women. The effect of registration of a marriage is that it makes illegitimate children legitimate. The rights of inheritance of such children are, however, limited to the property of their parents.

A marriage under the Act effects the severance of a person from the Hindu undivided family. A member of a Hindu joint family who marries under the Act becomes divided from the other members of his family, and from the date of the person marrying under this Act succession to the parties and to his or her issue is regulated by rules relating to Christians in the Succession Act, 1956.

Chapters V and VI provide for the restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, divorce, and divorce by mutual consent. The grounds for judicial separation and divorce are the same. They are: (1) adultery; (2) desertion without cause for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of a petition; (3) imprisonment for seven years or more (provided that the prisoner has undergone at least three years in prison out of the said period of seven years prior to the presentation of the petition); (4) cruel treatment since the solemnization of marriage; (5) suffering from a communicable venereal disease or leprosy or incurable unsoundness of mind for a period of three years; (6) absence of any knowledge of a person's existence for a period of seven years or more; (7) non-resumption of cohabitation for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of a decree of judicial separation; and (8) non-compliance with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of the decree. The wife can obtain divorce from her husband if he is guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality.

The petition by mutual consent for divorce is a novel feature of this Act. One condition for a petition for divorce by mutual consent is that both husband and wife should have lived separately for a year or more, or that they have not been able to live together, or that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

The Act prevents the presentation of any petition for divorce

before the lapse of three years from the date of entering the certificate in the Marriage Certificate Book. On account of exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, a petition is allowed to be presented before the lapse of three years to the District Court. Parties to a divorce can remarry only after a year has elapsed since the dissolution.

Any marriage solemnized under the Act shall be null and void on the non-fulfilment of the conditions relating to the solemnization of special marriages or on the ground of impotency at the time of the marriage and at the time of institution of the suit. They may be annulled by a decree of nullity. Any marriage solemnized under the Act shall be void (1) if the marriage has not been consummated owing to the wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate the marriage, or (2) if the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner, or (3) if the consent of either of the parties to the marriage was obtained by coercion or fraud (Clause 24). To prevent misuse of, or frivolous petition against, the latter two grounds, certain safeguards are provided for. While annulling a marriage on the ground of pregnancy at the time of the marriage, the court must satisfy itself (1) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged; (2) that proceedings were instituted within a year from the date of the marriage; and (3) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existing of the grounds for a decree.

With regard to the petition for granting a decree of nullity on the ground of coercion or fraud, the court must satisfy itself (1) that proceedings have been instituted within a year after the coercion has ceased or within a year after the fraud has been discovered; or (2) that the petitioner has not with his or her free consent lived with the other party to the marriage as husband and wife after the coercion has ceased or the fraud has been discovered, as the case may be, children born of such void and voidable marriages are legitimized, but such children are not given any right in or to the property of any person other than their parents.

The proceedings under the Act may be conducted *in camera* if the parties so desire or at the discretion of the court. Clause 36

provides for payment by the husband of alimony and the expenses of the court proceedings to the wife who is bereft of independent income which is sufficient for her maintenance as well as for the defrayal of the expenses of the proceedings, on application being made by her to the court. Any court exercising jurisdiction under the Act can order the husband to pay for the maintenance of his wife such gross sum or such monthly, periodical payment of money for a term not exceeding her life, having regard to her own property, if any, her husband's property and ability, and the conduct of the parties. Such alimony and maintenance should be modified or withdrawn according to altered circumstances. If the wife gets remarried or is not leading a chaste life, it could be withdrawn. It is left to the discretion of the court to pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the decree for the custody, maintenance, and education of the minor children as would be in the interest and welfare of the children. The Act prescribes penalty for marrying again under the Act by a married person for bigamy, for signing a false declaration or certificate for wrongful action of the Marriage Officer, etc.

We shall deal next with those laws which seek to simplify, secularize, and liberalize such features of the Hindu Law as are supposed to be far behind the times and bring the law into line with the spirit of the times. Attempts to codify the Hindu Law had been made since 1939. The opposition to the Hindu Code from the orthodox section among the Hindus made the Government decide to split the Code into parts so that its passage could be rendered smoother.

It is not necessary to deal with the various features of the Hindu social system prior to the changes brought about by the four Acts dealing with the Hindu Law because they are well known. The term *Hindu* has been used in all the Acts in the widest possible connotation so as to embrace Virashaivas, Lingayats, Brahmo-Samajists, Prarthana Samajists, Arya Samajists, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and others such as the backward classes, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the nomadic tribes. Thus the old distinction based on caste or creed is done away with, and the division of the Hindu society into four *varnas* is completely abolished. The Acts are applicable to the whole of India, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955

✓The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, came into force on 18 May 1955. Some of its salient features are (1) the abolition of caste restrictions as a necessary requirement for a valid marriage among the Hindus; (2) the enforcement of monogamy; and (3) the permissibility of divorce or dissolution of marriage. Most provisions in the Act are of a permissive and enabling nature.

The Act also states that a Hindu marriage to be valid must be solemnized between any two Hindus neither of whom must have a spouse living at the time of marriage, and that the bridegroom must have completed the age of eighteen years and the bride the age of fifteen years at the time of marriage, provided that where the bride has not completed the age of eighteen years, the consent of the guardian is necessary. Further, the parties to the marriage must not be within the prohibited degrees of relationship unless sanctioned by custom or usage, the parties must not be *sapindas* of each other unless permitted by custom or usage, and neither of the parties must be an idiot or a lunatic.¹³ The Act does not prescribe any form of ceremony for the solemnization of a marriage. It can be performed in accordance with the customary rights and ceremonies of the parties thereto. But where the marriage ceremony includes the *saptapadi* (taking of seven steps by the couple before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes binding only when the final step is taken.¹⁴ Since the consent of the guardian-in-marriage is essential if the bride is below eighteen years, the Act lists the persons who are entitled to guardianship.¹⁵ A guardian must have attained twenty-one years of age. In the absence of any guardian as specified above, the consent of a guardian is dispensed with for a marriage under the Act. The court has jurisdiction to prohibit an intended marriage if it thinks that it is necessary in the interest of the bride to secure the guardian's consent. Registration of Hindu marriages is left to the discretion of the various States. The State Governments may make rules to provide for optional or compulsory registration of marriages. Failure to register would not invalidate a marriage, but where registration is compulsory, failure to do so would be punishable with a fine of Rupees Twenty-

¹³*Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*, sec. 5.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, sec. 7.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, sec. 6.

five.¹⁶ The Act expressly says that pre-Act marriages shall not be invalid just because the parties belong (1) to the same *gotra* or *pravara*, or (2) to different religions,¹⁷ Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain, etc., or (3) to different castes or to different sub-castes.

The Act provides for restitution of conjugal rights,¹⁸ judicial separation,¹⁹ and divorce.²⁰ When either the husband or the wife ceases cohabitation with the other without any reasonable excuse, the aggrieved party can get his or her conjugal rights restored by obtaining a decree to that effect against the other party.

If the decree is not carried out within two years the aggrieved person can divorce the other party. This decree for restitution of conjugal rights, therefore, is a stepping-stone to divorce. But the real intention of the clause is to preserve unbroken the marriage ties as far as possible. Thus provisions for judicial separation and divorce are framed not with a view to separating the husband from the wife, but in order to allow time to bring them together after their emotional tension has died away. Judicial separation can be obtained on the ground of (1) desertion for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, or (2) physical or mental cruelty, or (3) suffering from a virulent form of leprosy for at least one year preceding the presentation of the petition, or (4) suffering from a venereal disease in a communicable form for more than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, or (5) continuous unsoundness of mind for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, or (6) an act of adultery.²¹ In the case of a judicial separation, any of the parties to the judicial separation desiring to live again as husband and wife can file a petition before a court for the cancellation of the decree.

Continuous adulterous life, or conversion to another religion, or incurable unsoundness of mind, or a virulent and incurable form of leprosy, or a venereal disease in a communicable form, or renunciation, or absence of any knowledge of the husband's or wife's whereabouts for a period of seven years, or failure to resume cohabitation for a space of two years or upwards after a decree of judicial separation, or non-compliance with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights are the various grounds mentioned in the Act for divorce. A wife

¹⁶Ibid., sec. 8.

¹⁷Ibid., sec. 29.

¹⁸Ibid., sec. 9.

¹⁹Ibid., sec. 10.

²⁰Ibid., sec. 13.

²¹Ibid., sec. 10.

can also apply for divorce in the case of a pre-Act marriage (1) provided the other wife is living at the time of making the application, bigamy being prohibited by the Act; (2) if the husband, since the solemnization of the marriage, has been guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality; and (3) under the customary laws.²² The petition for the dissolution of a marriage by a decree can ordinarily be made three years after the date of the marriage. It is unlawful for the divorced parties to remarry before the expiry of one year at least from the date of the decree. Both judicial separation and divorce petitions could be filed for pre-Act marriages as well. The Act treats certain marriages as void and voidable for non-compliance with the conditions in general enumerated earlier for a valid marriage.

The Act contains provision for safeguarding the interest of children²³ who are likely to suffer as a result of the granting of a decree of nullity in respect of a void or voidable marriage or of a decree of divorce. The Act legitimatizes children born or conceived of such annulled or void or voidable marriages and frees them from the stigma of illegitimacy which is foisted upon them for no fault of their own but of their parents.²⁴ They have been given rights in or to their parents' property but not to collateral property.

At the time of passing a decree of nullity in respect of a void or voidable marriage, or a decree of divorce, or thereafter, the court has to see that the custody, maintenance, and education of minor children, consistent with their wishes wherever possible, are ensured. The court is empowered to revoke, suspend, or vary any such orders and provisions previously made from time to time in the interest of the child.

Contravention of the provisions regarding the age of marriage, parties marrying within prohibited degrees of relationship or *sapinda* relationship, contravention of the condition regarding consent of guardian in the case of a bride, publication of judicial proceedings under the Act without the permission of the court, marrying another wife when the first wife is alive—all these are made liable for punishment under the Act.²⁵

Either the husband or the wife is made liable to pay maintenance during the pendency of the suit and the expenses of the proceedings if the petitioner has no independent means of income sufficient for

²²Ibid., sec. 13.

²³Ibid., sec. 26.

²⁴Ibid., sec. 16.

²⁵Ibid., secs 17 and 18.

his or her support.²⁶ Similarly there is provision for payment of permanent alimony and maintenance by the wife or husband to the other party. Remarriage or unchastity on the part of the wife or sexual intercourse with any woman out of wedlock by the husband would result in the discontinuance of the maintenance allowance and alimony.²⁷ These two provisions act as a deterrent to any frivolous action. But those genuinely unable to make this payment for want of resources will be at a disadvantage. Here the practice prevalent in criminal cases (where the State engages a lawyer to conduct cases in which persons without resources are parties) may be adopted in addition to granting a nominal allowance for maintenance, subject to certain conditions in really deserving and genuine cases.

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956

When a Hindu dies leaving an interest in the coparcenary property, his interest will devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members and in accordance with this Act.²⁸ The property of a Hindu dying intestate shall devolve first upon the heirs being the relatives specified in Class I, II, and other cognates and agnates.²⁹ However, property acquired by a female Hindu by way of gift, under a Will, by an instrument under a decree or order of a civil court, or under an award where the terms prescribed restrict estate in such property is kept out of the purview of the Act. The Act confers absolute right over the property possessed by a female Hindu before or after the commencement of the Act.³⁰

The Act lays down the rules of succession to the property of a female Hindu dying intestate.³¹ The order of heirship is as follows: first, sons and daughters including the children of any predeceased son or daughter and husband; second, the heirs of the husband; third, mother and father; fourth, heirs of the father; and lastly, heirs of the mother. Exception, however, has been made with regard to the devolution of the property, inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, or from her husband or father-in-law. If such a female Hindu has no son or daughter or the

²⁶Ibid., sec. 24.

²⁷Ibid., sec. 25.

²⁸Ibid., sec. 8 Schedule and Articles 10 and 11.

²⁹Ibid., sec. 14 (2).

³⁰Ibid., sec. 14.

³¹Ibid., secs. 15 and 16.

children of any predeceased son or daughter, then the property will go to the heirs of the father in the case of the former and to the heirs of the husband in the case of the latter.

Where right to any immovable property is inherited and business interests devolve on two or more heirs, any one of them has the preferential right to acquire the other's share.³² Thus the son or sons could buy up the share of the daughter or daughters.

A female heir has no right to claim partition of the family dwelling-place unless the male heirs agree to effect the partition. But her right to reside in the family dwelling-house is expressly recognized. This right is restricted to an unmarried daughter, a widow, and a discarded wife.³³

Children born to a Hindu after his or her conversion to another religion are disqualified from inheriting the property of their Hindu relatives, but the convert himself or herself, however, is not deprived of his right to succession or inheritance.³⁴ A posthumous child of an intestate is entitled to inheritance from the date of the death of the intestate.³⁵ According to the Act, the interest in the intestate property of a *Mitakshara* coparcener devolves by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary, but the principle of survivorship does not apply in cases where the deceased is survived by a female relative specified in Class I or by a male relative specified in that class who claims through such a female relative specified in that class. Further, the right to make a testamentary Will in respect of succession to the interest of a coparcener in the coparcenary property is against the *Mitakshara* system. Though the Act apparently claims to preserve the joint family yet certain loopholes found in the Act would indirectly weaken if not extinguish the *Mitakshara* joint family system. The Act has been made applicable to joint families governed by the *Marumakkatayam*, *Nambudiri* law, and the *Aliyasanthana* law as well.³⁶

The Act does not apply to succession to the property of a Hindu marrying under the Special Marriage Act, to the testamentary Will of succession made by a Hindu coparcener,³⁷ and to agricultural property. In order to avoid fragmentation of land, the Act has not been made applicable to agricultural land.³⁸ Clarifying the doubts

³²Ibid., sec. 22.

³³Ibid., sec. 23.

³⁴Ibid., sec. 26.

³⁵Ibid., sec. 20.

³⁶Ibid., sec. 7.

³⁷Ibid., sec. 5.

³⁸Ibid., sec. 4 (2).

expressed as regards the application of the law to agricultural holdings, Pataskar said that the Act would not have overriding powers over the laws which the State might have enacted for the prevention of fragmentation of land.

HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 1956

The Act codifies those portions of the Hindu Law relating to minority and guardianship which have not been covered by any other enactments, and is supplementary to the provisions of other laws on the subject. The scope of the Act is limited.³⁹ It deals with only natural guardians and testamentary guardians of Hindu minors.⁴⁰ It does not supersede the Guardians and Wards Act. Ceasing to be a Hindu or renunciation of the world bars a person from becoming a guardian of his children.⁴¹ The natural guardianship of an adopted minor son devolves on the family of his adoption.⁴²

The natural guardian is empowered to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection, or benefit of a minor's estate.⁴³ In order to preserve for the minor any property that might come to him or her by inheritance, restrictions are put on the disposal of the minor's property by a natural guardian, so as not to bind the minor by a personal covenant except by the previous permission of the court for mortgaging or charging or transferring by sale, gift, exchange, or otherwise any immovable property of the minor or leasing any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term exceeding one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.⁴⁴

According to the Act the Will of the minor's father appointing a testamentary guardian will not take effect if the mother is alive. But if the mother dies without nominating a guardian, the testamentary guardian appointed by the father will come into the picture.⁴⁵ The right of the guardian appointed by Will ceases in respect of a minor girl on her marriage.⁴⁶

³⁹*Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act*, sec. 3.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, sec. 6.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, sec. 6, provisos (a) and (b).

⁴²*Ibid.* sec. 7.

⁴³*Ibid.*, sec. 8.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, sec. 8 (2), provisos (a) and (b).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, sec. 9 (2).

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, sec. 9 (6).

The *de facto* guardian under the Act cannot dispose of or deal with the property of the Hindu minor.⁴⁷ This does not mean that the Act prevents an orphan minor from being looked after by his relative.

The other important provisions of the Act are the following: (1) Where a minor has undivided interest in a joint family property and the property is under the management of an adult member of a family, no guardian will be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest.⁴⁸ The jurisdiction of a High Court to appoint a guardian in respect of such interest is, however, not affected. (2) In the appointment of a guardian by the court, the welfare of the minor should be the paramount consideration, and no person will be entitled to guardianship if the court is of the opinion that this would not be for the welfare of the minor.⁴⁹

HINDU ADOPTION AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1956

The Act is in two parts—the first relates to adoption and the second, to maintenance.

Every male Hindu has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption (1) when he is in sound mind, (2) when he is not a minor, and (3) when, if he is married, he has obtained the consent of his wife or wives who are alive unless (a) the wife has renounced the world, or (b) has ceased to be a Hindu, or (c) is declared as of unsound mind. He can adopt one son or daughter at a time.⁵⁰ Only the death or conversion of the adopted son or daughter would entitle him to adopt subsequently.⁵¹ If a male Hindu has a non-Hindu wife, her consent to adopt a son is not essential. The consent of a Hindu wife would be valid only if she has completed eighteen years.

The capacity of a female Hindu maiden, married woman, widow, or divorcee to adopt a child depends upon her soundness of mind and her not being a minor. Where a female Hindu adopts a male Hindu the adoptive mother is to be twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted.⁵² In respect of a wife, in addition to the fulfilment of the above two requisites, the conditions that must be

⁴⁷Ibid., sec. 11.

⁴⁸Ibid., sec. 12.

⁴⁹Ibid., sec. 13 (1), (2).

⁵⁰*Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956*, Article 7.

⁵¹Ibid., Article 11 (i) and (ii).

⁵²Ibid., Article 11.

satisfied are that her husband (1) has renounced the world, or (2) has ceased to be a Hindu, or (3) has been declared as of unsound mind. The validity of the adoption will depend upon (1) whether the male Hindu intending to adopt a child has the capacity to take the child in adoption,⁵³ (2) whether the person giving away a child in adoption has the capacity to do so,⁵⁴ (3) whether the adoptee has the capacity to be taken in adoption,⁵⁵ and (4) whether the conditions of adoption have all been complied with.⁵⁶ This provision giving to a female Hindu the right to adopt a boy or girl is an innovation in Hindu Law which is disapproved both by the orthodox and by the large masses of people in the countryside. The Hindu social system allows only the adoption of a son, and even that strictly on religious ground to continue the family line. Adoption of a boy or girl by a Hindu female is novel.

The capacity to give away a child in adoption vests in the natural father or the natural mother or the guardian. The child cannot give himself away in adoption.⁵⁷ An adoptive parent has no capacity to give away in adoption his or her adopted child.⁵⁸

The Hindu father has the capacity to give his child in adoption (a) if he is of sound mind, (b) if he is not a minor, and (c) if he has obtained the consent of the mother unless the mother has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court to be of unsound mind.⁵⁹ Even if the mother of a child lives separate from her husband owing to a decree of judicial separation or of divorce from him, he has to obtain her consent before giving away the child in adoption. The father has the primary right to give away the child in adoption and as long as he is alive and has capacity, the mother has no right to give away the child in adoption. On the death of the father or termination of his capacity, the child's mother may give him or her away in adoption.⁶⁰ Similarly, the remarried mother has the capacity to give in adoption her child born of her previous marriage. In the case of the death of both the father and the mother or the termination of capacity of both of them, the testamentary guardian or a guardian appointed or declared by a court has the capacity to give the orphan in adoption with the previous permission of the

⁵³Ibid., Articles 6 and 7.

⁵⁴Ibid., Article 9.

⁵⁵Ibid., Article 10.

⁵⁶Ibid., Article 11.

⁵⁷Ibid., Article 9 (1).

⁵⁸Ibid., Article 9 (5), (i).

⁵⁹Ibid., Article 6.

⁶⁰Ibid., Article 8 (c).

court. The court while granting such permission will have to look to the child's well-being as a whole.⁶¹

The Act further defines who can be taken in adoption and also the conditions to be followed in a valid adoption. The performance of *dattahomam* is dispensed with.⁶²

On adoption the child becomes the child of his or her adoptive father or mother and loses his or her ties with his or her natural parents. Property vested in him or her before the adoption is not divested by his or her adoption. Nor does he or she divest any person of any estate vested in him or her before the adoption. An adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of his or her properties by transfer or by Will.⁶³

Where the deed of adoption is registered, a court shall presume that the adoption is valid. The Act, however, does not provide for such registration. The reason for this omission is not clear.⁶⁴

The other part of the Act deals with maintenance. Provision for the maintenance of the dependants of the deceased became necessary as a result of a declaration in the Hindu Succession Act empowering a Hindu male to make a testamentary disposition⁶⁵ of his property for the above purpose. Maintenance includes provision for food, clothing, residence, education, medical attendance and treatment, reasonable expenses relating to the marriage of an unmarried daughter, etc. The wife, a widowed daughter-in-law, minor children (legitimate as well as illegitimate), and aged and infirm parents are liable for maintenance, if they are Hindus. In the case of the wife, children, and aged parents, the liability is personal. The Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime and to live separately from her husband, without forfeiting her claims to maintenance on valid grounds. The maintenance would be available till the relation of husband and wife subsists between them.⁶⁶ After the dissolution of the marriage it could be claimed under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Special Marriage Act, depending upon the form of solemnization of the marriage. A widowed daughter-in-law is entitled to maintenance from her father-in-law from the coparcenary property

⁶¹Ibid., Article 9.

⁶²Ibid., Article 11.

⁶³Ibid., Article 12.

⁶⁴Ibid., Article 16.

⁶⁵Hindu Succession Act, sec. 30.

⁶⁶Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, sec. 18.

if he has any. She will be eligible for such maintenance (1) if she does not remarry; (2) if she is unable to maintain herself or obtain maintenance from the estate of her husband, or father, or mother, or son, or daughter; (3) if she does not obtain shares from the coparcenary property; (4) if she remains chaste; and (5) if she is not converted to another religion.⁶⁷

The obligation to maintain (1) a legitimate or an illegitimate son till he attains majority, (2) a legitimate or an illegitimate daughter till she is married, and (3) aged or infirm parents if they are unable to maintain themselves is personal and is placed both on a male and a female Hindu.⁶⁸ The act also enumerates the categories of relations who are deemed to be the dependants of the deceased.⁶⁹

The debts of the deceased have priority over the claims of his dependants for maintenance unless the latter are secured by charge.⁷⁰ The charge has to be created by the Will of the deceased or by a decree of a court or by an agreement between the dependents and the owner of the estate or its portion or by any other modes.⁷¹

YOUNG PERSONS (HARMFUL PUBLICATIONS) ACT, 1956

Harmful publications, otherwise known as horror comics, which encourage anti-social tendencies among children and exert a harmful influence upon them, are banned under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The Act under consideration prohibits indigenous production of such literature and its circulation.

The term *harmful publication* is defined as any book, magazine, pamphlet, leaflet, newspaper, or other like publication which consists of stories told with the aid of pictures or without the aid of pictures or wholly in pictures, stories which portray wholly or mainly (1) the commission of offences, or (2) acts of violence or cruelty, or (3) incidents of a repulsive or horrible nature, in such a way that the publication as a whole would tend to corrupt a young person into whose hands it might fall whether by inciting or encouraging him to commit offences or acts of violence or cruelty or in any other manner whatsoever. A young person is described as a person under the age of twenty years.

(a) Sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition, or circulation of

⁶⁷Ibid., sec. 19.

⁶⁸Ibid., sec. 20.

⁶⁹Ibid., sec. 21.

⁷⁰Ibid., sec. 26.

⁷¹Ibid., sec. 27.

any harmful publication, or (b) printing, making, or producing, or possessing any harmful publication for the purposes aforementioned, or (c) advertising or making known by any means whatsoever the source of availability of a harmful publication is made punishable with imprisonment extending to six months or with fine or with both.

The Act empowers State Governments to declare any publication as harmful after due consultation with the Principal Law Officer of the State, and to forfeit such publications. Offences under this Act are cognizable.

SUPPRESSION OF IMMORAL TRAFFIC IN WOMEN AND GIRLS ACT, 1956

Procurers, pimps, and others who live on the prostitutes' earnings, as well as landlords and brothel-keepers are punishable with rigorous imprisonment and fine. It is to be noted, however, that convictions for procuration have been very few, although it is obvious that procurers are found all over the land in big cities and small industrial centres and towns. The number of convictions of landlords, tenants, or occupiers who knowingly allow other persons to use their premises as brothels or who keep or manage brothels is low. It is estimated that convictions of these anti-social parasites range from 3 to 20 a year in the different States of India.⁷² It may be asked whether it is worth while to have expensive machinery just to deal with a few cases in each State.

A person who knowingly lives on the earnings of a prostitute is also punishable. The offence of a person living on the earnings of a prostitute shall be presumed if it is proved that he lives with a prostitute or is found habitually in her company or acts as a tout or pimp on her behalf. Even here convictions have been fewer than those for brothel-keeping. The reason is that it is difficult to prove procuration as the women procured would not depose against the procurer or the brothel-keeper. The law must presume that the offence has been committed by the parties involved.

To convict a brothel-keeper is equally difficult. The method adopted by the Police of employing a bogus customer with marked currency notes and then raiding the house and arresting the inmates

⁷²S.P. Aneaja, "Trafficking in Women", *Social Welfare* (Delhi), December 1963, p. 13.

is unethical, wrong, and reprehensible. Both the Bombay High Court and the Punjab High Court have rightly condemned this practice. The Madras High Court too has deprecated this practice and has suggested that the techniques of investigation should be revolutionized.

Legislation alone cannot eradicate this evil. More persistent efforts have to be made by the Police to eradicate the existence of open brothels. An open brothel is the rendezvous of all anti-social elements and centre of several other crimes. To meet the various difficulties in enforcing the provisions of this Act, the Punjab Government has appointed special staff, different from the ordinary Police. This step, it is reported, has resulted in more convictions than before. and commercialized vice in many cities is said to be on the decline. It is true that commercialized vice cannot be eradicated completely by legislation alone. A combination of healthy public opinion, whole-hearted public co-operation with the staff entrusted with the enforcement of the Act for the suppression of this vice, and vigorous action by the State—these alone will make the implementation of the Act effective.

WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S INSTITUTIONS (LICENSING) ACT, 1956

The administration and management of a majority of institutions for the shelter, protection, and custody of orphan children and destitute or rescued or widowed women have not been quite satisfactory. Social workers everywhere felt that the Government must exercise proper control and supervision over these institutions to protect women and children from exploitation, to regulate and license orphanages and other institutions, to pay surprise visits to institutions for women and children under eighteen years of age, to ensure the safety and security of the inmates in them, and to provide them with the minimum needs for a healthy and cheerful life. Further, Article 39 of the Constitution aims at securing protection against exploitation, and against moral and material abandonment of children and young persons. The Act for the Women's and Children's Institutions was passed to meet the aforementioned challenges.

The Act prohibits the establishment and the maintenance of any institution for the care of children and women except under and

in accordance with the conditions of licence and lays down the manner in which an application for licence is to be made and the procedure to be followed by the licensing authority in granting the licence. Hostels or boarding houses attached to, or controlled or recognized by educational institutions or any protective homes established under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 do not come within the purview of this Act. The management of an institution falling within the purview of this Act is to be entrusted to women wherever practicable. No fees are to be charged for the grant of a licence. A licence granted under the Act is not transferable. A licensing authority is empowered to revoke it if there is a breach of conditions laid down for its granting, or of the provisions of the Act, or of the rules made under the Act. The licence can also be revoked if the management or superintendence of an institution is considered unsatisfactory, after giving due opportunity to the holder of the licence to offer an explanation. On the revocation of the licence this licensing authority has to arrange for the restoration of any woman or child who is its inmate to the custody of her or its parents, husband, or lawful guardian as the case may be, or to get her or it transferred to another institution. Contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder is made punishable with imprisonment or fine or both. Power is conferred upon the State Government to frame rules on matters specified in the Act.

CHILDREN ACT, 1960

This Act provides for the care, protection, maintenance, welfare, training, education, and rehabilitation of neglected and delinquent children and for the trial of delinquent children in the Union Territories. Under the Act, in each Union Territory, the Administrator shall constitute a Child Welfare Board with a Chairman and such other members as the Administrator thinks fit, of whom at least one shall be a woman. Every member of the Board shall be invested with the powers of a Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code. Both the Board and the Children's Court have power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under the Act relating to neglected children or delinquent children. The Administrator is empowered to establish Children's Homes for reception of neglected chil-

dren under the Act; he may certify any voluntary institution already functioning in the Territory as a fit institution to receive neglected children; and he may establish special schools wherever necessary for delinquent children or certify any existing voluntary agency as a fit institution to receive delinquent children.

The Administrator is also empowered to establish what is called an Observation Home for the temporary reception of children during the pendency of any inquiry regarding them under the Act. He may also establish and recognize After Care Homes for the purpose of enabling the children to lead an honest, industrious, and useful life.

Under the Act any Police officer authorized by the Administrator can take charge of an apparently neglected child and present him before the Board for necessary disposal. If the child has a parent or guardian, he will be asked to produce the child before the Board. If the Board is satisfied on inquiry that the child is neglected, it may order the child to be admitted into a Children's Home and looked after until he is no longer a child. If in the opinion of the Board the parents or guardian is unfit to exercise proper care and control over the child, the Board may also entrust the child to any other suitable custody.

DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961

This Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Dowry has been defined as any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party or by the parents of either party to the marriage to any other person at or before the marriage, as a consideration for the marriage of the said parties. This does not include "dower" or "mahr" in the case of persons to whom the Moslem Personal Law (*Shariat*) applies. But any presents made at the time of marriage to either party to the marriage in the form of cash or ornaments or clothes or other articles shall not come under the term *dowry* unless they are made considerations for the marriage of the said parties. Under the Act both the giver and the receiver of the dowry shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rupees Five Thousand. But no cognizance of the offence will be taken by the

court without the previous sanction of the Government or the officer specified in that behalf. Agreement to give dowry will be void. But if the dowry is received by any person other than the bride before the marriage, he shall transfer it to her within one year after the date of the marriage. If the dowry is received at the time of or after the marriage, he shall transfer it to her within one year after the date of its receipt. If the dowry is received when the bride is a minor, he shall transfer it to her within one year after she has attained the age of eighteen years. Pending such transfer he shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the bride.

If any person fails to transfer the property as required by subsection 1 and within the time limited therefor, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rupees Five Thousand or with both. Where a woman entitled to any property aforementioned dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being.

SLUM AREAS (IMPROVEMENT AND CLEARANCE) ACT, 1956

The concentration of population in industrial or commercial cities and towns has resulted in unplanned development of those places. This unplanned development is a menace to public health and morals. One of the remedies for the clearance and prevention of slums is a legislative measure. Legislative action by itself is not an answer to any social problem, unless such action is coupled with educative and social measures. Civic consciousness or awareness of the problem and readiness and willingness of the people to improve their lot are other aspects of the problem of slum clearance. Thus legislative and social measures are complementary to each other in eradicating and forestalling the springing up of slums in future. The object of the Slum Areas Clearance Act, 1956 is to provide for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories and for the protection of tenants in such areas. The Act extends to all Union Territories except the Andaman and Nicobar islands, the Laccadives, and the Minicoy and Amindivi islands.

The Act defines expressions such as "administrator", "building", "competent authority", "erection", "work of improvement", "occupier", "owner", "prescribed", and "slum clearance".

“Building” includes any structure or erection or any part of a building. “Erection” in relation to a building includes extension, alteration, or re-erection. “Work of improvement” includes in relation to any building in slum area the execution of any one or more of the works such as (1) necessary repairs, (2) structural alterations, (3) provision of light points and water-taps, (5) construction of drains, open or covered, and provision of latrines, (6) provision of additional or improved fixtures or fittings, (7) opening up or paving of courtyards, (8) removal of rubbish, and (10) any other work including the demolition of any building or any part thereof. “Slum clearance” means the clearance of any slum areas by the demolition and removal of buildings therefrom.

The Act provides for the declaration of any area as unfit for human habitation (1) if the buildings there are bad from the point of view of repairs, stability, freedom from damp, natural light and air, water supply, drainage and sanitary conveniences, facilities for storage, preparation, and cooking of food, and for the disposal of waste water, or (2) if it is by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design, narrowness or faulty arrangements of streets, lack of ventilation, light, and sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety, health, and morals. Provision is made to cause the owner of a building in a slum area to execute the needed works of improvement if his building is in any respect unfit for human habitation. For this purpose the building must be capable of being rendered fit at a reasonable expense. If the works of improvement are not carried out by the owner, the competent authority appointed to carry out the purpose of the Act is empowered to do it and all the expenses incurred by it in carrying out the works of improvement are to be recovered from the owner of the building as arrears. The Act provides for the demolition of a building in a slum area if it is unfit for human habitation and is not capable of being rendered fit at a reasonable expense. Power is given to the competent authority to declare any slum area as a clearance area—an area to be cleared of all buildings which are unfit for human habitation or dangerous or injurious to health—after getting confirmation for such a declaration from the Administrator. When a slum clearance order has become operative, the owners of the buildings described above shall have to demolish their buildings within the periods stated in the order, fai-

ling which the competent authority will carry out their demolition and recover the expenses thereof from them. No land in such a clearance area can be redeveloped except in accordance with the plans approved by the competent authority and subject to such restrictions and conditions as the authority may think fit to impose. The competent authority can by order determine to redevelop any land in the slum clearance area which has not been or is not in the process of being redeveloped by the owner. The Government is empowered to acquire land within, adjoining or surrounded by a slum area to enable the competent authority to execute any work of improvement in relation to any building or to redevelop any slum clearance area. Compensation shall, however, be paid to the owner in respect of such acquired land.

Due protection has been given in the Act to the tenants in slum areas against being evicted by owners. The provision relating to it says: "No person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area shall be entitled to execute such decree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority." This proviso restraining an owner from evicting a tenant from a building in a slum area is not made applicable in respect of a tenant in any building belonging to the Government, the Delhi Improvement Trust, or any local authority in a slum area.

The Act confers powers on the competent authority to enter privately owned slum areas for the purpose of providing basic amenities. The competent authority is authorized to remove any dangerous or offensive trade in a slum area. Appeals against any notice, order, or direction issued or given by the competent authority lie with the Administrator and his decision on it is final and is not to be questioned in any court. The Act lays down penalties of imprisonment, or fine, or both for contravention of any notice, order, or direction issued or given under this Act or for commencing or causing to be commenced any work in contravention of any restriction or condition imposed for redevelopment of any land in a slum clearance area.

UNTOUCHABILITY (OFFENCES) ACT, 1955

Article 17 of our Constitution is an important provision for achiev-

ing social equality. It says: "Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden." It guarantees social security to a community which has suffered for a long time from social handicaps at the hands of persons higher in the social hierarchy. This practice of discrimination can be seen in its subtlest form in such matters as social and religious customs and practices, clothes, utensils, houses, etc. The Article is of a declaratory nature and makes no specific provisions for the abolition of untouchability. There were laws in the various States for the removal of the social and religious disabilities of the Harijans prior to the enactment of this central law on the subject. These laws suffered from want of uniformity. The purpose of the Untouchability (Offences) Act is to have a uniform law throughout the country to effect the abolition of untouchability. It prescribes punishment for the practice of untouchability, for the enforcement of any disability arising therefrom, and for other related offences.

Preventing any person on the ground of untouchability from entering any place of public worship which is open to other persons professing the same religion or belonging to the same religious denomination or any section thereof; or from offering worship and prayers or performing any religious service in any place of public worship; or from bathing in, or using the waters of, any sacred tank, well, spring, or watercourse in spite of belonging to the same religion or to the same religious denomination or any section thereof is made punishable with imprisonment, or with fine, or with both. Thus the religious disabilities from which the Harijans had suffered were done away with by this provision. Section 4 of the Act lays down certain restrictions with a view to the removal of the social disabilities of the Harijans. It proscribes enforcement against any person any disability with regard to (i) access to any shop, public restaurant, hotel, or place of public entertainment; or (ii) the use of any utensils and other articles kept in any public restaurant, hotel, *dharmashala*, *sarai*, or *musafirkhana*; or (iii) the practice of any profession or the carrying on of any occupation, trade, or business; or (iv) the use of, or access to, any river, stream, spring, tank, cistern, water-tap, or any other source of water or bathing ghat, burial or cremation ground, sanitary convenience, road, passage, or any other place of public resort; or (v) the use of, or access to, any place used for a charitable or public purpose maintained wholly or partly

out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public; or (vi) the enjoyment of any benefit under a charitable trust; or (vii) the use of or access to any public conveyance; or (viii) the construction, acquisition, or occupation of any residential premises in any locality whatsoever; or (ix) the observance of any social or religious custom, usage, or ceremony or taking part in any religious procession; or (x) the use of jewellery or finery.

Commission of the following acts against the Harijans by any person constitutes a punishable offence: (1) refusal of admission to them to any hospital, or dispensary, or educational institution, or any hostel attached thereto, if these institutions are established for the benefit of the general public or any section thereof, and discriminatory treatment after admission to these institutions; (2) refusal to sell them any goods or render any service to them at the same time and place and on the same terms and conditions as for other persons; (3) preventing their exercise of the right guaranteed under Article 17 of the Constitution or molesting, injuring, or causing annoyance to them in their exercise of that right or for their exercising that right, obstructing or causing or attempting to cause obstruction in their exercise of that right or for their exercising that right, or inciting or encouraging people by word or by sign or by visible representation to practise untouchability; (4) boycotting them, by refusing them the use or occupation of any home or land, or by refusing to deal with them, work for them, or do business with them, or by refusing to do customary service to them or to receive customary service from them on equitable terms, or by abstaining from social, professional, or business relations with them; and (5) excommunicating those who refuse to practise untouchability or to do any act for the furtherance of the object of the Act.

The Act provides for the suspension or cancellation of licences issued to persons in respect of any professions, trade, or calling for refusing to sell any goods or render any service to the Harijans. It empowers the Government to direct the suspension of grants given to a place of public worship for breach of the Act as well as to order resumption of grants, partly or in full measure, on being satisfied that untouchability will not be practised there any longer. Abetment of the offences under the Act is also made punishable. Enhanced penalty is prescribed for subsequent convictions under the Act. Offences under the Act are cognizable and compoundable.

PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT, 1958

There existed no probation law in any State of the country except in the States of Bombay, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Even in the States mentioned as exceptions above the law was not uniform and was not adequate to meet the requirements of the times. The Act makes uniform law for all the States and accepts the principle that a criminal should be treated as a diseased person and that efforts should be made to cure and rehabilitate him instead of leaving him to the unhealthy effects of jail life.

The Act empowers the Government, in the case of a few minor offences, to release first offenders with an admonition, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. Similarly, offenders not punishable with death or imprisonment for life can be released on probation of good conduct on their entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to the effect that they would appear and receive sentence when called upon at any time during a period which shall not exceed three years and that in the meantime they would keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Before passing such orders, however, the court has to take into consideration the report, if any, on the case by the probation officer concerned. The court can order offenders to be placed under the supervision of a probation officer for a period not less than one year. The court can lay down conditions for such supervision. The court will have to require offenders to observe the conditions specified in its order and such additional conditions as relate to place of residence, abstention from intoxicants, etc. Power is given to the court to direct offenders to pay compensation for loss or injury done to any person as well as the cost of the proceedings. The court is not allowed to sentence to imprisonment offenders under twenty-one years of age punishable with imprisonment—but not with imprisonment for life—without giving reasons for not releasing them on admonition or on probation of good conduct. On the application of a probation officer, conditions of probation could be varied. The procedure to be followed by the court in case offenders fail to observe the conditions of the bond is prescribed in the Act. Offenders released with an admonition or on probation of good conduct shall not suffer any disqualification attaching to a conviction unless they are subsequently

sentenced for the original offence.

The Act prescribes the duties of a probation officer and gives him protection against any suit or legal proceedings. The State Governments have been given the power to make rules on specific subjects mentioned in the Act to carry out the purposes of the Act.

APPRENTICES ACT, 1961

This Act prohibits an employer from engaging as an apprentice anyone who is not less than fourteen years of age and satisfies standards of education and physical fitness. If a minor is to be engaged as an apprentice, his guardian has to enter into a contract of apprenticeship with the employer. The employer shall pay to the apprentice during the period of his apprenticeship and training such stipend as is not less than the prescribed rate in the contract of apprenticeship. The provisions of the Factory Act will apply to the apprentice in matters of health, safety, and welfare. Hours of work, overtime allowance, leave, and holidays will have to be prescribed and observed. If the apprentice suffers any injury in the course of training or in the performance of his duties, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation. The necessary machinery for the enforcement, supervision, control, fines, and punishments are provided. Thus provisions relating to children in this Act are designed to safeguard the children from exploitation of any kind.

The Factories Act, 1948, the Mines Act, 1952, and the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 have definite provisions for the health, safety, and welfare of women.

FACTORIES ACT, 1948

Under the Factories Act no woman can be employed in any factory except between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The State Governments are authorized to vary these limits, but not beyond 10 p.m. or before 5 a.m. This relaxation in limits is allowed in respect of women employed in fish-curing and fish-canning factories. No woman worker is allowed to work in a factory for more than nine hours a day. No woman or child (i.e. below fifteen years) is allowed in any factory to clean, lubricate, or adjust any part of a machine while that part is in motion, or to work between moving parts or between

fixed and moving parts of any machine which is in motion. Further, no woman or child can be employed to press cotton in any part of a factory in which a cotton-opener is at work. A woman could be employed at the feed end if it is separated from the delivery end by a partition extending to the roof. In a factory, where more than fifty women are ordinarily employed, provision has to be made for maintaining a suitable room or rooms, adequately accommodative, lighted and ventilated, and in a clean and sanitary condition for the use of the children (under the age of six years) of such women. These rooms should be in the charge of women trained in the care of children and infants. Free milk or refreshment or both have to be supplied to these children. Facilities have to be given to the mothers of these children to feed them at necessary intervals. Separate urinals and latrines and washing facilities have to be made for women.

MINES ACT, 1952

The Mines Act prohibits the employment of women in any part of a mine which is below the ground level. The Act lays down that even an adult shall not work in a mine for more than nine hours a day and forty-eight hours a week. Women can work only between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The Act prohibits the employment of a woman worker in a mine for four weeks from the day she gives birth to a child and provides for the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of twelve annas day for a period of four weeks of absence before, and four weeks after, delivery. The qualifying period of service entitling a woman to claim maternity benefit is six months' service preceding the day of delivery. The Act provides for the payment of a bonus to her if she is attended by a qualified midwife or a trained person at the time of delivery. The employer is prohibited from dismissing a woman during the period of her maternity benefit on the ground of absence from work. The Act makes provision for a crèche and additional rest interval for such a woman.

PLANTATION LABOUR ACT, 1951

Under this Act, no woman worker can be employed between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. except with the permission of the State Government con-

cerned. Total hours of work during the week are fifty-four. It makes the maintenance of crèches compulsory in units employing fifty women and more. Under the Tea Districts Emigrant Labour Act, 1932, children under sixteen are prohibited from migrating from any recruiting region to Assam to work in any capacity on a tea estate unless such children are accompanied by their parents or other relatives on whom they are dependent. Married women too are not allowed to migrate without the consent of their husbands. Plantation women workers in Assam are governed by the State Act and are entitled to a cash benefit of Rs 0-11-6 a day in addition to the usual food concession. The Kerala and West Bengal (Tea Estates) Acts provide for Rs 5-4-0 a week. In other plantations of South India, Employers' Associations have recommended payment of benefit of Rs 0-12-0 a day for eight weeks on a voluntary basis.

INDIAN CINEMATOGRAPH ACT, 1952

The aim of the original Act of 1949 was to regulate the exhibition of films and the construction and maintenance of cinema halls. Under the Act the power to certify a film as worthy of public exhibition was vested in the State Governments. Concentration of the production of films in the States of West Bengal, Bombay, and Madras and the import of films through the ports of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras made it necessary that the examination of films and their certification by the Boards of Censors should be done in the first instance at these ports.

In 1952 the Act was amended and films were divided into two categories, those which could be shown to adults alone and those which were fit for universal exhibition.

The Act, as it stands today, empowers the Central Government to review the certification of any film and cancel, if deemed necessary in the public interest, the certificate given to it after issuing a notice to the person who has taken out the certificate for the film, asking him to explain by a specified date why the certificate should not be cancelled, and giving due thought and consideration to his explanation if submitted by him in due and proper form within the period specified. The Act also makes it obligatory for those delivering a certified film to an exhibitor or distributor to transmit all necessary information and documents relating to the certificate

and prescribes punishment for exhibiting portions of the film cut out by the Board of Censors before certification. The Act also contains provisions to counteract interpolations and exhibition of unauthorized scenes in certified films.

Under Section 5 (4) (3) of the Cinematograph Act of 1952, every film is scrutinized by the Board of Film Censors and a certificate is issued or refused, or issued with cuts and modifications. The Board tries to ensure that horror comics and obscene films such as are likely to encourage vice, crime, and offences against decency and morality, or to promote disrespect for law and order, or to cause offence to a foreign country or people are not exhibited.

There is a large consensus of opinion that films certified by the Board of Censors contain shots and scenes likely to corrupt young and impressionable minds, and that a stricter censorship is called for.

The Hindu Succession Act has made some revolutionary changes in the old Hindu Law. All property held by women is now their own absolute property. Heirs of a deceased Hindu are entitled to a share even in the undivided interest in the coparcenary property. The tribes feel that these provisions are contrary to their customs and practices, and that they should be extended to them only after each tribal council has had the opportunity of knowing fully the implications of the provisions. Again, adoption by a Hindu is usually of a boy primarily for spiritual benefit. But the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act of 1956 permits the adoption of a son or a daughter for secular purposes as well. And the consent of the wife is necessary. I discussed these changes in Hindu Law with the leaders of the Kotas and the Todas in the Nilgiris, the Kanis in Agasthianagar near Papanasam Dam, and the Malayalis of Javadi Hills.

The Todas aver that they are now monogamous. The Toda elders are against intercaste marriages. The Toda women have no right to property. The new law conferring on women absolute right to property is strange to them. Shares in the coparcenary property etc. are too complicated for them to understand. The idea of writing a Will is also strange to them.

The Kotas are monogamous, but like the Todas they also feel that the extension of the provisions can be agreed to only after the tribal elders have given their consent. The Malayalis of Javadi Hills have a customary law under which it is obligatory for the

husband to maintain his divorced unfaithful wife and her illegitimate children, present and prospective. All these tribes are against intercaste marriages and the tribal *panchayat* would outcaste those who marry outside the tribe.

I have discussed all these matters with the various tribes, and it seems to me that the various Acts governing the Hindu community should not be extended to them without first preparing them for it. The most effective way to secure the approval of the tribal communities for the extension of the Act is (1) to prepare a small pamphlet in the languages of the regions inhabited by these tribes, explaining the provisions of the various Acts and the advantages that would accrue to the communities if they fell in line with the new enactments; (2) to have the various Acts explained and discussed at the tribal *panchayat* meetings; and (3) to secure the consent of the *panchayats* and the leaders of the community as a whole in writing for the extension of the provisions they favour.

28 March 1967

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LAKSHMI MAZUMDAR

HISTORY OF INDIAN SCOUTING

"Though Scouting was presented to the world through the experimental camp which B.P. [Lord Robert Baden-Powell] conducted on Brownsea island in August 1907," says Colonel J.S. Wilson, "it had been a long time in the making."¹ From the accounts given by the close associates of B.P. it would appear that the ideas for the development of the basic values of a human being so that he could be a worthy citizen of his country had occupied his mind for a long time. He had confided to his close friends and co-workers that the qualities which the Knights of King Arthur's Round Table are reputed to have possessed had influenced him to a great extent in thinking out the qualities which a good citizen must imbibe. These ideas had worked on his mind from as far back as 1890. This can be confirmed from different sources and documents. Hence the camp at Brownsea Island could well be regarded as firm evidence of the crystallization of his thoughts and his first attempt to apply them in practice. Thus it was in 1907 that Scouting could be said to have been born officially. Since then it has grown gradually and spread beyond the frontiers of the country of its birth.

Scouting for Boys was a programme conceived and planned mainly for the benefit of British boys who had been thrown out of their traditional environment in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, and also for the benefit of those who had to go out to new lands when their parents left their mother country to find new careers for themselves as traders, administrators, technicians, and settlers in the colonies and countries under the British Crown. The ideas and programmes set out in Scouting for Boys were, however, so universal that it was not long before they had travelled across the English Channel to many lands beyond the seas.

Mrs Mazumdar was Chief Commissioner of Girl Guides, India, from 1961 to 1964 and has been National Commissioner of Scouts and Guides since 1964.

¹Colonel John Skinner Wilson, *Scouting round the World* (London, 1950), p. 13.

In India, Scouting first came in for the benefit of British and Anglo-Indian boys, as a measure to bring home to them the traditional values of British society so that the environment in a country so far away from their homes might not obscure their ultimate duties and responsibilities as sons of Britain.

Understandably, the authorities of the newly formed movement did not envisage that the programme and ideals would be suitable for Indian boys. Colonel Wilson, in a description of his rôle as a Scoutmaster, a Cubmaster, and a Commissioner, which he held simultaneously while helping Sir Alfred Pickford in organizing Scouting in Calcutta in 1917, writes: "Together we had been struggling for the admission of Indian boys into Boy Scouts Association; there was a Government of India Order against it, in which it was bluntly stated 'Scouting might turn them to become revolutionaries.'"² Similarly, we learn from our veteran leader, Sardar Hardial Singh, that when, as Assistant Scoutmaster, he was helping Rev. H.R. Ferger in 1918 in running a troop at Dehra Dun, they evoked a similar suspicion from the authorities for "their revolutionary activities."

The establishment of three Indian universities in the second half of the last century in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, and the adoption of the Western educational system, as against the traditional system, brought in an onrush of new ideas in every sphere of life in India. The newly educated classes in Indian society clamoured for reforms and for new thoughts and ideas in every field. It was no wonder that in the area of youth welfare also the demand for Scouting for Indian boys became increasingly persistent.

Against this background, Indian Scouting made its début spontaneously in the different parts of the country—in the towns and in the cities—wherever enthusiastic and competent leadership was available. It is worth noting that in this effort both Indian and non-Indians took an effective lead. In writing the early history of Indian Scouting one cannot, therefore, give a strictly chronological account of the growth of the movement. It must necessarily be a chain of stories connected with the rise and growth of a disciplined troop under dynamic and localized leadership in several parts of the country.

²Ibid., p. 19.

This state of affairs continued till the visit to India of the Founder and the Chief Guide in 1921. Several small organizations had sprung up on a State or area basis and were carrying on their work without much co-ordination one with another. During his first visit in 1921, B.P. tried his best to give a lead for the formation of an all-India organization. He succeeded in bringing a large section of Indian Scouting into the fold of the official Boy Scouts Association but failed to bring about an agreement with another important section. Thus the history of Indian Scouting started with two major camps. Even within the camps, the leaders of the movement could not establish authoritative centres on an all-India basis. The Seva Samity Scout Association had its stronghold in the then United Provinces, whereas the Baden-Powell movement grew province-wise with only a loose connexion between the different prominent branches.

It may be interesting to note that although Girl Guiding in India began its life with the same kinds of handicap from which the Boy Scout movement had suffered, namely that Indian girls were debarred from enrolment as Girl Guides, the all-India organization came into being soon after the visit of the Founder and the Chief Guide in 1921, and became one of the founder-members of World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts in 1928. The Indian Scout movement received its direct affiliation with the International Scout Bureau only after the second visit by the Founder in 1938. The Seva Samity Scout Association had a band of Girl Guides in its fold, but this wing had hardly any women leaders to lead them. Later on, when the Hindusthan Scout Association was formed, it was able to enlist a few women commissioners, but for technical leadership they had to depend on their men leaders.

II

Scouting came to India in 1909, two years after the camp at Brownsea Island. Scout troops consisting of British and Anglo-Indian boys were formed at Bangalore (Mysore), Kirkee (near Poona, Maharashtra), Simla (Himachal Pradesh), and Jubbulpur (Madhya Pradesh). These troops were registered with the "Imperial" Headquarters in London. A large number of Scouts belonging to the

above groups assembled in Calcutta during the visit of King George V in December 1911. In order to co-ordinate the work of the troops in India a Chief Commissioner, an Assistant Chief Commissioner, and a General Secretary were appointed by the "Imperial" Headquarters in 1912. The first Scout Magazine, *Ye India Scout*, was brought out in 1911. This name was later changed into *The Boy Scouts Gazette of India*.

It is no small pride to all of us in the movement that the first Indian to attempt to form a troop with Indian boys was our revered leader, Vivian Bose. After his return to India from England in 1913, he started the first Indian Scout troop at Nagpur. Similarly, at Benaras (Uttar Pradesh), about this time, Dr G.S. Arundale (an Englishman) founded a Scout troop at the Theosophical High School, and L.G. D'Silva formed another group at Raipur (Madhya Pradesh). During this period Pandit Shri Ram Bajpai started a troop under the name "Bal Seva Dal" at Shahjahanpur (Uttar Pradesh). Thus, in the history of Indian Scouting, the names of V. Bose, Pandit Bajpai, Arundale, and D' Silva will go down as the pioneers of our movement.

By the end of 1916 Scout troops sprang up sporadically in Assam, Baluchistan, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Madras, Mysore, the then Nizam's Dominions, the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Rajputana, Sind, and the United Provinces.

The relevant census figures of the number of Scouts in different years were as follows: 1912—502; 1913—1,154; 1914—2,038; 1915—2,277; and 1916—2,699.

From 1916 onwards the "Imperial" Headquarters permitted Scout troops with Indian boys to be registered in their office.

It has already been explained why the early history of Indian Scouting must necessarily consist of a bunch of short accounts about the movement in different provinces carried on entirely under local leadership. Very few documents are available on the basis of which a full history of the growth and development of the movement in its formative years could be compiled. In the following paragraphs I shall, however, make an attempt to give a bird's-eye view of the movement province-wise supported by the few documents to which I was able to gain access within the relatively short time at my disposal.

III

Bengal

Bengal was one of the pioneering provinces of India which had accepted higher education through the medium of the English language at a very early date, and had thus exposed itself to the new and modern ideas of the West as they prevailed in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Western-oriented educated Bengali middle-class leaders in the field of education and other professions realized that as a first step towards winning *swaraj* from the British, India must build up worthy citizens. Along with other ideas, the story of Scouting as planned by B.P. for citizenship training reached Calcutta fairly early in the history of Scouting. A new set of English-educated professionals such as Dr S.K. Mullick, Lieutenant-Colonel S.P. Sarbadhikary, N.N. Chattak, J.M. Ghose, D.N. Bose, etc., to name only a few of them, took the initiative and formed the Bengalee Boy Scouts League in 1914. Later this name was changed and a new name, the Bengalee Boy Scouts Association, was given to the organization. Among the first batch of trained Scouts the names of Saroj Ghosh (a former National Secretary of the Bharat Scouts and Guides) and the late Satta Bose deserve special mention. The Association sought the affiliation of the London Headquarters, but failed. It may be noted here that forward-looking British officials and others living in India had full sympathy for this demand of Indian Scouting for recognition by the Headquarters in England. Among those who took active part in this matter were Sir Lancelot Sanderson, the then Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, Sir Alfred Pickford, Major N.M. Ross, and Colonel Wilson.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught came to India in connexion with the inauguration of the reformed Legislative Councils in August 1920. In his honour a rally of B.P. Boy Scouts was held, in which some Indian Scouts also participated. On that occasion Sir Alfred Pickford, the then Chief Commissioner of India, in his capacity as head of the Indian Branch of the B.P. Association, convened a conference of the All-India Scouts Association. The conference was held in Calcutta on 20-21 August 1920. Dr H.N. Kunzru, Chief Commissioner, Seva Samity Scout Association, and F.G. Pearce, Chief Commissioner, Indian Boy Scouts Associa-

tion, also attended this conference. Dr Mohan Sinha Mehta and Pandit Shriram Bajpai accompanied Dr Kunzru to assist him in the conference. The majority of the participants, however, belonged to the B.P. Association. Dr Annie Besant, the architect of the Indian Scout Association, who also participated in the conference, forcefully explained the point of view of Indian Scouting. The conference unanimously decided to invite the Chief Scout to come to India in order to help in the establishment of a unified organization for Indian Scouting. As a result of this conference, the then Viceroy of India officially extended an invitation to the Founder and the Chief Guide.

In 1923 Colonel Wilson, as Deputy Camp Chief, held the first Wood Badge course in Calcutta. Among the first batch of holders of this Badge were: (1) N.N. Bose; (2) the Rt Rev. R.W. Bryan; (3) Haridas Goswami; (4) K. Zachariah; (5) Mohammed F. Kasim; (6) L.R.W. Jacob; (7) D.M. Lawrence; (8) B.C. Studd; (9) H.E.G. Tate; (10) K.F. Watkinson; (11) D.P. Tamby; and (12) Satta Bose.

This year, *Scouting for Boys in India* was also published. Lord Ronaldshay, the then Governor of Bengal, took a great deal of interest in the promotion of Scouting among Bengali boys. Following the pattern of the King's Scouts, the best qualified Scouts of Bengal were named the Governor's Scouts. Among those who won this distinction were: (1) Amar Bose; (2) Mr Anil Dutt; (3) Ashim Dutt; (4) Biren Bose; (5) Provas De; and (6) Subodh Dutt.

Uttar Pradesh

The rise of Scouting in the then United Provinces (now known as Uttar Pradesh) had a deep impact on Scouting in India. Like other parts of India the need for citizenship training for boys was deeply felt by educationists and other prominent thinking men. As a result sporadic but spontaneous Scout troops sprang up here and there. I should particularly like to mention the group formed in 1918 at the A.P. Mission School, Dehra Dun, with Rev. Ferger as the Scout-master. Later on, when Langley Moon was appointed a full-time Provincial Commissioner, more Scout troops were formed in different parts of the province. These troops were affiliated to the Indian Boy Scouts Association, Madras. Side by side, a small seed

in the form of a boys' group called Bal Sewak Dal was sown in 1913 by Pandit Bajpai at Shahjahanpur; within a short time it grew into a mighty tree and attained to its full stature as the Hindustan Scout Association in 1938. The specific contributions of this organization to Indian Scouting were that although it drew its inspiration from the fundamental principles of the Scout Law and the Promise as laid down by the Founder, in its objectives it was fully in tune with the aspirations of Young India for the attainment of *swaraj* based on the best elements in India's past heritage; and that it provided meaningful idealism to the boys in its fold by encouraging them to participate in the social welfare needs of the country.

While Dr Besant and her friends were agitating in the South for the recognition of the eligibility of Indian boys for enrolment as Scouts in the movement, the matter received deep attention in the North also from prominent educationists and public men of eminence like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Dr Kunzru, Dr Arundale, and others. At the invitation of the Prayag Samiti in 1918, Pandit Bajpai brought his volunteers to the Kumbh Mela at Allahabad. The dedicated services rendered by the group in controlling the crowds and offering assistance to the pilgrims impressed the leaders of the Seva Samity, so much so that both Pandit Malaviya and Dr Kunzru prevailed upon Pandit Bajpai to stay on at Allahabad and organize Scouting through the Seva Samity organization. Thus on 1 December 1918 the Seva Samity Scout Association was inaugurated with its Headquarters at the Seva Samity building at Allahabad. Pandit Malaviya was its first Chief Scout and Dr Kunzru its first Chief Commissioner. Pandit Bajpai was appointed Chief Organizing Commissioner.

The dynamism of Pandit Bajpai and the selfless leadership of Dr Kunzru drew a large number of prominent men and women into the fold of the organization. Besides the service-oriented activities of the Scouts, the emphasis laid on adherence to the traditional and indigenous culture in the programme caught the imagination of the people. Within a few years it became an effective youth movement with troops in other parts of the country affiliated to it.

During his official visit to India the World Chief Scout and the Chief Guide visited Allahabad and witnessed a combined rally of the Indian Boy Scouts Association and the Seva Samity Boy Scouts Association organized in their honour on 5 February 1921. About

one thousand Scouts from all over the United Provinces welcomed the Chief Scout on the grounds of Muir College, Allahabad.

The Chief Commissioner of the Seva Samity Association, Dr Kunzru, accorded a hearty welcome to the Founder in glowing terms. He stressed the importance of keeping the movement out of Government control and official interference. In his reply the Chief Scout assured Dr Kunzru that he also approved of the views held by him, and stressed the importance of the international character of the movement, observing:

We all belong to a human family. Your own poet, Sir Rabindra Nath Tagore, has given out that splendid idea in his lines that God has put men in the world to enjoy kindly nature. We can try and make it a practical proposition by trying to produce [worthy citizens] among the new generations all over the world. Genuine good feeling and sympathy for one another and sincere efforts for making human fellowship will keep them together.

In 1921 Dr Kunzru, as a member of the UP Legislative Assembly put forward a claim on the floor of the House for Government assistance to his association. The then Education Minister, C.Y. Chintamani, accepted the claim pressed by Dr Kunzru and divided equally the annual grant-in-aid of Rs 24,000 between the two Scout organizations operating in the United Provinces. Besides, with the special grant-in-aid sanctioned by the Provincial Government, the Seva Samity Scout Association arranged to send Pandit Bajpai to Gilwell for his Wood Badge training at the International Training Centre. On his way back Pandit Bajpai visited a number of countries in Europe and studied the working of the movement in those places. He revisited these countries in 1929 to renew his old contacts and went over to the United States to study Scouting there.

The Seva Samity Scout Association attracted a number of devoted men to work for the movement. Among those who took a prominent part in building it up were Dr Mehta, Dr D.L. Anand Rao, and Janki Saran Verma. The Seva Samity Scout Association was more popular in the United Provinces than the Boy Scouts Association. By 1935 the number of Scouts in the Association in the United Provinces rose to 38,000.

Bombay

Scouting came to the Bombay Presidency in 1909, but only Euro-

pean and Anglo-Indian boys were eligible for admission into the movement. The oldest troop in India was established at the Bishop, High School, Kirkee, Poona. Thereafter Scouting was introduced in other European schools in Bombay, among which mention may be made of the well-known Cathedral High School.

The Parsee community in Bombay was one of the first sections of Indian society to take full advantage of the university established in Bombay and to adopt Western-oriented higher education through the English medium. Later the newly educated classes fully appreciated the need for citizenship training as a part of the educational system. In 1914, some time in August, a troop by the name of Parsee Scouting Society was formed. It still exists and celebrated its Silver and Golden Jubilees in 1939 and 1964. Commander K.B. Godrej was a member of this troop. The late Rustomji Sethna was its Scoutmaster. Initially, this troop was formed under the auspices of St John's Ambulance. Another group called Dayvadhya Scout Association also came into being. Several other sporadic groups sprang up spontaneously.

The Indian Boy Scouts Association convened a Scout officers' camp in May 1919. The well-organized programme of the camp and the quality of the participants showed the progress and the strength which the Indian Boy Scouts Association had achieved during the last few years. At the end of the camp, an all-India conference was held which passed a resolution pressing for the admission of Indian Scouts into the World Brotherhood of Scouting.

In July 1921 the first meeting of the Provincial Council of the India Boy Scouts Association was held at Government House, Poona, with the Governor, Sir George Lloyd, as President. The Council elected the Governor as their Chief Scout and Sir N. Chandavarkar as the first Provincial Commissioner, and Dr Besant, the Mir of Khairapur, the Maharaja of Kolhapur, and the Maharaja of Navanagar were invited to serve on the Executive Committee of the Association.

Madras

In Madras the newly established university had thrown up a number of English-educated young men and women. They were mostly educationists and professionals full of ideas for all-round advance in society. The presence of the dynamic personality of

Dr Besant in Madras and her prominent part in introducing reforms in every department of life in the country gave additional support and encouragement for these efforts. Naturally, the need for the introduction of Scouting among Indian boys as a measure of citizenship training did not escape the public mind. As a matter of fact, Dr Besant herself took the initiative in creating public opinion not only in Madras but everywhere else in the country, urging the Government to extend all possible help in introducing Scouting among Indian boys. It was under her patronage that the Indian Scout Association was established in Madras which later opened sister associations in a number of provinces. 'She collected a number of devoted workers round her to help her in her task. Among those who took a leading part in these efforts were Pearce, M.V. Venkateswaran, Dr Arundale, V.K. Krishna Menon, and S.V. Kamath.

Under the pressure of public opinion, an association called the Boy Scouts of India was established in 1916, with Lord Pentland, the then Governor of Madras, as the Chief Scout of Madras. J. Vincent was appointed full-time Organizing Commissioner for the Presidency.

Thus two Scout organizations, viz the Boy Scouts Association and the Indian Scout Association, became active in Madras side by side. By 1920, the then Governor of Madras, Lord Willingdon, saw the danger of permitting two associations to work in the field and extended his official pressure on the authorities of the two organizations to bring about a merger. In 1920, under the name of the South India Boy Scouts Association, a new organization comprising the above two associations was formed. This may be recorded as the first successful attempt at merger of Scout associations in India.

Punjab

Like other provinces of India, the Punjab was quick to take up Scouting as a measure of citizenship training for boys. By 1917 Scout troops of Indian boys were formed in several institutions, namely at the Rangmahal Mission School, the Aitchenson School, and the Central Model School at Lahore and the Khalsa Collegiate School at Amritsar. Rev. Ferger took the initiative in introducing Scouting at Lahore and at Ludhiana, whereas at Amritsar the work started under the leadership of Principal E.H. Wathen. Rev. Ferger drew up a scheme similar to Scouting but with a threefold

promise instead of the fourfold. The troops under this new scheme were called "Ailichi" instead of Scouts.

By 1920 under the pressure of public opinion and with sincere help from the then Chief Commissioner, Sir Alfred Pickford, Scout groups under the B.P. system sprang up. With the help of Rev. Ferger, a Scout troop was formed in 1920 at the Christian Boys' Boarding School at Ludhiana. This troop was inspected by the then Education Minister, Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain.

The first Scout training camp was held at Lahore from 14 December 1921 to 24 December 1921. E.W. Hogg of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) ran this course. The Provincial Council for the Punjab was reconstituted with Rev. W.T. Wright as Provincial Commissioner and Hogg as Provincial Secretary. Twenty-eight prominent men from the Punjab were included in the reconstituted Council as its members.

IV

By 1920 the "Imperial" Headquarters changed their attitude towards Indian Scouting with Indian Scouts and Commissioners. It may be inferred that the political reforms introduced in 1919 as a first step towards the attainment of self-government, the pressing demand for the Indianization of the Scout movement, and the growing sensitiveness in the country to the issue of national prestige had induced a change of heart in the men in authority in the United Kingdom and had persuaded them to alter their earlier views. The resolutions passed by the conference held in Calcutta in 1920 hastened this change of heart. The initiative came from the then Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford. He extended an invitation to Lord and Lady Baden-Powell to visit India on a goodwill mission. The Founder and the Chief Guide arrived in Bombay on 28 January 1921 and made an extensive tour of India, covering Bombay, Delhi, Allahabad, Jubbalpur, Lucknow, Ranchi, and Madras. They met all those who had been working to build up Scouting in India against heavy odds. One of the objects of B.P.'s visit was to build up a national organization for all the Scout groups in India which had been formed by different pioneer leaders in different parts of India. After protracted negotiations, the Indian Scout Association headed

by Dr Besant agreed to merge with the Boy Scouts Association in India. This great decision was announced at a special rally held in Madras. Dr Besant was declared Honorary Scout Commissioner for India and was awarded the Silver Wolf in recognition of her services to the movement. The result thus achieved in forging partial unity among Scout groups in India may be recorded as the second successful attempt to achieve this goal of a unified movement.

The amalgamation meeting was held on 19 February 1921 in Madras. The following were present at this meeting: Dr Annie Besant; F. Howard Oakby; A.J. Leech; F.G. Pearce; J. Vincent Mendis; V.K. Krishna Menon; I. Venkata Ramayya; Harold J. Wills; M.V. Venkateswaran; P.A. Subrahmanya Ayyar; G.P. Aryanatha; V.S. Ratnasabhapathy; G.T.J. Thaddaeus; Rev. Geo Wilkins; Sir C.P. Ramaswamy Ayyar; G.V. Subba Rao; Rev. R.C. Hutchinson; Mrs A. Gathrie; S.K. Yajnanarayana Ayyar; C.V. Wrenn; T.V. Nilakantham; and Sir A.D. Pickford. It was agreed that

1. The movement should be regarded as private and non-official.
2. Control should be exercised by the Association as a private organization and not by the Government or its officers as such.
3. The policy of the Association should be to develop a common loyalty to the Empire and to India in all boys, Anglo-Indians and Indians, and as affecting Indians with due regard to Indian ideals and traditions by inculcating in them the desire for service to the motherland and thereby to the Empire, on the basis of the Scout Promise and Law.
4. Administration should be on a provincial basis, while recognizing the desirability of fostering a sense of all-India unity.
5. In the interest of unity and (in so far as it is desirable) uniformity, the provincial organizations should be in touch one with another through the medium and with the assistance of such all-India officers as may be decided upon.
6. It should be the settled policy of the Association to extend the work already partly undertaken to adopt the movement to the needs of India.
7. The Viceroy should be the Chief Scout for India as representative of the King, from whom the Association would receive its Royal Charter of Incorporation.
8. The Governor of a province might be appointed Provincial Chief Scout for the same reason.
9. The Chief Commissioner should be appointed by the "Imperial" Headquarters.
10. There should be a Headquarters Council for India as a representative and advisory body for all India. Its constitution is to be worked out by a special subcommittee to be set up.

11. Provincial councils should be constituted according to local conditions. Their general outlay should be laid down by the subcommittee proposed to be set up.

12. There need be no objection to officers of the Civil Service, the Army, the Railways, the Police, etc. taking up work with the Boy Scouts, so long as they do so in their private capacity.

13. There need be no objection to financial assistance being sought from the Government when needed by a local council, provided that the acceptance does not involve control or direction by the Government.

14. Politics under any pretext should be barred in the Scout Brotherhood.

15. All Scout officers should be required to take the Scout Promise and to carry out and act according to the spirit underlying them in the same way as the boys. Appointments of officers should generally be for a period of one year renewable annually.

16. In relation to Item No. 3 alone, a *Handbook of Scouting for Boys* and a *Wolf Cub Handbook* should be compiled in the vernaculars adapting Scout training more clearly to Indian ideals.

This first visit of B.P. to India can thus be regarded as having paved the way to the foundation of the Scout movement in India. The Seva Samity Scout Association, however, kept out of this merger, as they could not agree to the following points: (i) the form of the Promise; and (ii) the provision in the constitution providing for the appointment of Provincial Governors as *ex officio* Chief Scouts of the provinces concerned.

V

With the amalgamation of the Boy Scouts Association and the Indian Scout Association in India, a new chapter in the history of the Boy Scouts Association was opened. As has already been mentioned, the first instalment of political reforms, known in contemporary Indian history as Montford Reforms, was introduced in 1919. Lord Chelmsford, the then Viceroy of India, had the vision to take several supporting steps to bring about progressive changes in official policy in several other spheres of activities. He indeed proved to be a true friend of Scouting in India by inviting the Chief Scout to this country and thereby helping to remove the then prevailing misunderstanding and give Indian Scouting an official status in the world movement. In this respect, the dynamic leadership of Dr Besant will always be gratefully recorded by every Scout in India. The services rendered by Sir Alfred Pickford in helping to eliminate a

separate organization for European and Anglo-Indian Scouts and in getting all Scouts irrespective of race into a single national movement also deserve to be acknowledged and recognized.

The new status of the Scout movement in India gave a tremendous impetus to it. Sir Alfred was appointed as the First Chief Commissioner. All the provinces elected their Provincial Councils and their local and district associations. The Aims, Policy, Rules, and Organization (APRO) were issued, and in 1921 "the policy of decentralization and establishment of provincial autonomy" was accepted. The membership of the movement went up steadily as will be seen from the statement given below: 1922—15,202; 1924—36,616; 1926—80,887; 1928—1,36,332; 1930—1,55,159; 1932—1,89,762; 1934—2,32,956; and 1935—2,72,853.

After the visit of the Chief Scout, both Sir Alfred and Colonel Wilson went to England and underwent the Wood Badge course at Gilwell. They became the first Dy Camp Chiefs (DCC) in India.

As already mentioned, the first Scoutmasters' course in India under a DCC was organized in Calcutta in 1923, and a similar course was conducted in Madras in the same year. It was also in 1923 that *Scouting for Boys in India* was brought out for the benefit of Indian boys. In this Indian edition, Indian stories and many other features conforming to Indian traditions were included. Even the national song "Vande Mataram" was included in the book.

The first Jamboree was held in 1920 in London. During his visit to India, the World Chief had invited the Indian association to send a contingent to the next International Jamboree to be held in August 1924 on the occasion of the Wembley Exhibition. Several parties from India as well as from the Indians living in the United Kingdom participated in this Jamboree. V.K. Krishna Menon from the then Cochin State was among those who took part in this Jamboree. After attending this Jamboree, the party from Bombay participated in the International Jamboree in Copenhagen. The welcome given there to the Indian contingent and its high standard of performance produced a deep impression on the Scout authorities in India and created the climate and the urge for holding an Indian Jamboree. Under the dynamic leadership of Sir C.P. Ramaswamy Ayyar, Provincial Commissioner in Madras, a Jamboree was organized in Madras in 1926. Four thousand Scouts from Baluchistan, Bangalore, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Ceylon, Cochin, Coorg,

Hyderabad, Kashmir, Madras, Mysore, and Travancore attended this first Indian meet. D.P. Joshi and Dr M.N. Natu were among those who went from Bombay to participate in it.

In 1927, the first All-India Scouters' Conference was held in Delhi, and was opened by Lord Irwin. In this conference it was decided that a national headquarters should be opened in Delhi. Colonel Wilson, who had become the Camp Chief of Gilwell after his retirement from India in 1923, came to India at the invitation of the Boy Scouts Association in November 1933 and stayed on till March 1934. During this period he visited a number of provinces and ran Wood Badge courses at Pachmarhi and also attended the Second All-India Conference held in Delhi from 20 February 1934 to 23 February 1934. This conference also was opened by the then Viceroy, Lord Irwin. Colonel Wilson submitted an exhaustive report containing his recommendations for the reorganization of the general set-up and arrangement for the training of leaders. During his stay he also tried to bring together the Seva Samity Scout Association and the Boy Scouts Association.

In 1935, for the first time, an Indian was nominated as the Chief Commissioner of India, Captain Nawab Sir Muhammad Ahmad Said Khan of Chhatari.

The first Triennial Conference was held on 16 November and 17 November 1937 under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner of India, the Nawab of Chhatari. Two far-reaching resolutions were adopted:

1. That the Boy Scouts Association in India be reconstituted as an independent national organization and an application be made to the International Bureau for affiliation as such; and
2. That Provincial and State Associations should have autonomy except for the necessary control of a Council to be formed to co-ordinate Scout activities in their area and to standardize training.

VI

In order to meet a part of the political demands for self-government made by the people of India under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, India was granted provincial autonomy in 1935. Under this scheme of reforms, almost in every province, popular Governments were formed. Most of the newly elected Education Ministers were in favour

of forming a single national Scout organization. About this time, under the patronage of Bhulabhai Desai and with the co-operation of the Government of Bombay, Dr B.H. Mehta organized a Scout organization called the National Scout Association.

Much confusion was created by the different organizations seeking patronage and assistance from the different Provincial Governments. Besides, the existence of different Scout organizations and competitive loyalties to the Provincial associations threatened to undermine the very basic conceptions underlying the Scout movement. In this context the desire for a united national organization again gained a tremendous accession of strength. This time the Seva Samity Scout Association took the initiative to achieve this end. The First Round Table Conference was convened by them at Allahabad on 28 November and 29 November 1937. The Boy Scouts Association accepted the invitation and was represented by the Nawab of Chhatari and G.T.J. Thaddaeus, General Secretary of the Association.

After prolonged deliberation, the Round Table Conference set up a subcommittee to work out a formula for amalgamation which, it suggested, should again be discussed in the Second Round Table Conference. The subcommittee met on 15 March and 16 March 1938 and made the following recommendations:

A. (1) That we approve of the establishment of one Indian National Scout Organization for the whole of India.

(2) That every Provincial and State Organization should be autonomous in Provincial and State matters, except for the necessary powers of a Central Council to co-ordinate their work and to ensure the observance of the constitution and the rules framed under it.

(3) a. The Association will be a non-official body and will depend on public and State support for carrying out its aims and objects.

b. The Association will be a non-political, non-military, non-denominational, and educative organization. It should not identify itself with any religious sect, social class, or political party.

c. The Association should remain international in spirit and outlook and national in its methods of training.

B. *Resolved* that the name of the Association should be the "Scout Association of India".

C. *Resolved* that the Scout *Promise* should be:

I promise on my honour that I will do my best

1. to do my duty to God, State, and Country;

2. to help other people at all times;

3. to obey the Scout Law.

"Crown" or in Indian State "Maharaja" or "the Ruler of the State" may be

used instead of "State" in the *Promise* as Provincial or State Associations may decide. For Buddhist Scouts the word *religion* can be used for "God".

D. The *Badge*: Fleur-de-lis, with the three-petalled lotus, the exact design to be adopted later on.

The *Motto*: "Be prepared" by making oneself

1. physically strong;
2. mentally awake; and
3. morally straight.

E. The *Flag* shall be 6 ft by 4 ft in size with the Scout emblem in yellow in the centre with dark green background.

F. *Resolved* that a Standing Committee be appointed consisting of the persons of the Conference Subcommittee to draft a constitution and to carry on correspondence with the headquarters of the different Scout Associations in the country with a view to the calling of another representative conference to adopt the new constitution not later than the Easter holidays.

The Second Round Table Conference was convened on 23 April and 24 April 1938 at Allahabad. The Chief Commissioner of the Boy Scouts Association could not agree to the recommendation of the subcommittee with regard to (a) the Name of the Organization; (b) the Promise; (c) the Badge; and (d) the Flag.

He sent round a Private and Confidential Circular letter to all Provincial and State headquarters, urging them to send adequate representation to the proposed conference, so that he might receive the necessary support for the point of view expressed by the Boy Scouts Association. These veiled directions from the Chief Commissioner to the Provincial headquarters were not conducive to the promotion of any agreed solution for an honourable merger. In the event, the Second Round Table Conference only confirmed these apprehensions.

Following the breakdown of the second merger talks, the two other organizations, namely the Seva Samity Scout Association and the Indian National Scout Association of Bombay merged and a new organization under the name of the Hindusthan Scout Association was formed. It developed its own training schemes and established branches in other provinces and states with its headquarters at Allahabad. Dr Kunzru remained the head of the Organization, but it did not receive affiliation to the International Scout Bureau.

Gandhi gave his blessings to the movement at a rally organized by the Hindusthan Scout Association at Wardha in 1938. In his message he said:

I was particularly glad to note that the Khoja Boarding House at Wardha had sent its quota of Scouts to participate in your rally. This is as it should be. Boy Scouts' training has been incorporated into the Wardha scheme of education. It would be nothing worth it if it did not serve to remove all mutual distrust and suspicion and foster among various sections and communities a perfect spirit of *camaraderie* which is an integral part of that scheme, although it is not set down in so many words in the Zakir Husain Committee's Report. The Wardha scheme of education does not aim merely at imparting literacy training to the students; the object is to give an education for life that would answer the needs of our millions. It is calculated to be a living and life-giving experiment. Teachers, who have in their turn to become torch-bearers of this education, have need, therefore, of a broader and wider training, and scoutcraft is an important and useful part of this training.

VII

In November 1938, the Boy Scouts Association received its affiliation to the Boy Scouts International Bureau and in 1940 the Association was registered in India under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860.

The year 1941 was a very sad year not only for the members of the movement but for all those in the world who were anxious to see that the younger generation was brought up on the basis of respect for the fundamental values of life. The movement as conceived and built up by B.P. certainly laid the foundation for this growth. His sudden death in Kenya was a grievous blow to the movement. In his passing away the world lost a great, dynamic, and imaginative leader. After him there was nobody to take his place as the Chief Scout of the World.

The second Triennial Conference of the Boy Scouts Association was held in 1941 with the Nawab of Chhatari in the chair. In 1942 he was succeeded by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru as Chief Commissioner while Vivian Bose succeeded H.W. Hogg as Dy Chief Commissioner. Sir Tej Bahadur and Bose made a very good team and tried their best to bring about a thaw in the hardening attitudes between the two all-India organizations, namely the Hindusthan Scout Association and the Boy Scouts Association in India. Much of the misunderstandings and misgivings were cleared up and the leaders of the two associations began more and more to turn their attention to the irksome problem of bringing the two bodies together without loss of face for either of them.

The third Triennial Conference was held in 1945 with Sir Tej Bahadur in the chair, but because of his failing health he could not attend the fourth Triennial Conference held in 1948. This was presided over by Bose. When Sir Tej Bahadur died on 21 January 1949, Bose succeeded him as Chief Commissioner of India. After the visit of the Cripps mission to India in 1942 it was apparent that a complete change in the political order in India was in the offing. An interim Government was set up in Delhi in 1946 with Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister. In the new climate of opinion in the country, there was hardly any room for argumentation, and it was appreciated by the two bodies that their mutual bickerings and suspicion must come to an end. In free India all must join and work together in all nation-building and constructive activities.

VIII

On 29 May 1948 an informal meeting was convened in Delhi under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. It was presided over by the Education Minister, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. The main item on the agenda of the meeting was the consideration of the steps to be taken for a merger of the two Scout associations, namely the Boy Scouts Association and the Hindusthan Scout Association.

Opening the discussions, Azad stated that soon after he had assumed office he had realized the necessity of having one Scout association for the whole of India. Whatever may have been the reasons for the existence of different organizations in the past, there was no justification whatever for duplication of organization in the political set-up of the country. He also said that he had had discussions with the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, and that Mountbatten was not only anxious for the unification of the two organizations but had also offered his active co-operation in bringing it about. He emphasized that the objectives of the two organizations were the same and that, therefore, there was no reason why they should not unite. In conclusion he stressed that Scout organizations should be free from all taint of political or communal partisanship.

Following a long discussion, the representatives of both the associations unanimously agreed that subject to ratification by their respective national executives, there should be a merger of the two organizations which should be affiliated to the International Bureau

and retain their non-political and non-communal character.

The meeting further decided to set up a small committee with Dr Tarachand, Secretary, Ministry of Education, as chairman and with Commander G.H. Nicholls, Deputy Private Secretary to the Governor-General, as a member to work out the details of the amalgamation. It was decided that this committee should meet on Wednesday, 2 June 1948.

Accordingly, a meeting was held on 2 June at 4 p.m. in the conference room of the Ministry of Education, New Delhi, with Dr Tarachand in the chair and with the representatives of the two Scout organizations and Commander Nicholls. After the principle of amalgamation of the two organizations had been accepted, it was agreed that the new organization should be called Hind Scouts and that it should have a constitution on the following lines:

(a) *General Council.* It will elect office-bearers every year, make rules and regulations, and guide the general policy of the organization.

(b) *Executive Committee.* It will be a small body to carry out the policy of the General Council and will be responsible for the efficient working of the affairs of the organization.

(c) *Officers:* (i) An officer is to be appointed as President or Honorary President of the Council. He will be the head of the organization and will confer honours, titles, etc.

(ii) Chief Commissioner or National Chief Commissioner;

(iii) Deputy Chief Commissioner (one or more);

(iv) An officer in charge of training;

(v) Treasurer;

(vi) National Organizing Commissioner; and

(vii) General Secretary of the Headquarters and one or more Assistant Secretaries.

The aims and objects as laid down in the Memoranda of Association of both the bodies with slight changes were accepted. The Scout Law and Promise were also accepted.

It was agreed that a committee consisting of the following should be formed to draft the constitution of the united organization:

(i) G.T.J. Thaddaeus	}	Boy Scouts
(ii) P.K. Menon		Association

(iii) M.N. Natu	}	Hindusthan Scout
(iv) S.R. Bajpai		Association

This committee was to meet at 9.30 a.m. on 3 June 1948 and

was to present the draft constitution to the chairman at 2.30 p.m. on the same day.

In view of the fact that the Boy Scouts Association was bringing along the Girl Guides Association, the Drafting Committee was asked to frame the new constitution in such a way as to leave the door open for the Girl Guides Association to come in.

It was agreed that the united organization should be affiliated to the International Bureau. The present DCCs were to continue side by side for a period of three years, but they would not hold their warrants from outside India. The two systems of training would continue side by side for a period of three years and Scouts would be permitted to choose during that period whichever system they might like to adopt.

It was also agreed that the Badge of the Hind Scouts would be fleur-de-lis with the Dharma Chakra, the actual design being left to the artist who was to be entrusted with the job.

It was decided that the properties of the two bodies should vest in a trust to be created by the new body in due course and that the two existing organizations should take necessary steps in this regard. It was resolved that the existing paid staff of the two associations should continue on their existing terms for a period of three years.

The following time-table was drawn up for the establishment of the new organization; the Boy Scouts Association to call its Triennial Conference on 28 August and 29 August 1948, the Hindusthan Scout to call its National Council in July 1948, and the two associations to pass resolutions at the above meetings conveying their agreement to merger and to nominate a person each to form the united association with the authority to sign and send the Memorandum of Association to the Registrar, Joint Stock Company, by 15 September 1948.

The Drafting Committee was to provide for an interim organization to carry on the work of the Hind Scouts pending the setting up of the General Council and the Executive Committee in accordance with the rules and regulations of the new organization. It was further decided that the new organization was to come into being with effect from 1 October 1948.

The above small committee met on the following morning at the headquarters of the Boy Scouts Association, Regal Building, New Delhi. Bose, Chief Commissioner, Boy Scouts Association,

also participated in the discussion. The Committee agreed that the first Headquarters Council (Working Committee) of the amalgamated association should consist of the following *ex officio*: (1) Dr H.N. Kunzru, Chief Commissioner; (2) Vivian Bose, Deputy Chief Commissioner; (3) S.R. Bajpai, National Organizing Commissioner; (4) G.T.J. Thaddaeus, General Secretary; (5) Mrs H.C. Captain, Girl Guides Association; (6) nine members elected by the Boy Scouts Association; and (7) nine members elected by the Hindusthan Scout Association.

The Committee also agreed that this body should function as its Executive Committee from the date of the formation of the amalgamated body and that it should continue as such till the end of March 1949, or until the new Working Committee was elected according to the constitution, whichever was later.

Similar provision was decided on for the working of the Provincial or State Scout associations which would function till 31 March 1949.

As regards the provinces or the states where both the associations were functioning, it was decided that the person with the longest period of service in the post should be the Commissioner and that where two persons had equal periods of service in the past, he who had the longest period of Scout service to his credit was to be the Commissioner.

Regarding the decision to retain the paid staff of both the central associations for a period of three years, it was decided that the necessary amount of money should be kept in trust for guaranteeing the payment of salaries and allowances so that there was no inconvenience in the event of their services being terminated before the end of three years. Provinces and states were also advised to make similar provisions for their employees. It was agreed further that if the services of any of the employees were to be terminated for inefficiency or misbehaviour or insubordination, the aggrieved person should have the right to appeal to a *panchayat* of five persons with two persons each nominated by the Boy Scouts Association and the Hindusthan Scout Association and one independent chairman selected by the above four. The *panchayat* was to function for the first three years.

In view of the services rendered by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in the cause of Scouting, the honorary rank of Chief Commissioner was conferred on him for life.

As it was felt that the drafting of the Memorandum and the Articles of Association required more careful thought and work and consultation with a solicitor, it was decided that the work should be continued during the third week of June 1948.

IX

The two associations arranged to convene their supreme bodies in August 1948 to consider the draft agreement as arrived at in May and June as mentioned above. The main hurdle faced by the two associations in obtaining acceptance of the conditions arrived at was in respect of the two systems of training side by side and the bringing of the All India Girl Guides Association into the merged organization. Moreover, many members of the Boy Scouts Association did not approve of the suggested name of Hind Scouts for the united association.

The Hindusthan Scout association held an emergency meeting of their National Council on 22 August 1948 in Delhi. They objected to the provisions in the draft agreement for the merger in respect of training and the guarantee to the existing staff of the right to be retained in service for three years and to the payment of their salaries. They, however, elected the following to represent them in the informal conference which was to be held at Nagpur on 30 August 1948: Dr H.N. Kunzru; Dr M.N. Natu; Mrs Kusum Sayani; Madan Mohan; and R.K. Sidhwa.

The Council also elected the following to serve on the Working Committee for the interim period: Mrs R. Charpurey; Mrs Probha Banerjee; R.K. Sidhwa; Madan Mohan; M.V. Donde; Virdeva Vir; Kanayajee; and Ramanand.

Further the Council authorized the following to sign the application for registration of the united association, viz the Hind Scouts: Dr H.N. Kunzru; S.R. Bajpai; Lala Hansraj Gupta; and Madan Mohan.

The Boy Scouts Association held their fourth Triennial Conference on 30 August 1948 at Nagpur. As the Chief Commissioner, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, was unwell, the Deputy Chief Commissioner, Bose, presided over the meeting. The main business of the conference was to discuss the proposed merger. As already mentioned, representatives from the Provincial Councils expressed their deep

anxiety about the future of Scout training and also of the old members of the staff who had served the organization loyally for so many years. Unfortunately a lot of uncertainty had been created by the overzealous articles written and statements made by some of the leaders of the Hindusthan Scout Association. Bose, however, guided the deliberations very wisely and succeeded in persuading the delegates that the merger was in the best interests of future generations and should be given a fair trial. Dr Kunzru, Pandit Bajpai, and a few of the leaders of the Hindusthan Scout Association met the members of the conference at an informal meeting with Mangal Das Pakvasa, the then Governor of the Central Provinces. On the passing away of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru on 21 January 1949, Bose was appointed Chief Commissioner, and the heavy burden of negotiating the merger and carrying all the members with him fell on his shoulders. One was amazed at his deep faith in the movement, his love for the country, and his sincerity of purpose. It is needless to say that but for him the process of merger would not have been so smooth and quick.

A small Merger Committee was formed to work out the broad principles and other arrangements. It consisted of Dr H.N. Kunzru (Hindusthan Scout Association); Vivian Bose (Boy Scouts Association); and Dr Tarachand (Secretary, Ministry of Education).

It was also decided that Mrs Captain (Chief Commissioner, Girl Guides Association) should be invited to join the committee if the Girl Guides Association so desired.

The first meeting of the Merger Committee was held in Delhi on 9 May 1949 at 4 p.m. at Rashtrapati Bhavan (the President's official residence). The draft constitution of the united organization, Hind Scouts and Guides (now that the Girl Guides Association was considering their joining the new organization, the name "Hind Scouts" was changed to "Hind Scouts and Guides"), was considered. Besides, important decisions with regard to the Promise, Aims, Policy, Rules, and Organization (APRO), the design and the colour of the flag were taken. It was also resolved that the following office-bearers (honorary and salaried) should be appointed for the interim period of three years: Dr H.N. Kunzru, National Commissioner; Vivian Bose, Chief Commissioner (Scouts); Mrs H.C. Captain, Chief Commissioner (Guides); S.R. Bajpai, National Organizing Commissioner; G.T.J. Thaddaeus, Miss Tehmi Asha, and

Mrs C. Mohini, Joint Organizing Commissioners; and J.S. Verma, Honorary Secretary.

Bose informed the committee that an application had been made to the court by his association for setting apart a sum of Rs 180,000 to ensure payment of emoluments for a period of three years.

The second meeting of the Merger Committee was held on 22 October and 23 October 1949 at Nagpur. All the members, including Mrs Captain, were present. The wording of the Promise was finalized at this meeting. It was decided that the Interim Committee was to consist of six from the Hindusthan Scout Association, six from the Boy Scouts Association, and six Guides to be jointly chosen by Dr Kunzru and Mrs Captain. Eight officers, in accordance with an agreed list adopted at the meeting held on 9 May, were to be included among the eighteen members of the Interim Committee. The Committee was to be responsible for the management of the merged body for three years till the new Executive Committee and the new National Council were elected. A Trust Committee consisting of Dr Kunzru, Bose, and Mrs Captain was formed to hold all movable and immovable properties belonging to the three associations. It was also agreed that a sum Rs 180,000 set apart for meeting the salary and emoluments of the paid staff of the headquarters should be held by the Trust Committee and not allowed to remain in the custody of the Council.

X

The third meeting of the Merger Committee was held on 26 December 1949 at Government House, Nagpur, and was attended by Pakvasa, Bose, and Dr Tarachand. The most important decision at this meeting was that the fund held by the Guide Trust should be used only for Guide work.

The question of the type of training to be adopted and other conventions which were borrowed from the International Training Centre and were accepted by all the member countries of the International Bureau of Boy Scouts created a great deal of resentment and suspicion among the veteran leaders of the Boy Scouts Association. Unlike the Girl Guides and Girl Scouts, the member countries acknowledged Gilwell Park as the centre of their training; the pattern of training was the same as laid down by Gilwell;

Honourable Charge for DCCs was also issued by the Camp Chief of Gilwell on the recommendation of the Camp Chiefs of the different countries. Besides, all the DCCs wore the same kind of badge scarf and beads and woggle. It must be admitted that both the Director of the World Bureau and the Camp Chief of Gilwell displayed considerable tact and wisdom and adopted a flexible attitude towards the points and thus made it easy for the Indian associations to merge and work together. In reply to a letter, No. 5218 dated 29 October 1948, from Commander K.B. Godrej, the then Director of the World Bureau, Colonel Wilson wrote on 5 November 1948:

Para six requires a reply so far as the modifications for wood badge training are concerned. I say at once that I see no reason to object to these since a certain amount of latitude must be allowed in order to meet conditions and prejudices, however hypothetical the latter may be.

I give the following specific answers to the various points raised by you:

There is no objection to the use of the term "Himalayan Wood Badge"—I am glad to hear that the Gilwell scarf and woggle has been accepted without any modification or change. I naturally regret the desire and decision to alter the wood badge beads as such, since by doing so India departs from the insignia which is internationally recognised and approved. However, this departure does not affect the training as such in any way, nor does it affect the holders of the Wood and . . . substitute a blue cord for the leather thong that is solely their concern. I note with pleasure, however, that as is usually the case, those scouts who already hold the wood badge will be permitted to retain the beads originally granted to them.

I have a feeling that, in the course of time, the movement in India will itself wish to do away with the difference now suggested.

Colonel Wilson was right in his assessment of the situation. In 1959 the Bharat Scouts and Guides accepted the Wood Badge training of Gilwell. They also adopted the pattern of beads though made locally and changed the colour of the cord to black. The universal pattern of the leather thong has not yet been accepted, maybe because of the cost of the thong.

XI

At a meeting of the Headquarters Council held on 12 February 1950 at Nagpur, with Bose in the chair, it was resolved that the fifth Triennial Conference of the Boy Scouts Association should be held

on 16 April 1950 at Nagpur to consider whether there should be any amalgamation or not, and to summon the second meeting of the conference to confirm the proceedings of the first on 12 May 1950. It was not easy for Bose to get the resolution processed through the two conferences as there was a section of old leaders who did not like some of the provisions of the merger agreement. But Bose had the loyal support of a number of other leaders, e.g. Sardar Hardial Singh, Saroj Ghosh, Dr M.N. Zutshi, Shyam Sundar Sharma, and Hidayatullah. The resolution was successfully passed by the two consecutive conferences. The application for transfer of funds belonging to the Boy Scouts Association came up before the court on 6 October 1950 and the merger was effected on 7 November 1950. The Girl Guides Association did not come in as they were not satisfied with the result of the negotiations in respect of the direction of their General Council held at Lucknow from 23 February to 25 February 1950, which was as follows:

The General Council of the Girl Guides Association, India, agrees to the proposed merger with the Hindusthan Scout Association and with a view to give equal opportunities and suitable training to the girls, unanimously resolves to merge, provided that

1. The administration and training of the girls be in the hands of women both at the centre and in the states, with a woman National Organising Commissioner working under a woman Chief Commissioner. The former shall be responsible to the National Commissioner only through the woman Chief Commissioner.

2. A woman be eligible for the office of the National Commissioner.

The news of the agreement for merger of the Scout associations reached London. Lord Mountbatten was then holding the high position of the Fourth Sea Lord of the British Admiralty and in a letter to Bose on 24 October 1950, he said:

As you know I fully recognised in 1948 the necessity for this Merger in the new independent India, and I then offered my active co-operation to the Minister of Education to bring this about. The Boy Scouts Association in India has for 40 years done magnificent work in India in all civic fields, and as Ex-Chief Scout of the organisation and as Commodore of the Sea Scouts of Great Britain I congratulate all of you on the grand work you have done.

I am sure that this good work will continue in the New India in the wider sphere of endeavour which will result from the merger, and I wish you all very good fortune in the future.

At the time of the registration of the united association the proposed name of the new body was changed from "Hind Scouts and Guides" to "Bharat Scouts and Guides". The word *Hind* was objected to by several members of the Boy Scouts Association as it appeared to be too close to the name of one of the two constituent bodies. Besides, the old name might appear to others that the organization was controlled by the majority Hindu community. For all these reasons, the name "Indian Scouts and Guides" was suggested, but again it was thought that this name might appear too close to the name of the other constituent association.

Immediately after the Triennial Conference of the Boy Scouts Association on 28 August and 29 August 1948 at Nagpur, a meeting was convened by Pakvasa, then Governor of the Central Provinces, on 31 August.

The following attended the meeting:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|---|------------------------|
| 1. Commander K.B. Godrej |) | |
| 2. G.T.J. Thaddaeus |) | Representatives of the |
| 3. Dan Mal Mathur |) | Boy Scouts Association |
| 4. Ram Swaroop Dhiman |) | |
| 5. H.N. Kunzru |) | |
| 6. S.R. Bajpai |) | |
| 7. R.K. Sidhwa |) | Representatives of the |
| 8. Mrs Jusum Sahai |) | Hindusthan Scout |
| 9. Madan Mohan |) | Association |
| 10. M.N. Natu |) | |
| 11. K.G. Vaidyanathan |) | |
| 12. Shrujat |) | |
| 13. D.P. Joshi |) | |

At this meeting far-reaching decisions were taken to ensure smooth merger according to the agreement arrived at earlier.

In the Constitution of India, the name *Bharat* as an alternative name for India had been accepted. So it was agreed that the new organization should be registered under the name of "the Bharat Scouts and Guides." I wish the name *India* had been retained, for in international gatherings it is difficult to make other countries understand that the Bharat Scouts and Guides is the Scout Organization of India. No appreciable benefit has been gained by changing *India* for *Bharat*.

Meanwhile negotiations with the Girl Guides Association continued. As a result of the relentless efforts of the chairman of the Merger Committee and the gentleman's assurance given by Dr H.N. Kunzru, the then National Commissioner of the Bharat Scouts and Guides, the Girl Guides Association finally merged with the Bharat Scouts and Guides on 15 August 1951.

As agreed upon, the work of the organization for the interim period of three years from 7 November 1950 to the end of October 1953 was carried on by an Interim Committee. During this period the Expert Committee, which had been appointed by the Merger Committee, drafted the detailed rules and regulations for the conduct of the business of the association in regard to its APRO. The work of the committee was carried on by the same subcommittee which had been appointed on 2 June 1948 to draft the constitution of the combined association. Now that the All India Girl Guides Association agreed to merge with the new organization, the following additional members were co-opted in the committee:

Miss S.B. Rustomjee) Representatives of the All-India
Miss T.P. Asha) Girl Guides Association
Mrs C. Mohini) Representative of the Guide Sec-
) tion of the Hindusthan Scout
) Association

The first meeting of the National Council of the Bharat Scouts and Guides was held in Delhi on 31 October and 1 November 1953. Pakvasa was elected as the first President of the new association. Those who had worked as office-bearers during the interim period were elected as office-bearers of the newly constituted body. As no settlement had been arrived at on future policy about Scout training at the time of merger, no Camp Chief was appointed. Later on, however, with the agreement of the person concerned, Sardar Hardial Singh was appointed as the first Camp Chief of India on 27 March 1954, and he continued to hold this position till April 1957.

XII

The work of the interim period suffered to some extent from mutual suspicions and mental reservations, but these teething troubles

were gradually overcome by wise and skilful guidance and leadership at the top. In this respect two names should be particularly mentioned. The contributions of these two leaders helped to iron out many misunderstandings in the initial period. At the risk of losing his popularity among the members of his old association, Bose gave his whole-hearted support to Dr Kunzru in working out the details of the administration and of future policy. But for his sincere love for the movement, the efforts at creating a unified national organization would have come to nothing. Pakvasa also worked as a peace-maker and helped to bring about an amicable understanding between the new establishment and the old. Unfortunately, however, a few members of the Boy Scouts Association mostly belonging to the Delhi State left the new association in 1952 and formed another organization called the All India Boy Scouts Association. They sought the co-operation of the Nawab of Chhatari and appointed him as the Chief Scout of India for their newly formed organization.

The Scout/Guide movement is for the welfare of our boys and girls. Separatist ideas, whatever may be the provocation for them, are alien to the spirit of Scouting. When, after many decades, some basis for working together had been found, it was the duty of every Scout and Guide to give the leaders of the movement full support and a fair chance to forge and fashion a strong national movement. The writer does not propose to go into the details of the misunderstanding which led to the formation of the new body so soon after the merger but shares the hope of the leaders of the Bharat Scouts and Guides that our dissident friends will come back to the national movement and add further strength to the Bharat Scouts and Guides which has already emerged as a strong national association for India with about a million members, based on strictly non-political and non-sectarian principles and enjoying widespread public support and confidence. The Bharat Scouts and Guides is the only organization which is recognized by the Government of India and the State Governments. It is also the only organization which is affiliated to and recognized by world bodies, viz the World Association of Boy Scouts and the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts. Although the All India Boy Scouts Association was not recognized by the World Association of Boy Scouts, they got in touch with the national associations of different coun-

tries on their own and thus created a great deal of confusion. In order to deal with this unhappy situation, the Director of the World Bureau of the World Association of Boy Scouts, Major General D.C. Spry, sent round a general circular letter to the national associations of its member countries explaining the relation between the Bharat Scouts and Guides and the World Bureau and also its stand in respect of the splinter group, viz the All-India Boy Scouts Association. The copy of this circular is as follows:

Boy Scouts International Bureau

Circular No. 25 of 1956

15th October, 1956

132 Ebury Street,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

My dear Colleague,

The All-India Boy Scouts Association

1. Following the independence of India in 1947 it was agreed by all the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides Organisations then in existence to merge and form a single National Scout & Guide Movement. In 1950 the merger was ratified by all parties and the Bharat Scouts & Guides became the sole organisation for Scouting and Guiding. It was registered under the Societies Registration Act and continues to be the sole Organisation for Scouting and Guiding which holds the approval of the Central and State Governments of India. In December 1950 the International recognition of our former member Association was transferred by the International Conference to the Scout section of the Bharat Scouts & Guides. (Our circular No. 40 of 1950 refers.)

2. In 1952 a few people broke away from this National Movement and have since set up a dissident Scout Organisation, the All-India Boy Scouts Association, with its Headquarters at 7, Jangpura 'B', Mathura Road, New Delhi. This body is not internationally recognised nor affiliated in any way to our member organisation in India, the Bharat Scouts & Guides. It is not recognised by the Central or State Governments. The dissident body is known to be sending correspondence and magazines to other countries and to be soliciting messages.

3. You are therefore asked:

- (a) Not to carry on correspondence with the All-India Association;
- (b) In cases of doubt please refer back any requests you may receive from India to the National Headquarters of the Bharat Scouts & Guides (Resolution 16/51),
- (c) If any Scout from India visits your Association please insist that he produces the standard form of International Letter of Introduction (Resolution 17/47).

4. We must also make it plain that neither Gilwell Park nor the International Bureau recognise Mr. A S. Virley as a member of the International Gilwell Training Team nor can any training course certificates issued by him, or by any other member of the All-India B.S.A. previously appointed by Gilwell, be accepted as valid by any other Association or us. (Resolution 7/55).

Yours sincerely,
Sd/—D.C. SPRY,
Director

XIII

The first big official event held after the merger on an all India basis was the Scouters' and Guiders' conference held in October 1952. This conference was attended by the World Directors, Dame Leslie G. Whateley, and Colonel Wilson. The conference was opened by the then President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, on 27 October 1952 and was held at the camp site near Humayun's Tomb, New Delhi. The conference was addressed by Nehru on 29 October. The conference was a great success. Pandit Bajpai worked relentlessly to make the conference a success.

The Scout and Guide movement stands out from other youth welfare programmes because of its very well-thought-out training schemes. The merger was brought about on the understanding that the systems of training devised by the Boy Scouts Association and the Hindusthan Scout Association would remain in force till a unified system of training was worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned. The training conference of the DCCs was held at the Punjab State Training Centre at Taradevi, Simla, from 27 May to 3 June 1954. The second meeting was held at Pachmarhi from 26 December to 31 December 1954. Both the conferences were sponsored by the then Chief Commissioner (Scouts), Bose, who took great pains to make them a success. A draft scheme of training was prepared and a major decision was taken to recommend to the National Executive Committee to take suitable steps for the establishment of a National Training Centre. An *ad hoc* committee with Dr Kunzru, the then National Commissioner, as chairman was formed to explore a suitable site for this purpose. Both Dr Kunzru and Bose worked relentlessly and negotiated for a big area of about fifty-five acres at Pachmarhi for setting up the training centre. The Bharat Scouts and Guides will remain ever grateful

to Pakvasa, the then Governor of Madhya Pradesh, and to the late Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, the then Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, for their help and co-operation in obtaining this area as a gift to them and also for a handsome donation of Rs 45,000 from the Kirorimal Trust towards the setting up of an administrative block on this site. The Girl Guides Association had with them a sum of Rs 68,000 for a training centre for their own organization. They had raised this sum in the name of the Founder after his death, and had decided to dedicate to him a building to be constructed out of this fund. After the merger, the Trustees of the Girl Guides funds decided that the B.P. Memorial House should be built at the common training centre at Pachmarhi. In due course, the amount was handed over to the Bharat Scouts and Guides with the request that the building constructed out of this fund should be named B.P. Memorial Guide Bhawan. The Trustees of the Girl Guides Association also agreed that this house would remain open also for the use of the Scout section, but understandably the Guide section would receive preference for accommodation.

The foundation-stone of the B.P. Memorial Guide Bhawan and other ancillary structures was laid by the then President of India, Dr Prasad, on 10 September 1956. The master plan of the training centre was prepared by Poke, an eminent American architect and a friend of the Boses. The detailed plan and execution of the project was subsequently entrusted to an architect firm, Messrs Master Sathe and Kothari. The cost of the project was estimated at Rs 500,000. The Government of India very generously agreed to contribute seventy-five per cent of the estimated cost, provided the Bharat Scouts and Guides raised the balance of twenty-five per cent. On the recommendation of the then National Commissioner, Dr Kunzru, it was decided that the construction work should be executed departmentally. In the meantime the part-time Hony Camp Chief, Sardar Hardial Singh, was replaced by a whole-time Camp Chief, J.I. Muthiah, from 18 April 1957. He was posted at Pachmarhi to look after the property acquired by the Bharat Scouts and Guides for the National Training Centre, and also to run training camps according to the scheduled programme. For various reasons the construction work at Pachmarhi could not be carried out very smoothly, and it was only in 1961 that the three major blocks (viz the Guide Bhawan, the Administrative Block,

and the Multi-Purpose Hall) were completed. Lady Baden-Powell, the World Chief for Guides, visited India at the invitation of the Bharat Scouts and Guides towards the end of 1960. On 22 February 1961, before a gathering of top Scout and Guide leaders from all over India, she opened the B.P. Memorial Guide Bhawan and the other buildings at this centre. The establishment of a National Training Centre will remain a landmark in the history of Scouting and Guiding and signifies the maturity of the movement and its continuing progress towards self-sufficiency.

Through the wise and bold leadership of Bose in 1958, when he was the National Commissioner of the Bharat Scouts and Guides, the National Executive Committee accepted the Gilwell Training Scheme as the basis of the future training policy. It has already been mentioned earlier that unlike the Guide section, all national associations of Scouts in different member countries of the World Association of Boy Scouts had accepted the Gilwell Training Scheme as the basis of their training methods and policies. The member countries, however, were free to adopt their own programmes and test work according to their country's traditions and culture. India would have remained away from the general stream of Scout training if it had not accepted what all other countries of the world had done. This mature decision and the establishment of the National Training Centre at Pachmarhi helped the Bharat Scouts and Guides to become one of the leading Scout organizations in the world.

The Bharat Scouts and Guides has taken its rightful place in the world of Scouting. The Boy Scouts Association had established its reputation at the world level by their participation in world conferences and Jamborees. Although the Hindusthan Scout Association was not a member of the World Association of Boy Scouts, many top leaders, such as Pandit Bajpai, Dr Mehta, Joshi, and others, had received their training at Gilwell. Above all, the reputation of their selfless, noble National Commissioner, Dr Kunzru, gave the organization additional weight nationally and internationally. Besides, Bose was elected as a member of the World Committee in September 1947 in his personal capacity and served on the committee till August 1949. This was the first time that an Indian had the honour of holding a high office in the world of Scouting. Moreover, the visit of two successive serving World

Directors, Colonel Wilson in 1952 and his successor, Major General Spry, in 1956, helped the newly created Bharat Scouts and Guides to establish close relations with the World Bureau.

The Sixteenth World Conference held in the United Kingdom accepted the invitation of the Bharat Scouts and Guides to hold their Seventeenth World Conference in India in 1959. This was the first time that a world conference on Scouting was to be held in Asia. The Bharat Scouts and Guides knew the magnitude of the responsibility they had accepted. The prestige of Asia was involved inasmuch as this was the first time that a world gathering on Scouting was to be held in this part of the world, and many had their doubts about the capacity of the Bharat Scouts and Guides to organize it successfully. The National Executive entrusted the responsibility for organizing this conference to a small organizing committee presided over by a woman Commissioner, Mrs Lakshmi Mazumdar. Many eyebrows were raised at a woman being in charge of this work for men. It was no small pride to the Bharat Scouts and Guides that the arrangements and organization for the conference were perfect. A large number of delegates from all over the world came to participate in the conference, which was opened by Nehru on 29 July 1959 in the main hall of Vigyan Bhawan before a large gathering of the *élite* of the Capital. He made one of his most brilliant and thought-provoking speeches, which is still remembered and freely quoted in the member countries of the world. Mrs Mazumdar worked relentlessly to discharge her great responsibility. Much of her success depended on the trust and confidence which was extended to her by the then National Commissioner, Bose. She was given a free hand to seek help and co-operation from everybody concerned, and there was no interference from the establishment in her day-to-day work. The successful organization of this world conference in India achieved two valuable results, namely the international recognition of the capacity and standard of Indian Scouting and secondly the acknowledgement of the success of a joint movement. The perfect co-operation between the Scout and Guide sections and the interdependence of the two on equal terms showed to the world the measures of benefit which could be achieved by bringing the two sections of the movement closer to each other.

While Dr Kunzru was the National Commissioner, he had nego-

tiated for a plot of land in Delhi for the construction of the National Headquarters building of the Bharat Scouts and Guides. After the merger the new associations continued to occupy the old Headquarters located in a small three-roomed flat on Parliament Street which was wholly inadequate for the increasing work of the two sections. There was not a single room in it which was large enough to accommodate the National Executive Committee in full session. For the meetings of the National Council, special *ad hoc* arrangements had to be made in other places. Besides, there was no place where a visiting Commissioner or any other member of the organization coming from other States could be offered some accommodation. Through the good offices of the then Ministry of Works and Housing, a piece of land measuring half an acre was allotted to the Bharat Scouts and Guides. Unfortunately, for want of funds, this plot could not be taken possession of, and at the National Council meeting held in Madras in 1957, it was reported that the allotment letter would be withdrawn by the Government if the price for the piece of land was not deposited with the Government within six months. Mrs Lakshmi Menon, a co-opted member of the Council, spoke very forcefully at the meeting and urged the State associations to contribute at least one thousand rupees each for this purpose so that the land might be acquired by the Bharat Scouts and Guides. A small committee was formed, with Mrs Menon as chairman, to collect funds for the Headquarters. Through her effort seventeen States paid their promised quota, and the land was acquired from the Government. But the construction of the Headquarters could not advance further as there was hardly any attempt at raising funds from the public. The Government of India was prepared to sanction an adequate grant-in-aid for the construction of a suitable building on condition that the association raised a sizable matching sum. The National Executive appointed two subcommittees, one for fund-raising and the other for building construction. Mrs Mazumdar was invited to be chairman of both these committees. On 12 October 1961, Dr S. Radhakrishnan, the then Vice-President of India, laid the foundation-stone of the building. Mrs Mazumdar visited all the big cities of India at her own expense to collect funds from business houses, trusts, and the general public. She also succeeded in enlisting the interest of the

hearted co-operation in her fund drive. With the generous help of the Government and the contributions received from the general public in cash and kind, the dream of building a national home for the Scouts and Guides came true. The building was constructed within the record time of eleven months and was formally opened by Dr. Zakir Husain, the then Vice-President of India, on 31 January 1963.

The establishment of a National Training Centre at Pachmarhi was the first step for the onward progress of the Bharat Scouts and Guides. The construction of a National Headquarters building was another step forward. A national home with modern physical facilities gave the Bharat Scouts and Guides a status in the eyes of the general public in India and abroad. Besides, it removed a long-felt want of the Bharat Scouts and Guides, and provided it with the essential facilities needed for running a national organization with international affiliation.

After the merger in 1950, Dr Kunzru had been elected as the National Commissioner, and he held office till 1957. When he voluntarily retired and the National Council elected Bose as his successor, unfortunately some of his colleagues did not like this change and did not give Bose their full co-operation in his work. This attitude became more obvious when Bose was obliged to replace the then serving National Secretary and appoint another in his place. The position of Bose became so difficult that he felt that he could not continue as National Commissioner any longer. He, therefore, resigned his office in November 1959. This was a dark episode in the history of Scouting in India. Much of the goodwill which had been created for Indian Scouting inside the country and abroad was dissipated by this regrettable incident. Madan Mohan, Chief Commissioner (Scouts), was appointed to act in his place till the next election was held in 1960, when Dr Kunzru was re-elected unanimously as National Commissioner.

The writer would not like to pursue the story of the growth and development of Indian Scouting at much length beyond 1960 inasmuch as she has been directly concerned with the organization and working of Scouts and Guides since this year. As she was a close witness to the happenings in the post-merger period and has been closely involved in the developments that have taken place in recent years, it will be more appropriate for her to relate the

rest of the story when she relinquishes her office as National Commissioner of the Bharat Scouts and Guides.

Looking back on the period from 1960 onwards one is struck by the fact that this year marks the beginning of a new chapter in our history. The shock given to the movement by the premature resignation of Bose and the inclusion of seven Railways as State branches in 1959, a step taken by Bose before his resignation, changed the atmosphere and to some extent the character of the National Council. Although the merger was accomplished in 1950, the two constituent bodies could not forget their old loyalties. As a result every major step taken by the leaders was for quite some time regarded with unjustified suspicion. The members of the Fourth National Council consisted not only of the representatives of the territorial State branches but also of a large number of members from the Railways who were not committed to any of the older camps. The effect of this change was reflected in the election of the leaders in 1960. Yet the hang-over of the past and the serious illness of Dr Kunzru prevented the emergence of the requisite and open-hearted co-operation between the top leaders at the National Headquarters, notwithstanding the fact that the overhanging clouds began slowly to clear after 1960. In this respect the sacrifice which Bose made for the Bharat Scout and Guides and his wise step to offset the clan spirit of the two older camps will go down in history as a most significant contribution towards the preservation of the spirit of the merger.

Whatever may have been the unfortunate effects of the misunderstanding between the two old groups in the Scout section of the movement, the combined organization of the Bharat Scouts and Guides was based essentially on sound foundations. The immediate effect of the merger was that the movement became much more broad-based than before, and the programmes for the boys and girls were also reoriented so as to meet the needs of the present generation. The successive all-India Jamborees held in 1953, 1956, 1960, and 1964 brought about increased integration among the members of the different State associations and raised the standards of Scouting and Guiding. The three main branches of the merger, namely cub-bulbul, the scout-guide, and the rover-ranger, received full attention and made rapid progress. Besides the other branches, namely the sea-scout, the air-scout, and the handicapped scout.

were also developed. After much effort in 1960, Mrs Mazumdar succeeded in persuading the President of India to be the Patron-in-Chief of the Bharat Scouts and Guides. The President also very graciously agreed that the best Scouts and Guides of a year should have the distinction of being called the President's Scouts and the President's Guides.

It will be no exaggerated claim to make in the year 1967 that the Bharat Scouts and Guides constitutes the only distinctive national youth welfare organization organized on a voluntary basis and based on non-political and non-sectarian principles and provides an all-India platform for a million boys and girls of free India. They have voluntarily taken the promise to do their best to serve their country, to remain faithful to God, to help other people, and to obey the ten basic laws of the movement so as to be worthy citizens of India and of the world. Through the practical programmes of test work, the edge of their natural aptitudes and talents is constantly sharpened, and through the Promise and the Law the young hearts are charged with a sense of practical idealism, which is the surest guarantee against parochial chauvinism that breeds discords and conflicts. In this great work for the young, forty-five thousand adult leaders have enlisted themselves as scouters, guiders, and commissioners, and have offered their voluntary service ungrudgingly for the fulfilment of this great responsibility. For generations we would remain grateful to the Founder for evolving such a method of training for the young and for helping them to grow up into purposeful human beings. This movement came to India along with many other ideas from the world outside. Today, on the eightieth birth anniversary of our beloved leader, Dr H.N. Kunzru, we bow to him for his contributions to the growth and development of the movement for nearly half a century of his crowded life.

31 March 1967

M.S. GORE

SOME PROBLEMS OF EDUCATED YOUTH IN INDIA

IN A PURELY PHYSICAL SENSE, youth, as a stage beginning with the onset of adolescence and ending with the attainment of full physical maturity, characterizes human beings in all societies. But youth is more than a biological phenomenon. It has complex social and psychological correlates. These latter vary a great deal from one society to another. Not every society clearly identifies and separates the stage of youth from childhood on the one hand and from adulthood on the other. In some of the primitive societies youth is recognized as a category, and young men and women in their early youth and prior to marriage are separated out as a group with their special pattern of social life. This, however, is not true of all primitive societies and is much less true of the peasant, agrarian societies. In peasant societies the movement from childhood to adulthood takes place inconspicuously from the social point of view though physically as well as psychologically the adolescent individual must experience changes and problems. The youth rôle is not institutionalized to the same degree as the child and adult rôles are.

YOUTH AS A SOCIAL CATEGORY

This may be said to be equally true of Indian society though the Indian concept of *ashramas* provides for the stage of *brahmacharya*, which could coincide with the stage of youth. However, it is doubtful whether and how far the concept of *ashramas* really ruled the life of the rural peasantry. It cannot be seriously argued that the emphasis on discipline, study, and preparation which is characteristic of *brahmacharya* had the same relevance for all sections of the

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population as it had for the ruling and priestly castes. The practice of hereditary occupations within the home did not require prolonged periods of learning and discipline which would have separated from the period of adult responsibilities.

Besides, in the case of women, the concept of *ashramas* was probably not applicable at all. Young girls, who were generally married when they were eight or ten years of age, took on their adult rôles in a physical and social sense soon after they had attained puberty. They were mothers by the age of sixteen and usually grandmothers between the ages of thirty-five and forty. Youth as a socially recognized period separating the pre-adolescent girl from the adult woman did not exist.

It is only in industrial-urban societies that youth emerges as a separate, identifiable stage in the life of an individual. An important consequence of industrialization has been the separation of the occupational functions from the functions of the domestic, family group. This has also meant a change in the manner of entry to different occupations. In industrial-urban societies young persons do not inherit their occupations from their parents, but have to choose an occupation consciously and seek an entry into it. With technological advance the entry into any occupation requires a certain measure of preparation and training. The higher the occupation in terms of the status system, the longer the period of preparation required for it. Even otherwise entry into industrial jobs today calls for seven to ten years of schooling from the age of six to the age of fourteen or sixteen. The special preparation for the job may form a part of this general education or may have to be provided additionally. In the case of those who wish to take up white-collared jobs the period of preparation is extended by another six to seven years and, in some cases, by another ten to twelve years. Thus industrial-urban societies have at any time a section of their population which has outgrown the stage of childhood and is not yet ready to take on the adult responsibilities of earning one's own livelihood or setting up and maintaining a family. The size or proportion of this population varies a great deal depending upon demographic, economic, and social factors; but, generally, industrial societies are likely to have a larger proportion of such individuals than non-industrial societies, and the urban segments are likely to have a larger proportion of such persons than the rural segments.

India had in 1961 a total population of 73.2 million between the age of fifteen and the age of twenty-four. This was approximately 16.63 per cent of the total population of the country. Of this number about 58.3 million lived in the rural areas and 14.9 million in the urban areas. But whereas in the rural areas the 58.3 million youth constituted 16.21 per cent of the rural population, the urban youth were 18.84 per cent of the urban population.

The employment status figures for 1961 are available for the age group 15-34, but not for the age group 15-24. These employment figures are not available at present for the country as a whole, but only for about thirteen States. Using the available figures for urban as well as rural areas it is seen that the average percentage of the rural, employed *male* youth for these thirteen States is 90.45 and the corresponding urban average is 76.57. Thus, whereas the percentage of the rural male youth (14-34) who are not in the "employed" category is only 9.35, the corresponding percentage for the urban male youth is 23.43. The employment data for women are not considered here because traditionally the middle-class woman is not expected to be employed and consequently the proportion of unemployed women is much larger in the rural as well as urban areas.

The separation of occupation from the kin-group and the emergence of formal economic organizations is accompanied by another consequence. Increasingly in the industrial-urban sector of the economy a larger proportion of the population has the status of being employees than of being self-employed. Their entry into work life depends not only on whether they are willing and able to work but on whether there are organized opportunities for employment. This means that individuals have to depend on persons other than themselves and situations not subject to their control to gain entry to the occupational world. It also means that the distinction between the status of being employed or unemployed is sharper and more easily made in the urban, industrial segment of the economy than in the rural, agrarian segment. In the rural, agrarian economy where individuals are employed in household industry or participate in cultivating family land, it is difficult to classify individuals as being employed, unemployed, or partially employed. In the urban, industrial economy, where individuals have to be formally recruited to a job and paid for it, there is little scope for ambiguity.

LATER AGE OF MARRIAGE

From the sociological point of view the attainment of physical maturity and the non-attainment of adult social status which depends largely upon the individual earning his own livelihood and supporting a family—are two of the important attributes of the youth rôle. From these attributes may be derived several other social and psychological correlates of the youth rôle.

To begin with, the attainment of physical maturity and the lack of opportunity for the legitimate fulfilment of the sex urge impose a strain on the individual. In the village society of India, this problem did not arise since the consummation of marriage coincided with the attainment of physical maturity. The postponement of the age of marriage—characteristic of the urban, educated section of the population—gives rise to certain anxieties. The uneducated youth who enter upon work life at the age of eighteen, or those who marry early in the socially supported belief that the support of a wife is the responsibility of the entire family and not individually of the young husband, escape some of this anxiety and frustration.

There is a clear rural-urban variation in the marital status of youth. For the country as a whole 61.31 per cent of the population of 15-24 years of age was married according to the 1961 census. For the rural areas this percentage was 65.05 and for the urban areas it was 46.68.

The anxiety is further accentuated by the culturally borrowed, though not uniformly borrowed, norm of marriage by choice. The educated young man or woman whose marriage has been postponed is also specially susceptible to this new norm. The books that he reads and the films that he sees emphasize the “romantic” complex in marriage and make a “marriage by choice” seem more desirable than an “arranged marriage”. Though, in fact, most marriages—even among the educated—are still arranged by the family, the growing expectation among the peer-group that marriage should follow the independent choice of the marrying individuals increases the anxiety and a lurking sense of inadequacy among the young.

CONTINUED DEPENDENCE

Another socio-psychological correlate of the youth rôle—particularly among the student youth—is the continued dependence on the parent for material support. In the more industrialized countries with their fuller employment opportunities, young persons can look for part-time and occasional employment. Although these jobs do not pay fully towards their support and education, it gives them the feeling of partial independence as well as participation in the adult economic world. In India, and probably in all developing countries, the opportunity for such employment does not exist. The sense of individual inadequacy that would normally accompany the prolonged dependence upon one's parents is minimized by the continuance of joint-family norms where dependence upon the family of orientation is culturally supported. However, in the very situation of prolonged dependence there is potential for a sense of anxiety and guilt.

From another point of view continued dependence on parents or guardians even beyond the attainment of social maturity can also give rise to conflict and resentment. The experience of having to go and seek permission and funds for going to a picture or a hotel or for a trip with friends is often resented by the young. Where the young person studies in a college and lives in a hostel he enjoys a greater degree of freedom, but where he continues to live in the family while attending college he may feel more restricted and controlled in his actions.

In the case of uneducated or non-student youth the problem of continued economic dependence is minimized, but even here there is a difference between the rural and the urban youth. In the rural areas the young male has a sense of participation in economic life even as early as the age of fourteen or fifteen. He can work with other members of his family whether it is on a farm or in a village craft. He may or may not be fully employed, but he has no sense of being unemployed or of being outside the adult economic world. In urban areas the opportunities for employment in the organized sector of the economy are not available for persons below the age of eighteen. Their education on the other hand may be over as early as the age of eleven—assuming they have completed the period of compulsory primary education. This means that in the case of

the non-student urban youth as well there may be a period of about three years—between the age of fifteen and the age of eighteen—during which they are neither in schools nor in jobs. They share, therefore, in some measure the uncertainties of the youth rôle which have been described above for the student youth.

CHOICE OF EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

Two other major sources of strain for the student youth are the educational and the occupational systems of modern industrial societies. The two systems are interlinked since the entry to the occupational system is, in the case of the student youth, conditioned by their choice and performance in the educational system. The strain arises because of the difficulties involved in making the choice and later in exercising the choice. The difficulty in making the choice is related to three factors—the student's young age and inexperience, the lack of information on the different possibilities from which he has to choose, and the lack of adequate information on the implications of an educational choice that he may make for his subsequent occupational career. With increasing specialization in the different branches of knowledge, the student is being called upon to make an early choice of the group of subjects he would study. In the thirties he was required to make his choice after he had spent a year at college; in the forties and fifties he had to make the choice at the point of entry into college. He is now called upon to make that choice while selecting subjects for the School Leaving Certificate examination, i.e. in the ninth or tenth year of his school career. For some vocational or technical courses he may opt out as early as at the middle-school stage, i.e. at the age of fourteen or fifteen. Although choice is inescapable and also desirable in any system of education, the rigidity of school and college organizations introduces an element of finality in this choice which is undesirable. A student who makes an erroneous choice cannot often correct his error by just studying the additional subject which he may have missed. He may have to spend a whole year or two and study all the subjects and pass a comparable examination again if he wishes to change his subjects. This would involve hardships even in a country where much more information is available to the student about the alternatives that are open and

the long-term implications of the choice he would make. As at present the choice is governed by what his particular school offers, by the often ill-informed advice of class-fellows and relatives, and by the vague notion that some courses lead to better occupational opportunities than others.

The difficulty in making the choice is followed by the difficulty of exercising the choice once made. Whether one is able to obtain the education of one's choice depends upon the seats or places available in an institution for a particular programme of education. Usually the courses in medicine, engineering, and technology are the most sought after, and these are the ones for which the number of admissions is most limited. Even when the seats available in teachers' colleges, colleges of nursing, and agricultural colleges are taken into account along with seats in medical, engineering, and technical colleges, the total number of students in "general" education far exceeds the number of those in programmes of education leading to specific careers. There is probably one seat available in a professional college to every six or seven seats in other colleges or departments. In many universities the percentage of seats in professional colleges—including medicine, engineering, agriculture, education, and nursing but excluding law and commerce—is only about 10.15 per cent of the total seats. The following table constructed on the basis of data furnished in an official report shows the number of universities against the percentage of seats available for technical-vocational education.¹

<i>Percentage of seats for all types of professional, technical, and vocational courses, excluding law and commerce</i>		<i>Number of universities</i>
Less than	5	9
	5—9	5
	10—14	8
	15—19	7
	20—24	6
	25—29	2
	30—34	4
	40+	6

¹Government of India, Ministry of Education, *Education in Universities in India, 1960-1961: A Report* (New Delhi, 1964).

Opportunities for technical and professional education have always been limited in India, but probably employment opportunities for those without such education were better in earlier days than they are now. Although there is no way of verifying this statement, one can assert that the total volume and proportion of unemployment in the country has grown over the last twenty years and that the share of the educated in this unemployment is not insubstantial.

Our Planning Commission estimated, in accordance with the data given at the beginning of Chapter VI of the Draft Fourth Plan, that in 1956 in India the unemployed persons in the labour force were about 7 million in number. At the end of the Third Plan (1961-66), this number is estimated to have increased by another 3 million because the increase in the labour force outpaced the increase in employment opportunities. It is feared that the number of the unemployed will increase at the end of the Fourth Plan by another 4 million or more.

From the point of view of the young person this implies another point of serious anxiety—anxiety which is all the greater in the case of the urban, educated individual since his status as an employed man or as an unemployed man is unambiguously defined. The difference between being employed and being unemployed is not merely the difference between earning and not earning a salary, though this is important. The difference has social and psychological implications. It affects his own concept of himself as a competent young person. It affects his chances of getting a good wife. It affects the scope of his friendships. It affects also his rôle in his family of orientation—particularly in relation to his siblings. An elder brother who cannot get established in a job or business and therefore postpones his own marriage causes some embarrassment and even difficulties for the younger brothers in the joint family where so much emphasis is laid on adherence to the sequence of birth in all matters of rôle-succession—as student, earner, and bridegroom.

The youth in modern Indian society are thus called upon to make three major choices which have a significance much beyond the period of youth—the choice of education, of occupation, and of marriage. Though this responsibility to choose can be looked upon as a challenge and an opportunity, it is inevitably accompanied

by psychological tension. The tension or strain is related to the general abilities of the individual exercising the choices as well as to the scope that he may have for following up his choices once he has made them.

CONDITIONS WHICH ACCENTUATE STRAINS

The strains imposed by the choice situation are probably less severe where the choice decisions are not irrevocable and can be revised or modified with the minimum waste of time and resources. Such a situation obtains in many Western countries, where despite growing formalization of the educational system it is relatively easy for students to change their courses or combine them in particular ways more suitable to their individual requirements. Students can take particular courses to make up the gaps in their background without having to spend whole academic years to qualify for specializations other than the one which they had originally chosen. In India educational institutions are much more rigid in the matter of transfers from one department to another and the examination system makes it difficult to pass in individual courses and fill up gaps without spending at least one year. Even persons who have obtained technical qualifications from recognized but non-university institutions find it difficult to go back to universities and improve their academic competence and standing. This loads the situation of educational choice with a measure of finality.

The choice situation is also less threatening when the scope for following up one's choices is wide. The limited admissions to much-sought-after courses mean not only temporary frustrations, but in the case of most, a complete closing of the door to certain careers. Besides, as stated earlier, career opportunities generally are still very limited and restricted to certain fields. Traditionally, public administration, the professions of law, medicine, and engineering, the armed forces, and, only more recently, business houses have offered careers to educated persons. The entry into all these fields has been severely restricted. A large number of the new professions which are listed in the classification of occupations in Western countries are almost unknown in India and, if known, have not attained the degree of professionalization which would make them seem attractive to educated youth. The still undeveloped economy

cannot support the superstructure of new specializations, and wherever specializations occur, the individuals who follow them have ahead of them a long period of waiting on the side-lines. The spread of education which has followed from the liberalistic values of the ruling *élite* and the concurrent failure of the economy to throw up new job opportunities at the rate at which new educated persons are being added to the labour force give rise to a situation fraught with difficulties. The youth who are called upon to choose and who simultaneously have to pass through the process of being chosen or rejected by the educator, and later by the employer, face a bleak situation.

There is also a cultural factor which increases the difficulties in decision-making. Life in the joint family is not conducive to the development of the capacity to make decisions for oneself. The emphasis in the joint family is on conformity to tradition since this is one of the easiest ways of forestalling differences between the several adult members of the family. When new situations arise for which tradition does not lay down a rule and for which no precedent exists, an effort is made to interpret the tradition to suit the occasion. There are not many demands made upon the individual to make decisions which are uniquely his own and which may differ from those of other members in the family. Now that the individual is called upon more and more to make decisions for himself, he feels uncertain about his ability to make them. He turns to his parents and elder brothers for guidance and he may not be entirely unwilling to have them make his decisions for him.

Unfortunately, the elders in the family are themselves often ill-equipped to make the right decision. As more and more young persons go to schools and colleges from homes where the elders themselves have had no education, the elder generation in the family is found to have no experience to fall back upon and offer guidance to the younger. Parents often do not know what their children are engaged in during the period of their study. Many of them have a vague notion that it is good to send their wards to schools and colleges because in course of time this will help them to get suitable jobs. They know very little about the varieties of employment opportunities that exist and the different types of preparations that they call for from those who aspire to take advantage of those opportunities. As a result most parents

find themselves even less informed than their children are in this matter.

Where parents cannot be of assistance, the student should normally turn to teachers and to organized information services. However, such services do not exist except in a few metropolitan cities. The school principals and the college principals are often themselves not in possession of the necessary information. The institution of career masters has not yet developed. As a result students turn to each other or to those who are in senior classes and obtain information of varying degrees of correctness from them. Elder brothers of friends, distant uncles who have had some education, cousins who happen to be working in metropolitan areas—these become sources of information. The person who seeks the information is not clear about what he wants and the one who gives the information is not possessed of adequate or full information. The consequence is that the student makes his educational as well as occupational choice on a basis which is far from satisfactory. Simultaneously the inability of the elder generation to continue to play its traditional rôle of authority reduces its authority and enlarges the gulf between the young and the old within families and in society generally.

There are also other social and political changes that have taken place in the recent past which have alienated the youth from the elder generation. The cynicism and disillusionment that came to many young persons in the Western world as a result of the Second World War affected the Indian youth only after the attainment of independence. Those who were young between 1920 and 1947 had been enthused by the idealism and the demand for sacrifices made by the nationalist movement. The post-Independence era has been characterized by the gradual dissipation of this idealism. This was partly inevitable since the assumption of authority and office always deprives the revolutionary of some of his charisma, and his erstwhile followers who are either too idealistic to accept the demands of the day-to-day political situation or are frustrated because of being denied a share in the spoils of victory have a feeling of being let down. Unfortunately, the failings of the party in power and the exigencies of a democratic policy have further vitiated the political atmosphere. Increasingly the emphasis is upon demands made by one set of interest groups against another

set of interest groups and against the nation as a whole. There is no accent, in this atmosphere of conflict, on what individuals or individual groups might contribute to the making of a strong country. If economic development had proceeded smoothly, the changes in the political climate would not have by themselves resulted in the total disillusionment that the youth seem to experience in the country today.

IMPLICATIONS

What are the implications of this general situation of frustration and of the specific strains to which our young men are subject? It is a great temptation to jump to the conclusion that the waves of discontent and indiscipline in our universities are a direct consequence of the strains to which the youth—particularly the student youth—in our country are subjected. But at best this is only a plausible hypothesis, and it cannot be substantiated even at the crude level of many of our generalized observations until we can answer the questions whether indiscipline and disquiet among the youth are present wherever they are subject to such strains and whether they are evident only in a situation where the youth are subjected to the strains characteristic of the Indian situation. In other words we should be able to say whether strains caused by a difficult employment situation, the postponement of marriage in an otherwise traditional society, and the limited opportunities in education are the necessary and sufficient conditions of student unrest.

It would not be possible to undertake the examination of such a hypothesis within the limits of this paper. Apart from the fact that the relevant data which would help test such a hypothesis are not available, it may even be necessary to restate the concepts and define them operationally before we know what data to look for.

A cursory examination of newspaper reports, however, suggests that even in countries with expanding economies like Japan and the United States of America, the university campuses have not been entirely free from disturbance. In Japan students participated in political agitations and had a share in unseating the Kishi Government. In the United States, many university campuses have experienced spells of disquiet intermittently over the past several

years.² This would seem to question the hypothesis that the difficult employment situation and limited opportunities in education have necessarily brought about student unrest.

On the other hand, even where these factors may not be responsible, they may still be sufficient to lead to student unrest. An examination of this proposition could be undertaken by comparing different universities in different parts of the country to see whether the relative quiet or disquiet that each of them has is related to the different educational and economic opportunities available to them in the parts of the country where they are located.

3 March 1967

²S.M. Lipset and Philip Altbach, "Student Alienation in U.S.A.", *New Society* (London), vol. 8, nos 205 and 206, September 1966.

K.G. SAIYIDAIN

INDIAN UNIVERSITIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION

IT IS A GREAT PRIVILEGE to be associated with this public tribute which is being paid to Dr H.N. Kunzru's outstanding personality and services. He is not only a man of great distinction but also what may be called an "institution" in himself. He has won his place in public life and public respect not by trying to court popularity but by being true to himself and his convictions. In fact, he has often espoused causes which happened to be unpopular or out of fashion, but he believes, as all of us should (but alas do not !), that a nation can become great only by cultivating the qualities of intellectual courage and integrity and by being sensitive to the needs and interests of the masses. He has made a marked impact on many different fields of beneficial activity and has helped to build or develop many fine organizations of public service, e.g. the Servants of India Society, the Indian Council of World Affairs, the Indian School of International Studies, the All India Scout Organization, and other educational, cultural, and social institutions. In Parliament, he has stood for the old tradition of "liberalism" in the good sense of the word and has spoken with authority on subjects as varied as defence, education, and economic policy and has always commanded respectful attention because he knows, and studies very carefully, what he is talking about. He has pleaded vigorously for the retention of English as the medium of instruction at the stage of higher education and for Urdu being given its rightful place in the country. I hope that his services will be assessed appropriately in these many fields by other contributors to this Volume. I mention them as a preamble to this paper of mine on "Indian Univer-

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sities and Higher Education", which is a token of my admiration and respect for his interest in, and contribution to, the field of higher education.

One might start with taking note of the widespread criticism that the standards of university education in India have gone down alarmingly, both in respect of intellectual achievements and training and in the matter of discipline. This is generally taken to be valid and justified criticism, whatever the reasons or apologies that may be offered for the situation. I am, on the whole, inclined to agree with the trend of this criticism in the light of what one sees of the average quality of the students being turned out, of the reports of their examiners and interviews, and of the accounts of their exploits in the field of "discipline" as they appear in the newspapers, though I would not hold the universities or colleges alone responsible for them. This is confirmed by a study that I conducted about four years ago to assess the opinion of university teachers and administrators themselves about the existing situation. In fairness, however, to the situation, it must be admitted that it is not possible to say off-hand how *widespread* the reported deterioration of standards in academic learning and character is and whether this is applicable to all classes of students—good, bad, and indifferent. It is necessary, in my opinion, for every university or college to undertake an objective assessment to enable it to visualize the size and intensity of the problem and to locate the weakest points to which attention must be given on a priority basis. Such an honest heart-searching will be a good point of departure for possible improvements.

Having made this precautionary statement, I feel free to confess that there are many facets of the situation which give room for anxious thought. Whatever the results of the assessment which has been suggested above and which will highlight the priority areas, there are undoubtedly numerous weaknesses in our colleges and universities which, in the light of the Education Commission's Report, the authorities of the universities and colleges, as well as the Ministry of Education and the Departments of Education, must co-operate to set right. Whatever their nature—administrative, financial, or connected with curricula and methodology—all of them have an adverse effect on the quality and standard of the education imparted. The central concern in our thinking should,

therefore, be: What can we do to improve quality and raise standards? A case could be made out in the field of primary and secondary education for placing emphasis on quantitative expansion and quality being soft-pedalled for the present on the plea of inadequate resources, etc. But no intelligent and sensitive person, conscious of all the issues involved, could make out a case for perpetuating the present low standards and thus courting the risk, among other things, of giving the country a low quality of leadership, intellectual and moral, which may result in disaster. A lucky and unique combination of circumstances has so far enabled us to weather many storms and to win a certain measure of stability at home and status abroad, the most important of these circumstances being a galaxy of leaders of unusual calibre vouchsafed to us by Providence during the last hundred years. But it would be a fatal mistake to make lucky chance the arbiter of our destiny. We should concentrate not only all our available material resources but also all the resources of our creative thinking on the development of a pattern of higher education which would provide high-quality leadership in the various fields of national life—intellectual, practical, artistic, technological, social, and moral. A people can, one presumes, *exist* without it, but one would doubt whether such existence is worth while !

This is a very difficult and complex undertaking. Let us not make the mistake of belittling the difficulty. It involves not only a radical and effective reform of higher education but also, inevitably, a reconstruction of education at lower levels—primary and secondary. Apart from this *internal integration*—without which no lasting results can be achieved—it would also be necessary, in the broader perspective of national planning, to integrate the objectives of education with the economic, technological, and social objective of planning, so as to inculcate upon our educated youth a vitalizing sense of social purpose and worthiness and to enable them to utilize their trained talents both for individual fulfilment and for social service. It is true that university teachers and authorities are not *directly* concerned or even associated, to any appreciable extent, with the formulation of policies in this wider field. It is, however, necessary for the sanity and concreteness of their thinking and the effectiveness of their schemes that they should be conscious of these broader implications and relationships and work not in an

academic vacuum but in a vital social context.

In the world of today, dominated by the mass media which tend to produce uniformity, it is the primary function of the University to encourage individuality, variety, and dissent, within a climate of tolerance. Dissent is there, usually of a superficial or sensational kind, but the broad tendency is towards goose-stepping, producing the "organization man" who is afraid to challenge the blindly accepted pattern of social behaviour and institutions and is anxious to worm himself into the good graces of the people that count. This is the type of mind which the University should firmly discourage. Its business is not to give Society what it *wants*—which is usually the concern of the politicians—but what it *needs*, which is not always identical. It is not a "community service station", passively responding to popular demands that would endanger its intellectual integrity. Nor is it an "ivory tower" into which its students and teachers can withdraw for teaching or pure research, accepting no responsibility for the betterment of society. It has to maintain an ambivalent position, balancing itself carefully between commitment and detachment—commitment in action, detachment in thought. It must always be in a constant state of creative *tension*, knowing where to interpret, where to criticize, where to pioneer, and where to support traditional values. It cannot identify itself with the existing environment and institutions, yielding uncritically to every wind of change, every passing pressure. That would be to surrender its integrity of outlook and judgement. It must ever stand ready to assess its own society—its customs, mores, and values—as objectively as it would and should assess others, to assimilate the new that is healthy, to eschew the old that is diseased. Such a study can sometimes be not only challenging but unpleasant, for it needs courage to reject unduly complacent images of one's national life and overcome the many emotional blocks in the mind. Actually, most persons have no keen desire to know their own failings and weaknesses or to examine with detachment their own policies or programmes or the "scratches on their own minds". They are conditioned to the preservation of the *status quo*, unless they are alternatively conditioned to reject all that is old, which is no more intelligent.

The University can play its rôle adequately if it has faith in the power of the mind and helps others to share this faith. It must

encourage free and disinterested thinking which challenges vested interests and established ways, for that is the only method to ensure that men will be able to live wisely and intelligently in this dynamic world. Freedom of thinking, generation of creative ideas, and solving of new and emerging problems in the light of tested knowledge are as much man's basic business as producing food, or making roads, or manufacturing machines. If the University is to be fruitfully involved in the swiftly developing society of today, it follows that it must work hard to preserve its autonomy; for, without autonomy, it cannot cultivate the detachment needed to see things clearly and in the right perspective. The University has played a leading rôle in developing science and technology and has thus created, in a sense, many of the problems and difficulties as well as the new opportunities that characterize our world. It must now take upon itself the burden of social responsibility and learn to act as the conscience of society. If it is to do so adequately, it must learn to analyse, in classroom teaching and research, the numerous social, economic, and cultural problems with which modern man is faced, not only as an individual but also as a socially conscious member of society. And it must prepare him for tackling them with intelligence, wisdom, and sensitivity. He will certainly need knowledge for this purpose and trained capacity for productive work: without them he cannot contribute to the intellectual and material good of society. But this is not enough. He should be able to commit himself to the values which confer dignity on man, and if he finds these values challenged or thwarted, he should take his stand firmly in defence of them. Above all, he should be an uncompromising advocate of social justice, wounded to the quick whenever cruelty, exploitation, or mere indifference to the sorrows and deprivations of the under-privileged makes life unbearable for his fellow men and women, knowing that pity has no face and misery no name. It is not that an individual by himself or a small group of individuals can always achieve much, although history offers many examples where even single individuals or small groups have been able to achieve miracles. The first condition for doing anything worth while is the creation of this temper, this responsiveness to feeling. And no one can say beforehand where an exceptional individual may emerge to break through centuries of neglect and tyranny. The University must, therefore, nurture this capacity

both in the normal and in the exceptional individuals and thus make a contribution to the new world that is yet to be.

I have stated briefly what I consider to be the main purposes which the University must set before itself firmly. Now, what are the various issues that are involved in achieving these purposes and in tackling the problem of raising the quality of education? I refer to them below not necessarily in any order of priority but as they occur to me, with the prefatory remark that they are all interconnected, directly or indirectly, and that their full impact can only be felt if we make a many-fronted attack on the problem.

ADMISSION OF STUDENTS

Till recently, admissions have not been generally based on any rational, well-thought-out considerations. At first, anyone who could afford to pay the fees was entitled to admission. Later, when the number of those seeking admission increased and there were not enough seats, either some arbitrary standards of marks obtained by a candidate in the High (or Higher Secondary) School Examination were laid down as the minimum condition or recommendations and pressures from influential people were used to secure admission. Sometimes, the latter consideration outweighed the former. More recently, "democratic pressure" has increased and the claim is often made that admission to a college is almost the "birthright" of every student that has passed the High (or Higher Secondary) School Examination. In the capital city of Delhi, for instance, where educational facilities on the whole are more ample than in many other cities, frantic efforts are made, year after year, to find accommodation for the rapidly increasing number of students—not in consequence of any rationally-thought-out policy but often as a response to agitation and political pressure. It is not suggested that the remedy of the situation is to *restrict* admission haphazardly or irrationally or to ignore the expanding need of the country for highly educated persons. No one has, however, been able so far to argue the case convincingly that in an economy of scarcity like ours it is an advantage to provide higher education to students who lack either the capacity or the willingness to profit by it. In spite of the efforts made by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and individual colleges and universities, my impression is that quite

a large proportion of students in these institutions are just wasting their time because they have nothing else to do or because they can afford to do so. It is possible that much more could be made of some of them, if the conditions of work were favourable. But under existing conditions of overcrowding at least in urban areas, they only queer the pitch for the more promising students by increasing the student-teacher ratio and lowering standards of teaching. The result of such haphazard admissions, often made without regard to adequate staff, buildings, equipment, and other essential amenities, is seen not only in the depressing of examination results year after year, involving enormous human and material wastage, but in the breakdown of the morale and discipline of students, the growing sense of frustration and social revolt and apathy and irresponsibility on the part of the teachers. There have been some studies of this problem in India which may be found useful. Mention may be made of a study entitled *Access to Higher Education*, sponsored by the UNESCO, which examines this problem in depth. In any case, it is quite clear that unless a policy is laid down to ensure that obviously unpromising students are denied admission and those who persistently refuse to work earnestly and honestly are eliminated, no durable foundations can be laid for real improvement. The Education Commission has recently considered this problem and has recommended that while there should be no attempt to restrict *necessary* expansion in view of the increasing demands of the national economy, the quality of admissions should be improved radically, partly by the institution of fellowships and stipends to tap all available talent of university quality, partly by devising procedures of selection which will enable the inferior students to be sifted out, and partly by improving conditions of work in all institutions, so that those admitted may be given a real chance to profit by the education imparted to them. At the same time, the Commission has said that students who may not get a chance of admission or those who were denied this opportunity in the past and are now working to make their living but are anxious to improve their qualifications, should not find themselves in a blind alley. For these students the Commission has recommended that there should be evening colleges, correspondence courses, and the opportunity of taking examinations privately (in some cases), provided certain necessary conditions to ensure

the minimum standards are fulfilled.

Special reference may be made to the importance of organizing a genuine search for talent and of making it possible, so far as we can, for every student of promise, every student capable of profiting fully by higher education, to find the requisite facilities for the purpose. To ensure this, the net must be flung as wide as possible at the school stage and suitable selection procedures should be devised in colleges to pick out promising students and afford them necessary financial assistance and good conditions of work which would enable them to make the best of their gifts. Scholarships, stipends, books, residential facilities, stimulating contact with good teachers, and the quiet, educative influence of a pleasant environment will all come into it. From the national point of view, it is more wasteful to leave out in the wilderness talented students who lack financial resources or are geographically far removed from centres of higher education than to provide higher academic education for intellectually poor students. These have to be sought out with care and educated with solicitude so that their talents may be used in the service of the country. If this can be achieved, half the battle of raising academic standards is won.

EXPANSION OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

This is a very complicated problem because it must balance a variety of conflicting considerations. As discussed with reference to the admission of students, there is, on the one hand, a democratic pressure for throwing open the gates of the University as widely as possible. There is, again, the increasing need for trained manpower as well as for qualified leadership in all walks of life, which would also appear to be in harmony with the democratic pressure mentioned earlier. In view of the size of the country, it would be difficult to argue that we have too many students receiving university education. On the one hand, there is the inescapable problem of quality which cannot be reconciled with a policy of haphazard quantitative expansion, particularly when the total resources available are rigidly limited and every increase in number means further dilution of standards owing to unfavourable student-teacher ratio, insufficient equipment and residential facilities, poor libraries and laboratories, and, to some extent, fall in the quality of the staff

available for recruitment. Every time that a new university is opened—and the number of universities is growing much faster today than before Independence—it either takes away good or distinguished teachers from the existing universities or makes do with comparatively junior or inferior persons even for the higher posts. This is perhaps even truer of subjects coming under the humanities, where the universities are not turning out a sufficient number of first-class men and women who are prepared to go into the teaching line. The urgent demand for qualitative improvement and the limitation of funds would, therefore, appear to demand a slowing down of the tempo of expansion and to suggest definite ceilings of enrolment beyond which colleges and universities should not normally go, *unless* they are adequately equipped to meet the needs of the increased enrolment. While, as the Commission has recommended, the attempt to improve all universities and colleges so that they attain at least a minimum standard of efficiency must continue, there is urgent need to develop *high centres of excellence* in some of the best existing universities, comparable to the finest universities abroad, where carefully selected staff and students in adequate numbers—"critical masses" of them, to use a phrase from nuclear physics—will ensure high standards of teaching and research. They might provide a "breakthrough" point in the reform of the universities as a whole.

SELECTION OF STAFF

The greater part of the other half of the battle is the recruitment of the best available teachers, the provision of training and orientation facilities for them, the offer of reasonably good salary scales and related amenities, and a persistent effort by the administration and the Faculty co-operatively to create good and stimulating conditions of work, physical as well as psychological and intellectual. What can we expect, in reason, from teachers who are economically so harassed that they must eke out some extra money by taking private tuitions or writing "cram books" and who are unable to buy significant books for private study? Or from teachers who lose their enthusiasm and integrity of purpose quickly, because the administration is rigid or the Principal is unimaginative or the colleagues are cynical and indifferent? The problem is at least twofold. What

shall we do with teachers already in service—some of them with many years of work to their credit (or discredit)—who are set in their ways and usually find it very difficult to turn over a new leaf? Secondly, how shall we ensure that the newly recruited teachers are properly oriented to their work? Some persons are apt to despair of the former, holding that nothing can be done to change them. I do not agree with this view because I know that many of them—not all—*can* be aroused from their apathy or indifference through an imaginative and human approach, through understanding their material and psychological difficulties, through improving their working conditions, and through adopting measures to raise their professional efficiency. Some of these measures have been adopted already, e.g. raising salary scales, organizing summer courses for teachers in different fields of study, and improving library and laboratory conditions, at least in the universities. These measures have not made their full impact yet for various reasons: the increase in salaries has been largely offset by the increase in the cost of living; many teachers are still inadequately paid; and the number of summer schools is still small compared with the total number of teachers working in the field of higher education. If these (and other) measures are adopted more extensively and followed by more imaginative and vigorous implementation, their influence is bound to be felt. So far as the new teachers are concerned, it is necessary to insist on high standards of initial qualifications, to make suitable and adequate arrangements to give them early professional orientation, to adopt intelligent methods to initiate them into their work, to accord recognition to quality of work both in teaching and in research, to provide adequate library and laboratory facilities, to ensure proper social status for them, and generally to go all out to encourage and reward merit. A Principal who lacks this quality and is mostly concerned with maintaining his administrative dignity and authority, or is patently or insidiously jealous of the ability and brilliance of his junior colleagues, or cannot adjust himself to the reasonable individual needs of his colleagues is unworthy of his position. He has no business to be where he is. A good deal can be said conversely of the duties of the staff, but the point I am concerned with making here is that it is *essentially* the Principal's responsibility to get the best work out of his colleagues and to provide the necessary conditions for the purpose.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

Arising from what I have just said is the whole question of the salary and conditions of service for university teachers. A good deal of thought has been given to this matter in recent years, and thanks to the initiative of the UGC, some improvement has been made. Since quality is "the essence of the contract" in this field and men of good intellect and character are even more urgently needed here than elsewhere, there is no justification for rating teachers lower in financial terms than civil servants working, say, in the police or revenue or judicial departments or in technical professions. And to put it mildly, there is *some* justification for rating them higher. Otherwise, it would be difficult to attract the best talent to the teaching profession; it would naturally gravitate to other more lucrative fields. This is not to imply that the mere improvement of salary scales can make for better teaching or standards—many other things have to be done simultaneously, as indicated above—but if the scales are weighted on the other side, we start with a serious handicap. Barring exceptions who come to this field because they have a natural urge for teaching and research, we shall have to make do generally with the disheartened "left-overs" of other more lucrative professions and services. While we should certainly insist on exacting high standards of work and refuse to tolerate slackness and indifference, we should be equally concerned about improving their conditions of work and social status.

RESEARCH FACILITIES

Special reference might be made to the provision of adequate facilities for research which are still inadequate and ill-organized in many universities and almost non-existent in some. There are many issues involved in this matter. What is the relationship or respective importance of research and training? In some universities in the world, no promotion is given unless a teacher regularly publishes some research papers or books. He must "publish or perish"! Teaching is apt to be considered as comparatively unimportant. Is that the right policy? Personally, I do not think so. In my opinion, in the present situation in India, a good teacher is at least as important as a research scholar. Also, some very good

teachers may not be capable of doing research work of high quality and originality, though they can make very valuable contribution otherwise to the life and work of their universities. Both types need to be encouraged. But even the admittedly good teacher should be encouraged to carry on some research or advanced studies not necessarily for the sake of taking a doctorate or publishing the results of such research for the enrichment of knowledge but to keep his own mind alive and vigorous and strike sparks in his students. For the benefit of all teachers, particularly those who have the requisite talent and inclination for research, the universities must provide them with the necessary facilities on a generous scale, sufficient leisure to do research and to guide research, and opportunities to come into contact with other outstanding workers in their special fields inside the country and abroad. The niggardly policy, which usually governs teachers' attendance in academic conferences and associations—partly because of the travelling expenses involved which are really quite negligible compared with the total budget—needs to be reconsidered. Also, to encourage fruitful inter-university contacts, arrangements should be made for exchange of brilliant teachers between various universities as visiting lecturers and professors. This would be both a recognition of merit and a challenge—particularly for junior men—to show what they are capable of doing. The comparatively small additional expenditure involved could be easily met from the UGC funds.

GOOD WORKING CONDITIONS

Given good teachers and promising students who are not unduly worried about financial problems and are assured of receiving proper encouragement, the stage would be set for attempting some real improvement in university education. The next thing is to ensure that proper *working conditions* are established, in order to eliminate the great wastage of time, energy, and enthusiasm which goes on in most institutions. Some of these conditions are physical, some psychological, and some pedagogic. Among the first is the provision (as already explained) of good libraries, laboratories, and adequate teaching and residential accommodation for the students and the faculty. In spite of the recent improvements in this regard brought about through the financial assistance of the

UGC, the conditions are still far from satisfactory. Moreover, the impact of the assistance given by the UGC has been felt more in the universities than in 2,500 or more colleges. It is not necessary for me to describe these conditions or their effect on teaching; any one conversant with education in colleges is only too painfully aware of them. We should analyse how acute the shortages are and ascertain the *minimum* needs which must be met in every single college to enable it to carry on its work under tolerable conditions. Surveys and studies have been made already which give a fairly accurate idea of the educational scene. What remains is the provision of adequate funds and their proper distribution. This is, however, one side and the comparatively easy side of the picture—the *provision* of facilities. The other, more difficult side is to ensure that full *advantage* is taken of these facilities. This is the *educational* problem which involves, among other things, teachers who have a love for scholarship and research and the capacity to share it with their students, stimulating teaching techniques which would lead to the proper use of the library and the laboratory, and a pattern of examination which calls for wide, discriminating, and intelligent reading rather than the mere memorization of a textbook or lecture notes or (worse still) “market notes” about textbooks. Similarly, the provision of suitable residential facilities—which is imperative in any case, considering the conditions in which a majority of students live—cannot yield its full results unless the students’ hostels are built up into *communities* of eager scholars, learning to live and work together and organizing a large range of social, academic, and cultural activities with the teachers’ tactful and unobtrusive co-operation. The mounting sense of frustration and resentment in youth against society, lack of interest in work, and acts of indiscipline and violent lawlessness—of which one finds so many heart-breaking reports every day—are often the result of the hollow, unsatisfactory life that students lead from day to day, in which there is neither the compelling sense of purpose nor the emotionally releasing joy of living, but only a sense of present dissatisfaction and a haunting apprehension about the future, which does not seem to hold out any hope to many of them. To this the general state of affairs in the adult world, as they see it around themselves or as mirrored in the newspapers, adds the corroding sense of cynicism. Unless our institutions offer both academic challenge

and personal satisfaction and they are *accepted* by the students as dynamic agencies leading to the possibility of a better life, they cannot expect to make any healthy impact on their mind or character or personality. These are by no means original ideas or suggestions, but that does not make them less true. It should, therefore, be the primary concern of every institution, a concern which should take precedence over almost everything else, to produce healthy working conditions, which might, in due course, develop into strong traditions, where one's working to the best of one's ability would be the norm and one's failure to do so would be an aberration. Some good colleges have shown that this is *not* an impossible objective to achieve. While every sympathy and understanding should be extended to students and their personal difficulties and problems considered with care, solicitude, and promptness, it should be made clear beyond the shadow of any doubt that neither persistent academic indifference and slackness nor hooliganism nor the attempts to interfere in matters which are clearly beyond their competence will be tolerated in any circumstances. It is neither in the interest of individual students nor in the interest of society. Such a policy would no doubt bring the educators into clash—at least in the beginning—with parents, political pressure groups, influential individuals, even the administration. But there is no half-way house between academic integrity and educational disaster. I can suggest no easy way out of the difficulty, the conflict has to be faced, but success can be achieved only if *all* involved in the process are gradually made to realize that this is a problem of common interest and it is necessary to strengthen the hands of teachers—which are, in all conscience, very weak at present—as also to win over the understanding co-operation of the other groups involved, such as students, parents, political parties, administration, etc. They are not contending teams engaged in a tug-of-war. They are engaged in the common task of building up a better life for the country. There will certainly be differences of view from time to time, but the essence of the “university temper”—if I may so describe it—is to solve them through discussion and reconciliation of points of view as far as possible. For instance, it would be worth while and practicable to establish standing councils of teachers and students in each university and college to advise and deal with problems of discipline and other matters pertaining to the life of students and

the amenities needed by them and to make students fully responsible for certain sectors of their everyday life.

TEACHING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

By and large, our methods and techniques of work are dull and uninspiring, and have remained unchanged over a long period of time. This is partly due to the fact that it has been assumed that anyone who has taken his Master's degree—even in the third division—is good enough to teach in a college. This is an unwarranted assumption. Apart from other, larger issues, it means that every new entrant has to learn even the mechanics of his daily work through the costly and time-consuming process of trial and error. Teaching in colleges has been identified far too long with lecturing and note-taking and, in the case of the sciences, some usually uncreative and unstimulating laboratory work. There is urgent need for experiments in new methods and techniques which will provoke independent study, thoughtful work in libraries and laboratories, training of the mind in the objective assessment of data, and the capacity to form dispassionate judgement on controversial issues. These qualities are important not only intellectually but also socially and are the bases for the proper functioning of democracy. Moreover, there are several new media of teaching developed in recent years—audio-visual media like the radio, the tape-recorder, the cinema, and the television, teaching machines, programmed teaching, etc.—of which increasing use is being made in some countries. I would not suggest that we either should, or can afford to, utilize them on a large scale, but we should consider how far they can be of help in our situation. Where high teaching talent is scarce, it may even be a source of economy to make first-class lectures, demonstrations, etc. available to students and teachers on the tape or through films, the radio, and the television on a large scale. Side by side with the emphasis on better teaching methods and on students being released from the tyranny of unpromising practices, we must remember that one of the highest qualities of a good teacher is scholarship and the capacity for continuous intellectual growth. This means that not only should we initially recruit teachers of high qualifications but also provide for them opportunities, through conferences, seminars, workshops, summer courses, etc. to keep their

interest and enthusiasm fresh and to profit by contact with the best scholars in their fields. Scholarship, combined with a freshness of approach to the problem of communicating knowledge, can raise the whole tone and quality of education.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF CREATIVITY

In organizing teaching methods, I would suggest that special attention should be paid to the cultivation of what I can best describe as "creativity" in teachers and talented students, without which neither high-quality research nor the life of the mind, in general, can be developed. A good deal of work has been done in this field abroad, and one might quote in this context, by way of example, Harold Rugg's *Imagination* (New York, N.Y., 1963) and Jerome S. Bruner's *On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand* (New York, N.Y., 1965). Indian universities will have to give serious thought to the problem of developing conditions in which the gift of creativity can best unfold itself. It is realized, of course, that where the spark does not exist, it cannot be artificially kindled, but in our educational system, there are many conditions under which it is definitely discouraged and often killed—lack of proper encouragement, pressure of routine work, absence of stimulating intellectual contacts, mechanical methods of teaching, use of a foreign medium ill understood by many of the students, failure to provide the leisure and solitude in which creativity comes to grip with itself. Even if it is found in very few individuals, it is of the highest significance because, in the final analysis, all great intellectual and artistic achievements—inside as well as outside the University—depend on it, and no nation can afford to ignore this infinitely precious source of inspiration. Our universities have hardly paid any attention so far to this crucial problem, and I suggest their active involvement in this area. Some reference has been made to this problem in my book *Universities and the Life of the Mind* (Bombay, 1965).

PROBLEMS OF THE CURRICULUM

This is a very large field, involving many issues. In some ways, the proper approach to these problems is the central concern of the faculties of universities—the elimination of dead lumber, the enlarge-

ment and modernization of the curricula, the integration of studies, the introduction of general education, the search for points of emphasis, the working out of inter-disciplinary approaches, etc. No one else can do this work for the universities; each one of them has the high duty to do so and to go on doing it as a part of its normal work. It would be futile to expect that the Academic Council or the Faculty, meeting in formal conclave once a month or less frequently, could thrash out the many intricate problems involved or carry on the fascinating work of exploration in the field. It is partly a matter of organizing effective machinery and, even more so, of kindling the necessary desire and enthusiasm for the purpose in all members of the Faculty or in as many of them as possible.

MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION

We will also have to consider, in the light of the constitutional directive and the various surveys of the linguistic situation in the country, the difficult problem of the medium of instruction at this stage. We have to take two fundamental considerations into account simultaneously, which to some extent appear to be incompatible. On the one hand, there is a demand, which has adequate justification, that teaching at all stages should be carried on in the mother tongue or regional language when it happens to be reasonably well developed. On the other hand, there are obvious dangers associated with using many different media of instruction in the universities of the country, thus compartmentalizing its intellectual life and scholarship and making the interchange of students and teachers from region to region next to impossible. Also, there is a school of thought which advocates Hindi taking up the place of English as soon as possible so that throughout the country there is a single medium of instruction in higher education. Apart from the fact that there are several States which are strongly opposed to this solution, many persons who, in principle, favour Hindi, realize that it has not yet developed sufficient intrinsic strength and does not possess enough literature in all fields of knowledge to be able to perform this function effectively. To this objection, the answer has been given—which also has considerable weight—that if a language is not afforded the opportunity to grow in the academic

atmosphere of a university and is not to be used as a medium, how can it be expected to generate the necessary strength and richness? There is yet another school of thought which, in view of all these difficulties and differences, would like to see English continued indefinitely in its present position, without perhaps realizing that one cannot keep the language of administration and higher thought distinct from the language (or languages) of the people, at least not in this age of democracy and the desire of the masses to be associated not only with the political but also with the cultural life of the country. The Education Commission has made its own proposals in this behalf and it is now necessary for the Government, in the light of this authoritative expression of opinion and with due regard to all the factors involved, to define its short-range as well as long-range policy and see in what way and how far the co-existence of Hindi or regional languages and English is possible at this stage and how a transition can be eventually brought about smoothly and gradually without upsetting the apple cart in the process. Since English is likely, in any case, to be studied as a language at the collegiate stage, the question of ensuring reasonable minimum standards of efficiency in it is obviously involved in this debate.

REFORM OF THE EXAMINATION SYSTEM

Proper methods of assessment are important not only because they *can* give a correct idea of the quality and achievement of students but also because they have, particularly in India, a direct bearing on methods of teaching and learning and standards of work. There is a good deal of critical material about the present method and system of examination in the country, challenging its validity, its lack of objectivity, and its stress on the wrong aspects of teaching. Less work has, however, been done in the actual reconstruction of its pattern, though many useful suggestions have been made and some of them carried out in a few of the colleges and universities. The criticism continues, but the system, on the whole, remains basically unaltered ! In its contemplated reconstruction, I suggest that at least the following five factors need to be emphasized:

(i) How can examinations cease to be the dominating factor in teaching and stress in education shifted from "passing" them to

learning, scholarship, and the development of mind and personality?

(ii) How can their pattern be modified so that they exercise a beneficial and liberalizing influence on teaching practices instead of the baneful and restricting effect which they have at present?

(iii) How can they be made broad-based so that they will provide a more comprehensive assessment of a student's quality and promise instead of being largely a test of memory?

(iv) How can their validity and objectivity be improved?

(v) What can be done to minimize the large percentage of failures which occur in all examinations, involving incalculable waste of national resources—human and financial?

The Commission has made important recommendations in this behalf which I need not reiterate here. They should be seriously considered by every university and implemented as quickly as possible unless they can make out a convincing case for not following any particular proposal. It is imperative that the dead hand of inertia and the stranglehold of routine and vested interests should be removed from this crucial field as quickly as possible. Otherwise, the "examination system" will continue to be static and will always be pleaded as an adequate excuse for not carrying out *any* worth-while reforms. Some risks there always are in trying to carry out any radical reform, but they must be taken with courage and faith; they cannot obviously be more than the risks involved in perpetuating a foolish *status quo* !

UNIVERSITIES AND THE COMMUNITY

Indian universities have not, as a rule, recognized their true relationship to the community. A large majority of them have not only not done so, but, till recently, there was not even a recognition on their part that it is one of their essential responsibilities. They were, at first, mainly concerned, as we have seen, with providing trained scholars who will be able to discharge their duties as Government servants and, latterly, they have given some attention to research and post-graduate education. It has now become urgently necessary to highlight the responsibility of universities and of the colleges affiliated to them to improve the life of the community and to impinge on its manifold activities purposefully and vigorously in order to raise its standard in all directions. This failure is really

built into a long-standing university tradition which has held sway in many Western countries also. They, too, were mostly concerned with professional or technical education, or with training for services, or with preparing scholars to carry on the pursuit of new knowledge. Many Western universities, among others, have now recognized that they cannot limit the scope of their services to a narrow field, or live in an ivory tower, but must extend their sphere of influence over the whole range of community life. This has become necessary because, in addition to other things, these problems have become more complicated and complex and they need the knowledge and the expertise of the university mind to be applied to them. Also, from the point of view of proper education of the individual, it is important—particularly in developing countries like ours—that the university men should realize the intimacy of their relationship with the community and participate in the constant process of improving it.

Let me give a few examples to underline this point. There are many universities and colleges in different parts of the country which are situated in unhealthy, unhygienic, and unattractive surroundings but have done nothing to improve them, either in their own interest or in the interest of the local community; perhaps they have not even drawn the attention of the civic authorities to them ! The economic condition of the people living in their vicinity has failed to attract their attention. Even their Departments of Economics and Sociology do not usually carry out surveys of the position and apply their expertise to solving the problems which harass their community. Universities with Departments of Agriculture and Colleges of Agriculture have not, as a rule, played any effective part in raising the efficiency of agricultural operations in their neighbourhood. In the new agricultural universities, recently important extension service activities have been started. But there is still a general complaint that the other colleges are cut off from life in the villages and do not carry over the fruit of their research and experience into the field. Medical colleges have likewise had little impact on the health situation. The point is not that during the period of their training, the students can devote a great deal of their time to providing medical services to the people. But a college, as a whole, with its staff and students, forms a powerful unit for carrying on medical education of the neighbouring commu-

nity and can also render some active service, provided it has the will. Ignorance and illiteracy have merrily thriven under the shadow of the universities and the colleges even where they have functioned for decades. There have been sporadic attempts at starting literacy campaigns, but they have petered out after some time. There is, to my knowledge, no university or college which can claim that it has fully eradicated illiteracy even from its campus. One of the most important functions of a university is to carry on extension activities, to organize continuation classes, to offer part-time education of varying kinds, and to conduct correspondence courses for members of the community. Many West European, American, and Russian universities have recognized this as an essential part of their duties and have extended their facilities enormously in this direction. In India, only a few universities have made a beginning in this work somewhat apologetically. But there is no general recognition of their importance yet and consequently no schemes are being implemented.

What can we do about it? I feel that every university should have an Extension Department, adequately staffed and financed, which will be responsible for all such instructional work to be attempted by it. As more resources become available, the scope of the work can be increased, but every university should immediately make a beginning depending on its local situation, and the various Departments should give it their closest co-operation. Students of these Departments should be closely involved in activities necessary for the good of the community. The type of activities selected will depend on the aptitudes of students, the leadership provided by members of the staff, and the opportunities offered by the local situation. Some of the activities will, therefore, have to be determined in the light of the special training received by students, and there will also be activities in which all types of students will participate to organize projects of value to the community. Every university should regard itself as an agency to which different kinds of problems can be referred for solution, economic, technical, social, etc. It should carry on surveys of various kinds, take some of the problems to the laboratories, and apply its techniques of study and research to them. While a university has, on the one hand, to concern itself with issues which are universal, it is also concerned with the special problems of the region in which it is

situated. Social service camps should be organized regularly to enable students to come into educative contact with the rural (or urban) population and their problems, and they should be given the opportunity to serve the locality in various ways. There are other possible variations of the idea, e.g. the "adoption" of a neighbouring village or some particular *mohalla* in the city to which groups of students may go regularly in order to carry on campaigns of literacy, sanitation, and reform of social customs or to suggest possible ways of improving the economic position. It has been suggested that every student should give back in the form of service the debt which he owes to society for providing him with the benefits of higher education. This should be built into the traditions of all institutions so that every student may come to accept it as a part of his normal duty.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE CONCURRENT LIST

This question has already been under the consideration of the Central Government, whose present position in this respect is somewhat anomalous. Apart from Central institutions for which it has direct responsibility and such somewhat tenuous hold as the objective of "maintaining and co-ordinating standards" gives it over institutions of higher learning, it cannot make a great deal of direct impact on higher education in the States, even if it had enough resources, technical competence, and imagination to do so. The UGC has been given certain functions and powers and, in an advisory capacity, the Inter-University Board, the Vice-Chancellors' Conference, and the Central Advisory Board can be of some assistance. But if a bold policy of reform is to be followed and some reasonable parity of standards and working conditions is to be established, the hands of the Central Government need to be strengthened. For this purpose, it has been suggested that higher education, i.e. education beyond the secondary stage, be placed on the concurrent list. This will not by itself solve all, or even many, problems, but it will clear the way towards the adoption of a clearer and more coherent policy and not leave questions of national importance to purely regional or local discretion. It is also hoped that this will help to strengthen the autonomy of the universities against political and bureaucratic interference to which they are often subjected at present. But the

response of the States to this proposal has been largely negative, and it is obviously not possible or advisable to proceed with it without their willing co-operation. Unless, therefore, the State can see the justification for this move, it will be necessary for the Central Government to consider what they can do, *within* the present Constitutional framework, directly and through the UGC and the existing machinery of consultations, to ensure the achievement of the broad objective of university reform as spelt out in the report of the Education Commission.

28 March 1967

Economic Growth and Political Development

P.N. DHAR

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF THE INDIAN ECONOMY

PLANNED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT was initiated in India more than fifteen years ago, and since 1951 a massive effort has been made to realize three five-year plans. This long-awaited regeneration of the Indian economy is being attempted within the framework of a political democracy based on universal adult suffrage and a federal State structure. In other words, the establishment of a functioning political democracy and the creation of a viable and growing economy are being attempted simultaneously. This is an ambitious task which is unprecedented in the history of the world; indeed India has attempted to put history upside down because so far political democracy has followed and not preceded a successful industrial revolution. It is this that lends uniqueness to the Indian effort; otherwise economic development is an ideology accepted all over the world, especially after the end of the Second World War, which coincided with the decolonization of former colonial territories.

How far has India succeeded in creating a precedent? More specifically, how far has it succeeded in its endeavours so far and what do its economic prospects look like? This is one of the most important and anxious questions of our times. And it is to this question that some answers have been attempted here.

India began its career of economic development in 1951 with more hopes than anxieties. The progress achieved during the first ten years, though less than had been hoped for, was nevertheless

This paper draws heavily from the Rabindranath Tagore Lecture delivered by the author at the London School of Oriental and African Studies.

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substantial. The national income increased by 42 per cent or on an average of 3.5 per cent a year. Agricultural output rose annually by 3.5 per cent and industrial output by about 7 per cent.

Economic growth, though measured in quantitative terms, cannot adequately be described in those terms. The crude arithmetic of rates does not indicate the important qualitative shifts that have taken place in the structure of production and the degree of resilience and dynamism that the economy has acquired. The cotton-textile industry is a good case in point. Between 1953 and 1958, there was a fall in the production of cotton textiles. On the other hand, during the same period, a whole range of textile machinery was successfully fabricated. The net effect on the index of industrial production of a fall in textile production and of a rise in that of textile machinery was insignificant or possibly even downward. Nevertheless, from a qualitative point of view, the advance was real.

In general, industries producing capital and intermediate goods have been expanding at a much faster rate than those producing consumer goods. But the fact that expansion has been rapid in those industries which have relatively small weights gives a downward bias to the index of industrial production. Furthermore, the capital goods industries incorporate a more difficult and complicated technology whose absorption is a qualitative improvement which no index of production can indicate.

Apart from the impressive quantitative increases, the recent industrial development has resulted in the building up of a whole complex of capital goods industries which will support the expansion of investment goods and consumer goods industries and a further expansion of the infrastructure. These developments have given a vertical depth, so to speak, to the process of industrialization which was earlier proceeding horizontally and nearing the saturation point.

To come back to the crude arithmetic once again. India's rates of growth are not spectacular, but they certainly are substantial, particularly when compared with those prevalent before Independence or even with those of developed countries during similar stages of growth. For example, it has been estimated that between 1900-01 and 1946-47 the national income in India rose by about 1 per cent a year and agricultural output on an average by about one-fourth of

1 per cent.¹ In the case of Japan, admittedly one of the fastest-growing economies, agricultural output increased at less than 2 per cent (compound) during the period between 1878-82 and 1928-32,² and its industrial output advanced for the first four decades of this century at an average annual rate of about 7.5 per cent.³

Thus, the Indian growth rates, by themselves and in comparison with India's own past and that of other more successful countries, are significant. So also is the effort made to mobilize the resources for this growth. Savings as a proportion of national income rose from about 5 per cent in 1951 to about 8 or 9 per cent at the end of the decade.

But India's pre-Independence period was that of relative economic stagnation and Japanese rates of economic growth were not shadowed by the spectre of demographic pressure and critical balance of payments situation. India has, therefore, to accelerate its rate of growth if per capita income is to rise perceptibly and if India is to become independent of foreign aid. Although the growth rates and the efforts that went with them were significant in themselves, they fell short of what was expected and shorter still of the requirements. The rate of savings did not increase as much and as fast as it should have. It went up to 8 or 9 per cent whereas it was expected to go up to 11 per cent. This was because less was saved from the additional income generated than was expected. The pattern of investment, income, and consumption actually chosen over time by the people is reflected in the choice of the marginal rate of savings and this is what determines the acceptable degree of austerity; and in the absence of bold measures to restrain consumption, one cannot take for granted an increase in savings on any desired scale.

Part of the reason for the sluggishness of the rate of savings was the greater increase in population than was assumed. The earlier assumption of the Planning Commission regarding the growth of population proved to be an underestimate. The population was

¹S. Sivasubramanian, "National Income of India, 1900-01 to 1946-47" (unpublished).

²G. Ranis, "The Financing of Japanese Economic Development", *Economic History Review* (Utrecht), series 2, vol. 9, no. 3, April 1959, pp. 440-59.

³William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change 1868-1938* (Princeton, N.J., 1954).

growing at the rate of 2 per cent as against the envisaged 1.25 per cent. (Currently it is rising about 2.5 per cent a year.) As a result, the population actually increased by 77 million as against the expected 45 million, leading in turn to enlarged consumption requirements and inevitable cuts in the available savings.

This increase in aggregate consumption coupled with the inadequacy of the measures taken to mobilize domestic resources would have shown itself, in any case, in a worsening balance of payments position as a consequence of the higher rates of investment attempted in the Second Plan. The pattern of investment chosen was also such as to add to the pressure on the balance of payments. The actual balance of payments deficit turned out to be even greater (Rs 17 billion) than was expected (Rs 11 billion). There is no doubt that most of the increase in the deficit can be attributed to the fact that the foreign exchange component of the development programme was underestimated. The responsibility for this underestimation, however, lies as much with foreign suppliers as with the Government agencies concerned. The resulting increased reliance on external assistance was thus a reflection not so much of the failure to step up domestic savings to the level targeted in the Second Plan as of the inevitable reliance on foreign sources of supply for the implementation of a heavy industries development programme. As a matter of fact, if external assistance had been available in greater measure, the growth in domestic savings could have been correspondingly larger, not only as a result of greater utilization of capacity and the consequent increase in production, but also because the willingness to invest (and to find the savings to finance the investment) would have encountered less frustration.

However, despite these considerations, the point remains that the achievements of the Second Plan seem to have depended on external savings to a much greater extent than was anticipated. The errors of underestimation, whether of population growth or of capital and foreign exchange costs, resulted in an inadequate appreciation of the effort and policy measures needed to attain the specified targets.

The strains and inadequacies revealed during the Second Plan period continued to nag the planners while the Third Plan was formulated, but the predominant sentiment then was that these strains went with growth and that even if the process of development had turned out to be somewhat slower than was expected, it

could now be resumed with greater vigour.

Accordingly, the Third Plan was conceived of essentially as a continuation of the Second in terms of the basic strategy except that the sights were raised and the output was expected to grow at a faster rate in order to secure a rise in national income at more than 5 per cent (31 per cent over the whole period), and to achieve self-sufficiency in foodgrains and increased agricultural production to meet the requirements of industry and exports.

It was only when India was half way through the Third Plan that the country found itself overtaken by a sense of crisis. How real is this crisis? And what is its nature? Can it be traced to an inappropriate economic strategy? Or does the trouble lie in faulty associated policies of an otherwise sound strategy?

The answers to these questions are indispensable for determining and assessing the economic prospects of India. We might begin the examination of the nature and dimensions of this crisis by comparing the performance of the Indian economy with the prospects held out by the Third Plan.

The economic progress in the Third Plan period has been very slow. There have been significant shortfalls in the Plan targets for industrial output, agricultural output, and production capacity. Over the five years of the Third Plan the rate of growth of national income was less than half the 5 per cent aimed at. Except for 1964-65, agricultural production did not show any increase whereas industrial output increased at less than 7 per cent a year instead of the targeted 11 per cent. Taking into account the growth of population and defence expenditure (in the wake of the Chinese aggression), the per capita consumption today is probably not higher than it was five years ago. Perhaps it is lower.

Undoubtedly these shortfalls can, at least partially, be explained in terms of unforeseen circumstances like bad weather and an unavoidable and sharp increase in defence expenditure. But the faulty estimates of costs and outputs and the inefficiency in the implementation of projects, which characterized the earlier Plans, remained unremedied in the Third Plan and made their own contribution to lower outputs. A critique of the Government's policies will certainly indicate that sometimes resources have been used less productively than was ideally possible. There are instances of mallocation of industry or the encouragement of small-scale produc-

tion in certain fields leading to an uneconomic fragmentation of capacity. Admittedly, some justification can be found for such cases in political and social compulsions such as the need for dispersal of industry (in a large and heterogeneous country governed under a federal political structure) or the need to prevent concentration of economic power. But it is also possible to argue that other policies, economically less burdensome, could equally well have achieved the political and social objectives of the Government. The principle of economic efficiency alone cannot rule the roost, especially if it runs counter to the political and social values of the community, but the fact remains that commensurate increase in administrative and organizational effort to implement the Third Plan did not come about. Nor was any serious effort made to reduce the area of conflict between contradictory objectives of policy, as, for example, in the field of industrial licensing.

Although the lapses from the straight and strict rules of economic efficiency did exercise their deleterious effect, it is the lag in agriculture that constitutes the most serious failure, resulting in the frustration of a major objective of the Third Plan.

To be sure, even during the first two plans, difficulties—at times serious ones—did arise. The first foreign exchange crisis, as stated earlier, appeared in 1958. Balance of payments difficulties have continued to haunt India ever since. The food shortages, which tended to grow, were kept in check through PL 480 imports from the United States. It would now seem, in retrospect, that the symptoms of a crisis were discernible but did not erupt into an overall crisis because the volume of external assistance that flowed in was at least sufficient to keep the situation under control. Thus both agricultural and industrial production managed to continue to grow.

The new development as India reached the middle of the Third Plan was that agricultural production became stagnant, growth of industrial production began to slacken, the population continued to grow, and at higher rates than was expected, the stream of marketed surplus of foodgrains began to shrink, and the country found itself in the midst of a food crisis, which has assumed a new severity in the current year. It is true that even in the past agricultural production, subject to the vagaries of the weather, had not shown a steady increase but had fluctuated around a rising trend and it

may well be asked why similar behaviour in the Third Plan is considered so extraordinary as to cause widespread alarm.

The reason is twofold:

(a) The problem has arisen essentially because the growth of agriculture has been lagging behind that of the non-agricultural sector with this difference that in the past, the absolute gap it generated between demand and supply of foodgrains was moderate enough to be covered by PL 480 imports. Now this gap has assumed disconcerting proportions.⁴

(b) The problem of inter-sectoral imbalance arising from a sluggish growth of agriculture can no longer be dismissed as an aberration of the weather even though bad weather has been a contributing factor.

The linear growth rate of foodgrain output declined from 4.4 per cent a year for the period 1949-50—1955-56 to 3.8 per cent during 1955-56—1961-62. Bad weather coming on top of what was even otherwise a slackening in the rate of growth produced a stagnation in foodgrain output in the first three years of the Third Plan. And as foodgrain output failed to grow, available evidence suggests that marketed surplus tended to decline.⁵ Considering the higher incomes and the larger population base of the agricultural sector, this was not altogether unexpected. As a result the absolute gap in relation to the ever-growing demand of the non-agricultural sector became even wider. Thus instead of approaching self-sufficiency in foodgrains aimed at in the Third Plan, we found ourselves drifting away from it. Nor was the problem confined to foodgrains alone. The growth rate of the non-foodgrain crops, even if it had been maintained, would have fallen short of the requirements of

⁴The share of imports in total supplies to the urban areas increased from 30 per cent in 1960-61 to 57 per cent in 1963-64 and even in 1964-65, the year of the record harvest, it was nearly 50 per cent. See "Foodgrains Demand Projection: 1964-65 to 1975-76", *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin* (Bombay), January 1964, pp. 25-35.

⁵According to the Reserve Bank of India study (n. 4), the availability of foodgrains from the rural sector for consumption in urban areas declined from 7.0 million tonnes in 1961-62 to 1.2 million tonnes in 1963-64. This finds support in the figures of market arrivals of rice, wheat, and jowar in certain selected markets in the country (published by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India), which have shown a declining trend ever since 1961-62.

industrial growth. If the industry was able to obtain its requirements of agricultural raw materials, it was only by encroaching upon their export surplus. The fact that even the rates of growth achieved in the past could not be maintained when the industrial targets of the Third Plan called for a significantly higher rate of growth made the situation far more serious.

That this lag in agricultural production is already exercising an adverse effect on industrial growth is now obvious. There are many lines of industrial activity where under-utilization of capacity and slackening of growth can clearly be ascribed to this lag. The vegetable oil industry is an obvious example of this. The pressures of domestic demand are writ large on the wide and growing differential in the prices of vegetable oils in India and abroad. In the case of the jute industry the crop failure resulted in the output of only 5.7 million bales in 1965-66 and about 7 million bales (estimated) in 1966-67 as against the target of 9 million bales.

There are, of course, large areas where the difficulties can be attributed to the shortage of imported spares, parts, and balancing equipment—the results of a continuing shortage of foreign exchange. But in so far as the failure to increase the exports of certain agricultural products is due to a lack of increase in agricultural output, the difficulties—at least in part—are, once again, ascribable to the performance of the agricultural sector.

In this context it is perhaps instructive to recall what seems a pertinent resemblance between the Indian situation on the one hand and the Soviet situation in a comparable period of development and the Chinese situation, of late, on the other.

It is well known that in the middle twenties the Soviet Union had run into an acute crisis of disproportionality when it was poised to launch large-scale industrialization based on heavy industry. Being confronted with the formidable difficulties of aiming at an ambitious and simultaneous advance on both the agricultural and the industrial fronts, Soviet economists debated in particular the appropriate sequence of sectoral development. Was the programme of industrialization to be financed by forcing out agricultural surplus through a process of primitive capital accumulation? That is to say, was industry to grow at the expense of agriculture, as Preobrezhensky advocated, or was it to wait till an initial emphasis on agriculture paved the way for an ambitious programme of industrialization to

be carried through, without undue strain, to success? How were the food and raw material requirements for this programme of industrialization to be met? Also, how was the export surplus to be obtained, which in this context meant the surplus of primary products, to pay for technical know-how and other specific resources needed from outside, without a commensurate growth of agriculture? The conflict could have been softened if not resolved if foreign aid had been available to the Soviet Union to finance the operation through an import surplus. But external economic assistance was not available. Leon Trotsky cried in vain that without a revolution in the developed world, "socialism in one country" was not possible. And socialism here implied heavy industry. But the Soviet programme of industrialization could not be kept in abeyance. Joseph V. Stalin chose the device of collective farms to mobilize the agricultural surplus. Collectivization was designed to solve two basic problems: to increase agricultural productivity by modern large-scale farming methods and to remove the power of the peasants to withhold grains and affect prices.

The subsequent developments on the Soviet scene underline the severe limitations of a process of coaxing, cajoling, and forcing the peasants to part with what was not, in the normal course of things, an adequately growing agricultural surplus. The problem is germane to any attempt to attain economic independence within a relatively short span of time without—or with little—external assistance.

The principal difference between the Soviet and the Chinese situations is twofold: The Soviets had to rely on their own efforts with little economic assistance from outside to soften the rigour of the process; whereas the Chinese began their march towards heavy industrialization with massive economic assistance from the Soviet Union. This difference, however, was not to last long. It was brought to an end by the Sino-Soviet conflict and China paid back what it had borrowed. And as the import surplus transformed itself into an export surplus, the dilemma we have been stressing presented itself. The Chinese sought to resolve it by practising the Nurksean formula, which promises a simultaneous development of the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors on the grandest scale attempted so far and chose for this purpose the collective form of rural organization—the Chinese Commune.

On their own admission we know now that the results of the Great Leap Forward, the dramatic name given to this movement, were much less spectacular than they had initially been made out to be. The experiment shows that the possible leakages Nurkse talked about do not belong to the footnotes but deserve to occupy a prominent place in the text of the story. The failure—or the partial success if one prefers to call it that—of the experiment points to the serious difficulties that stand in the way of stopping the leakages: for the more effectively they were closed, the more rapidly the ardour of the peasants cooled off. Thus the Soviet and the Chinese experiments, their mutual differences notwithstanding, underline alike the difficulties of widening the stream of the marketed surplus of agricultural produce which an ambitious programme of industrialization calls for.

The Indian experiment with its programme of large-scale industrialization emphasizing producer goods industries bears a family resemblance to the Soviet and the Chinese situations and its difficulties too are essentially the manifestations of a developing inter-sectoral imbalance between agriculture and industry. Its outstanding difference with the Soviet situation and the Chinese situation following the stoppage of Soviet economic assistance stems from the fact that India has been able to supplement its domestic effort with sizable external economic assistance.

The rôle of aid, which is essentially one of bridging the time lag between the creation of the bases for rapid growth and the growth itself, has been crucial in minimizing the rigour of the process, although the steadily mounting requirements of aid in relation to its availability have kept the Indian balance of payments position under continuous strain. But in the same step that aid exercised a softening effect; it obliterated from view, or, at any rate, blurred the real character of a developing situation. A succession of three poor or mediocre harvests in the Third Plan combined with the more recent interruption in the flow of economic aid precipitated a crisis. Thus, the difference between the Indian situation and the comparable Soviet and Chinese situations is only a difference of degree, and not of kind.

These historical parallels serve to highlight the crucial dependence of such a pattern of development on external economic aid. The Soviet and Chinese experiments posed the question: How far can

organization be a substitute for external economic assistance—substitute in the sense of being able to help mobilize the necessary resources and/or effectively impose the necessary austerity—in successfully carrying out such a pattern of development?

The outstanding achievement of the Soviet experiment was that it demonstrated for the first time that such a pattern of development could be successfully executed with little foreign economic aid. But even as it demonstrated its feasibility, it underlined the high price that had to be paid in terms of a degree of regimentation quite incompatible with economic and political democracy.

For a nation that has accepted the democratic process as India has, the dilemma is very real and can perhaps be resolved only if there is an adequate inflow of aid, for an appropriate length of time, and on terms which are not so onerous as to make it self-defeating.

Are the current problems of the Indian economy then a reflection of factors pertaining to the inflow of aid or do they arise from faults in the deployment of resources?

That in a proximate sense the imbalances we have been emphasizing can be ascribed to the insufficiency of the net inflow of aid constitutes no answer to the question. For the point at issue is not whether more aid will not immediately help alleviate the strain on the balance of payments and ease the pressure of other shortages. The question really is whether India's growing need for aid is not an indication that the Indian economy is drifting into a vicious circle of needing more and ever more aid because of a faulty deployment of resources. Indeed there is a view that India has put in large resources, including the aid resources, in creating capacity which cannot be utilized without still more aid and in creating industries which lack comparative advantage and which will probably not survive liberalization of imports and consequent competition. It is a corollary of this view that dependence on aid, instead of diminishing, is growing because our strategy of development is unsound. If correct, it would explain much of our present malaise. But is this view correct?

If one had to sum up India's development strategy with desperate brevity, one would call it a strategy of import-substitution. Let us examine the rationale of this strategy.

The Indian planners, after an assessment of the export possibilities of the economy, came to the view that these possibilities were

so restricted that given the targeted rate of growth of income and the consequent requirements of investment, a high priority for investment goods industries was a logical corollary, and, furthermore, that this priority would have to continue till the ratio of investment to income reached a stage where the non-availability of investment goods (either imported or domestically produced) would no longer exercise an inhibiting effect on growth. Thus, given the assumption of limited additional foreign exchange earnings via exports and given the capital-output ratios of different industries, a particular type of structure of production was indicated.

In view of the known resources of coal and iron, bauxite, manganese, power, etc., the scope for the importation of new techniques, and the size of the domestic market, the strategy did not lack basic support in an adequate and diversified domestic resource base. Expansion of the steel capacity became the nucleus of the new industrial effort. It was around this nucleus that various kinds of fabricating facilities, heavy foundries, forges, structural shops, other machine-building capacity and the supporting infrastructure for the capital goods sector and the rest of the economy were programmed for.

This strategy is sometimes criticized for making the Indian economy too much like a closed economy and neglecting the liberating rôle of international trade, but the criticism is valid only in a limited sense. It can be demonstrated that even on an optimistic assessment of the possibility of international trade, the structure of production that would best assure the inevitable pattern of availabilities would not be materially different from the structure of production that must prevail in a closed economy. Not only are the possibilities of export promotion limited in the short run, but there is also a pre-emptive claim on India's foreign exchange earnings dictated by the necessity to import things which cannot physically be produced in required quantities locally, such as oil, non-ferrous metals, certain chemicals, etc., and if to these inexorable demands we add the need for what are called "maintenance requirements" of the economy, we will have accounted for much more than the entire foreign exchange earnings of the country. In such a situation the expansion or creation of new capacity becomes limited by the availability of investment goods from either domestic production or foreign aid.

It is, of course, true that the possibilities of trade are not inherently limited. But for India they lie in the direction of a sufficiently diversified structure of production corresponding in broad outlines to the kind of structure that must prevail if it were indeed a closed economy. This contention is reinforced by the fact that any large-scale stepping up of Indian exports in the future will have to be mainly in non-traditional exports and that such stepping-up can become feasible only after sufficient expansion in capacity in new lines and diversification in the industrial structure have taken place.

In this context, reference is sometimes made to the recent increase in the export of light engineering products and the hope is expressed that these "new manufactures" (as Sir Donald MacDougall called them) would make a "major and important" contribution to India's foreign exchange earnings. Since India is a minor exporter of these products and the world trade in manufactures is growing fast, it is argued that the export possibilities of these products are immense.

On a closer examination, however, these possibilities do not seem to be on a scale that would amount to a major breakthrough. Apart from the fact that these exports have a very narrow base (in 1960 they accounted for only about 2 per cent of India's exports), their large-scale expansion seems to be subject to various uncertainties. The bulk of these engineering products constitutes consumer goods or simple intermediate products which can be produced on a small scale and are mostly exported to underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa which also face balance of payments difficulties and cherish ambitions of industrialization. These characteristics obviously mark out these products to be the likely victims of trade restrictions or import-substitution on the part of importing countries. On the other hand, developed countries, with less serious balance of payments problems, can take these products, provided their tariffs permit it. But even in this case there would be some awkward problems, such as the need to set up special export capacity to meet specific requirements which may be at variance with those of the domestic consumer.

In view of these circumstances, India's major export possibilities outside the traditional items would seem to lie in capital goods and such intermediate products as iron and steel and chemicals and essential consumer goods (like drugs, for example) whose imports

are less likely to be shut out and which cannot be locally produced. Thus we are back again to the industries which figure so prominently in the Indian development programme. Indeed, if one were to push this logic further, the criticism should be that while programming for these industries no provision was made for the additional capacity for exports.

This is, of course, not to deny that even within the existing structure, a certain degree of expansion in exports is and was possible with the requisite effort towards that end. It has been suggested that if India had maintained its relative share of world markets in the case of its major exports, its export earnings would have been 15 to 20 per cent higher adding to its foreign exchange something of the order of Rs 900/1,200 million a year during the late fifties. But this estimate errs on the high side; for it is unrealistic to assume that India could maintain, for example, its pre-Partition share in the total world exports of jute manufactures in the face of the emergence of the jute industry in Pakistan. Important though the possibilities of additional foreign exchange earnings undoubtedly are, the fact is that they constitute no more than a small fraction of the total import bill. These possibilities cast no doubt on the essential soundness of the strategy of development adopted.

Thus it would seem that whichever way one approaches the possibilities of promoting economic development in India, there is a certain inevitability about the broad strategy that India has evolved for itself.

Now that we have seen that the Indian strategy has been essentially sound, we may also note that the pace of its implementation has been encouraging. The import content of domestic investment has progressively declined from 21.5 per cent in the First Plan to about 14 per cent in the Second Plan and about 11 per cent during the last part of the Third Plan.⁶

Despite this progress the balance of payments problem continues and India's aid requirements tend to grow. This is essentially because having regard to the requirements of a subcontinental economy of the size of India, this process, which started in right earnest only in the middle of the Second Plan, has been in operation for only a limited period so far. Since the creation of capacity in one line

⁶V.K.R.V. Rao, "Indian Exports during Three Plans: Retrospect and Pros-

calls for the creation of complementary capacity in several other lines and since these tasks cannot be accomplished simultaneously in view of the overall limitation of domestic and external resources, the progress of import-substitution, in its earlier stages, tends to accompany an increase rather than a decrease in the aid requirements. The increase in India's requirement for net aid, therefore, is primarily a result of gestation lags and the transition period, and the even greater requirement of gross aid is to be attributed to the heavy burden of debt service. Thus in relation to the capacity of a country to utilize aid resources effectively, (a) the larger the initial inflow of aid, (b) the easier the terms on which it is made available, and (c) the more rapidly it is able to step up its marginal savings rate, the shorter the period over which it is likely to achieve self-reliance (that is, independence from the need for aid).

In terms of India's capacity to absorb aid effectively, the quantum of aid it has received is inadequate and the bulk of the loan assistance it received till recently was on terms which have imposed a serious burden of debt service on it, thus widening the gap between its net and gross aid requirements. Of the loans repayable in foreign currencies, authorized up to the end of December 1963, a little less than half carried interest rates exceeding 5 per cent. And of these loans nearly 40 per cent were short-term and medium-term loans with periods of repayment of less than fifteen years. It is true that the terms of loan assistance have been getting easier in recent years. But some idea of the size of the burden imposed by loans contracted in the past can be had from the figures for capital repayments and interest payments involving foreign exchange which shot up by about 100 per cent between 1960-61 (Rs 500 million) and 1963-64 (Rs 950 million) and are estimated to go up further by about 70 per cent in 1965-66 (Rs 1,650 million). The figure for 1965-66 constitutes nearly a fifth of the total export earnings of India in that year.

As for the domestic effort to raise savings, it has been mentioned earlier that by the end of the Second Plan the effort was less than adequate. A simple way of measuring the effort put into the mobilization of domestic resources would have been to assess how far it had lifted up the marginal saving rate. But although we have some very rough idea of the marginal rate of savings obtaining in the Indian economy over the period 1950-51—1962-63, we have

little dependable and reasonably firm estimates of its behaviour over time.

The Government's effort in mobilizing resources can, however, be gauged by the fact that during the first two Plans, it jacked up the tax effort at the rate of about 10 per cent a year and since the Chinese invasion the figure has nearly doubled. For a democratic Government this is not unimpressive. To be sure, there exist pockets which have been left untapped, relatively speaking. Agriculture has, by and large, got off lightly; so have middle-range income-earners who belong to the income-tax-paying category. This is perhaps an indication of a democratic Government's hesitation to tax the peasantry, who control the largest bloc of votes. It is also true that there is a good deal of evasion and avoidance of tax payments. While these hesitations and incapacities are admitted, they also indicate the nature of the potential available for mopping up. Under the stress of circumstances, these hesitations are not allowed to become insuperable hurdles as was proved in the stiff budget of 1963-64 (following the Chinese attack). Thus while domestic resources are being increasingly mobilized (as seen in the steady increase in the average savings rate) and are capable of being mobilized still further, the awkward problem of converting domestic savings into foreign exchange earnings remains largely unchanged.

Can we then infer that India's growing need for aid is no reflection on the soundness of its economic strategy or on the manner in which it has broadly deployed available resources? Not entirely. India has now reached a stage of development which calls for important shifts of emphasis, already overdue, in the deployment of its resources. It has arrived at a stage which underscores the validity of the proposition that to be ambitious on the industrial front it must be still more, and not less, ambitious on the agricultural front. This proposition needs some elaboration. While it is true that so far India has followed the course of simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, it must be added that the dimensions and content of the simultaneity we are now talking about are not quite the same as those of the simultaneity India has practised hitherto.

For at least the decade that lies ahead the growth rate of agriculture, lying anywhere from the 3 to 3.5 per cent attained so far, is clearly inadequate. Presuming that the annual growth of national income sought is around 7 per cent, that the population continues

to grow at no more than the current rate of 2.5 per cent, and that the income elasticity of demand for foodgrains is about 0.5, the domestic demand for foodgrains would grow at the rate of nearly 5 per cent a year. As for the principal cash crops, the domestic demand for oilseeds is increasing so rapidly that it is making steady encroachments on the export surplus. The vigorous expansion in the domestic demand for sugar has limited, likewise, the possibility of increasing its exports, which are at present a very small fraction of the total world exports of sugar and offer a fair scope for expansion. The recent decline in India's share in the world offtake of jute manufactures is due more to domestic factors than to world demand. On available evidence, the domestic demand for cotton textiles and raw cotton is increasing almost at the same rate as the national income. Thus the trends of domestic demand and export possibilities suggest that the output of cash crops needs to grow even faster than that of foodgrains, at any rate not slower.

The export possibilities of these products in relation to India's current and prospective foreign exchange requirements are, of course, limited, but there is an obvious and pressing need to reverse their present declining trends and to exploit to the fullest whatever possibilities of increase do exist. This in turn dictates a restraint on their domestic consumption in the immediate future and an increase in their production as soon as it can be realized. As is to be expected in an economy of the size of India, the total requirement for these products is so large that even in more normal conditions than those obtaining at present, no more than a marginal fraction of these can be relied upon to be met by imports. And it is becoming increasingly clear that India cannot go on relying on aid in order to close the steadily widening gap between the domestic demand and the supply of these agricultural products. It has become imperative to attain self-sufficiency, or near self-sufficiency, and the necessity can no longer be postponed. But self-sufficiency is another name for import-substitution. The case for an increased emphasis on agricultural development is powerful indeed, but it needs to be stressed that it rests both on considerations of import-substitution and also on those of export promotion, though to a lesser extent.

We must turn to the question of whether or not the increased emphasis on agriculture necessitates a diversion of resources from industry. In other words, how far are agricultural and industrial

developments proving to be more mutually competitive than complementary?

It is pertinent here to note that although the situation demands an urgent lift-up of the growth rate of agriculture from the realized 3 to 3.5 per cent to the required minimum of 5 per cent, the fact of the matter is that with the traditional inputs on which India has relied so far, it cannot hope to maintain even the rate of growth realized hitherto, if for no other reason than that nearly a half of the growth of agricultural output achieved has been the result of expansion in the sown area, which is now fast approaching the limits of exhaustion. This fact has a significant relevance to the more recent stagnation of agricultural output in India. The burden of achieving a much higher rate of growth in agricultural output now rests almost entirely on stepping up yield per acre, and this marks a new and a much more difficult stage in the agricultural development of India. It is widely recognized that at this stage yield per acre cannot be stepped up without a large-scale increase in the availability of modern inputs, fertilizers, pesticides, insecticides, high-yielding seeds, and so on. We need not digress here into the controversial area of the need for land reforms, for their advocates do not deny the need for modern inputs; they advocate land reforms only as a precondition for a large-scale absorption of these inputs. The real point is that these inputs can be made available to the farmer either by importing them or by creating the capacity to produce them within the country. The latter is decidedly the more economic of the two alternatives, and indeed still more economic when compared with the third alternative of importing foodgrains. A few figures will illustrate. It has been estimated that every rupee of foreign exchange spent on building a fertilizer plant means, eventually, a recurring saving of two rupees every year spent on the import of fertilizers or six rupees on the import of foodgrains.

The raising of the sights on the agricultural front, calling for a large-scale step-up in the domestic capacity to produce modern inputs, then, is not a competitive move in relation to industry. It only requires an internal shift in industrial priorities, a shift of emphasis from metals to chemicals and in metals from base metals to machine-building capacity. But this complementary relationship between agriculture and industry obtains over a time-horizon in which industry starts supplying these modern inputs to agriculture.

In the interim it is competitive in the sense that the creation of the input capacity competes for the scarce foreign exchange resources, thereby depriving agriculture of imported fertilizers. In fact, the strategy hitherto followed implies a still longer time-horizon but embodies a yet more lucrative alternative of creating capacity to manufacture fertilizer plants domestically. An implication of this strategy is that it enlarges and prolongs this competitive relationship unless foreign aid increases commensurately in the interim to neutralize its sting.

One might, therefore, reasonably assert that there is nothing unsound about India's basic strategy, provided adequate aid is available; but if it is not, it has to strike compromises between the short and the long run in the realization that it has no choice but to modify this ambitious strategy. Our failure then consists in not having foreseen the true significance of the growing inter-sectoral imbalance conjointly with the increased gap that was to emerge between requirements and availability of aid to shift, in time, the relative emphasis from metals to chemicals within the framework of what is otherwise a sound economic strategy. The recent experience has served to dramatize what are essentially two facets of the same phenomenon; inter-sectoral imbalance and the inadequacy of aid. The shift of emphasis that has been indicated here is now being effected in the proposed Fourth Plan. If the Indian planners had foreseen the realities of the aid situation and taken proper note of the inter-sectoral imbalance which was brewing in the Second Plan, they would have worked for this shift in emphasis in the Third Plan itself, and the edge would have been taken off the competitiveness between agriculture and industry. In the short-run context of today, the edge is still sharp enough to hurt. The realities of the situation have brought home to India the realization that to achieve self-reliance tomorrow, it must start working for it right away.

What then is the prospect of Indian economy today? This question cannot be answered unless one takes a view on the size of the foreign aid likely to be available, say for the next ten years (for we have seen that external assistance is a necessary complement to self-help). If, as we have attempted to demonstrate, the essentials of the Indian strategy are sound and if the shifts in some priorities which are needed to correct the imbalances and stimulate further growth are incorporated into the relevant policies, then it

might seem that India's ability to attain economic independence in the course of the next decade importantly depends upon the immediate availability of adequate aid.

If, however, the donor countries decide to curtail aid or attach such conditions to it as will force India to decline it, a new situation and a new challenge will face the country. In that case India will have to mobilize its own domestic resources to the utmost. The aim of such efforts will have to be to cut down consumption to the bone and to squeeze out as much surplus as possible for investment. This might necessitate, for instance, drastic reduction in the imports of long staple cotton and kerosene, expansion in the export of sugar, and the prevention of leakage of imported investment goods to non-essential consumer goods. In these circumstances, a régime of rationing of essential consumer goods (like foodgrains, cloth, kerosene, and sugar) and widespread austerity will become inevitable. Furthermore, it will entail strenuous efforts to convert domestic savings into foreign exchange so as not to starve the economy of imported investment goods essential to economic growth. This will further cut down domestic consumption. It will also mean that the period over which such strenuous efforts and sacrifices will have to be made will be much longer than it need have been if aid were available.

Poor as India may be, it still has some fat which it can throw into the fire to maintain a desirable rate of economic growth. But this is an economist's point of view. Whether it will be possible or practicable for a Government which believes in persuasion rather than in coercion to implement such a programme of austerity on an adequate scale is more than one can say. It will be a severe test of the quality of Indian political leadership.

31 March 1967

P.S. LOKANATHAN

FOREIGN AID AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

DURING THE LAST couple of years or so, there is evidence of disturbing second thoughts on international aid both in the lending and in the receiving countries. The lending countries apparently share the view that the effort to put the developing countries on their feet takes a long time—longer than was so readily assumed in the fifties. At any rate, the consensus among the lenders seems to be that aid and economic growth are not so automatic. Owing perhaps to wrong priorities, or to wrong time schedules, or to administrative inefficiency, or to all these and other lacunae in some proportion, the donor countries feel that their aid has not been put to the best use by the beneficiaries; and that the rate of growth does not reflect the quantum and the frequency of the aid given.

The aid-receiving countries, on the other hand, have always held that the flow of aid is far too meagre and given without commitment to a specific period of time to help them on rapidly towards self-sustaining growth. Besides, there is the political overtone which many of the loans and other forms of aid generally take on. Many of the developing countries, prominent on the aid list, have only recently shaken off colonial rule; they are, therefore, jealous of their economic freedom and resent the donor countries' claim to scan or change their priority schedules as an attempt by the over-zealous lenders at establishing some form of neo-colonialism.

To us in India the virtual stoppage of all aid at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965 brought home the point that any excessive dependence on foreign aid would expose our economy to

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the vagaries of international power politics, and that, in any case, we could not have an independent foreign policy on the basis of dependence on one bloc or the other in our economic sphere. We were sharply reminded on this occasion that we should strive to pursue a self-reliant economy in the future and that we should think of a deadline to the stopping of foreign aid. While this view has been slowly crystallizing since the conflict with Pakistan, the President's speech in the current session of the Parliament has put down stoppage of all foreign aid by 1976 as a definite objective of the new Government. This aim is certainly in consonance with our recent thinking on the matter, but it is interesting to note the implicit recognition in the President's policy statement that aid is necessary for another ten years to come, thereby indicating that without aid in this period our economic development cannot be fast and that perhaps it would be slower than it is at present if we dispensed with foreign aid forthwith.

At the same time, it is only too well known now that the foreign aid we anticipate for the Fourth Plan is still far from probable. We should not be surprised if, when it ultimately comes, both the quantum of aid and the terms under which it is lent are disappointing. For it is obvious that the donor countries, especially the United States, are now, implicitly or explicitly, insisting that our getting aid is conditional upon our following certain policies and certain priorities to their satisfaction. It is in this background that this article is being written.

It is not my purpose here to narrate in detail the evolution of international aid. Nor is it necessary to help us appreciate that global aid in the present magnitude is essentially a post-war phenomenon. An altogether new dimension was given to it when the United Nations, by two Articles in its Charter, laid the responsibility of giving economic aid to the developing countries upon Member states, both individually and collectively.

In pursuance of this, a great deal of assistance, on an average of 6.6 billion US dollars a year between 1961 and 1965, has been distributed to the needy countries. Over a hundred and fifty countries on all the five continents have benefited. Of the aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which provides

—43 per cent—has gone to Asia, followed by Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Oceania, in that order. Including private lending, the per capita receipt, in the period 1960-65, for the Asian countries, was 20 US dollars as against 46 to 49 US dollars for Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The United States has provided 52 per cent of the total flow, followed by France (16 per cent), the United Kingdom (9 per cent), Germany (7 per cent), and Japan (4 per cent).

The discussions in the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have also led to a consensus of feeling that at least one per cent of the national income of the richer countries should be given as aid to the developing countries. Above this target are such aid-givers as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.¹ Even so, the share of official aid in the total gross national product (GNP) from the DAC members has declined from about 0.65 per cent in 1961 to about 0.5 per cent in 1965. The ratio of official aid to their combined national income has similarly gone down from 0.8 per cent in 1961 to 0.6 per cent in 1965.

Besides the magnitude, within these years, the form of aid, the agencies of aid, and the type of aid have all undergone visible changes. In fact, even the term aid, in the sense of outright grant, is not right; such grants form an insignificant proportion of the total flow of funds. The bulk of the so-called aid is in the form of interest-bearing loans. The form of aid in recent years has increasingly been consortium-sponsored as against the earlier, purely bilateral type. Bilateral aid is preferred by the donor countries because of the facility it gives them in choosing the specific areas of help and also in stipulating the terms. Countries like the United States maintain this form in their surplus foodgrains distribution also. Short-term interests are served better by bilateral than by multilateral ones. On the other hand, multilateral aid has found overwhelming favour with the receiving countries. They do not have to fear interference by foreign Powers in their domestic affairs; they can also draw from various sources technical skills of different kinds; multilateral programmes can direct pressures on recipient countries for utilizing the aid more effectively; and multilateral aid

would direct the resources to certain basic projects rather than to those of temporary political significance.

The agencies of aid also have multiplied even as the specific needs of the developing countries are better appreciated. The World Bank mainly provides capital finance besides technical assistance. The family of the UN Specialized Agencies draw up their own schemes of help. Regional finance institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, etc. finance specific projects. Of course, private investment plays an important rôle in some developing countries, especially in Latin America, in supplementing official aid although such private effort cannot strictly come under the term *aid*.

Of the types of aid, the two broad categories are the project and non-project aid; the latter is no doubt more useful to the receiving countries, but its proportion to the total aid in any country depends on a variety of considerations, not the least important of which is the lending country's balance of payments position. The obligation under the tied loan is that the amount earmarked should be utilized in the lending country itself for getting equipment, etc.; where the lending country's cost is high, it adds naturally to the debt burden of the receiving country. The donor countries prefer tied loans because these loans will be used to create particular assets which later on will be associated with the donor country. It creates a psychological satisfaction for the people of the donor countries in that they have contributed something tangible in the development of the receiving country.

While the changes such as those traced here are broadly in conformity with any living form of international co-operation and are a sign of appreciation of the complexity of the world economic issues, what is striking is the transformation, as I have said, in the very attitude to aid over time both in the aid-providing and the aid-receiving countries.

Yet the benefit of aid and the principle of extending it were never more clear than at present. The benefit part of it is direct and can be easily summarized. International aid gives that breathing space—that shot in the arm—which enables a developing country to supplement its own saving capacity and plan for a politically and economi-

between the present and the attainable growth in a developing country, there is perhaps no alternative to foreign aid, except, of course, the large-scale consumer denial and regimentation such as the Soviet Union went through in the twenties. The present savings rate and the potential savings capacity of the developing countries are acknowledgedly low and their exports are largely inelastic. Granting that some expansion in export is possible through international pressure—the forum of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) being purposefully used, for instance—it is still difficult to see the developing countries' current maintenance imports and the extra imports for development being both financed from the export earnings alone within a reasonable time. Besides, the developing countries should acquire not only capital equipment but technical management and know-how also. Further, at the initial stages of development there is a large outlay to be made on economic overheads such as those in transport and power; the equipment in this case has to be imported, and this involves foreign exchange. Such investment involves considerable waiting before it begins paying. In short, if the commonly accepted rate of per capita growth in income between 4 and 5 per cent—the rate at which the economy is said to be at the take-off stage—is to be attained by the developing countries, large-scale help through external aid is inevitable. Of course, the acceptable growth rate will vary from country to country depending on, to illustrate, the growth rate of the population and the extent of the seriousness in the structural imbalance that stands to be corrected.

Where do the developing countries stand now? As the UNCTAD Secretary-General, Raul Prebisch, pointed out a few months ago, even midway during the so-called Development Decade, the wealth gap between the rich and the poor countries is actually seen to be on the increase. Whereas the former have a recorded average of 4.5 per cent annual growth, the latter are still stagnating around 1.5 per cent. Yet it is precisely at this juncture that the financial assistance from the donors has declined from 0.85 per cent a year of the total of their national incomes to 0.63 per cent, as I referred to earlier. It is also precisely at this time that the conditions of aid are stiffening. In fact, the debt burden of the receiving countries for the aid they have received already is so high that the net value of

ing countries in this context is easily understandable. They rightly complain that the rich countries do not live up to the spirit of the UN Charter; the Development Decade has not so far meant to them anything special. They also make it clear that the so-called aid has no charity element in it; almost in every form of it, aid is disbursed only on computation of a rate of interest and a time schedule for repayment. If, in the circumstances, some of the aid-receiving countries, such as India, visualize a date by which they would dispense with all aid, it arises not from any underrating of the importance or the usefulness of external aid as such but largely from a feeling that both self-respect and an appreciation of the political and economic realities of the world demand that they should become quickly self-reliant.

As against this, the donor countries feel that in their own midst popular attitude to aid is discouraging if not actually hostile. Considerable theoretical opinion, doubting the usefulness of aid, is also cited in support. In the United States, for instance, Professor Banfield has argued that aid is not likely to make much difference to the development of the poor countries and that, ultimately, it may not help in promoting international peace or the growth of free institutions such as the US Government may have at the back of its mind when launching on aid plans. Others, like Professor Friedmann, have also more or less expressed themselves on these lines.

Although it is true that not all the other donor countries feel as strongly about aid, they too raise many questions in self-doubt: By how much will their aid increase the recipient country's national income? By what percentage would aid increase the savings from the additional income? What would be the effect of any aid on population growth? And so on.

Generally, the common measure for giving aid is the absorptive capacity of the benefiting country. While not every investment can be self-liquidating, the total inflow and its utilization should result in a reasonable increase in income. Aid should also lead to an increase in the marginal capacity to save. Added to these, the donor countries feel that there should be a subjective evaluation of the receiving country's overall administration, especially in the development wing.

The aid-giving countries now usually add a rider: they do not

effort in the benefiting countries themselves to raise resources. This calls for a proper assessment of the benefiting countries' resources for development, their potential for development such as technical skill, etc., and also their capacity to improve their external trade when domestic production is increased as a result of any aid scheme.

There is an apparent feeling in some donor countries that the interest rate should be stiff so as to oblige the receiving countries to use the aid most prudently. Luckily, there is not much support for this as it is commonly found that some of the most unreasonable and low-priority projects have come to be financed by high-interest loans. While the deterrent effect of a high rate of interest and other stiff terms may not be so clearly arguable, what is foreseeable is that the debt burden of the benefiting countries will go up and that this in turn will reduce the usefulness of all aid and put off the date of the receiving countries' self-sustaining growth to an indeterminable future. This is now well recognized by knowledgeable persons. No less than the President of the World Bank has recommended to the donor countries that the terms of trade should be liberalized both in terms of the interest rates and in terms of the period of repayment.

II

Before I come to India's problems *vis-à-vis* international aid, I should like to run through a few basic facts on the subject. The quantum of aid to India has grown with each successive plan. From Rs 380 crores in the First Plan, it increased to over Rs 2,007 crores in the Second Plan and to nearly Rs 4,000 crores in the Third Plan. The main element in the aid has been the PL 480 foodgrains import. Excluding food aid, the proportion of foreign aid to total investment has increased from 5.9 per cent in the First Plan to nearly 17 per cent in the Third Plan.

Aid utilization has been increasing at a fair rate; from 53 per cent of the total resources available in the First Plan, this proportion has gone up to 63 per cent during the Third Plan.

The type of aid to India has been both project aid and non-project aid. During the First Plan 53 per cent of the total loan

the Second Plan the tied loans were nearly four-fifths of the total. If I may digress here briefly, I would say that one of the reasons for the slow utilization of aid is the tying up of the loans to specific projects; when these projects get delayed for any reason, the percentage of utilization also goes down. If the tied aid is utilized to create capacity, it is still uncertain whether that capacity will be utilized fully for want of sufficient foreign exchange to get the maintenance imports. Thus, the very purpose of tied aid—creating sufficient capacity for utilizing it—is defeated for want of non-project aid. However, of late, the donor countries have shown better appreciation of this problem and seem to be willing to release more non-project aid to utilize the capacity fully.

Of the aid received during the three plans, the United States contributed nearly 40 per cent; the World Bank and its affiliates, 13 per cent; the Soviet Union, about 10 per cent; Germany, about 7 per cent; and the United Kingdom, 6 per cent. More than half of US aid is repayable in rupees.

The Table at the end of this paper gives the utilization pattern of aid during the period 1961-62—1964-65. If all aid is taken together, nearly 50 per cent will be seen to have gone into capital goods production and four-fifths of it to the producer goods industry. If non-food aid alone is taken, nearly 70 per cent went into capital goods industry and nearly 30 per cent for maintenance material. This is clear evidence that India has put the aid funds to the best use possible—to create capacities and to strengthen the infrastructure.

Depending on the specific donor countries and the institutions, the loan terms to India have varied. Certain loans are free of interest but payable in short periods; others are both of low interest and payable over comparatively long periods; others are in between.

Country-wise, a majority of the loans from West Germany are at 5.75 per cent interest, loans being repayable in 15 to 20 years. Loans from the Soviet Union generally carry interest at 2.5 per cent and are repayable in 12 years. Interest rates for loans from the United States vary from 3.5 per cent to 5.75 per cent, and the repayment period starts from the first year itself on some of the loans; ten years after, in others; or after the sanction of the first

15 to 20 years. For aid from Japan, the rates are around 5.75 per cent, and the repayable period is 15 to 20 years with generally a moratorium of 5 years. Of the institutional loans, the World Bank charges us from 3.5 per cent (for one loan for agriculture) to over 4 per cent and some even at 5.75 per cent. The repayment period is from 7 to 20 years. The IDA loans have no interest, but only a service charge. The loans are repayable over 50 years with an initial moratorium of 10 years.

On this point of debt service hangs the first major problem of this country. It would be seen that a large number of the loans are at a fairly high rate of interest, and having regard to I.M.D. Little's view that the developing countries would be put to enormous difficulty to repay both the loan capital and the interest if the latter was around 6 per cent, India would seem to be a typical case in this unfortunate situation. It is estimated that the debt service charge in 1965-66 would have gone up to around Rs 150 crores, before devaluation. By 1970-71, the service charge is expected to mount up to Rs 500 crores annually. As I said earlier, the situation that many developing countries including India find themselves in is that as the debt service increases, the ratio of net aid to the gross falls significantly. Our interest and capital payment together were about 15 per cent of the total aid during the Third Plan; this proportion is expected to increase by nearly 25 to 30 per cent during the Fourth Plan.

It is not only that the interest and the repayment terms work out to be hard on the developing countries. There are other tags equally stiff. For instance, the World Bank insists that the tenders for the projects financed out of loans from it should be given to the lowest bidder. The result is that the Indian firms among the tenderers lose the contract on account of their higher quotations. In the process, the Government also loses a chance to conserve foreign exchange. Further, as I said earlier, tied loans require that most of it is spent in the lending countries themselves. This pushes up the cost of the project itself because the cost in the lending countries, from which the equipment, etc. have to be bought, is also high.

What is the extent of India's need of foreign aid in the future? Before answering this question, let me mention that whereas in absolute terms we in India get more than any other country,

on a per capita basis the aid to us is perhaps among the lowest in the world. For instance, the aid per capita to India on an average in 1962 and 1963 was only 1.8 dollars as against Pakistan's 4.4 dollars. India's record of utilization of the aid, already mentioned, is very satisfactory. India is also poised for rapid development. Sufficient overheads have been created, sufficient basic industries have been established, and, as for technical personnel, the country has an edge over many other developing countries. A good case has thus been made out for India—one more massive dose of aid and a big push would enable the country to achieve a self-sustained and self-reliant economy. However, in this context, what is important is not merely the aggregate foreign aid during, say, the next decade, but also its phasing; in other words, we may need a larger percentage of aid in the next three to four years and a relatively small one in the subsequent period. Two economists, Bergsman and Manne, have worked out alternative models depicting India's growth to self-sufficiency within about the Fourth Plan period. In one such alternative, they indicate that if the following conditions are fulfilled, the period of foreign dependence could be drastically curtailed: (a) the aggregate rate of growth in the economy should be 5.8 per cent; (b) the national savings rate should be 35 per cent; (c) the rate of increase in export earnings should be around 6 per cent a year; and (d) foreign aid in the Fourth Plan period should be around Rs 3,000 crores at the pre-devaluation rate.

By assuming a slightly higher level of exports by 1970-71 and by focussing attention on a new concept of "import saving" as different from "import-substitution" in the exercise of Bergsman and Manne, the National Council works out that self-reliance could be achieved even earlier than 1972-73.

The economists' model conforms to the Fourth Plan proposal of the target date for doing away with foreign aid. In fact, the aid figure in the Fourth Plan (Rs 4,700 crores), together with a flow of private foreign capital (Rs 685 crores), is slightly higher than the Bergsman and Manne figure of Rs 3,000 crores. But the snag is—and this is important—that there is no indication that as much as Rs 1,000 to Rs 1,200 crores of aid will be available for each of the early years of the Fourth Plan.

Here arises a crucial question. Having considered what is

desirable and what should be expected by way of aid, we should now be ready to face the contingency if aid as desired or as expected is not forthcoming. A number of priorities and the acceptance of a few basic principles at once suggest themselves. The most immediate priority is the attainment of self-sufficiency in food. The three important basic principles are: (a) increased mobilization of domestic savings, i.e. an increased share of additional income being diverted to investment; (b) a concerted attempt at import-substitution; and (c) the creation of well-defined export sectors and earnest efforts to increase exports.

I do not have to reiterate here that the most deplorable aspect of our dependence on foreign aid is that of our food requirements. I am not against PL 480 imports; at the initial stages, PL 480 was welcome, because it enabled the developing countries to utilize their meagre foreign exchange reserves for importing basic equipment for development instead of spending them on food. But we failed to develop agriculture on account of complacency, if not negligence. The result was that in the last six years or so, we were obliged to import foodgrains worth Rs 850 crores under PL 480, and this was in addition to food imports worth Rs 180 crores during this very period against hard foreign exchange. The food problem continues to be what it has been. The draft Fourth Plan has provided for an import of 19 million tonnes of foodgrains under PL 480. This is a substantial quantity. But if the President's policy statement of our being self-sufficient in food requirements by 1970 is to be honoured, this lot of 19 million tonnes should be about the last block of PL 480 imports.

About domestic savings, it can be readily assumed that given the existing income distribution and the current rate of 9 per cent average savings, achievement of the desired rate of mobilization of resources may not be possible. The effort should be to find ways and means of doubling the present average savings rate and to push the marginal savings rate to about 36 per cent against the present 16 per cent or so. One way of looking at savings is that they should exceed investment at least by an amount equal to the debt service charges. Even to make this possible, the effort at mobilization is stupendous. Taxation seems to be the most obvious way of mopping up the resources, but how far we can go in this respect is a matter open to a wide difference of opinion. The conventional means of collec-

ting the individual, corporate, and Government savings are all to be tapped for what they are worth. And yet I believe that other avenues should be explored for proper mobilization of the extra income that may have percolated to the community through the developmental efforts.

The second basic factor for reducing the need for foreign aid is to follow import-savings and import-substitution more consistently and purposefully than in the past. It cannot be denied that there is considerable scope for import-savings in this country. In a recent study by the National Council, it has been estimated that maintenance imports of a large number of industries can be reduced by 50 per cent during the Fourth Plan if proper steps are taken from now on and if the targets of the many intermediate products, as envisaged in the Plan, are achieved. One consequence of devaluation and the liberalization of imports has unfortunately been that the urge for import-substitution has had a set-back. It should at least be ensured that the liberalized imports go only to those industries which can either cut imports through their increased output or increase exports in a substantial way. It is equally necessary that a systematic account should be made of the import-substitution possibilities industry-wise, as early as possible.

The Fourth Plan has, no doubt, set an ambitious target of export push and export earnings. It should be presumed that the difficulties in the way of expanding exports have been taken into account. One official assumption that devaluation will give the necessary fillip to exports seems to have been falsified to a large extent by now. What is urgently required is the enunciation of a clear export policy similar to the industrial policy and a cogent set of directives to the officers executing the export policy. No doubt increased production is the basis of increased export; yet it may be possible in certain spheres to increase export by reducing domestic consumption. There is also the feasibility of setting up specific export units, technologically on par with their international competitors, which would produce only for export.

Having given in the last few paragraphs the broad guidelines for reducing foreign aid by a proper mobilization of domestic savings, by import-substitution, and by increasing exports, let me again go back to the fact that whatever be our effort, a minimum amount of foreign exchange is, in any case, necessary for our rapid

development. Because of the irritation caused by the stoppage of aid during the conflict with Pakistan and because also of the political pressure that is sometimes exerted by the donor countries, some people here have begun to argue that we must give up foreign aid and let the country get on without it. I think this is unfortunately not correct; as stated earlier, if our objective is to become self-reliant, the flow of aid must be larger in the early years. We have also to reckon with the fact that the normal investment flow which existed in the nineteenth century (with which many sectors of our economy, such as the railways, plantations, the jute and other industries, etc., were developed) is now a mere trickle. Where private investment is thus not forthcoming for the purpose of development, Government-to-Government aid becomes essential.

Finally, to understand the real rôle of economic aid for development, one has to recognize that the developing countries, including India, are anxious to raise themselves to a reasonably satisfactory level of living within the short span of 20 to 22 years from now. The developed countries of today reached their maturity only after several decades, and during that period they were also recipients of foreign loans. In fact, probably with the exception of Japan, most of the advanced countries of today have had recourse to foreign loans during the early stages of their development. And, therefore, to expect the developing countries to become self-sufficient too soon without foreign aid in some measure would be unrealistic.

At the same time, I do not forget the fact that the success of aid consists ultimately in its being dispensed with. So far as India is concerned, the Government has now laid down, as I mentioned earlier, its target of dispensing with aid in ten years from now. This can be done provided the necessary steps are taken in earnest. It is to be hoped that these steps will be both effective and fruitful.

28 March 1967

AID UTILIZED DURING 1961-62—1964-65 BY END USE*

	<i>In crores of rupees</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
(1) Capital goods, going into:		
(a) producer goods industries, including power and transport	842.2	40.1 (56.7)
(b) consumer goods industries	113.6	5.4 (7.6)
(c) education and research	53.8	2.6 (3.6)
(2) Intermediates, going into:		
(a) producer goods industries	27.6	1.3 (1.8)
(b) consumer goods industries	—	—
(3) Maintenance materials, going into :		
(a) producer goods industries	408.1	19.4 (27.5)
(b) consumer goods industries	—	—
(4) Food	613.7	29.2
(5) Aid not elsewhere specified	41.1	2.0
TOTAL	2,100.1	100.0

*The figures in this Table are approximations, because full breakdowns of credits obtained are lacking in some cases.

NOTE: (i) Figures in brackets represent proportion of non-food aid.
(ii) Compiled from data published in Reserve Bank of India, *Report on Currency and Finance for the Year 1964-65* (Bombay, 1965).

SOURCE: National Council of Applied Economic Research, *Development without Aid* (New Delhi, 1966), p. 14.

B.N. GANGULI

DEVALUATION

LET ME first present the compelling character of the considerations which might have had a bearing on the Government of India's decision to devalue the rupee in June 1966.

The problem (or rather problems) may be stated from the angle of national income and expenditure, which I consider more rewarding. Import restrictions cannot be relied upon as an automatic method of bringing about the needed adjustment in the aggregate expenditure, or, in real terms, of keeping a country's absorption of goods and services within the limits of total production.

When expenditure on foreign goods is forcibly restricted, the money-income previously spent on them by consumers is spent on domestic goods and services. Home demand thus encroaches directly or indirectly on exports. Only in conjunction with deliberate restraint on total spending can import restriction bring any lasting benefit to the balance of payments. Mere exhortation to reduce spending or to "export or perish" does not work. To the extent to which part of the income spent on imports is saved, import restriction has the right effect. But we cannot expect much from this. It is only when spending on home goods is restricted by rationing and physical controls that an unspent margin of purchasing power can materialize. Since such controls have been found to be neither possible nor desirable in India, import controls are unlikely to have any impact on total spending. Indeed, it was on this ground that the British were determined to avoid import restrictions in 1954-55, when they were faced with a critical balance of payments situation. In India we have heard the popular argument that we

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can improve the foreign balance through import-substitution. For one thing, through import-substitution in consumer goods production (not necessarily of the type of "necessaries"), we have become increasingly dependent on imports of materials, spares, and components, this dependence being considered "crucial" because if their imports are cut the existence of certain industries is threatened. For another thing, a shift of production to such industries has only fed the pressure of home demand and weakened our export capacity. This was a wrong thing to happen when what was needed was increased saving induced by import restrictions. The external balance could not be attained without bringing aggregate expenditure into line with aggregate income. Import restrictions obviously could not achieve this.

The theoretical point involved in this piece of analysis is the simple notion that a country's net foreign balance is necessarily equal to what the country produces *minus* what it absorbs for its own uses. Domestic expenditure is, therefore, an important "policy variable". Since domestic expenditure cannot be effective without a corresponding disposable income, an "expenditure policy" involves also an "income policy" as regards the level of wages and other incomes which the requirements of a given magnitude of net foreign balance would justify in the new situation. This angle of vision brings into focus the problem of "living within one's means".

Other things being equal, it is easier for a country to live within its means if national income is high in relation to past maxima and current comparable levels elsewhere. Yet some control over the domestic absorption of income is an essential condition of stability. Fortunately, in an economy where there is ample slack to be taken up, there is the possibility of increasing domestic absorption and improving the foreign balance at the same time. I believe that with sufficient effort India can realize this possibility. When I say this, I do not mean that this was within our grasp as soon as the rupee was devalued. Indeed, in spite of devaluation, we may again be caught up in the same vicious circle in which we found ourselves under the system of import restrictions. But devaluation has given us a chance of a break with the past if we understand it aright.

Evidently, "export promotion" and "import-substitution" must now acquire new meanings in the context of the "domestic absorp-

to be taken up. "Domestic income" and "domestic expenditure" will have to become important "policy variables". "Plan expenditure" and "budgetary equilibrium" must also have different meanings. Like a shot in the arm, devaluation administered a shock to the economy. One hoped that its responses would be different, that its nerve-centres would react to the new situation by summoning up the necessary vigour and efficiency, and that transforming currents would course through the arteries.

For quite some time the rupee had been subjected to "concealed" devaluation. What leaped to our eyes was "open" devaluation. In the thirties we had instances of countries (Austria and some South American countries) trying to give up maintaining an artificial exchange rate and letting it depreciate in accordance with the purchasing power parity. They reached a new equilibrium permitting relaxation of exchange control. In most cases the rate was not depreciated openly all at once but step by step. At first emergency taxes were levied on foreign exchange allotted to importers and the proceeds given as subsidy to exporters. Then the extra charges on imports were gradually extended and unified till sooner or later depreciation became definitive and yet concealed. Often the trend was towards a more or less general and uniform export premium. Under "open" devaluation there would be a general and automatic subsidy on exports. When devaluation was "concealed", it became sometimes general, but not automatic. In India our system of export subsidies and import entitlements have been selective but have increased in comprehensiveness through a snowball process. One is not sure whether the cost of the subsidies has been equitably apportioned between the direct beneficiaries of these subsidies and the general taxpayers. But the generality and comprehensiveness of the taxation of imports and the subsidization of exports increased to such an extent that one could very well speak of a "concealed" devaluation of the rupee.¹ Only the desired response of exports and imports was sought to be achieved in a devious and cumbrous manner which permitted "leakages". We started moving step by step towards "concealed" devaluation. The increasing severity of import restrictions (reduced quotas and

¹It is an open secret that an import consignment under the import entitlement scheme has been permitted officially to be worth twice the rupee equivalent as

increasing import duties) and the proliferation and increase of export subsidies were further inevitable steps leading from "concealed" to "open" devaluation. No wonder that "concealed" devaluation had to become "open". There is an inexorable logic in the process which we must appreciate in the cold light of reason.

II

The pressures which forced upon us the decision to devalue the rupee were not merely the outcome of the abnormal economic factors in the recent past, but were inherent in the kind of planned economic development that the country had chosen. Let us take a look at the past not only to understand the present but also to face the future with a clear vision and in the light of past experience.

A certain degree of imbalance is inherent in the process of planned development, but the economy has to generate strength to counteract it. The first portents of serious imbalance appeared during the foreign exchange crises of 1956-57. In the course of a paper I had prepared for the Consultative Committee of Economists of the Planning Commission, I analysed how a certain kind of imbalance was built into our strategy of economic planning. It was clear that "India had become an exporter of all categories of goods: (1) 'consumption goods', (2) 'materials chiefly for consumption goods', (3) 'materials chiefly for capital goods', and (4) 'capital goods'. All of them showed a rising trend." The other impressive aspect of our economic development was an increase in net exports of consumption goods "which represented the real surplus available for capital formation through imports of capital goods". Nevertheless, it was also quite evident that our exports were much too inadequate for matching the increase in net imports of capital goods and of materials for capital goods. I said that development of export capacity depended on our "ability to divert goods from internal consumption to exports by maintaining a reasonable cost-price parity. This could not materialise, unless there was release of the inflationary pressure of the internal demand for consumption goods on prices." There were also other alarming symptoms. The value of exports of category (2)—"materials chiefly for consumption

years there was a rising trend of net imports under this category which, taken together with net imports under categories (3) and (4), were responsible for an "insupportable payments deficit". The rising trend of net imports under category (2) could be justified if they contributed to net exports of consumption goods, since the value added by manufacture is much higher than the cost of the material and there is, therefore, a net gain in foreign exchange. But our exports were losing their competitive power. Domestic consumption was eating into actual and potential exports. Thus imports of "materials for consumption goods" were increasingly used to produce goods for domestic consumption.

In my paper I refuted the argument advanced at that time by Government spokesmen that "materials for consumption goods" were used in industries producing substitutes for imports and that, therefore, foreign exchange spent then saved foreign exchange later. I argued that in a developing economy, if consumer demand is given more or less free play, increasing demand has to be met by increasing net imports of materials for consumption goods and that, therefore, there would be no saving of foreign exchange, because the total foreign exchange requirements to support the larger volume of consumption would be much larger than it was at that time. I added that "we have to increase our exports of 'materials for consumption goods' by expanding and improving our primary production and that at least we must avoid large food imports".

I drew attention to an unfortunate fact, viz that the liberalization of imports of consumer goods after 1952-53 had resulted in a considerable increase in the imports of manufactures and "general imports" like cutlery, hardware, woollen yarns and manufactures, electrical goods, stationery, and rayon textiles. Austerity had been relaxed without adequate reason.

I had an opportunity of reviewing the fundamental economic imbalance of our economy once again in 1960 in the course of an article entitled "New Importance of Foreign Trade" published in the *Hindu Survey of Indian Industry, 1960*. I found that "the increasing pace of import-substitution in respect of manufactures had brought about a considerable increase in net imports of industrial raw-materials and intermediate products including components and spare parts. Besides, considerable imports were permitted under this category, which went into residential construction." The

official theory was that if new industries consuming imported materials and intermediate products developed, they would earn foreign exchange by supplying both the home market and the export market and exporting more; and that industries producing import-substitutes for the home market alone would save foreign exchange. For reasons I have already explained, foreign exchange could be neither earned nor saved to the extent anticipated, while our import dependence in respect of materials and intermediate products progressively increased. My finding, therefore, was that during 1957-60 "in spite of rigorous controls the imbalance had shown no signs of easing off". At the same time the restrictive import policy had caused dislocation and uncertainty in that part of our industrial sector (including the sector of small industries) which had become so heavily dependent on imported materials and components.

The percentage of the total value of imports accounted for by imports of "intermediate products" had remained steadily high at 50 since we commenced planned economic development. I, therefore, came to the conclusion that "we have now reached a stage where resolute effort has to be made to achieve import-substitution in this field". I added that "this should be the main strategy of the Third Plan, apart from the possibility of banking on foreign aid".

In all conscience, we had reached a very difficult stage in the process of economic growth which was picturesquely described as a "hump". Crossing over the "hump" turned out to be dangerous owing to the combination of a number of highly adverse factors. The weaknesses of our economic development were exposed in a dramatic manner and our vulnerability to adverse shocks originating internally as well as externally became all too evident. The precarious equilibrium that was being maintained over the years was badly upset, although I believe that we have not done too badly in the face of the severe economic strain to which the economy had been exposed.

By the very nature of the Third Plan, one got the impression (shared by foreign-aid-givers) (1) that during this phase our dependence on foreign aid would temporarily increase; (2) that shortfalls in agricultural production would not be much of a problem if buffer stocks were built up for evening out fluctuations of supply

in relation to demand, and (3) that agricultural prices might be kept on the low side as a stimulus to rapid industrialization—a policy which, among other things, reacted unfavourably on agricultural development.

Two unforeseen factors upset these calculations. The Chinese attack on India in 1962 awakened us to a new sense of our lack of military preparedness. But the five-year plan of defence expenditure has important implications for the success of the Third Five-Year Plan. There had to be a necessary change in the orientation of development towards meeting the requirements of defence. The strain on real resources was obvious, although truly heroic measures were taken to raise tax revenue.

The second dislocating factor in the situation was the relative stagnation of agriculture combined with unprecedented vagaries of the season. There was a small increase of agricultural production during 1961-62, a decline of 5 per cent during 1962-63, and a rise of 3.7 per cent during 1963-64. During 1964-65 production was said to have risen by 10.5 per cent, but market arrivals were lower owing to some kind of restocking movement, and imports were 7 million tons. During 1965-66 both the Kharif and the Rabi crops were very poor owing to drought. Even with higher imports, the availability of foodgrains was expected to be less than during 1964-65. Apart from foodgrains, the outlook for the production of raw cotton, raw jute, and oilseeds was a grim one.

The combined strain on the Indian economy was reflected in the usual economic indicators. The rise of wholesale prices, which was 9 per cent during 1963-64, was 8.7 per cent during 1964-65. During the first nine months of 1965-66, the rise was 11.4 per cent. It has gone higher since then and retail prices have shot up with serious repercussions on the cost of living.

The balance of payments came under considerable pressure. During 1964-65 the decline in reserves was as large as Rs 72 crores, in spite of the withdrawal of Rs 47.6 crores from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The rising burden of debt service was an inescapable commitment; so was the payment of the IMF loan. Larger imports of food and imports of materials, components, spares, and other intermediate products were needed to keep industries dependent on them going. While debt service payments were Rs 100 crores during 1963-64, they were Rs 122

crores during 1964-65. The food bill was Rs 29 crores. Imports of machinery and raw materials, which had been liberalized during 1963-64, were at a higher level. Our exports, on the other hand, added only Rs 1 crore to our foreign exchange resources. We had utilized foreign aid to the extent of Rs 408 crores during 1963-64; during 1964-65 we utilized Rs 503 crores of aid. We also drew Rs 36 crores from the IMF. Import restrictions were made drastic. New licensing of imports to be paid for in free foreign exchange was suspended for two months from the beginning of May 1965. In spite of all these compensatory adjustments there was a decline in foreign exchange reserves to the level of Rs 250 crores (as against the statutory minimum of Rs 200 crores) during 1964-65.

The balance of payments deficit was matched by budgetary deficits. During 1965-66 the inescapable commitments regarding military expenditure and increased dearness allowance called for a supplementary budget in August 1965. Nevertheless, an overall deficit was anticipated in the Central budget. The State Governments also incurred deficits.

As the Government of India's *Economic Survey 1965-66* put it, "the budgetary deficits accounted, in large part, for a substantial expansion in the supply of money. The rate of increase during the current year may well be about 9 per cent" (p. 5). Deficits occurred in spite of the considerable budgetary support which the import of foodgrains under PL 480 provided in recent years. While there was such a substantial expansion of money-supply, output had not risen. Investment in the private as well as the public sector had, in part, to be financed by the banking system instead of through long-term saving.

Thus the traditional conjuncture of factors that accentuate inflationary pressures in an economy reappeared in an ominous form. One is tempted to detect an almost ten-year cycle in the pressures that built up during (1) 1947-49; (2) 1956-57; and (3) 1964-66. The latest crisis was hastened by the combination of certain peculiarly adverse factors which I have explained.

III

The essence of what happened was that what was "veiled" devaluation became "open". "Open" devaluation would have had

some real significance if it had induced us to realign our sights so as to face economic reality, however unpleasant it might be. I recall, in this connexion, the economists' metaphor: "Money is a veil behind which the action of real economic forces is concealed." There are periods in a nation's life—for example, when it wages a war—when manpower, equipment, organization, and resolute discipline become more and more, and money less and less, central in economic thinking. Occasions also arise when the "veil of money" becomes an evil genius. Devaluation tears away the veil of money. We begin to think in "real" terms, and cease to think of the size of our plans or the deployment or utilization of our resources only in monetary terms. Thus economic realism consists in having a close look at the "real economic forces" which have come out in the open under stress of adverse circumstances. Manpower, equipment, organization, resource development, efficiency, economy, productivity, and discipline are the kind of factors that should now engage our attention, rather than the "veil of money" which hid economic reality from our view.

As a corrective, devaluation is bound to generate compulsions. It should impose on us certain constraints which are supposed to operate through the price mechanism functioning not without controls and steering the economy along the desired path.

The fundamental constraint from which everything else flows logically is the necessity of "living within our means" as far as possible, without straining our balance of payments beyond a certain limit of tolerance. Devaluation was a recognition of the rather unpleasant fact that we had crossed this limit and that we could not have hazarded a more disastrous consequence that would have flowed from our style of economic performance if the rupee had not been devalued and we had had access to adventitious means of overcoming the balance of payments crisis.

What is, then, the new regimen to which we have to get habituated? I shall, first, present a conceptual framework which broadly indicates the nature of policy measures which should have accompanied devaluation.

The essence of the operation, whatever the method of readjustment chosen, is a combination of policies which will, on the one hand, induce changes in the commodity flows and also, on the other hand, provide incentives through prices for the necessary exchanges

to go on.

The successful outcome of devaluation in operational terms may be simply defined in the words of the IMF *Annual Report* for 1949 (p. 15) as follows:

For exchange adjustment to be successful it is essential that the expected benefits should not be dissipated by an offsetting rise in local prices and costs. It must, therefore, have public support and be accompanied by appropriate fiscal and credit policies. Even if an exchange adjustment is accompanied without a significant rise in prices and costs, it would be futile if the greater demand abroad were not matched by an equivalent supply of exports. Unless home demand is restrained, the expansion of exports, which alone can justify an exchange adjustment, will not be achieved.

The broad strategy—increase of production and diversion of goods and services from domestic consumption to exports—involves shifts in production and prices.

While the range of purely export goods is narrow in the case of India, that of export goods which are partly consumed within the country and partly exported has become quite wide. These are what are called “exportables”. The range of domestic goods of a “non-competing character” is naturally much wider. If they are substitutes of exports or imports, they are not entirely non-competitive. Goods in any one of the different stages of production—raw materials, semi-finished goods, finished goods, etc.—may enter into exports or imports, whereas goods at other stages may be domestic goods. In this situation the pull of export demand or domestic demand would operate indirectly through shifts in relative prices. Thus, although the prices of domestic goods would seem to be more or less independent of international markets and should have no direct connexion with the rate of foreign exchange, the indirect relationship will turn out to be quite significant during a period of adjustment if the initial change is quite large in magnitude.

To be of any real consequence as an instrument of bringing about appreciable shifts in production and diversion of supplies to exports, devaluation had to be large in magnitude. That is why currency devaluation usually tends to be quite drastic when it does occur. Those who condemned the drastic devaluation of the rupee should have borne this simple operational requirement in mind.

The price and income effects being *assumed to be quite appreciable*, let us see how the process gets started. The transmission line of

induced effects runs through the rise of import prices via home production to exports. Devaluation operates as a uniform tax on imports and as a uniform subsidy on exports. Rise of prices at the import end is an impact effect; so is the rise of prices expressed in rupees at the export end. If we take our principal imports—capital goods, industrial raw materials, and instrumental goods like spares, components, and other auxiliary adjuncts of production as well as essential consumer goods like foodgrains, drugs, kerosene, etc.—their pre-devaluation prices were artificially low. In respect of capital goods there was, to the extent of the overvaluation of the rupee, misallocation of resources. It has been assumed that there will now be better allocation (although it is not the price factor alone which always determines optimum allocation).

To the extent to which prices of essential imported articles of mass consumption were raised by devaluation their consumption had to be subsidized. Importation of non-essential goods has been penalized, as it should be. When the cost of living of the masses, in so far as it depends upon imports, is protected, the burden of the subsidy is borne by the Exchequer and will be scrutinized by the general taxpayers who bear the real burden. It has, of course, been assumed that the capacity to bear it is within the nation's fiscal resources. at any rate in the short period. Another assumption has been that import restrictions would continue. Whether the import duties would continue at the old levels in all cases is doubtful in view of the fact that devaluation by itself operates as a tax on imports.

The following considerations have to be carefully balanced: (1) additional revenue earned as against the foreign exchange spent; (2) the possibility of rapid import-substitution on the basis of substantial domestic availability of materials, components and spares, and even machinery; and (3) the handicap of high capital cost in priority industries if the high import duties continued in the face of devaluation. On the whole one would expect an appreciable rise in the prices of imported inputs—machinery, materials, components and spares, etc. Industries dependent on these imported inputs face higher costs. But this should encourage import-substitution in the vital sector, the lack of which, as I have explained, has been one of the serious weaknesses in our planning effort. This kind of import-substitution is not desirable all along the line. In any case, import-substitution takes time. The planning authorities

should decide whether domestic production of certain kinds of inputs for the manufacture of luxury goods is a desirable policy at the present stage of our development. Unfortunately, many industries dependent on imported inputs of specialized kinds are in the small industries sector in which, I am inclined to think, there has been serious misallocation of resources. Vested interests have resisted any readjustment by way of proper resource allocation as judged by the criterion of an economical capital-output ratio. The higher costs in industries producing non-competing home-market goods of the luxury variety are expected to keep down home consumption. If these industries could switch to the manufacture of exports, or of commodities related to export production, that would be in the direction of the right kind of adjustment. It is doubtful whether the allocation of licences for "maintenance imports", made possible by the non-project loan of \$ 900 million, has been so regulated as to assist this kind of adjustment.

What is expected to happen in industries producing partly for the home market and partly for the foreign market? Their imported inputs, to the extent to which they are dependent on them, would cost more. It is argued that what they gain by higher prices of exports they will lose through higher prices of imported inputs. The argument is fallacious. The cost of the input forms in most cases a small percentage of the total cost. The value added by manufacture may be quite high. The higher input cost may be small compared with the higher export price realized immediately. Indeed, the unit cost could decline substantially if the installed capacity is more fully utilized, as is likely to be the case when imports of inputs are liberalized. Of course, they could not, and should not, be liberalized all along the line.

Let us consider the incentive effect of devaluation in so far as it operates as an export subsidy. If the price per unit of a commodity which is produced both for the foreign and for the domestic markets is X , expressed in foreign currency, its rupee equivalent, after devaluation, would rise by the degree of devaluation. If the foreign demand is inelastic in the sense that a small fall in the price of commodity expressed in foreign currency does not encourage sales to any appreciable degree and if the domestic supply also does not respond much to a rise in price (in rupees), it is wise to levy an export duty and earn revenue rather than allow abnormal windfall profits

to the domestic seller. If the home demand is also inelastic, an export duty does not hurt. If home supply and foreign demand are both elastic at the price allowing for the export duty, exports would obviously be boosted at the expense of domestic consumption in view of the large price differential between the export price in rupees and the ruling domestic price. There are large assumptions underlying such reasoning, and these have not been realized in actual life owing to adverse domestic and international factors, including failure of economic initiative and leadership within the country and the psychological resistance to the adjustment of the economy to the new challenges and opportunities.

What about industries producing partly for the home market and partly for the foreign market, but not dependent on imported inputs to any considerable extent? The pull of higher export prices is expected to operate fully without its being neutralized to any appreciable extent by the higher prices of imported inputs.

As regards industries which cater purely for the home market, some may be those which have achieved complete or nearly complete import-substitution. They are not expected to develop export possibilities in spite of the price advantage created by devaluation. If they also depend upon imported inputs (the motor-car industry is an instance), they are bound to face higher unit costs without there being any offset in the form of higher export prices. They have not had a bad time because consumer resistance to higher prices has not developed.

There are also industries catering only for home consumption—industries producing “non-competing home-market goods”. If they are export-related industries in the sense that the goods are at some of the stages of production, whereas goods at one of the stages are export-goods, the pull of export demand will provide them with the incentive for a higher degree of export-orientation.

Given the right kind of behaviour of the entire economy and a sufficiently long period for adjustment, the shifts in production could be quite fundamental in character. It is conceivable that an industry that is largely export-oriented may become entirely so, provided the foreign demand is highly elastic. One could also expect that the general stimulus to exportation might tilt the balance and result in purely home-market goods moving into the category of exports, provided that they are in the margin of transfer from

the point of view of cost advantage. If, as I have contended, domestic consumption is cut down as part of the adjustment process, it is expected that factors of production released thereby would move into export industries or export-related industries or industries producing at least partially for the export market. Here also the basic assumptions have gone wrong.

There is also the most important strategic sector of primary production—agriculture, mineral production, and oil extraction. Petroleum extraction and oil-refining are home-market-based industries, whereas agriculture and mining fall in the category of industries producing both for the home market and for the foreign market. Let us, first, take agriculture and mining. Higher prices of foodgrains and imported natural raw materials, like cotton or woodpulp, should assist the process of import-substitution so badly needed in this sector. The price incentive which the producer of foodgrains has lacked could be immediately supplied by devaluation. Imported foodgrains would then be more expensive and their imports could be restricted to strictly marginal requirements. Foodgrain prices could attain a better parity with the price-trends in the case of non-food crops. There is no escape, however, from food subsidies at any rate for the vulnerable sections of the population. Otherwise a higher cost of living is bound to generate inflationary pressures. The higher export prices could stimulate diversion to exports of a number of agricultural exports which form such a large bulk of our export trade. All these anticipated effects have failed to materialize in view of the impact of the failure of crops in the second year in succession and the nation's failure to contain inflationary pressures.

However, the prevailing market situation is not unfavourable for the fundamental modernization of our agriculture that has been planned. How far it is possible to subsidize agricultural inputs to assist the process and also prevent agricultural prices from rising too high is doubtful. One may also expect a similar situation in the lagging sector of mineral production notwithstanding the stimulus of higher export prices. In the sector of extraction and refining of petroleum the impact of devaluation is bound to be adverse because the bulk of the crude oil is imported and the imported input at the present stage of prospecting and development of extraction capacity and refining has also a great economic importance,

These shifts in production were conditional not only upon assumptions being fulfilled which have not been fulfilled, as I have explained, but also upon a number of other things happening. Too much emphasis could not be laid on the price factor. Inter-industry mobility is not an easy matter in a developing economy, especially when such flexibility as there was has been lost in a highly sheltered internal market. Besides, such readjustments that one could theoretically argue about are also dependent on the *certainty* and *continuity* of import of inputs on a large enough scale.

The main difficulty inherent in the current Indian situation is that the existing structure of import licensing, based upon certain set notions of "priority industries", has remained unaffected, because this happens to be the line of least resistance that will inspire confidence in the industrial community. There may be a limited degree of rationality behind this. If the growth rate reaches 8 to 9 per cent in industry through the flow of imported inputs enabling fuller utilization of installed capacity, as Government spokesmen have said, we should turn the corner towards self-reinforced growth, provided that the gamble in rainfall during 1966-67 gives us bumper crops. While the corrective measures were not taken in a pre-election year, the growth assumptions turned awry. Thus we are left with a Micawberish economic policy which will defeat the strategy of devaluation if the supplementary corrective measures are long delayed.

Although precious time has been lost, the success of devaluation would depend upon the relative gap in the sectional price levels. The Government's economic policies in the short run must be geared to maintaining the disparity in the sectional price level as far as possible with a view to reaping the full benefits of devaluation till a more satisfactory equilibrium can be regained. No doubt the rise in the prices of "international goods" will exercise an upward pressure on home prices. But "home-market goods" are relatively important in a country like India. If the prices of these goods such as food and simple necessities can be prevented from rising, and, indeed, if increased production, through more liberal supplies of inputs at reasonable prices, following in the wake of devaluation, can begin to exert a downward pressure, the economy can yet veer round to a healthy course.

On the whole, however, one should expect a rise of prices for

other reasons. There are current inflationary pressures to reckon with. Other measures, as I have explained, have now to be adopted to curb them. In spite of them, the momentum of rising prices is likely to continue owing to scarcities and bottlenecks. To this extent the relative gap in the sectional price levels will be narrowed and the benefits of devaluation dissipated. To an appreciable extent this has already happened. The large measure of devaluation has, however, created a wide enough gap. If other counter-inflationary measures succeed, there is a clear chance of our being able to overcome the crisis, although precious time has already been lost.

IV

Let me comment briefly on some of the imponderable factors which have a bearing on the possible operational success of devaluation.

The probable expansionary effect of devaluation on exports will vary according to the nature of our export goods. Some of our export goods—"traditional exports" as they are called—are such that India happens to be a major exporter. There is the second category consisting of exports of processed or differentiated manufactured products, the bulk of which is consumed locally, the marginal amounts being exported. We may include in this category the products of our new engineering industries, of which we are marginal exporters, but which have developed export potentialities in recent years. In respect of "traditional exports", our difficulty is that the foreign demand for them is not sufficiently responsive to a change in price. In respect of goods of which we are marginal exporters, devaluation is expected to produce quite favourable results.

What about the products of our new engineering industries? There was evidence before devaluation that some of them could compete effectively in the world market. The substantial devaluation that has occurred may enable more of them to compete effectively and also strengthen the position of those which have already entrenched themselves in the foreign market. The main bottleneck has been the lack of utilization of full capacity due to scarcity of raw materials, components, and spare parts.² This bottleneck will

²There is considerable idle capacity in our engineering industries on the basis of even a single-shift working. Double-shift working is feasible.

be broken through the flow of non-project aid designed to meet precisely this situation. There is now a clear chance of not only increasing the competitive power of Indian products which have already appeared in the world market, but also of pushing the sales of new products, the possibilities of which might not be foreseen by the wisest of Export Promotion Councils. A situation has thus emerged in which, elasticity of domestic supply having been assured, we can exploit our position as marginal exporters. But our success will depend upon what Marshall called "resourcefulness of supply"—adapting exports to the requirements of the various markets and quoting lower prices in foreign currencies either to gain a foothold, or to increase our share, in a particular foreign market.

If the reader accepts the validity of the reasoning presented above, he will have little difficulty in answering the question why, if 80 per cent of our exports do not need subsidization, Government has resorted to devaluation to deal with the problem of a mere 20 per cent of exports. Assuming that these percentages are correct,³ the real problem has been the stagnation of our exports—their stabilization at a dangerously low level. The problem is how to increase the volume of not only the 80 per cent but also of the other 20 per cent. Devaluation, in so far as it acts as a general subsidy on exports, in place of selective subsidization, opens up new export possibilities. There is a chance, in the long run, of adjustment at a higher level of both exports and imports, and eventually at a higher level of domestic consumption, although, as I have argued, this is predicated upon reduction of spending or "disabsorption", in the short run, as well as upon structural readjustment and shifts of production, in the long run. Devaluation, by itself, cannot achieve these results. It only gives us a chance of overcoming our weaknesses and the distortions that have accumulated in the Indian economy over the years.

In the Indian situation the case for devaluation is reinforced by the fact that the demand for "essential" developmental imports being highly inelastic, the only way in which the balance of payments

³They are incorrect. Import entitlements, railway freight, concessions, and tax credits have been offered on a wide range of products. They represent export assistance in different forms. Recently jute and tea interests were clamouring for export assistance and would have got it. Tax credits have a much wider coverage than is realized.

could be improved in an inflationary situation is the possibility of boosting exports through devaluation. The prospect as regards the possible reorientation of import demand deserves a brief discussion. There are some who blindly think that devaluation has given us a chance of abolishing import controls. Nothing would be more disastrous than such a course of action. There is an excess demand for imports which has to be rigorously curbed as before. Otherwise, this excess demand will more than offset the extra export earnings and call for another dose of devaluation.

The cost of investment goods, particularly working capital in the form of goods in process, like materials, manufactured components, and spare parts, was artificially low owing to the overvaluation of the rupee. In such a situation there was bound to be misallocation of resources. The higher import prices will now rectify the position. We cannot be certain that the suppliers did not take into account the degree of the overvaluation of the rupee in fixing prices; but it cannot be denied that the higher import prices now will lead to better and more careful utilization of imported inputs and capital goods not only in industries directly employing them but also in industries consuming the products of the former. This will create an incentive for the use of indigenous substitutes as well as factors of production entering into their production. There will also be a stimulus to the indigenously available ways of improvisation and the development of indigenous know-how based on the use of indigenous resources. On the whole, our propensity to seek foreign aid will be curbed and we shall be moving in the direction of self-reliance.

V

What will be the impact of devaluation on foreign private capital and foreign governmental aid? One must analyse the impact on existing investment, which has an obvious bearing on the expected flow of future investments. Generally, one may assume that anything that enables the Indian economy to move forward again should reassure the foreign investor who has a stake in India's prosperity.

Although there will be a substantial loss on the transfer of a given income, one may argue that there is a chance of much higher

rupee-incomes in the future. There will be much less incentive for repatriation of capital, not because there will be no loss (in sterling) on transfer of capital, but because it will be a much better earning asset in India and should rather be kept in India.

Currently foreign companies will compensate themselves on the transfer of their dividends or royalties by countervailing additions in rupees, so that there is no foreign exchange loss. In the case of foreign oil companies, the general approach of the Government all along has been to express profits or royalties in rupees. These companies will pay higher amounts in terms of rupees now to repatriate the same amount of foreign exchange that they were repatriating before. The question of this kind of compensatory adjustment has already come into the picture in the case of sterling tea companies. On the day after the devaluation of the rupee was announced, tea shares in London dropped considerably in value. The feeling was that, with new export duties, nothing would be gained, but that, in terms of rupees, dividends would cost 58 per cent more. The market, however, was reassured when it was discovered that in terms of rupees the proceeds from the Assam and Dooars crop sold in London, after tax, would well exceed the extra dividend cost.

The position will be different in respect of loans received from foreign Governments and international and other financial institutions. The burden of debt servicing (interest payment and amortization) will increase substantially. Our borrowings are bound to be more selective, unless we are reckless. The priorities will be more rigorous. It has been argued that the matter is simple: while we have to pay more rupees on old loans we receive more rupees on new loans to be contracted. One can see that the matter so presented is deceptively simple. Our fresh borrowings are expected to be less; in any case, they will form a small proportion of our existing foreign indebtedness of this kind. The net loss is expected to be quite appreciable. This will not, however, matter much if the real productivity of the foreign capital already invested, and not merely its monetary return, increases over time. In the short run, however, re-phasing of repayment will have to be negotiated in order to avoid an intolerable strain on our transfer capacity, which should not be minimized by taking recourse to sophistical reasoning.

VI

Let me finally deal with the crux of a sound post-devaluation strategy—I mean a sound reorientation of public finance in a broad sense.

When Government receives foreign aid for development and the “development goods” imported are sold within the country, the question arises whether this expands money-income and thus induces additional imports which cannot be financed out of the initial borrowing already utilized. National money-income will rise if spending on current domestic production increases. If the Government does not spend what it receives through the sale of investment goods, or collects adequate taxes, the national income as well as expenditure is prevented from rising.

Whether the process of receiving foreign loans, importing investment goods, and selling them to domestic producers is inflationary or not would depend upon whether these goods are bought with newly created, or hitherto idle money, or with funds released through curtailment of consumption and investment. In other words, a country receiving foreign aid cannot avoid adequate domestic saving. Without the exercise of fiscal and monetary restraint, the entire process of capital accumulation is frustrated.

There cannot be capital accumulation if additional resources received through foreign borrowing are used simply for net consumption. Net consumption (of domestic goods and imported goods) must not rise by the amount of additional imports.

Thus foreign aid can supplement domestic saving by giving us additional resources. It allows greater capital accumulation. It cannot replace saving. Otherwise, it adds to current consumption without capital formation. Clearly we have not taken the hard road which is certainly difficult to traverse. But if we wish to avoid another dose of devaluation in the future, we have to veer round and tread this difficult path.

An increased budget surplus is calculated to have the same effect as an increase in the level of voluntary saving. The economic disadvantages of seeking to restrain inflation by securing a larger budget surplus through a reduction in Government expenditure are much less limited. The cost of administration can be reduced, although

much cannot be expected from it. Really substantial reductions are possible through major changes in the activities and policies of Government connected with planned development. Many of them may be almost, if not quite, as unpopular as an increase of taxation.

The minimum that one can think of is that Government expenditures at the Centre and in the States taken together should be stabilized in real terms, while real national income continues to rise in the near future, as one expects. If this is too strict a regimen, at any rate, Government expenditures should rise more slowly than national income. If this modest hope is realized, a gradual rise in the budget surplus could be made consistent with undue rise of taxation and even a possible lowering of it.

An important dimension of fiscal-cum-monetary policy is the trend of income in relation to output. Here we have a dilemma. Unfortunately, under inflationary conditions, such as we have at present, any attempt to accelerate the output, as we are resolved to do in the near future, will tend to involve more than proportionate rise in incomes. Checking the rise in incomes usually involves some check to the rise in output, but the slowing down of output may be less than the slowing down of the rise in incomes. Usually slowing down of the rise in incomes is prescribed as a correct policy, although it will mean at least a temporary check to the rise of output.

But how do we check a rise in incomes? By checking the rise in those forms of expenditure that create incomes. How is this possible? The Government has to explore the possibilities. There are tried methods like the following: (1) withdrawing money initially from capital expenditure; (2) withdrawing money from incomes, while allowing a rise in capital expenditure; and (3) withdrawing money from both income and capital expenditure together. I cannot say whether these methods can be used in the Indian context. But it is evident that certain obvious forms of income-creation and income-creating expenditure under our traditional plan projects may have to be cut down drastically. Fortunately, the high import prices of investment goods as the result of devaluation, combined with increased imports duties, will have a deterrent effect on investment expenditure both in the public and private sectors and make it more selective.

It is now common ground among the bulk of economists that "cost-push" inflation is important in the contemporary world. Most of them assign active rôles to both labour unions and to oligopoly and monopoly pricing of commodities.

A suggestion was made last year that there should be a "wage freeze" as well as a "dividends freeze". Can labour and capital collaborate on this basis? How do we suppress monopoly pricing? How do we control the practices of oligopoly? How do we regulate profit margins in retail distribution? The Government resolved to subsidize the consumption of the necessities of life. Is this possible without income-creating expenditure that may add to the cost of the subsidies and yet may not lower prices to the full extent of the subsidies for the masses of the population who are most in need of them? Moreover, if the expenditure on subsidies is financed out of genuine savings, inflation is prevented. If it is otherwise, will not wage-induced inflation be arrested at the cost of deficit-induced inflation? These are difficult questions which are easier to pose than to answer. But they have to be answered, if we wish the devaluation to be a blessing in disguise and not an operation that we should be prepared to repeat under the pressure of circumstances.

There is no doubt, however, that fiscal and monetary policy should be oriented towards inducing the shifts in production to which I referred earlier in this essay.

The Planning Commission also must realign its sights and reformulate the Fourth Five-Year Plan, not merely with an eye to possible aid that may be forthcoming from various sources and the possible cost of the plan at post-devaluation prices, but with an eye to the re-structuring of production as a response to the challenge of devaluation.

The crux of the problem, however, is restraint on current consumption. As I have argued, a mere rise in export prices in rupees is not enough to ensure that supplies will adequately be diverted from home consumption to exports, because, at any rate in the short run, supply would be inelastic. Here we come back to the basic requirement that the domestic rise of costs and prices should not neutralize the benefits of devaluation. A good deal depends on the gap in the sectional price levels that has to be sustained in such a way as to bring about the desirable shifts in production. But this has to

be matched by the required shifts in income and expenditure. It is in respect of this matching process that careful and integrated planning of policy measures would be essential. Some of them would be fiscal-monetary in character. Others would have political as well as institutional implications. It is clear that unless people understand what has happened and what has to be done, and unless Government has the support of the people as a whole, most of these policy measures will not produce the right results.

A purely short-term policy of import liberalization should be resisted. Import liberalization should be oriented towards the long-term strategy that I have tried to analyse in this essay. The former should not be allowed to conflict with the latter. I hope nobody thinks of the tempting, but deceptive, strategy of saturating the market with imported inputs and breaking bottlenecks and scarcities wherever they exist, so that, with a good monsoon, we shall be poised for a spurt of prosperity. Should we yield to this temptation even if we get large "non-project" loans? Here is a dilemma. If the Government liberalizes imports of inputs on a large scale, how can there be import-substitution in respect of them? Eventually we become dependent on another big non-project loan, unless our exports expand fast enough and considerably in total value to pay for imported inputs. If imports of inputs are not liberalized on a wide scale, there would be unutilized installed capacity and possible unemployment. One must not, however, forget the long-term goal of re-structuring of production in the light of the fundamental weaknesses and imbalances of our planning effort. This means courage to face them and a change in our style of planning as well as in its targets and priorities.

In the case of Indian economic development, not only the speed of development but the selection of projects for which foreign aid has been available has not been regulated by dispassionate discussion but has been coloured by East-West competition. Whether we should aim at a fast rate of growth through the development, on a priority basis, of producer goods industries (at least at one remove), or whether the emphasis must be on the most important sectors of agriculture, irrigation, small industry, community development, education, technical training, administration, public health, transportation, and power are issues which pertain to rival economic philosophies. We have taken the view that these are complemen-

tary needs, and so our projects have been strung out all along the line without any sense of priorities as among them. This has landed us in a near disaster. Indeed, this incredible situation is inherent in the vast system of "project aid" that has been built up under the inspiration of the World Bank. In this matter, however, thinking on the other side of the ideological barrier is surprisingly alike.

VII

The analysis presented in this paper seems to be quite valid in the context of the assessment of the current economic situation by Morarji R. Desai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, in the course of his budget speech on 20 March 1967. It is apparent that the stresses and strains preceding the devaluation decision have persisted. The failure of the monsoon in the second successive year has wiped out incomes over large areas and has restricted supplies of both foodgrains and raw materials. Imports have risen with consequent pressure on small foreign exchange reserves, although food assistance from friendly countries has been a great relief. Industrial production has increased rather slowly, owing to the difficulties faced by agriculture-based industries. Low farm incomes have reacted adversely on industrial output. High food prices have also meant diversion of demand from manufactures. Monetary expansion was restricted and the Government's economy of plan expenditure was designed to contain inflation. But these measures have created pockets of industrial depression. International demand for our "traditional" exports has slackened, although there have been offsetting gains to some extent in respect of other exports. The impact of liberalization of imports has not yet been reflected in the flow of imports. And yet, in spite of the IMF borrowings of \$ 137.5 million, our foreign exchange reserves fell by about \$ 18 million. The indications, therefore, are that inflationary pressures have increased rather than lessened. Food prices rose at a more rapid pace during 1966-67 than during 1965-66. Other prices have responded. The demand for dearness allowance intensified and had to be conceded.

The budgetary position has reflected the adverse economic trends. While assistance for the relief of scarcity conditions has been given on a large scale and imported foodgrains subsidized, flow of tax

revenue has been sluggish. For the first time in decades the Railways have failed to earn normal dividend. Collection of import duties has fallen owing to the fall in imports other than food. Food gifts received from friendly countries have added Rs 85 crores to the budgetary receipts. PL 480 imports will also result in the accrual of about Rs 93 crores more. On the disbursement side, however, the purchase and sale of foodgrains and fertilizers account for a deterioration of Rs 235 crores mainly on account of subsidies in spite of which food prices have shown a marked upward trend. The Central Government has had to bear the burden of increased assistance to the States. The burden of both plan and non-plan expenditure in the States in the pre-election year has been quite heavy. Indeed, but for the overdrafts from the Reserve Bank received by the States and the incidence of the subsidies on foodgrains and fertilizers (in consequence of devaluation), the Central deficit would not have been so large as it has actually been.

The situation that has emerged is such that the remedy for the economic *malaise* will tax the nation's ingenuity to the utmost. The problem is how to reconcile expansion to counteract recession and excess capacity in transport and the sector of capital goods industries through increasing investment and liberalization of imports with the need for keeping the prices of essential goods in check by not pushing investment activity too far. How can we ensure non-inflationary expansion of output and employment? The fundamental problems of "living within our means" and of the mobilization of savings as a complement to foreign assistance—both of which I have explained in this paper—still remain to be boldly faced. These are problems that now transcend the issue of devaluation. If they are satisfactorily tackled, there is a chance of our regaining our economic health. Devaluation, let me repeat, is like a shot in the arm. The remedy lies deeper in the body-economic in its power of resilience as well as in its power of resistance. The future will show whether we are determined to seek this remedy rather than adventitious stimulus, be it an unpleasant stimulus like devaluation or a pleasant tonic like foreign assistance.

M. N. KAUL

ADAPTATION OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE TO MEET PRESENT-DAY NEEDS

PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS the world over are facing new challenges today. The great advance in science and technology since the beginning of this century and the socio-political forces released in their wake, the emergence of the concept of the Welfare State, the establishing of new, independent countries after the last world war, and the persistence of international tension have all tended to add steadily to the range and scope of governmental responsibilities and, correspondingly, of governmental activities, at the present time. In practical terms, this sudden growth of complexity in State activity has meant a vast expansion in bureaucratic machinery—more departments, more officials, multiplication of rules, orders, and regulations—and new forms of organizational set-up. Administrative satellites under various names, such as boards, corporations, Government companies, and the like, have been thrown upon the scene. So complex has the nature of its responsibilities grown that the Executive in the performance of its duties has now come to exercise functions even of a judicial or legislative character. All these developments, largely inevitable, have tended to upset the balance between Parliament and the Executive and pose for Parliament special problems in the maintenance of its position as the foundation of the democratic order.

The problem is fundamental in newly independent and developing countries, where parliamentary institutions may be said to be on trial, inasmuch as the success, as well as the prestige, of the democratic system in these countries is directly linked with its performance in the socio-economic sphere. It is necessary not only to translate for the common man the true meaning of democracy in terms that can be comprehended by him, but also to energize the entire

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community, as this is highly conducive to the promotion of a democratic climate. In new democracies like India, planning, being far from incompatible with democracy, becomes vital for its very survival. Planning under modern conditions, in all spheres of economic and national activities, implies extensive State initiative, with all its implications for Parliament. Even in the case of developed countries and of those which have long enjoyed parliamentary or democratic forms of government, some sort of planning, in the present state of affairs, has become inevitable. So the problem of strengthening the effectiveness of parliamentary institutions arises in all countries, particularly in developing countries.

The form any measure for strengthening parliamentary institutions would take in any country must, however, depend primarily on the constitutional framework and other features peculiar to the political system of that country. For example, whereas the system of government in the United Kingdom is founded on the doctrine of exclusive Executive responsibility and any procedure likely to dilute that responsibility will be looked upon with disfavour, under the US system, which is based on a different principle, detailed supervision of Executive action and even participation in Executive decisions would be regarded as nothing improper. The first consideration for any reform will, therefore, be its constitutionality. So every country must ultimately evolve remedies best suited to its own conditions. While it is necessary for Parliament to retain its initiative, control, and supervisory rôle, care has to be taken that unduly detailed controls do not affect the flexibility, efficiency, and discretion required in the conduct of governmental programmes. The object should be so to conduct the parliamentary system as to galvanize the inherent strength of the Executive machine and the people rather than to weaken them. The real problem is one of finding, within the framework of the existing set-up in a country, means which would keep the organs of the Administration effective under the ultimate scrutiny of Parliament.

Any scheme for strengthening parliamentary institutions must be concerned with steps to ensure that Parliament as a body is able to impress its corporate personality on the other organs of the State and in the direction of national affairs. Secondly, the range and magnitude of governmental activities in the present day would suggest the need for Parliament to shift its emphasis from its law-

making activity to "oversight of Administration". More time should be spent and more opportunities provided for discussion of public policy and matters of general importance.

As for the practical means of realizing these objectives, I would suggest the following: (a) according the Opposition its rightful place and ensuring its fuller participation in parliamentary life; (b) widening the opportunities for private Members for bringing up matters of public importance before the House; (c) review of the existing procedure relating to legislative and financial business so as to increase the effectiveness of Parliament in the discharge of its primary duties in these fields; (d) exercise of continuous control of the Administration through a well-devised committee system; (e) provision of a secretariat for Parliament independent of the Executive, with parliamentary staff specially recruited and trained for the service of Parliament; (f) providing opportunities and facilities for specialization by Members and for their general equipment in order to increase their effectiveness; (g) concurrent broadcast of parliamentary proceedings; and (h) automatic voting.

It is said that one of the greatest innovations in the parliamentary system is the place accorded to the official Opposition in Parliament. The concerted action of the Opposition is one of the surest means of controlling a Government. Though spectacular results, such as the fall of a Government, are seldom to be expected from debate, still it cannot be said that we have reached the stage when Opposition criticism has ceased to be effective. Even the limited criticism of governmental activities from within the Government party on the floor of the House can greatly influence the Government. One of the handicaps from which the Opposition suffers in a modern Parliament is the lack of as much time as it requires to discuss a particular Bill or policy before the House. If the power is given to the Government to control parliamentary time available for discussion, it is quite likely that the Opposition, where its strength in the House is small, may be outwitted and frustrated so far as discussion of a particular matter is concerned. Similarly, if it is left to the Presiding Officer to close a debate when he feels that there has been sufficient discussion, the position may be equally embarrassing and the Opposition may feel that it has not had its full say.

A happy solution to the situation may well be the experiment which the Indian Parliament has been conducting for the last fifteen years through the mechanism of the Business Advisory Committee. This Committee comprises all sections of opinion in the House, and the Opposition is represented on the Committee, which is presided over by the Speaker of the House. The Committee fixes in advance the time needed for each item of business which has to come before the House. All the decisions have so far been taken unanimously by the Committee, the Speaker filling the mediatory rôle of bringing about compromise between the Government and the Opposition. This is the peculiar feature of the Indian system. It is a new responsibility imposed upon the Speaker, but he has discharged it very efficiently and very fairly. The Committee then makes its report to the House, which is discussed for a short time, not exceeding half an hour. The House may make changes but generally approves the recommendations of the Committee. After the time allotted is known, the Opposition work out their share of the time. For example, in the Lok Sabha of the Indian Parliament, the Opposition commands one-fourth of the strength of the House, but by agreement the Speaker has allocated time between the Government party and the Opposition parties in the proportion of 60 to 40. This enables the Opposition to select its speakers on the various measures before the House and to utilize fully the time available to it to express its views. There is no occasion for the Opposition to say that the Government or the Speaker has been unfair to it in restricting Members from taking part in the discussion. Even in an extreme case where the progress of the discussion has revealed the time allotted to be insufficient, the House has, on a motion passed by it, increased the time or given discretion to the Speaker to increase it suitably so that proper and full debate takes place. This system has worked very well in India and has enabled both the Government and the Opposition to plan time in advance so that there is no uncertainty as to how much can be put through during the time available and how that time can be utilized by the Opposition parties as well as the Government party.

The Opposition, being nearly one-fourth of the House, is further given a place corresponding to a little more than its representation in the House entitles it to, on the various parliamentary

Committees of the House. Further, under the Indian system, since the Chairmen of the Committees are appointed by the Speaker, he gives the Members of the Opposition a fair chance to become Chairmen of such Committees. In the Committees, the system is not to work according to party line but as Committees of the House. No minutes of dissent are allowed, but Members are allowed freedom to express their points of view, and, therefore, while the minority point of view, if it is strongly urged, also finds a place in the report or minutes of a Committee, the majority are free to come to a decision. Further, the parliamentary Committees work under the overall control of the Speaker, are staffed by the secretariat provided by the Speaker, and conform to the established procedure and directions of the Speaker. If the Opposition is given "a sensation of consultation" and is allowed to exercise an influence which is a little more than its strength should reflect, it is able to feel that it is taking a constructive part in the political affairs of the country. Not only do the minority sections thus gain their rightful place in parliamentary life, but Parliament, as a body comprising both Government and Opposition parties, becomes truly effective and influential in the shaping of public policies and governmental activities.

The strength of parliamentary institutions depends considerably on the backbenchers' awareness of the possibilities of their influence. The corporate image of Parliament cannot be built up unless a sense of purpose permeates the parliamentary life of even the least important of its Members. This underlines the importance of providing adequate opportunities to private Members to air their grievances, to criticize the Administration, or to discuss policies and matters of importance arising from day to day. They must have adequate opportunities to ask questions for information, to raise short discussions for follow-up in cases of unsatisfactory replies, to call the attention of the Ministers to matters of public importance and ask them to make statements, to move adjournment motions, no-confidence motions, and motions of thanks on the Address of the Head of State, and to participate in major debates on foreign policies and other situations, as well as on legislation.

Sir Winston Churchill, in a message to the Inter-Parliamentary Union in September 1957, had this to say:

Our Parliament has survived because it made itself the spokesman not of the Government but of the people. In the fiercest clash of debate we have jealously guarded the right of every member freely to speak for his constituents and for himself.

Under the modern parliamentary system, party disciplines tend to be rigid and lead to the submerging of individual identities in the party interest. If the parliamentary system is to survive and emerge as an efficient instrument of public administration, the question arises whether in future the rigidity of party discipline should not be softened to enable the individuals who feel strongly on a subject to make their contribution on the floor of the House according to the dictates of their conscience and their national and international obligations. It is to be seen how far party rules and conventions should be subjected to the overall procedure laid down by Parliament for this purpose.

In the sphere of legislation an obvious line of improvement would be to reduce the labour and thought currently devoted to the formulation of the details of legislative measures. At present, much of the time of Parliament and the Government is taken in anticipating all kinds of difficulties and in providing for their removal and plugging loopholes, in laying down foolproof procedures, and so on, whenever a legislative measure is on the anvil. Experience has shown that in most cases things did not turn out as anticipated, that important links had been forgotten or not thought of, that new difficulties had arisen, or that the procedure had become cumbersome, so that changes had to be made much too frequently in the laws which had been made after so much care and expenditure of time whether in the House or in the Committees. Various reforms have been suggested or experimented with, but none has proved very effective so far. It appears that if new ground is broken in the field, perhaps Parliament may save much of its time and the community may be saved from many of the rigours of legislation which most of the laws unintentionally impose upon them and which cannot be quickly remedied. I feel that the Government and Parliament should, in the first instance, concentrate on the main or important features—in other words, principles of a legislative measure—and pass the minimum basic provisions required to put through a measure in practice. After the measure has been implemented and tried and watched for some time, steps should be taken

to collect and sift all the difficulties that have come to notice. If, as a result of the actual experience so gained, further amendments in the Act or the rules made thereunder are initiated, then any discussion will be meaningful, time-saving, and purposeful to the citizen because it will be based upon actual experience gained and not on mere anticipation, as is the case today. It should be provided that the details of these amendments to the Act or the rules be examined and considered in a Committee where evidence could be analysed, possible grievances of the public considered, and proper amendments drafted to overcome actual difficulties. This would enormously save the time of the House and eliminate academic discussions of imaginary fears and the like.

I come next to financial business and here my proposal is of a more radical nature. Power over the purse must ever remain an important ingredient of parliamentary authority. The budget being an instrument of policy—an arithmetical expression of a Government's programme of action—it is only proper that the Executive should have a free hand to work out the financial implications of the policy laid down by Parliament. It is important, particularly in countries where Ministers are responsible to Parliament, that Parliament does not get involved in the formulation of the budget in a manner that vitiates exclusive Cabinet responsibility. It is necessary that Parliament should devote a considerable part of its time to going into the estimates broadly and to making useful scrutiny itself or through its Committees. At present, the estimates of expenditure and proposals for Ways and Means are presented to Parliament every year and Parliament approves expenditure as well as the taxation proposals for a year at a time. Broadly speaking, this power of Parliament must remain intact, but in the complexity of the present-day situation, when a Government is called upon to apply itself to every field of national activity, the handling of a budget on a gigantic national scale has become complex and unwieldy. Huge projects undertaken by it—for instance, dams, power projects, heavy machine industries, chemical industries, agricultural schemes, and so on—require vast sums of money and a number of years to complete. The Government must, therefore, ensure that projects once started continue to get funds and parliamentary support until they are completed. Inevitably, a yearly budget is insufficient to cover all aspects of the planning, execution, and

getting into productive stream of the various projects that are undertaken. It is, therefore, essential that some sort of planning on a scale covering a number of years should be done. Modern writers have time and again drawn attention to the necessity of planning budgets, both estimates and taxation proposals, over a number of years at a time. This no doubt entails not only broad planning but also detailed planning of national resources and their utilization. A three-year or a five-year or a seven-year plan, according to the needs of each country, is, therefore, necessary in the present and future development of modern civilization. What I feel is that such a plan should be prepared by the Government at the beginning of a stated period and be thoroughly debated by Parliament and its various Committees and approved by it. The details of the plan should not be rigid. They should be flexible, and Parliament should have the right and power to modify them, to chop them, or to enlarge them within the overall strategy of the plan. The approval of Parliament should be of the broad principles and the ideas underlying the plan; then there should be a yearly detailed budget within the framework of this plan programme which should be carefully and strictly scrutinized so that the resources are properly husbanded and carefully utilized. After this is done, Parliament's attention to broad and important matters covered by the budget will be properly focussed, and trivial details and the criticism of the same measure over and over again during the course of a plan period will be avoided.

Along with such advance planning there should be a concurrent review by Parliament of the performance of the Government in pursuance of the execution of the plan approved by Parliament. For this purpose, Standing Committees of Parliament should be formed to evaluate the performance not only from the financial point of view but also from the point of view of achievement to physical targets, so that the accountability of the Government or Parliament is not vitiated in any sense. Such a Committee or Committees should have the power to examine whether the organization necessary for the execution of a project is compact, efficient, and economical in expenditure. In short, the performance must be commensurate with the expenditure involved. In a huge and complex Administration, wasteful and infructuous expenditure is inevitable, and it is the duty of Parliament to be vigilant to see that this

is kept to the minimum and that mistakes once committed are not repeated. I would rather lay stress on the *ex post facto* function of Parliament; that is, Parliament should give more attention to the performance by the Executive than to perfecting the details of the plan and anticipating shortcomings and drawbacks, which in most cases result in academic discussions and unfounded fears and may sometimes overlook some basic requirement to the execution of the plan.

Next come the Committees whose importance in any scheme of control by Parliament over the Executive should be evident. Apart from the obvious advantage of saving floor time and rescuing the House from detail, the very complexity and technical nature of modern business make it necessary that governmental activities should be closely scrutinized in a business-like manner, with the help of outside technical or expert advice wherever necessary. Parliamentary time being limited, it is essential that the Committee system be developed on an extensive scale, wherever it is not already in force. The Committees should be patterned after the Ministries or the Government Departments, or subject-wise, or in such manner as may be convenient in each country. The Committee or Committees on the performance of the Government (which I have suggested in the section under financial business) could also be linked up with these Standing Committees on Government Departments so that they could usefully examine how the Departments have fared.

Standing Committees, composed of Members of various parties, tend somewhat to cool down party spirit, promote a strong corporate sense, and help consideration of questions on their merits rather than on party lines. They also tend to promote an element of specialization among Members. In parliamentary assemblies where there is no organized Opposition, they serve further as the only major mitigating factor.

A suggestion has been made in some quarters recently that parliamentary Standing Committees should be assisted by knowledgeable persons in various fields who may be known as technical experts. The present procedure is that where the Committee system is well organized, the Committees do consult experts as witnesses who give evidence or submit memoranda to them. Another way in which experts are associated with these Committees is by

recruiting them on the Committee staff so that their advice is available to the Committees whenever needed, whether at the time of deliberations or in formulating their reports. A third suggestion which is now being canvassed is that a more effective and efficient method might be to co-opt, or associate with the Committees in some way, persons in public life who may also be experts in their own fields of activity or walks of life, so that along with Members they take full responsibility for the views and contents of the reports that may be made by them. One possible objection to this may be that the responsibility of the Committee which is composed of chosen representatives of the people will be considerably diluted if they have to share it with those who are appointed by some authority such as the House itself. The pros and cons of this suggestion have to be worked out carefully before it can be recommended. There is no doubt, however, that some briefing of the Committees has to be done either through the witnesses or by the staffs attached to them or by the association of experts, so that criticism of Government policies can be meaningful and purposeful.

The Committees should also see that the assurances given in the House are in fact implemented by the Administration in time, and in the terms in which they have been given. Otherwise a number of Ministerial assurances given on the floor of the House during debates or other proceedings in the House remain buried in the records of Parliament unless and until an interested Member takes it upon himself to pursue them on the floor of the House through the parliamentary means available to him. This is a time-consuming process and does not give complete satisfaction either to the Members or to the House as to their fulfilment by the Government. In the Indian Parliament we have an omnibus Committee called the Committee on Government Assurances, which lists every promise or undertaking given by the Ministers on the floor of the House and ensures that those assurances are fulfilled within a reasonable time to the satisfaction of the Committee. The Committee makes its report to the House from time to time. This Committee has done useful work over the years, and I think, in the nature of things, it would be desirable to transfer the work from this omnibus Committee to the Standing Committees on Ministries. However, I cannot say whether this would lead to more efficient results because in the Indian Parliament there are no Standing Committees on Ministries

and, therefore, this experiment has not been tried so far.

Nowadays much is being said on the rôle of appropriate machinery to give redress to the people who have grievances against the Administration. In ancient times, the benevolent kings heard the grievances of the people and gave them redress. In modern democracies, there being no single authority which can wield power, this practice has fallen into disuse. The authority of the kings has in part been taken over by Parliament. No doubt there are courts of law which give relief to the citizens where law has been transgressed or not obeyed, but there are grievances which fall in the administrative domain of the Executive and cannot be questioned or taken up in courts of law. It is in the field of these grievances of the citizens against the Government that machinery has to be devised. In some countries there are administrative tribunals which partly attend to grievances of an administrative nature and give relief to the citizens, but still there are a number of them which remain unattended to. In the Scandinavian countries, there is the institution of *Ombudsman*, through which public grievances are heard and dealt with. In some countries, there has been much debate recently on whether the institution as it functions in the Scandinavian countries or New Zealand should be adopted *in toto* or in some modified form. There has been a lot of debate on this in the various countries, but no satisfactory solution has been arrived at so far. I feel that, as a beginning, a Committee on Petitions should be formed as in the Indian Parliament. The Committee should have power to receive grievances in the form of petitions from the public, and, under the normal rules, have the power to call for papers and records, summon witnesses, and make reports. The Committee on Petitions could hear both the complaining person and the departmental authority against whom the complaint has been made, and, having heard both sides, it could make a report on the nature of the grievance, on how far it has been remedied or not, and on whether the Department should give further consideration to it or to a general grievance arising from a particular petition, modify its policy, and improve its procedure. A parliamentary Committee which has such powers and which is independent of the Executive would be very effective and useful in this regard, and I think it could be introduced as an experimental procedure. While on this subject, I will incidentally mention that if Parliament and its commit-

tees are to discharge their functions efficiently they must be served by a competent, compact, and fearless Secretariat. The officers and the staff must work without fear or favour either from the Executive or from individual Members. They should be self-reliant and objective in their approach. Their foremost aim should be to serve the institution of Parliament and to enhance its dignity by the product of their work. Equally, their terms and conditions of service should be such as to make them independent of any Executive or political interference. Parliamentary staff should preferably be under the overall control of the Presiding Officer of Parliament and should have within itself checks and balances and internal controls to make it fully self-contained, self-evolving, and self-confident. The staff is an integral part of the House and the Committees, and much preparatory work has to be done by it. Many of the decisions arrived at by the House or Committees have to be recorded carefully, honestly, and faithfully. It has to act as a permanent bulwark behind the transitory membership of the House, which changes at stated intervals, and keep the image of Parliament as a body in focus and effulgent before the nation. Much responsibility devolves upon the Secretariat, and care has to be taken that it is manned by staff properly recruited and trained for the many types of work that it has to undertake. The *sine qua non* of a true and efficient Parliament, is, therefore, a properly constituted Secretariat which has in many matters, like the House itself, to perform functions which are of a higher calibre than those performed by the various Government Departments, autonomous bodies, institutions, and organizations that Parliament controls. In this connexion, I should invite attention to a useful study which the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments has produced on the staffing of Parliamentary Secretariats. Efforts should be made at the uniformity or universality of the main features of Secretariats in all Parliaments and the interchange of officials to the mutual advantage of all concerned.

Following from the facts applied to modern life and the business that is transacted by Parliament, there is need for specialization on the part of Members. Since the electoral laws in almost all countries do not provide for the automatic return of experts or persons with special knowledge, the solution seems to lie in equipping the Members in all possible ways. It needs no emphasis

that in a democracy politicians and Members of Parliament should be well informed. The knowledge which a Member needs is twofold—information on the Administration and its policies, working, and activities and general equipment of the kind needed for effective participation in the House and its Committees. A major source of information concerning the Administration can be provided by the Standing Committees on the various Departments. A synopsis of administrative activities during a year and of the programmes they have for the next is usually furnished by the Ministries and Departments in their reports circulated from time to time. Under statutory prescription or convention, many reports are submitted to Parliament itself. There is thus a plethora of information which is available in the documents, reports, journals, and various other media of publication. The question is that it should be made available to Members in a tabloid form, as it were. This can be achieved by a properly constituted Library and Reference Service. Digests of important reports, articles, important news, statements, communiqués, and the like can be made available to Members, classified under different subjects, so that they may go through them with the least expenditure of time and may at their leisure read the originals if they are interested in any particular paper, document, article, or report. The need of the hour is to make available information in a microcosmic form so that the mind is quickly equipped with the important facts. One of the chief aims of the Reference Service should be to be objective in its presentation; that is, it should be able to convey the facts as they are without giving a slant or bias in favour of any political ideology or against it. It should be for the Member himself to utilize that information and to use it as he likes in support of his own political ideology or in criticism of any public policy. The system of writing speeches for the Members or substituting the views of the Reference Service for the Members' views is not envisaged under this plan. That would frustrate the very object in view. It is always necessary that a Member should speak from his own heart and express his own feelings. All that is required is that he should be assisted by carefully prepared synopses so that his mind begins to work and he speaks from knowledge based on facts.

In devising any methods whereby Members are kept informed of developments, care has to be taken that Members are made more

and more interested in information of a scientific character. They should themselves begin to appreciate the progress that science has made, is making, or has to make, in the development of modern civilization so that they can usefully contribute to these scientific processes and inventions. Members should not be strangers to modern scientific developments and they should take as much interest in them as the scientists themselves, so that there is proper balance between the scientists and the politicians in the development of modern science in civilization's future.

I now come to another matter, namely the question of how far parliamentary proceedings should be made known to the public. At present, news coverage is given to the proceedings of Parliament by newspapers, broadcasting, and television authorities. One of the questions which have been recently debated fairly widely is whether parliamentary proceedings should be concurrently broadcast or televised. Opinions are still divided as to its utility and its effect on the future development of the parliamentary system. Whatever the ultimate decision which each country has to take for itself, there is no doubt that the public expects Parliament to keep it informed of its activities, and Parliament must devise ways and means of making its proceedings better known to the people. Effective co-ordination must, therefore, be achieved between Parliament and the various media of publicity, such as the Press, the radio, and the television. It is very difficult to make any general recommendations in this regard, but there is no doubt that much more requires to be done in this field than has been done hitherto.

There is also need to save parliamentary time for useful and worth-while discussions. At present, a lot of parliamentary time is spent in the divisions which are taken by the orthodox methods. Those who have adopted the automatic voting device will testify that much parliamentary time that is otherwise consumed in trudging through division lobbies during the various divisions can be immensely saved if the automatic voting system is adopted.

In conclusion, may I say that parliamentary procedure is only a means to an end. By itself it cannot achieve the desired results. But it is equally true that any system can meet with failure if the procedure does not keep pace with the changing times. I cannot do better than quote here what Jawaharlal Nehru has said on this subject:

In these days of rival ideologies and international conflict, we have tried to keep apart from these clashes of opinions in the international sphere and have tried to seek a path for ourselves, and we have decided to base our Constitution and governance on the democratic parliamentary system. That system appears to us to have obvious virtues. Its critics point out that it is rather slow-moving in these dynamic times which require a rapid change from the old to the new. Ultimately, the system which yields large dividends in the shape of the well-being and advancement of the people will probably survive in every country.

The modern world offers us tremendous problems, among them the problem of securing individual liberty in the context of the highly specialized and centralized administrative and other machinery which has become inevitable today. Without that specialized machinery, we cannot function as an efficient and prosperous nation. Without individual freedom, we lose what is of the greatest value in life.

The development of technology has again led to problems of colossal magnitude. In the final analysis, this development is embodied in the hydrogen bomb, and the vital choice before the world is great progress on co-operative lines or conflict and utter destruction.

How then will the parliamentary system face these problems? I think that it will face them successfully and triumph in the end.

10 March 1967

D. SOM DUTT

THE DEFENCE POLICY OF INDIA

THE SAFEGUARDING of the security of the State is the most basic aim of foreign policy. Defence policy, therefore, forms an integral part of foreign policy, but it has, nevertheless, a distinctiveness, the importance of which, if unrecognized, can lead to grave consequences. From our very beginnings as an independent nation, we were certain of the shape that our foreign policy was to take. It is strange, therefore, that nothing like the same degree of certitude could be claimed for our defence policy. In fact it appears to be still going through a process of evolution. Many reasons can be given for our failure to define our defence policy. We did not recognize its distinctiveness; for quite some time after gaining our independence, we remained in a frame of mind which exuded friendship to all; and we hoped—were indeed convinced—that this friendly feeling could not but be reciprocated; the climate of our international relationships contained no clouds of antagonism, and so long as we ourselves did not disturb the elements, there appeared to be no reason why that climate should not continue to be clear for a long time to come. In effect we did not attach that degree of importance to defence matters which they really merited, and this attitude developed into a legacy which was to remain with us for a considerable time, and has perhaps not been shaken off entirely even now.

In determining defence policy, a great many factors have to be considered, of which two stand out somewhat prominently. One is that it must be specific and devoid of ambiguity, and there must be a clear-cut directive on which to work. The second is that the successful furtherance of overall policy depends in the last resort on an adequacy of strength to force the issue by military

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means, should the necessity arise. Where these considerations are not taken into account seriously, the defence of the country may well be jeopardized. For example, a process of thinking which places too great a reliance on the goodness of mankind, and assumes that harm comes only to those who harm others, is not a realistic enough basis on which defence planning can be undertaken effectively. Once strategy has been given shape, the quantum of armed forces that must be maintained and the lines on which they need to be organized are not difficult to determine. To do so, however, it is imperative that general directions be given on the nation's commitments, its aspirations, and future intent. As an example, the United Kingdom puts forth Defence White Papers outlining the nation's commitments and the measures needed to implement them. These are not secret papers, and are but an indication to the people of what will be expected of them in case of war. Equally, it facilitates the making of plans and other defence preparations by those in charge long before any of the possibilities of war outlined in the White Papers can turn into a reality, so that the nation, knowing what dangers lurk in what quarters and being in a state of continual defence preparedness, is never taken unawares. The mechanics of such a measure are not difficult to comprehend. Let us for a moment place ourselves in the position of the British Government in India before Independence and prior to the Second World War. To put it very briefly, they might well have assumed the possibility of an attack on India by the Soviet Union through Afghanistan, or the possibility of an attack by Japan, aided perhaps by a Western Power through Thailand and Burma, or through Malaya. This meant that defence measures to counter external aggression would have to cover not only the land routes, but also sea communications in eastern waters. The working out of war plans and the size and composition of the forces needed became then a matter for detailed examination.

It has been a lapse on our part not to have followed the practice of coming out with White Papers on defence. Had we done so, we would not still be evolving policy.

AIM OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY

It is certainly true that there were many difficulties in the way of the

Government's formulating defence policy soon after we gained independence. These difficulties will show up if an examination is made, even in a general way, of the aims of our foreign policy upon which our ideas of defence were to rest. These aims were: friendship with all; non-involvement in a third world war; attachment to no Power bloc; and the creation of areas of peace round us. All these concepts were directed towards the prevention of war. It will be agreed that it is difficult to formulate plans for the conduct of war if we work on the hypothesis that we will not be involved in any war. The Government was certainly aware of one direction from which danger was to be expected—Pakistan. Our neighbouring countries were thought to be too involved in their domestic affairs—which they were—and, being small by comparison, were thought to have little capacity for aggression, and to our way of thinking no reasons existed for any aggression from these quarters. China was a friend, bearing no animosity towards us, and Tibet and the Himalaya were in the initial stages considered as constituting a safeguard in themselves. There was, therefore, nothing very concrete on which the framers of defence policy could work. This nebulous position became still hazier because of other beliefs that were held. It is emphasized that it is not the beliefs themselves that are in question. What is being accented here is the effects that these beliefs had on the determining of our defence policy. We believed that a peaceful approach and a readiness to settle differences by negotiation were far preferable to a resort to arms in solving international problems. This was a correct belief, and indeed it can be argued that it is precisely this philosophy which achieved independence for us. Since we meant no harm to others and had no wish to interfere with their way of life, we believed that our own security would not be in jeopardy whatever be the outcome of the struggles that existed between others, the struggle between the Western and Communist blocs not excepted. In the domestic sphere also we felt that for a long time to come we would not reach that state of economic plenitude and industrial capacity which is an essential prerequisite for the forging of armed forces by any country that intends to be self-reliant in the matter of defence. From all this it appeared that there was no need for us to have large armed forces.

It will perhaps be conceded that where this is the pattern of

thinking, defence policy is left with no alternative but to concern itself with the very limited tasks connected with the policing of our borders, providing a safeguard against possible depredations by Pakistan, and dealing with internal security matters. The wisdom of setting such limited horizons in defence matters is debatable.

What are Our Commitments?

The picture that presents itself to those directly responsible for the security of the country, i.e. the armed forces, is, however, very different from that which has just been sketched. Positioned as we are in the Indian Ocean across the trade routes connecting Europe and East Asia, the strategic importance of our country is obvious. We also have a coastline of about 3,500 miles, and unless we have the capacity to be more positive, we are obliged to pay court, so to speak, to those maritime Powers that can not only interfere with the trade routes, but can intimidate our coasts at will. The question that presents itself immediately is this: Can we get away from our naval obligations and responsibilities, and the compiling of adequate naval forces to shoulder these responsibilities? Our land frontiers extend to some 8,000 miles, of which 1,800 miles are with Pakistan. The remaining 6,000 and odd miles constitute our frontiers with China, Nepal, and Burma. These have, of course, to be policed if not guarded. This commitment has to be carried out perpetually throughout the year, in conditions of climate and terrain which are forbidding, inhospitable, and trying in the extreme. Besides, the population in these areas has connexions with both sides of the border. The task is a gigantic one, and the size of both the ground and air forces which have to shoulder these responsibilities has to be big enough to meet the demands made on them. To say that we cannot afford such large forces is to beg the question altogether.

Himalaya is not Insuperable

Let us for a moment go back over half a century and see how this same problem was gauged at that time, and by a civilian. Lord Curzon had this to say:

India is like a fortress with a vast moat of the sea on two of her faces, and with mountains for her walls on the remainder: but beyond these walls, *which are sometimes by no means of insuperable height and admit of being easily penetrated*, extends a glacia of varying breadth and dimension. We do not want to occupy

it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends, but if rival and unfriendly influences creep up to it and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene, because a danger would thereby grow that one day might menace our security. He would be a shortsighted commander who merely manned his ramparts in India and did not look beyond.¹

The wisdom of this pronouncement can hardly be questioned. It entailed making a realistic appraisal of the situation, and determining a very positive line of action in case the Sino-Tibetan situation worsened. How have we met our commitment sixty years later in the same context? Tibet appeared to us as a buffer between ourselves and China, and it was our wish that this should continue to be so. We had recognized Tibet as being autonomous in the same way as had the British before us, and at no time was China unaware of our recognition of Tibetan autonomy. All seemed to be going well till, at the end of 1949, we recognized the Communist Government in China. When that country attacked Tibet and declared it to be a part of China itself, we were placed in a quandary. To cut the story short, in 1954 we reconciled ourselves to agreeing that this country had become the Tibetan Region of China. The effect of this was that our "buffer" disappeared and massive belligerent China became our immediate neighbour. The ills that followed from this need no repetition. They culminated in the refutation by China of all understandings regarding our borders, and the unprovoked attack by it across those borders in Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area in 1962.

We had paid dearly for our acts of omission (and commission). It cannot be said in defence of our actions that we had not visualized the course that events would take. What is suggested is that had our defence policy been specific and had White Papers on defence been prepared at the very beginning, measures would have had to be undertaken which would have avoided our being placed in an unenviable position. But to be clear and unambiguous in matters of defence means to live a hand-to-mouth existence, a procedure which is as distasteful to a nation as it is to an individual. Any surmise as to why Defence White Papers have not been produced must take into account the peculiar position that the Government and the armed

¹Quoted in J.C. Kundra, *Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954* (Groningen, 1955), p. 32. Emphasis added.

forces found themselves in at the time of Independence and the Partition of the country. The conditions that obtained then were semi-chaotic, and the domestic issues connected with the forces themselves were of a nature which required immediate and urgent solution before even any defence policy, if formulated, could possibly be implemented. Is it possible that this lack of opportunity to determine defence policy in the very early stages later transformed itself into a convenient excuse for not determining policy altogether?

PARTITION AND AFTER

During the Second World War almost two million men had been enlisted on a purely voluntary basis in the Army alone. The excess was being demobilized when Independence came. To this heavy task was added the problem of dividing the forces and equipment between ourselves and Pakistan. To comprehend the difficulties that all this involved requires a background knowledge of the Indian Army. The old Indian Army had been organized by the British according to principles that emerged from their concept of the suitability and fighting qualities of Indians as they saw them. They believed that not all Indians were fit to take to the profession of arms. Consequently they divided them into martial and non-martial classes, and even the former were recruited mostly from North India. For ease of control many regiments were one-class regiments, in that they were manned exclusively by the Sikhs or Dogras or Rajputs. The revolt of 1857 made the British wary of continuing with this system, and many regiments were later organized on a mixed-class basis, inclusive of Moslems.

Shortage of Indian Officers

With Independence, we were obliged to permit officers and men to exercise their right of opting for service either with India or with Pakistan. It does not require much imagination to visualize the complexities that this brought in its wake. The Gorkha regiments were also permitted to opt for service either in the Indian Army or with the British, or to go home. The officer cadre of the Army also presented a sizable problem. It had been the practice of the British to officer the army only with their officers, and although they did accept Indianization subsequently, we were woefully short

of officers in 1947. The process of commissioning our own people into the officer ranks has been through many vicissitudes, and we feel that a brief résumé here of the circumstances of Indianization, though seemingly irrelevant, is in place. In 1900 Lord Curzon held this view:

At intervals during the past twenty years attempts have been made... to devise some outlet for the military aspirations of Indians superior to that which is now open to them.... It has been argued that a policy of exclusion is not only uncalled for but unsound. Uncalled for, because the great strides that have been made in educational progress qualify them for admission to the commissioned ranks. Unsound, because it cannot be wise to slam the door of a military career in the face of those whose pride of birth prevents them from embracing a civilian profession.... The arguments by which this has been resisted have been almost exclusively of a military character. It has been alleged that it would weaken morale; that native soldiers are only capable of discipline and gallantry when led by British officers; reawakening of a martial spirit may be to the detriment of British interest.²

Again the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 stressed the need for a change in British military policy in conformity with the same principle that had led to the recruitment of Indians into the civil services. It was the Indian Legislative Assembly Resolution of 28 March 1921 on Indianization that recommended that Indians be admitted freely into the three Services in the commissioned ranks. And yet there were dissenting views typified by what General Rawlinson had to say on the subject:

The politicians clamour... for the rapid Indianization of the Army.... The process must proceed extremely slowly if it is not to prove a failure.... If the Army is to be completely Indianized, we want over 2,000 officers, and it is more than doubtful whether a sufficient number of the right type of Indian will ever be forthcoming to supply the requirements of the Army. Except for a few of the better class people of the Punjab and North West Frontier Province, others dislike discipline and physical work. Love of leadership and soldiering is a form of ambition which is quite absent in the average Indian boy; it is practically certain that after 4, 5, or 6 years of service in the Army, they would become tired of discipline and the discomforts, and would send in their papers and return home. The Indian does not now, and never will, enter the Army for the love of the profession of arms, and be prepared to lay down his life for the sake of the land of

²Lord Curzon's Memorandum on Commissions for Indians, 4 June 1900, in C.H. Philipps, ed., *Select Documents of the History of India and Pakistan* (London, 1962), vol. 4, p. 518.

his birth. In the absence of a definitely Indian patriotism, an efficient and completely Indianized Army becomes unthinkable.³

Concepts and theories do change however, and although the thread of antagonism that ran through most of the fabric of British governmental thinking on the subject of Indianization was spun by the military themselves, it would be unfair to blame all and sundry. After Independence, this is what an Army Journal had to say on the very same subject:

By the end of the nineteenth century we had come to realize that Indian troops could be a match for any soldiers in the world. But this was regarded as contingent on British leadership and organization, and on superior weapons and equipment which only a European country could provide. By 1945 it had been proved on many battle-fields that Indian troops led by Indian officers were equal to any fighting men on earth, and superior to most.⁴

Let us now pick up the threads where we left them before this digression, of the organizational complexities that faced us immediately after Independence. A complete reorganization of the Services had to be undertaken. In the Army, many regiments which were predominantly Moslem went across the border to Pakistan, and formations of which they were a part broke up. Those regiments that remained had to be recast. Of the ten Gorkha regiments, four were transferred to the British Army under agreement with Britain and Nepal. All British officers had to leave, and staffs at Headquarters—particularly Army Headquarters which had long been the exclusive preserve of British officers—were reduced to skeleton proportions. This vacuum had to be filled at all levels, but the officers simply did not exist. The situation was not a happy one.

Command and Control

There were a good many other matters, too, which demanded immediate attention. In pre-Independence days, the Commander-in-Chief was *ipso facto* a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council and, therefore, virtually occupied what is now the office of the Defence Minister. This was not acceptable in a democracy, and

³Ibid., pp. 525 and 529-30.

⁴Editorial in the *Army Quarterly* (London), vol. 69, no. 1, October 1954.

with the appointment of a civilian Defence Minister, the three heads of Services were designated Chiefs of Staff of their respective Services. Not only this, civilian control over the Services had to be established through the Defence Ministry. It will be pertinent to point out that although this was accomplished without rancour, it was an intricate task. Traditionally, control over the armed forces in India had been vested in the Commander-in-Chief. Civilian control in the manner in which it has to be exercised in a democracy was unknown. Besides this, it had been the practice to keep the forces very much aloof from the people. This policy too had to go overboard.

To change everything almost overnight placed a heavy and responsible burden on those charged with this duty. There were doubts and suspicions, hopes and fears, some of them loudly voiced while many others were discussed *sotto voce*, lest further complications should arise. The whittling down of the Services' authority was not an easy matter, and to do so without creating animosity required patience and consummate skill.

Another problem was that which concerned the political subdivision of the new India into States, and in conformity with this subdivision, to create Army Commands and administrative areas. The political and military conundrums that this entailed were far from easy of solution. Under these conditions of flux, it is easy to understand why it was difficult, though not impossible, for the Government to devote attention to the specifics of defence policy. Indeed there were other reasons, too, which militated against anything other than acceptance by Government of a broad policy of safeguarding our borders and the maintenance of internal security. The aim of our foreign policy did not dictate any requirement for large armed forces to be kept in being, in spite of factual circumstances dictating to the contrary. We did not view any particular country as being our enemy; we had no expansionist ideas; we never intended to align ourselves with any Powers; besides, the future development of our economy not only demanded conditions of peace for the implementation of our plans, but also required the expenditure on the armed forces to be reduced to the barest minimum. The view then began to be held that the existing size of the forces could well be pruned and that the sooner this was undertaken, the better. The stockpile of weapons and equipment,

particularly as the Second World War had only recently given over, was considered more than adequate for our needs. Since we also possessed some ordnance factories for the manufacture of our essential requirements, there appeared to be no cause for worry on the score of stores and warlike equipment. Then came the attack on Kashmir.

Kashmir Campaign and its Lessons

History will record how that campaign was fought. Of special interest will be the disclosure of the precarious basis on which it was conducted. One of the lessons that emerged—or rather repeated themselves—was the absolute necessity of having in being at all times properly balanced forces of all arms and services, adequately equipped, with sufficient reserves as a backing for the troops in the field. It was also brought home forcibly that indigenous manufacture of weapons and warlike stores would have to be taken in hand vigorously, since dependence on imports from abroad could not be guaranteed. In fact, the time had arrived when decisiveness and a sense of urgency were what mattered most. There is no doubt that some far-reaching decisions were now taken, but once again against a background of thinking which adhered to the belief that the danger to our security was not more serious than it had ever been, the Kashmir campaign notwithstanding. Emphasis was certainly placed on the indigenous manufacture of some items of warlike stores, but the pace was dictated by the small trickle of moneys which were made available for the purpose, and this was conditioned in turn by the doctrine that nothing was to be permitted to interfere with our economic development and progress. The policy of reducing the forces to predetermined strengths based on considerations of available finance was still to be adhered to. Our military hierarchy could be excused in the circumstances if they saw things in a different light, and subscribed to the view that a more realistic and practical approach to the problem of security was overdue.

Dame Fortune continued to smile on our international relations, and we continued to reorganize our forces at a steady but leisurely pace. Contingents were found for duty in the Congo, Gaza, Indo-China, and the Lebanon. It would seem that we had enough and to spare for meeting all our commitments. Then

came the attack by China in Ladakh and the NEFA area in 1962.

Chinese Attack

The reasons for this attack and its consequences are still being debated. We are too near the event to make an objective appraisal, but this set-back to our self-respect has led to much introspection not only in the purely military field, but also in the political arena. It can be argued with some strength of conviction that had our defence policy been more specific instead of merely broad-based, we might have been saved the predicament that China has placed us in. There can, of course, be an equally strong argument that a country wedded to democratic ways of conducting its life cannot hope to plug all the holes through which unprovoked aggression can creep in. We are not concerned with the pros and cons of such a discussion here. What is pertinent is that there is now a realization that second thoughts are overdue regarding our defence policy as well as our defence measures. Apart from the heart-searching that is necessary in the political sphere, there are some concrete and down-to-earth concepts that cannot be ignored, however mundane they may appear at first sight. We are obliged to clear our minds on certain assumptions that must be made, and these are mentioned here. Armed forces, if they are a necessary adjunct to our very existence, must be made as efficient as is humanly possible. The size and composition of the forces must be determined by the commitments and tasks they will have to undertake. These latter will, of course, depend on the specifics of our defence policy. The costs of the whole venture should be related not so much to what we can conveniently afford, but to the amount of sacrifice that the country just has to make if we are to maintain our security. The efficiency of the forces is dictated in large measure by the possession of up-to-date equipment, and this must be related to the job in hand.

Re-equipment Principles

We have perhaps been slow in re-equipping ourselves because of our dependence on previously available stockpiles. On grounds of economy we have been obliged to use and retain equipment much beyond the period that they were originally expected to remain

serviceable. Nor have we been anxious to produce any new material. In the field of new production, experience has shown that it can take anything from seven to ten years to translate a new idea in equipment into factual possession of numbers of the manufactured item. Surely this is an indication that in this matter, time is of the essence, else our state of effective readiness goes into retrogression. Quite understandably, when the situation demands that we re-equip ourselves—as it did after the Chinese aggression in 1962 and again in 1965—we have to import the more modern items of material from abroad. This has, of course, the advantage that we do not have to expend our thought, energies, and considerable sums of money on research and development for the manufacture of the new material needed. In fact, however, this is poor consolation. The terrain in which our forces have to operate possesses peculiarities of its own, and these are in a sense unique; our troops have their own intrinsic qualities of hardihood, frugality, sense of dedication, and acceptance of degrees of privation not commonly found in many other countries. Economically we have serious limitations. There is every reason, therefore, that we should exercise to the full our ingenuity and imagination in devising and producing for ourselves what our own peculiar requirements dictate. It will then at least be readily available.

It is obvious that developing countries like ours are seriously handicapped in their attempts at equipping themselves militarily, particularly when they mean to remain self-reliant. There is an alternative, however, to accepting without much question the ways and methods of conducting war followed by the more advanced nations which rely on much sophisticated weaponry. It is not necessarily far-fetched to suggest that superiority in weapons is not essential to success in battle. The rise of military Powers in Asia is today a very important event in the context of world politics. That they have been and are inferior to Western military might, cannot be gainsaid. Nevertheless, how have they behaved militarily? The Communist Chinese victories over the Nationalists in 1949, when the latter were infinitely better trained and equipped by the West, is only one example. Not very much later, the North Korean army took only a few weeks to overrun much of that country in spite of having inferior equipment. Still later, the Chinese fought a bitter war for three years against a most modern United Nations

army. Yet again, the Viet Minh campaign against the French affords an example of success against superior forces by an inferior army. Does the answer perhaps lie in the attitude of mind of these Asian military Powers? Is it not true that the possession of plenty (in arms and equipment) tends to inhibit the evolution of new tactical methods based on audacity and daring? Perhaps it also stultifies the exercise of ingenuity, originality of thought, and reliance on intrinsic aptitudes. Maybe it also deprives the possessor of plenty, of the value of pride of achievement against overwhelming odds.

These thoughts might appear to many as plain wishful thinking, akin to a starry-eyed view of the brutal practicalities of war. However, to dismiss arbitrarily consideration of unorthodox but successful methods of fighting on the assumption that they are unrealistic, is to prejudge the issue. Scepticism regarding that which is unfamiliar is understandable, but intuitive dislike of the unorthodox is indefensible.

DEFENCE POLICY FORMULATION AND CONTROL

Repeated mention has been made of the dilemma that the Chinese aggression has placed us in. The galling fact is that we have to recover from the humiliation that they have inflicted on us, and the least that we can do is to ensure that there will not be a repetition of what happened in 1962. However unpleasant an admission it might be to make, we can hardly escape the conclusion that our defence policy did not measure up to the occasion. And what of our higher defence control that formulates that policy? Our system of higher defence control is based on the British model, and a brief explanation is given here of the manner in which this system works. The three Chiefs of Staff, who are heads of their respective Services, constitute a Chiefs of Staff Committee, with one of the Chiefs as permanent Chairman. These duties he performs in addition to those he shoulders as a Chief of Staff. This Committee meets regularly, discusses matters of moment, and those that require ministerial approval before implementation are placed before the Defence Minister. Should the nature of the matter involve a policy decision, it is dealt with by the Defence Minister's Committee, chaired by the Minister himself, with the three Service Chiefs, the

Defence Secretary, and the Financial Adviser as members. If the matter is such that the Government of the country must make a decision, it is put up to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, of which the Prime Minister himself is the Chairman. This machinery ensures that decisions can be made at all levels without too much fuss. An examination of the system at today's stage of its development proves that it is simple enough and sufficient for the purpose. The history of its evolution, however, is replete with instances of bitter recrimination and argument among the highest in the land. Let us retrace our steps to the beginning of the century and take a quick look into some of the difficulties that presented themselves in the making of the control system. Discussing the evolution of a method for governmental conduct of war before the First World War, Lord Hankey stated: "For centuries there was a tendency to trust to the principles of peace, and of neutrality and diplomacy, as a substitute for war preparations. The risk that war may break out for reasons beyond our control, has too often been overlooked."⁵ Does this sentiment strike familiar chords? In Britain it was in 1904 that a Committee of Imperial Defence was set up with the Prime Minister as Chairman. It comprised Ministers of Government and two Chiefs of Staff, there being no Royal Air Force at that time. However, this was only an advisory body having no executive powers, which was unfortunate. During the First World War, Asquith set up a War Council and later a War Cabinet, but both bodies were hardly functional because they comprised far too many people for ease of decision-making. In 1916, Lloyd George brought these bodies down to manageable dimensions, but this too proved ineffective because it ignored the essential fact that any machinery for control had to have advice given to it which was the considered and agreed view of the Service Chiefs. This shortcoming was rectified by the creation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Professional advice had not been forthcoming previously because of differences between the Services themselves, as well as those between the Services and the statesmen. These differences were legion, and the consequences of the disagreements were always grave. In his *Memoirs*, Lord Ismay relates as follows:

⁵Lord Hankey, *Government Control in War* (Cambridge, 1945).

Far-sighted though the Committee had been, there were no preconceived plans for the provisions of adequate reinforcements to the Army, with the result that "our fighting strength did not reach its high-water mark until . . ." two and a half years after the outbreak of war. There were no plans for the conversion of industry to war purposes, with the result that it was not until June 1916 that the output of artillery ammunition became approximately adequate.⁶

Again, regarding the animosities that existed then between those at the helm of affairs, he says:

Nowhere can lack of unity be more fatal than in the machinery for the supreme control of war. A country may have powerful forces led by brilliant commanders; it may have statesmen of great competence, it may have a civilian population which is disciplined and resolute; it may have industries which are most efficiently run, but unless the statesmen and the soldiers at the summit work together in a spirit of mutual esteem, the essential co-ordination between all these diverse elements of strength will be lacking, and there is bound to be a deadly waste of blood and treasure.⁷

The heaviness of the atmosphere that must have existed in those days can almost be felt when one recalls a remark made to Lloyd George by Field Marshal Robertson. He said: "I could give you a hundred plans for winning the war if I had not got the responsibility for carrying them out."⁸ There is much more to this remark than would appear at first sight. The virtue of the control system lay in the fact that those who were responsible for tendering advice on defence were the very same people who were in actual control of the forces. "The idea of men of genius living in splendid isolation and divorced not only from the harsh realities of administration but also from any responsibility for the execution of their brainwaves, would not find many supporters among men of experience."⁹ This is a dictum which has much to be said for it. Hence Field Marshal Robertson's remark. The machinery for higher defence control which we have adopted has obviously been through much fire and brimstone, so to speak, before being perfected. Yet we do not appear to have worked it with much success in devising means to meet the repeated Chinese pinpricks culminating in their major assault in 1962.

One is constrained to admit that we could have measured up to our task of determining defence policy in a better manner than

⁶Lord Ismay, *Memoirs* (London, 1960), p. 47.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁹*Ibid.*

we did. If, because of circumstances and reasons unknown to most of us, it was necessary to defer consideration of the specifics of defence policy, may we suggest that the period when such a calculated risk could have been taken was during the year or two immediately after Independence. It happened to be an era when we and others like us (including those whose concepts of life are inimical to ours) were completely involved in orienting ourselves both in the domestic field and in the field of international relationship.

Strangely enough, it was precisely during this period that considerable attention was in fact devoted to defence matters. It was only later, when many of the administrative hurdles had already been crossed, that we appeared much more to take things for granted, and we paid the penalty for doing so. Why is it that at this later stage, when we had come clear of the woods of domestic concern, and when our relations with Pakistan and also with China were steadily worsening, did we show less awareness of our defence responsibilities and of the dangers that threatened us? Was it because of an unquestioning belief in the efficacy of diplomacy as a means of preventing possible war? Did we become over-idealistic and, as a consequence, ignore the hard facts of international life in the present-day world? Can it be that this led in turn to a conviction that the good intentions of China were as genuine as that country made them out to be? Try as we may, it is difficult to get away from the feeling that we had perhaps allowed a sense of complacency to set in. Can a country become complacent when its land frontiers extend to almost two-thirds of the width of Asia; when it has to frame policies with many countries beyond that frontier, with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tibet, Nepal, Burma, China, and even others to the East as well; when it also has a sea frontier, and being placed in the very centre of the vast Indian Ocean, there are no ports on the rim of that ocean with which it can remain unconcerned?

Answers to these problems, and indeed to many others as well, will have to be found. Perhaps overshadowing all of them is India's dilemma regarding China's nuclear threat. Does the only counter lie in an Indian nuclear-weapons programme? A study of the military implications of such a measure is a serious enough proposition in itself and would provide only part of the answer. Economic, political, international, and moral aspects of the problem

are of considerable importance and have a direct bearing on any decision that may be made.

In order to survive in today's world, it is necessary that decisions should be made well in time, else we can be overtaken by events themselves. For instance it would be difficult to refute the contention that another crisis of the nature of those that confronted the country in 1962 and again in 1965 may well trigger a decision where none has been made so far, and it is not inconceivable that this decision may prove wrong, since it will be made under duress.

If we have not accorded to defence policy a pride of place in our thinking, we have been wrong. If we have not evolved machinery effective enough to assist us in making objective appraisals, it is time we did so. We have the knowledge, the ability, and the ingenuity that will give us the answers we need. What is necessary is to put these qualities to work.

23 February 1967

External Relations

M.S. MEHTA

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

BEFORE INDEPENDENCE the external relations of this country were the responsibility of the British Government. India did not, and could not, have a foreign policy of its own. In certain minor and purely regional matters, Whitehall allowed a limited measure of action to the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India. This Department was manned almost exclusively by the British. Hardly ever were Indians entrusted with political or diplomatic functions. The Viceroy and Governor-General himself held charge of this Department in his Executive Council. Its affairs were ordinarily kept outside the scope of the Council.

It is evident, therefore, that the foreign policy of India in the sense in which it is understood and discussed in contemporary times has no indigenous roots. During British rule, the administration of this country was "a subordinate branch of Her Majesty's Government" in London. In the Moslem period too—even in the heyday of the Mogul Empire—foreign relations as they are understood today did not receive much attention from the rulers. Their thought and resources were directed almost exclusively towards relations with the other States of India, including wars for subjugating the neighbours, or for exacting tributes, or for overrunning their territories, and for negotiation and conclusion of treaties. Even in the *Artha Shastra* of Kautilya, the *Smriti* of Manu, or the relevant portions of the *Dharma Shastra* in ancient India, the formulation of foreign policies mainly dealt with the relations of States within the country. They were so little concerned with foreign countries.¹

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¹"The *Mahabharata* lays down that an Indian empire must not go beyond

The conception of India varied from time to time, but ultimately it came to mean the country stretching from the Himalaya to the southern sea and from the western sea to the eastern sea. This was the *chaturanta prithvi* which an Indian King might legitimately aspire to rule. Even Kautilya never envisaged that a Hindu emperor's rule would extend beyond this.

India became an independent country in 1947 with the passing of an Act of the British Parliament. But even earlier, some significant moves had been made in the direction of giving it a semblance of international status. After the First World War, India and the Dominions of the British Empire were associated in discussing the terms of the Versailles Treaty and became original members of the League of Nations. Canada was the first self-governing Dominion to assert its right in the field of external relations. It opened its diplomatic legations in Paris and Washington before any other unit of the Commonwealth. In order mainly to assert its freedom of action it declared war on Adolf Hitler's Germany a week after the United Kingdom.

The world-shaking conflict of 1914-18 had an explosive effect on men's minds in many directions, particularly in political ideas and in international relations. Woodrow Wilson's ideology, the entry of the United States in the First World War, the founding of the League of Nations, and the Russian Revolution produced profound changes in human ideas and outlook. The course of a decade had covered, as it were, almost the span of a century. This did not leave the peoples and countries of the British Commonwealth unaffected. The old concept of Empire was replaced by that of "the Commonwealth" as an association of "free and equal partners" without any member being subordinate to Britain. This far-reaching change in the position of the Dominions was definitely accepted in the Imperial Conference of 1926. Although India had not yet acquired the position of a self-governing country, its national status had risen significantly. This found expression in the utterance of the distinguished representative of India, the late Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, who said: "I am willing to join the King's household, but I refuse to stay in the outhouses."

In the matter of the representation of India in international these geographical limits." See K. Satchidananda Murty, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Calcutta, 1964), p. 9.

organizations and conferences as also in Commonwealth discussions, it was treated, formally at any rate, on the same footing as the other Dominions. The nature and quality of representation also underwent a steady change. Independent non-officials who enjoyed popular respect for their ability and independent views began to be selected to join Indian delegations for Commonwealth and world conferences. But in the legal sense this improvement still remained more a matter of form than a matter of substance. It appeared largely in the nature of a concession rather than the recognition of a right. In the formulation of policies on important matters as also in concluding major agreements with other countries, India was not as free as the self-governing Dominions. But even this cautious attitude of the authorities in Whitehall had some significance. It certainly roused a new sense of national consciousness and self-respect in India.

The Second World War between the Allies on the one side and Germany, Japan, and Italy on the other brought this issue to a head. Indian leaders had no sympathy whatsoever for Adolf Hitler, and they would have gladly supported the Allies in the war against the Nazis and the Fascists. In a statement on 14 September 1939, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress declared that "the issue of war and peace for India should be decided by the Indian people... Their sympathy is entirely on the side of democracy and freedom. But India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied to her."² Indian leaders claimed the freedom of decision; in such a vital matter they resented being dragged into an important decision without being consulted. Indian demand for independence became strong and irresistible. It was finally conceded in 1947.

During the sixty years (before Independence) of the life and activity of the most important political organization, the Indian National Congress, the external relations of the country did not assume great importance. It is true that occasionally its resolutions dealt with external affairs or even military matters: for example, at its first session in 1885 it deprecated the annexation of upper Burma; it took special interest in the Khilafat question after the First

²All India Congress Committee, *Congress and the War Crisis* (Allahabad, n.d.), p. 14.

World War; in 1920 a message of India's sympathy was expressed for the Irish people in their struggle for freedom; and in 1936 the Congress called for the observance of "Abyssinia Day" in Asia. But mostly it agitated and pressed demands for political power, the Indianization of the superior public services, national economic policies, spread of education, fair treatment of Indians overseas, and similar matters.

Jawaharlal Nehru was one outstanding exception among the Indian leaders in this respect. From the early years of his public life, international affairs attracted his attention and moved him deeply. The liberal ideas of the Fabians of London, the colonial possessions of the European states in Asia and Africa, the White man's supremacy in world affairs, racial discrimination in many parts of the world, economic disparities between the affluent countries of the West and the poorer people of the East, as also popular revolt against absolute power (as in Russia and later in Spain), fired his imagination. He participated in 1927 in the Congress of Oppressed Peoples in Brussels presided over by the British Labour Leader, George Lansbury. Less than ten years later, his "visit to Europe coincided with a period of intense crisis in the international sphere, and I put myself psychologically in tune with this by going straight to Barcelona", where the Spanish Civil War was in fierce action. All through the sustained agitation and national struggle for wresting political power from the British Government under Mahatma Gandhi's unique guidance, Nehru was the one prominent person among Indian leaders who felt deeply interested in international developments and followed world events with fervour. "The reaction of the Spanish War on me indicates how in my mind, the problem of India was tied up with other world problems. More and more I came to think these separate problems, political or economic, in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Central Europe, India or elsewhere were facets of one and the same problem."³

"There was", he wrote, "ferment in France resulting in fascist riots and the formation of a 'Nationalist' Government."⁴ And further, "In Austria Chancellor Dollfuss was shooting down workers and putting an end to a great edifice of social democracy there.

³Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London, 1936), p. 601.

⁴Dorothy Norman, *Nehru: The First Sixty Years* (Bombay, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 344-5.

The news of the Austrian bloodshed depressed me greatly.”⁵ Indignant at the Italian aggression in Africa, he said: “Ethiopia . . . lies helpless and prostrate before the brutal might of fascist imperialism.”⁶

There was not this fervour of feeling in other leaders of the Indian National Congress on world events and international problems, apart from a small cell of younger intellectuals like Ram Manohar Lohia, Raj Kumar, and Ashraf in the Congress office, whom he himself had largely inspired in this respect. It has been remarked that Nehru was the link between the Congress and the world.

When India attained the status of full nationhood both in internal government and external affairs, Nehru, as Prime Minister, became also the first Foreign Minister of free India. His colleagues, both in the party and in the Government, left the formulation of the country's foreign policy to him. As his biographer has put it, Nehru “was the philosopher, the architect, the Engineer and the Voice of his country's policy towards the outside world” and “in no other state does one man dominate foreign policy as Nehru does in India”.⁷ Alike in the party, in Parliament, and in the Cabinet, he was the sole author and director of the country's relations and negotiations in the external field. It was again he that explained and defended it in the country and the world. The central features of that policy bore the stamp of the ideas and circumstances which had influenced his career and attitude in public life and throughout the thirty years of the national struggle for freedom. And by no means the least important of these influences sprang from the official ideas and humanism of Gandhi, whom he accepted as his leader and political guide, even though their outlook on life differed widely.

The Indian view of world affairs and its approach to international problems has two basic features—the maintenance of peace and independence of approach to (or uncommitted position in) international issues.

Broadly speaking, three elements enter in the formulation of a nation's foreign policy, namely (a) national interests, (b) power position, and (c) ideology, and the traditional world of diplomacy has generally given them this very order of priority so far. The Indian Government apparently reversed the order in the treatment

⁵Ibid., p. 345.

⁶Ibid., p. 418.

⁷Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 564.

of foreign affairs. India did not and could not, as it did in other branches of administration, build up its policy in external relations on the foundations laid by the predecessor Government of India. There were no old moorings. Not only were the ideals of world peace, the views on the peaceful settlement of all disputes, and opposition to colonialism and racial superiority emphasized boldly and rightly and given the first place but their repetition inadvertently produced an impression abroad (especially in the West) as though Western thought as a whole had disregarded those fine and human principles. This was obviously unjust to the large and influential body of liberal statesmen and thinkers of Europe and America. It would be fair to recognize that even before the Russian Revolution, and between the two world wars, there was a respectable measure of articulate opinion in the West pleading for peaceful behaviour, abnegation of power, value of negotiation, reduction of armaments, and anti-colonial and anti-racial policies in world affairs. For the advocates of such an approach to international behaviour, "power policies and balance of power were ugly words for ugly phenomena".

As Indian leadership settled down in its new rôle of responsible statesmanship, the relative importance of the three constituent features of foreign policy—ideals, power, and national interests—underwent a slow but steady change. Not only in public pronouncements but also in actual negotiations—in the light of experience—a marked difference became necessary. The security of the country and national interests could not be wholly subordinated to moral principles or high ideals, especially when the world outside was not ready to accept them.

A viable foreign policy has to conform to enlightened self-interest. It is, of course, understood that in a fast-changing world, even for the defence of a country's permanent interests, the tactics, if not the basis, of its policy would constantly call for vigilant review and revision. The foreign policy of India soon began to be treated with this greater care and thought. Although, therefore, there was growing realism in its application as years rolled by the rocks of hard experience, its basic outlook and concept remained unchanged. Thus it came to be more and more the art of the feasible in the face of other nations, particularly the neighbouring countries, pursuing ideas of their own self-interest. After all it has to be

remembered that a country's foreign policy has no sanction of sovereignty to uphold it.

Numerous factors, tangible and intangible, enter in the formulation of the nation's policies. The geographical and strategic position of our country, our historical experience (both ancient and recent), the multiplicity of our religious traditions, our economic needs, our problems of development, and our huge and growing population (most of which is illiterate and subsists on a very low standard of living)—all this constitutes the warp and woof of our policies. Peace and security are not merely moral principles or noble ideals. They are also a necessary condition for the country's progress and survival. As Tagore once said, India carries on its back the "burden of ages". In Nehru's own words, "We are very old, and trackless centuries whisper in our ears."

It is in this context that the policy of non-alignment should be viewed and understood. India, as has already been remarked, did not inherit any major foreign-policy problems. It has, unlike China, a non-expansionist tradition. It has neither unresolved territorial disputes nor serious suspicions of any neighbours. Non-alignment reinforces the economic necessity of peace for India, as also the need of the world recovering from a major war. The goal of social and economic democracy, development through planning at home, and peace and non-alignment abroad, is thus both sound and logical. The horror of a modern war underlines the inevitability of interdependence. Non-alignment is, therefore, not a negative approach. It is certainly not synonymous with neutrality. It is a bold positive way of dealing with international issues by supporting and strengthening the rôle of the United Nations and its organs and Specialized Agencies. War as an instrument of policy has to be rejected both in principle and for practical reasons. The progress in technology is a compelling argument in favour of peaceful co-existence. India, by continuing to stay in the Commonwealth, gave courageous evidence of the positive aspect of its policy-making. In opposing the racial policies of South Africa and Portugal, Indian policy was clear, definitive, and positive. Again by its efforts to bring about a cease-fire in the Korean war and the repatriation of the prisoners of war, India played a significant and positive rôle on the side of peace. India's rôle in bringing about the end of hostilities in Vietnam and, from the side-

lines, the assistance it offered in the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in 1954 support the same view.

India was obliged to face armed aggression by Pakistan twice in recent times, in 1947 and in 1965. It reacted in self-defence, but on both occasions India sacrificed the military advantage, when victory was within its grasp, out of consistent regard for its policy of settling disputes by peaceful means. True to its basic faith in negotiation, it took the dispute to the United Nations. Unfortunately, the Kashmir conflict still remains a running sore. In the context of Indo-Pakistani history this issue is involved in the larger concept of secularism in the Indian democracy, apart from other complications affecting the South Asian region as a whole.

India's policy with its liberal and idealistic content received a jolt in its relations with its great neighbour, Communist China. Up to the mid fifties there was abundant expression of China's full accord with India. The top leaders of both the countries in a joint statement in 1954 supported the *Panch Shila* ("five principles" of international relations). In the Bandung Conference in April 1955 there appeared to be a common approach and a united wish to stand by Asian and African solidarity. But China always had its own notions of appropriate relationship with its neighbours and of foreign policy in general. It regarded peaceful co-existence as a tactical expediency to be used as a smoke-screen; the feeling of anti-imperialism was to be exploited to its own advantage; Asian-African solidarity was a step in its own plan of confrontation with other continents; equivocation was a legitimate weapon. India's relations with Bhutan, Sikkim, and even Nepal were recognized initially and repudiated later. India's faith was, therefore, betrayed by Chinese deceptive tactics. The possibility of a conflict began to be anticipated by 1959. The tragedy of Tibet and the suppression of Tibetan culture and institutions shook Indian public opinion and shocked the conscience of the world. There was an atmosphere of tension in which the failure of negotiations to resolve the border dispute became inevitable. When the battle of maps brought no result, the Chinese resorted to an undeclared shooting war in 1962. This shattered India's faith in its great neighbour's probity and professions. It raised a wave of indignation all over the country. India's China policy lay in shambles. A hard lesson was learnt that in international relations something more was

required than good faith and friendly feelings. The whole nation rose like one man to resist the invader.

The curve of appreciation and approval of India's foreign policy during the twenty years of Independence has had an uneven course. In the first few years India's prestige went up in the world for its bold ideals and their fearless enunciation. Apart from the hardened reactionaries in the chancelleries of the Western countries, world opinion was sympathetic and favourable towards India and Indian leadership. The icy reserve of many Western statesmen began also to thaw, and India's concept of non-alignment gained increasing understanding even in circles which did not accept its soundness. The critics were fewer than before, and they were much less suspicious.

From about 1960 onwards the graph-line of confidence and approbation began a descending movement. The basic principles of Indian foreign policy and also the mode of their application came into the arena of fierce debate in which political scientists, economists, journalists, and professional politicians participated. This free discussion should be regarded as a healthy feature of a democratic society. The affairs, policies, and actions of the government in power should be subjected to a proper scrutiny.

The main points of criticism call for a brief notice. The foreign policy of a country should bear close relation to its internal policies and conditions, social and economic, and to defence position, cultural pattern, and problems of general security. Foreign policy cannot and should not be conceived in complete isolation from the general situation within the country. This principle was often accepted and stressed by the late Prime Minister, Nehru. But his critics are not satisfied that he always observed it in actual practice.

The basic features of Nehru's (which has been hitherto very largely India's) foreign policy are: world peace; settlement of international disputes through negotiation and by peaceful means; steady reduction of armaments; international agreement or a ban on the use of nuclear power and weapons of mass destruction; strengthening of the ideal, purpose, and organization of the United Nations; moral support for the ideal of a democratic world order as a loose confederation; ending of colonial rule; removal of racial discrimination in the social as well as political sphere; non-alignment with regard to military pacts or defence alliances (whether

they are on an ideological or regional basis); freedom and independence in judging world issues or international conflicts; respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's affairs; and recognition of each other's equality on the principles of "peaceful co-existence", irrespective of racial, political, or ideological differences. These are the main ingredients of the policy which Nehru initiated and passionately pleaded on behalf of India. It meant a radical departure from traditional thought and behaviour in the sphere of international relationship. It was in no way related to, nor was it a continuation of, the policies adopted by the predecessor Government of the pre-Independence era.

With the rise of two giant Powers in military strength and technological knowledge—the United States and the Soviet Union—the old concepts of security and balance of power wore a different look. Fresh remedies and devices for defence and security were adopted such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance. The balance of power turned into a "balance of terror". The world trembled in the chilly atmosphere of the Cold War ! Nehru boldly stood out as its uncompromising critic and attacked it with the zeal of a crusader.

As has been noticed already, for Nehru's India the formulation of its foreign policy was like writing on a clean slate. The ideas, attitudes, and conventions of the pre-Independence era were put aside. Secondly, the foreign policy bore the stamp of Nehru's bias born of his own political thinking and was deeply coloured in the experience of the Indian national struggle against foreign rule. This was indeed a rare instance of a great nation entering on the international scene with a largely subjective urge and an ideological bias.

The policy of non-alignment along with the concept of the *Panch Shila* so vigorously upheld by India's Prime Minister, both at home and abroad, reached its high-water mark of prestige and recognition in the conference of Asian and African countries at Bandung in April 1955, where this approach to international affairs was enthusiastically endorsed by the participating delegations of about forty

countries. On that occasion, as also earlier, China too fully subscribed to this creed. Apart from the ideological reason for non-alignment and for the condemnation of the concept of military pacts, Nehru felt much troubled at the idea of foreign troops remaining on Asian soil. That is why he was keen on close co-operation among Asian countries. This even produced an unfair and uncharitable thought in the minds of many critics that he considered himself as the leader of Asia and a champion of Asian interests. It is true, however, that he did visualize Asia as an "area of peace" where nations would conduct their relations according to the *Panch Shila*.

India's policy of non-alignment was, at any rate in its early days, misunderstood and mistrusted in the West. It was "so often confused with neutrality on the one hand and with fellow-travelling on the other", to quote the words of Alan de Russet. Indian thinking still remains very largely the same, though many important events during the last five years have raised a spirited debate on its basic concept, both in India and abroad. It cannot be said that there is acceptance of the Indian policy in the West, but the mists of misunderstanding and mistrust have nearly cleared up in recent years. In spite of strong suspicion and unfavourable criticism, there is little doubt that it has attained a status of respectability. "Non-alignment" is no longer the dirty word it was in the time of John Foster Dulles.

The most powerful attack on the foreign policy of India is based on the view that it has not served it well. Whereas it has certainly evoked praise and admiration in sympathetic circles—for its idealistic content and courageous exposition—the purpose for which it was enunciated and so eloquently defended eventually failed to be realized for India itself. Although a period of twenty years has passed since Independence, this country has not succeeded in solving most of its outstanding problems in the external field or in putting its relations with its neighbours on a sound or friendly basis. Pakistan is a peculiar problem and may be left out for the purpose of this argument. Let us also leave out the exceptionally bad case of China. How are our relations with other countries? Ceylon, Burma, Nepal, and Thailand have not responded to India's open-hearted attitude. Even Indonesia under President Achmed Soekarno has not hesitated to give the cold shoulder to its old friend

and benefactor! The Arab world is more or less divided and often lukewarm in its attitude towards India, notwithstanding a consistent and all-out attempt on the part of India to cultivate its goodwill and its readiness to support them. In the Asian-African group, which India helped to build up in the United Nations with great zeal and a genuine sense of devotion alike to its own ideals and to their best interests, its prestige and influence does not seem to be as high as is sometimes assumed. These critics go so far as to assert that India is friendless in today's turbulent world.

In fact some rather unfair detractors of the Indian record in foreign relations doubt whether the concept of non-alignment can be considered as a definite policy at all, apart from being an expression of pious wishes and laudable ideals. This extreme view is a manifest exaggeration.

Another strong criticism comes from those who seriously question whether India's attitude of non-alignment is sincere. There were often, in its actual use, clear bias, in fact even sympathy, for the views and deeds of one bloc and undue criticism of those of the other. India's reactions to the Anglo-French adventure in the Suez Canal area and to the events in Hungary in 1956 are recalled to support this view. Other examples are cited—Berlin, Korea, and Tibet, to name only three—to demonstrate that Indian policy was not really “non-aligned”. Indeed it is described as “unworthy of a democratic nation”. In fact on many occasions the advocates of non-alignment did not display the independence of approach and judgement which was their professed aim and purpose.

Lack of consistency is another charge brought against Indian policy and its application. The principles of complete freedom for a sovereign state in its domestic and foreign policies and of respect for them, whatever they might be, are the main plank in the Indian platform. Presumably for this good reason India repeatedly pleaded for the admission of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. And yet it was extremely slow, indeed for many years unwilling, to recognize Franco's Spain or to open diplomatic relations with that country. India's attitude towards Israel all these years cannot be defended, except on the flimsy ground of expediency. Indian authorities disclaimed any idea of leadership or the thought of influencing other countries in their policies and decisions. Nehru said: “We are not, frankly speaking, influential

enough to affect international events very much." In the same speech, he added later: "I have come more and more to the conclusion that the less we interfere in international conflicts, the better, unless, of course, our own interest is involved..." And yet India took the bold initiative in convening an international conference in January 1949 to condemn Dutch action in Indonesia and press for the latter's independence. The earlier view that India was not in a position to influence world events gradually, possibly unconsciously, gave place to a new self-confidence. "India is growing into a real giant again", Nehru once said. He added: "India can play a big part, and perhaps an effective part in helping to avoid war." This notion coloured the vision and partly vitiated clear thinking which is an essential condition for consistency.

It is urged that in human affairs, and especially in the field of international relations, it is erroneous to regard anything either as all white or as all black. It is quite erroneous to suppose that the alternative to non-alignment can only be unconditional alignment or acceptance of the position of a camp-follower of a major Power or military group. Intermediary courses are also possible and can be explored, involving a partial alliance, carefully qualified after balancing the totality of forces and circumstances with the country's long-time interests. This would be the more profitable course and need not be the less honourable. Democratic countries jealous of their independence are also known to have pursued such a line of action. In any case, with a proper sense of proportion it should have been realized that with its underdeveloped economy and technological progress and inadequate military power, India was in no position seriously to prevent a conflict between the two mighty "embattled rivals".

Another factor in the discussion of a country's foreign policy, the importance of which is being slowly recognized in the country, relates to the character, competence, and training of the persons who are called upon to interpret and implement that policy both in the External Affairs Ministry at home and in its Missions abroad. "The origin of diplomacy is buried in the darkness preceding what we call 'the dawn of history'. . . . The first principle to become firmly established was that of diplomatic immunity. We find it among the Australian aborigines, in the Institutes of Manu, and as an

accepted principle in the Homeric poems.”⁸

The administrative aspect of foreign affairs has thus great importance in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. Only lately has it begun to receive from Parliament and the Press the attention that it deserves. Indeed there is considerable ignorance on this subject even among educated people and the public at large. The right knowledge of the principal functions of the Foreign Service and of how best they should be discharged in the interest of the nation needs to be strengthened and constantly refined. The art of diplomacy which has come down from time immemorial has now become more or less a specialization. It was well understood in ancient India and practised by the Greek city states and the Romans. Professional diplomacy was “an art which the Greeks had been too insolent, and the Romans too haughty, to study and perfect. It was a misfortune that this art, so necessary for the relations between self-governing communities came to Europe neither illumined by Athenian intelligence nor dignified by Roman seriousness but falsified and discredited by the practices of the Oriental Court.”⁹ The Byzantines taught diplomacy to Venice, and the Venetians set the pattern for the Italian cities, for France and Spain, and for all Europe. The Byzantine and Italian diplomatic method attended with “blemishes of strategem and suspicion” ended with the noble work of the eminent international jurist of Holland, Hugo Grotius, and the influence of the famous French statesman, Cardinal Richelieu. The former enunciated the “Law of Nature” as the basis for international relations. And to the Cardinal the interest of the country was primary and eternal in determining foreign relations and in choosing one’s allies. He realized also the importance of seeking popular support within the country for the nation’s foreign policies.

This delicate and difficult department of public affairs started from scratch in 1947, without the advantage of tradition, training, or experience. Moreover, the Service has had to expand very rapidly. In less than twenty years India has had to set up diplomatic and consular missions in no fewer than one hundred and fifty countries of the world. Considering these serious handicaps,

⁸Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London, 1954), pp. 2-3.

⁹*Ibid.* p. 24

India's diplomat has given an excellent account of himself. He has stood his ground creditably and has distinguished himself in the world of international diplomacy (including the councils of the United Nations), earning respect and glory for this country. In integrity, intellectual power, and competence, as also in the art of negotiation, he has won his spurs. This is not as widely known in the country as it should be. However, it has to be admitted that this description is not applicable to all or even the majority of the diplomatic staff who have represented this country abroad.

Mention must also be made of an initial disadvantage which has haunted the life and growth of this department of the Government of India: India had the distinction of having as its first Foreign Minister a great leader who was the acclaimed hero of the nation and a world figure with a halo round his head. He was too big and indeed too busy to be able to deal with this new and important Ministry effectively. It called for a high degree of organizing ability, capacity for going into details and thoroughgoing supervision in its working—at any rate at the start. Who could have discharged these functions except the Foreign Minister himself? The Ambassadors, some of them important figures in political life, could not always be disciplined by the Ministry's Secretaries. Power and responsibility did not appear to have stayed together.

Meticulous care and complete objectivity in the selection of suitable persons for foreign assignment, strict enforcement of proper standards of integrity and performance, a well-thought-out system of training and recruitment of new entrants, and lastly a just and impersonal use of reward and punishment for encouraging the worthy and the promising, warning the indolent, the unscrupulous, and the irresponsible, and even eliminating the incorrigible are, broadly speaking, the essential conditions for the successful working of a public service organization. They are recognized all the world over. One would be curious to know in what respects and to what extent these methods have been systematically applied, and with what results!

The selection of heads of Missions is an especially important problem. Their ability properly to present their country's image abroad based on its political ideology, cultural heritage, geographical conditions, economic plans, and historical background should

be the basis for their selection. They are expected to cultivate the confidence and friendship of the Government and the people of the country to which they are accredited. "Ambassadors", said Demosthenes, "have no battleships at their disposal, or heavy infantry or fortresses; their weapons are words and opportunities. In important transactions opportunities are fleeting; once they are missed, they cannot be recovered."¹⁰

These functions cannot properly be entrusted to persons who are selected as heads of Missions on the mechanical basis of seniority. Then the good, the bad, and the indifferent get promiscuously mixed together and all of them automatically receive an equal chance, with the result that the country's vital interests suffer. Sometimes the damage done cannot be repaired. The art of negotiation, which is a very important ingredient and qualification of an efficient and reliable foreign service, must be supplemented by personal qualities of integrity, penetrating intelligence, patience, and social charm in the country's envoys.

There is a widespread—perhaps a little exaggerated—complaint about the inadequacy of external publicity of India's point of view and of the developments taking place in India. This needs looking into. In the contemporary world the need and value of handing out correct and timely information are universally recognized.

The varied functions of the country's diplomatic missions abroad obviously include political and trade negotiations, correct interpretation of national policies, establishment of cultural relations, conclusion of treaties for mutual aid in various fields, and gathering as complete information as possible about the other country. The scope of this last item does not always receive the attention that it deserves. Not only is it necessary to obtain knowledge of the political trends and information about defence matters and strategy, trade, and industry—these commonly receive recognition—but studies of social, educational, and labour conditions, of geographic and demographic factors which are peculiar to the country of accreditation and affect its strength, policies, and progress are also very important. The advanced countries of the world have this very comprehensive expectation from their diplomatic Missions and so should India. One can never tell what information on what

¹⁰Ibid., p. 13.

particular subject (or an aspect of it) might be found essential in future for strategic, political, or economic reasons. Who could have foreseen that the physical features, sources of water, and the fauna and flora of the North African region would be found of vital importance in deciding the fate of the Second World War ? Another example is also relevant: the Dutch and the Indonesian delegations got bogged down in a deadlock in their conference at The Hague in 1949 on the issue of West New Guinea (W. Irian). India had taken a special interest in the outcome of the conference. Naturally, therefore, the Indian Ambassador had to watch those discussions with particular keenness and sympathy for the success of the conference. He had to secure, on that occasion, full information quickly from New Delhi about the subject matter of the dispute (West Irian), its social conditions, economic potential, natural (oil and mineral) resources, communications, etc. Examples can be multiplied to support this idea which is self-evident. The Foreign Ministry of India, it is presumed, is devoting its attention to the need for this development.

This brief discussion of the foreign policy and its implementation can touch only the more important aspects; limitation of space would forbid an exhaustive treatment of the subject. In the context of the Indian scene, however, one apparently minor point has some significance. Thoughtful and seasoned ambassadors generally avoid the limelight and undue publicity for their spoken words, actions, and movements. They realize that their colleagues in the diplomatic corps and the foreign ministry officials in the country of accreditation would more readily give them their confidence and speak out their minds to them if they feel sure that their meetings and conversation would not prematurely reach the Press and the general public. It is common sense that such confidence has to be assiduously cultivated and then fully respected. This enhances the quality and value of the diplomat's service to his own country. And yet it is quite true that certain occasions require as wide a publicity of views, events, and policies as can be given. And this should always be given. But this does not in any way affect the basis and importance of the general principle stated above. Some diplomats show undue fondness for publicizing their actions and moves. Their talks and interviews with foreign ministers appear in the papers and can be heard on the radio almost within

hours. If this is desired, it is futile to expect an experienced foreign minister or a senior ambassador to discuss delicate international issues without reserve. Some diplomats cannot resist the temptation of expressing adverse opinion in public on the actions and policies of the country in which they are posted. This is also a violation of the common conventions of diplomatic life. It can have unfortunate effects on the relations between the two countries.

All these matters relating to the organization, training, recruitment, and administration of the Indian Foreign Service were referred to a competent committee with a former Secretary-General of the Ministry as its Chairman. This body was allowed fairly wide terms of reference. It was set up largely as a result of frequent interpellations and criticisms of the Foreign Service in Parliament and the Press. Its report was submitted to the Government in November 1966. It is to be hoped that the whole subject will receive careful consideration from the authorities leading to an all-round improvement in the standard of performance of this important branch of public service.

Twenty years of independence has been a very instructive experience for India in its relations with the world. The ideological enthusiasm and forthright self-confidence with which it started have gone through a period of stress and strain. Both under the scorching heat of hard experience and in the light of the changes in the policies of the major Powers, the Indian principles of foreign policy have to take new shape and content. The basic ideas of *niti* as expounded in the "Shanti Parva" of the great epic, the *Mahabharata*, are not entirely out of date.

In the case of China there has been a failure in assessing its historic personality. India was willing to co-exist and wished to refrain from military commitments with Communist China. Who could have expected that China would look upon a non-aligned India as a hostile Power? China still poses a serious threat to India's security. For the other neighbour, Pakistan, the Kashmir Valley continues to be a sore. So strong is this feeling that ideological differences notwithstanding, Pakistan has thrown itself into the arms of Communist China in order to intimidate India. The Tashkent spirit seems to be disappearing. India, on the other hand, treats the accession of the State as "complete in law and fact".

However, in view of the recent history, geographical factors, the intimate connexion between the two peoples, relations between India and Pakistan appear close to the dominion of domestic rather than of foreign policy.

The process of *rapprochement* between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the rift between Communist China and the Soviet Union on the other have created a new situation in the sphere of international relations. The attitude of coldness on the part of France and Germany towards the United States is another development of recent years. To make matters more complicated, China has been exploding atom bombs and aspires to become a nuclear Power. Then there is the definite commitment of the United States in South Vietnam and in South-East Asia in spite of strong criticism of that policy in America itself.

At home the economic stress has grown with the decline of agricultural production, a steep rise in prices, and the necessity of stepping up defence production. The fourth General Election has shaken the political complacency of the ruling party. Along with the way in which internal government of the country is conducted, the basic ideas of our foreign policy are now being subjected to more searching criticism than they used to be in the past. This is inevitable and even desirable in a democratic society.

Non-alignment has become out of date in the context of the developments which have taken place. It must, however, be admitted that its enunciation and adoption have served a useful purpose. The concept of peaceful co-existence has served to dispel the suspicions and fears of old hostile alliances. This strengthens the general desire for peace which is so essential to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is this development which is threatened by China on a global scale. China seeks the leadership and solidarity of the have-nots instead of international co-operation between the rich and the poor.

There is thus a new challenge for India. With the disappearance of the Cold War and non-alignment ceasing to be a practical proposition, India should identify itself with the majority of the peoples of the world in accepting the need and wisdom of consolidation of their political freedom and economic opportunity. India has a selfish, as also enlightened, interest in peace and stability. It must be a matter of pride and satisfaction to the rulers of India that the

whole world leans more and more on the United Nations with hope, and recognizes the validity of the principles of its Charter for the preservation of peace and for the providing of opportunities for the social and economic growth of mankind.

India should exert itself and evolve such principles for its relations with other countries as inspire confidence all round. These principles should bear close relation to its strength and purpose and should ever adapt themselves to the changing circumstances in the world.

30 March 1967

K.P.S. MENON

INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

ALMOST THE FIRST STEP taken in the international field by India after it became independent—and, indeed, even before it became formally independent in August 1947—was to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In September 1946, the Congress having abandoned its policy of non-co-operation, Jawaharlal Nehru joined the Government of India as Vice-President of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Within a few days, V.K. Krishna Menon and I, who were in New York for the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, were instructed to broach with the Soviet representative there the idea of exchanging diplomatic representatives between India and the Soviet Union. We had only to mention this matter to the Soviet Foreign Minister for the Soviet Government to agree.

This was perhaps the first striking assertion of independent India's sovereignty. With other major states, India, even under Britain, had relations of a sort. In London, India had had a High Commissioner since 1921, though, as if to proclaim that he was little more than a Trade Commissioner, he remained under the control of the Commerce Department and not the Foreign Department (such as it was) of the Government of India. With China and the United States, the Government of India, under the stress of the necessities of the war, established semi-diplomatic relations in 1942 and sent an Agent-General for India—a tell-tale designation which showed that India was not competent to appoint Ambassadors and Ministers abroad. With the Soviet Union, on the contrary, India had no relations whatsoever. Great Britain was determined to keep the

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two countries apart.

To a student of history, this is not a matter for surprise. Throughout the nineteenth century, "the Russian bogey" was one of the cardinal concerns of British foreign policy; and the bogeyman looked all the more terrible when he put on the red cloak of communism. Between the two world wars, Great Britain could not make up its mind who its real enemy was, Russia or Germany, Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. The question answered itself on the outbreak of the Second World War; and England and Russia soon found themselves in the same boat as allies against Germany. Hardly, however, had the boat weathered the storm and reached the port of peace when dissension again broke out between the erstwhile allies. The Cold War was on.

It was at this juncture that India became independent. Nehru was determined to keep India out of the Cold War. As long ago as 1927, when he was in Moscow on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution, he had noticed how Great Britain was trying to encircle, and, if possible, to strangle Communist Russia in the coils of its diplomacy. In his letters from Russia Nehru wrote that British policy was to encircle Russia by pacts and alliances and ultimately to crush it. He referred to a book written by "Augur", a well-known spokesman of the British Foreign Office, which stated candidly that the League of Nations and the Locarno Pact were the expressions of a desire to combat Bolshevism. "It is the rigidity of the British Government", wrote Augur, "which builds up the wall of a united Europe against the Soviet Union."

As early as 1927, Nehru decided that whatever Britain's attitude might be, India and the Soviet Union were destined to be friends. India was an Asian country, he said, and so was the Soviet Union, sprawling over Asia and Europe. Between two such states, there can be amity or enmity. There is no question of indifference. As soon as Jawaharlal Nehru had the power, he took steps to establish relations between India and the Soviet Union on a firm basis of amity.

In the first few years, the relations between India and the Soviet Union were bedevilled partly by the legacy of suspicion lingering in India from the British days and partly by the dogmatic approach towards Marxism in the Soviet Union. Many people in India could not get over the fear that the Soviet Union was out to turn the

world red by hook or by crook; and the die-hards in the Soviet Union, who saw the world in terms of black and white, Communist and non-Communist, did not know where India, with its new-fangled ideas of neutrality, lay. One has only to recall the uncharitable sketches of Mahatma Gandhi and other Indian leaders in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia in Stalin's time.

Yet, even in Stalin's time, there was a growing consciousness that India was not, and would never allow itself to be, a hanger-on of any politico-military bloc. Stalin himself showed his regard for India by receiving Dr Radhakrishnan soon after he assumed office as the Ambassador of India and, again, before he left, and also by receiving me, only a fortnight before he died. The Soviet Government was particularly appreciative of India's independent stand during the Korean war and the efforts made by India to bring about peace in Korea and, later, in Indo-China.

With Stalin's death, there opened a new chapter in Indo-Soviet relations. In his first important statement as Prime Minister, in August 1953, Georgi Malenkov made an unprecedented friendly reference to India.

The position of such a considerable state as India is of great importance for the strengthening of peace in the East. India has made her own significant contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries directed to the ending of the war in Korea. Our relations with India are growing stronger and cultural and economic ties are developing. We hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union will continue to develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote.

The Soviet Union now adopted peaceful co-existence as the main plank of its foreign policy. Not that it was an entirely novel doctrine, but its whole-hearted adoption and application to practical politics had been hindered by the Marxist dogma that war was inevitable and beneficial to the spread of communism. The two world wars, the first of which precipitated the advent of communism in Russia and the second was followed by the establishment of communism in China, seemed to lend confirmation to this view. Since then, however, a new and grim factor had entered the field, the nuclear bomb, and the Soviet Government realized that in the nuclear age the only alternatives for mankind were co-existence and co-extinction. No longer was the dictum of General Clausewitz that "war

is diplomacy by other means" valid. The "other means" would now mean the destruction of civilization. Therefore, it was declared in the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow in February 1956, that there was no fatal inevitability about war

A further declaration in the Twentieth Congress, which had a mellowing influence on Indo-Soviet relations and, indeed, on the relations between the Soviet Union and Asian-African countries generally, was that violence was not essential to the transformation of society. It was even admitted that in certain circumstances the transformation could be effected under a parliamentary system. It was also recognized that there were different paths to socialism and that each country was entitled to follow its own brand of socialism in consonance with its own national conditions, historical traditions, and psychological and spiritual outlook. Soviet leaders were careful to say that these declarations did not mean "ideological disarmament" as between capitalism and communism, but they went far to remove the ideological obstacles in the way of peaceful co-existence between countries following different social systems.

The Soviet Union also recognized the co-existence of certain states, which, without being Communist, followed a non-capitalist path of development and deserved to be supported. At a meeting of 81 Communist parties in 1960, which was also attended by the Chinese Communist Party, these states were called "independent national democracies". Such a state was defined thus:

A state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, and against military bases on its territory; a state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialistic capital; a state which rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government; a state in which the people are ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, the Press, assembly, and demonstrations, and freedom to establish political parties and social organizations), the opportunity to work for the enactment of agrarian reforms and other democratic social changes, and for participation in shaping government policy.

This description is applicable, almost word for word, to India, as conceived by Nehru.

Though China attended this conference of Communist parties and subscribed to this declaration, it had mental reservations. "There are only two ways," Chairman Mao Tse-tung said long ago,

“and there is no third way.” Indeed, one objective of China in attacking India in 1962 was to disprove that there could be a third way. China had hoped that either the Government of India would crumble or that in panic it would align itself with the Western Powers and thus confirm Mao Tse-tung’s proposition. The fact that India did not adopt either of these courses did not open the eyes of Mao Tse-tung to the realities of the international situation. He still persists in his primitive view of the universe, with himself at the centre, and tries to foist it on the party and the people with the valiant assistance of the Red Guards. Thus, the main bone of contention between China and the Soviet Union is whether peaceful co-existence is feasible.

It can be claimed without exaggeration that the relations between India and the Soviet Union provide the best example of not only peaceful but fruitful co-existence. It has certainly borne fruit in the economic sphere, though this was by no means our primary objective in cultivating the friendship of the Soviet Union. What haunted the mind of Nehru was the spectre of a world increasingly and inexorably divided into two blocs and the possibility of their clashing in an earth-shaking collision. He was determined to join neither, but to cultivate friendly relations with both.

It was not until after Stalin’s death that Indo-Soviet relations entered their active phase. Until then, the economic relations between India and the Soviet Union were of the scantiest order. In my first year in Moscow in 1952, the value of the outturn of trade between the two countries came to only 30 million rupees; in my last year, 1961, it came to 1,000 million rupees, and now it has passed the 2,000-million mark. In 1953, the total exports from India to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries were worth only 40 million rupees; 10 years later, it came to 200 million rupees. Even more significant are the figures revealing the extent of Soviet participation in India’s five-year plans. The total credit given by the Soviet Government comes to 1222.5 million roubles. This credit is given on very favourable terms. It carries interest at 2.5 per cent only and is repayable in 12 years, the repayment beginning one year after the completion of the project for which credit has been given; and, what is most helpful, the Soviet Government accepts repayment in rupees which are utilized for the purchase of goods in India.

The first great project built in India with Soviet assistance was the mighty metallurgical plant in Bhilai, with a capacity for producing one million tons of steel, now being extended to 2.5 million. 5,000 technicians were trained for this plant in India and 800 in the Soviet Union. The Soviet offer to put up this project must be regarded as a landmark in the history not merely of the relations between India and the Soviet Union but also between Asia and Europe, between East and West. For centuries, during what the late Sardar K.M. Panikkar called the Vasco da Gama era, Asia and Africa were regarded primarily as a source of raw materials for the highly industrialized, manufacturing nations of the West. Even after Asian countries began to become independent, this pattern persisted. The first great break in this pattern was caused by the Soviet Union's offer to put up a steel plant at Bhilai. Nehru said: "Bhilai is embedded in the national consciousness of the people of India as the symbol of a new era." And now, Bokaro, the cousin of Bhilai, with a capacity of 1.5 to 2 million tons, to be extended to 4 million tons, is to be put up with Soviet assistance, the USA in its allergy to the public sector having declined to do so after protracted negotiations.

The Soviet hand is also visible in many other branches of heavy industry. "We want to build the machines which build other manufacturing machines", said Nehru. A heavy engineering plant with a capacity of 80,000 tons has been set up at Ranchi with Soviet assistance. This has been called "the plant of plants".

Among other Indo-Soviet projects must be mentioned the precision instrument factories set up at Kotah and at Palghat, the power stations at Bhakra, Korba, and Neyveli (which account for about 30 per cent of India's electric capacity), the anti-biotic plant at Rishikesh, a synthetic drug plant at Hyderabad, and a surgical instrument factory at Madras.

Soviet assistance is by no means confined to the industrial sphere. A State agricultural farm covering 35 acres, the largest in South-East Asia, has been set up in the Rajasthan desert at Suratgarh. This farm has an interesting origin. During Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union, V.V. Kuznetsov, first Deputy Foreign Minister, told me that the Soviet hosts were thinking of presenting two Zis cars to Nehru and his daughter. He asked me whether this would be an appropriate present. I told him that it would be embar-

passing for them to use these luxurious cars; that in India, the Government had prohibited the import of expensive cars; and that Nehru wanted to set an example by going about in modest, India-made cars. Kuznetsov then asked me whether I could make some suggestions for a suitable present. "Why not a tractor?", I said. "It would be a fine gesture of help to the peasantry of India." Thus, there came into existence the Suratgarh farm, with 70 tractors, 60 harvester combines, and earth-moving machinery worth 7 million rupees. Nehru went round the farm in a jeep in 1959 and was thrilled to see that oasis in the heart of a desert. A hundred such farms, he exclaimed, and India's food problem would be solved. Under the recent agreement relating to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Government has offered a gift of agricultural machinery and equipment to set up five seed farms in the public sector and credit, on easy terms, for setting up ten more such farms.

Perhaps the greatest benefit which India has reaped from its friendship with the Soviet Union is in respect of oil. It used to be thought that whereas India was rich in coal, iron, manganese, and other mineral deposits, it was deficient in oil. Ten years ago only 8 per cent of our requirements of oil were met from local resources; the rest had to be imported from abroad at a fabulous expenditure of foreign exchange. Our requirement of oil has grown with time. In 1948, it stood at 2.2 million tons; in 1966, at 6 million tons; and in 1971, our requirement is estimated at 28 million tons. The foreign exchange involved in the import of foreign oil ran into crores of rupees. Western oil experts surveyed certain areas which seemed promising and reported that no oil was to be found. It was then that the Government of India approached the Soviet Union. It did not take long for Soviet experts to find oil of good quality and in abundant quantities—and that, in the very areas which had been surveyed by Western experts and pronounced as devoid of oil. As Nehru put it gently: "Those who looked for oil in the early days did not hold out any hope of discovering oil in India. Then came other people from other lands to help our Indian technicians. They believed there was oil in India and succeeded in finding oil in Assam and Gujarat."

On the advice of the Soviet Government, an Oil and Natural Gas Commission was established in the year 1956. Kalinin, the

brilliant Soviet oil expert, recommended an annual outlay of 60 million rupees in the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61) for the necessary investigations. Other foreigners scoffed at the possibility of finding oil in India; they called the Soviet proposals by such names as "empty gas", "wild catting", etc. Even C.D. Deshmukh, who was Finance Minister, was unconvinced. "You recommend", he told Kalinin, "spending 300 million rupees to carry out your plan and to discover at this cost one or two deposits of oil and gas, but won't this be a waste of money? India is not rich enough to afford such risky experiments." And yet, ten years later, the entire annual outlay recommended by Kalinin was being recouped by the sale of crude oil from Ankleswar alone to the Trombay Refineries; and the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, which hesitated to spend 300 million rupees for the entire five-year period of the Second Plan, started spending more than that amount in a single year.

One still recalls the excitement in Parliament when, in September 1958, its normal proceedings were suspended and Jawaharlal Nehru read the message that "oil has been struck in Cambay Well No. 1". Subsequently, oil of much better quality was struck at Ankleswar. In 1966, it used to yield every day 2,300 tons of crude oil, worth Rs 184,600. It has now been established that India, far from being deficient in oil, lies directly in the great oil belt running continuously from Burma to Iran. Apart from discovering oil, the Soviet Government also assisted in setting up two oil refineries at Barauni and Koyali, each producing 3 million tons of oil a year. Moreover, the import of Soviet oil products has caused a breach in the Anglo-American monopoly of oil in India; and these companies have been obliged to give discount, running into crores of rupees.

Soon after he became Prime Minister, Nehru said: "In the modern world oil is a very costly commodity. Some call it black gold; in fact, it is costlier than gold in some respects. We must find this out in our own country and improve our financial position and self-respect." Now, thanks to Soviet assistance, his hopes have been fulfilled; and India has gained a strategic position in the world's oil market.

The growth of Indo-Soviet economic relations has been accompanied by an equally remarkable growth of Indo-Soviet cultural

relations. This was not an entirely new development. Russian writers like Leo Tolstoy, Feodor Dostoevsky, Anton Chekhov, and Ivan Turgenev were well known in India and their books had been translated into many Indian languages. In Russia, particularly in the University of St Petersburg (now Leningrad), there was a flourishing school of Indology. Our epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, had been translated into Russian. Rabindranath Tagore, too, was well known and his poems and plays had been translated into numerous languages in the Soviet Union. In 1930, Tagore visited the Soviet Union. What impressed him most was the rapid spread of education and the success with which the so-called lower orders of Russian society were beginning to acquire a new dignity and a new status. Tagore used to compare civilization to a lamp. The mass of nameless people at the bottom was the lampstand; it bore on its head the lamp of civilization which shone on a few individuals but hardly shone on itself. On the contrary, the lampstand was even stained by the oil which dripped from the lamp. In Russia, however, Tagore felt that the entire society was being illumined with the light of knowledge.

During the last decade Soviet scholars began to evince interest in the thought of men like Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru. Gandhi's *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, Nehru's *Autobiography* and the *Discovery of India*, and Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* were translated into Russian. Moreover, Indian plays such as *Abhijnana Shakuntalam*, *Mrichchhakatika*, and *Nala Damayanti* were put on the stage in Moscow and elsewhere. Particularly notable was the adaptation of the *Ramayana* for the Children's Theatre in Moscow. Produced in 1960, it is still on the repertoire of that theatre.

In India there has been a corresponding and growing interest in the study of Russian culture. The Russian language course has been introduced in a number of Indian universities; and an up-to-date Institute of Russian Studies has been established in New Delhi with Soviet assistance. The Soviet Government has also given valuable assistance in setting up an Institute of Technology at Powai, near Bombay.

Politically, India and the Soviet Union see eye to eye on many vital questions such as the need for general and complete disarmament, the elimination of the few remaining pockets of racialism

and colonialism, and the abolition of foreign military bases. Indian and Soviet representatives work in close co-operation in the General Assembly and other organizations of the United Nations. In questions affecting our territorial integrity, the Soviet Government has shown considerable understanding. One has only to compare the Soviet attitude with that of the Western states, which raised a storm of protest over the integration of Goa into India in 1961. They even made an abortive attempt to declare India an aggressor!

The Soviet Government's attitude towards the Kashmir question too, has been far more impartial than that of the Western Powers. Once, stung by the Western talk of Indian imperialists in Kashmir, Nehru hit out against Pakistan's "patrons in the UN" thus: "Kashmir is only a plaything for them, while it is very much in our hearts. They had the audacity to talk of imperialism to us when they were imperialists themselves and were carrying on their own wars and preparing for future wars. Just because India had tried to protect Kashmir from territorial invasion, people had the temerity to talk of Indian imperialism."

Very different was the Soviet attitude from the outset. On more than one occasion, the Soviet Government used its veto in the Security Council in India's favour in respect of Kashmir. The Soviet Government, however, has no desire to fan the flame of Indo-Pakistani disputes or, to change the metaphor, to fish in the troubled waters of the Indian subcontinent, as another neighbour of ours has been brazenly doing. On the contrary, the Tashkent Conference, which was convened in January 1966 on the initiative of Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin, not only brought about the disengagement of Indian and Pakistani forces, which had been poised almost eye-ball to eye-ball, but resulted in a declaration by both countries expressing their resolve to adhere to the way of peaceful negotiation in settling all outstanding differences. Furthermore, it indicated how there could be mutual co-operation in the cultural, economic, and other fields.

China's attitude has been very different. Soon after the Tashkent Conference, China's Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi, descended ostentatiously on Pakistan, aiding and abetting the recalcitrant elements there to remain recalcitrant. That is one reason why the Tashkent Declaration has not yielded the fruits which had been hoped for.

India has taken a number of measures, even unilaterally, to implement the Tashkent Declaration, and the Soviet Union has been quietly exerting its good offices on both the countries in that direction. This clearly shows that the Soviet Government is as interested in developing its friendship with India as in the maintenance of peace in our harassed subcontinent.

2 April 1967

SISIR GUPTA

SOME PROBLEMS OF ASIAN SECURITY

ASIA is both politically and militarily the most unstable of all continents and the task of evolving a stable peaceful structure of international relations in Asia is the major problem of world politics today. In the Americas, peace and security are ensured by the presence of the most powerful nation of the world in that region and the widespread acceptance by others of the fact of its predominance. In Europe, the balance of terror, on the one hand, and historical memories of conflicts, on the other, have created a common aversion to war. The existing state system on that continent has as a result achieved a high degree of stability and the security of European states is not under any threat against which adequate safeguards have not been provided. Although the political scene in Europe is continuously changing, there is no possibility of the changes creating circumstances in which use of force on the part of any Power would be permissible. In fact, some of the recent political events in Europe reflect a new sense of security among the European nations, big and small.¹

In Africa, for reasons entirely different, a degree of security exists. If in Europe peace is ensured by the high level of military preparedness (including nuclear capabilities), in Africa it is the low level of the national capabilities which makes it unlikely that any nation can pose a serious military threat to another. While in many ways the Asian and African situations are comparable—on both conti-

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¹For a discussion of the changed situation in Europe, see Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, N.J., 1966), pp. 21-37. The loosening of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in recent years has been made

nents new states are just beginning to tackle the enormous problems of nation-building through rapid economic growth and social transformation—the two continents are entirely different in so far as the military situations are concerned. It is not impossible that over a long term, the African situation will change and international confrontations will begin to acquire a military dimension. But in the foreseeable future it seems improbable that any African nation will be able to use national power to back up its aspirations of recasting the political map of the continent on what it considers to be a more logical and rational basis.²

II

The most widely recognized element contributing to instability in Asia is the economic backwardness of the continent and the widespread poverty of its people. In countries like Laos and Burma, the per capita income is a meagre \$ 60 per annum. In the case of China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Indonesia, and Yemen, the figures are below \$ 100. Thailand, Korea, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Ceylon, and Cambodia are only slightly better off. The contrast between these figures and those for Europe³ and North America⁴ is indeed revealing.

The possibility of an easy success in tackling this problem of poverty is virtually ruled out by demographic factors. In fact, most Asian countries already present a spectacle of overpopulation—China has more than 700 million, India about 500, Pakistan over 120, Japan around 100, and Indonesia around 110. What makes the resulting situation explosive is that in almost all Asian countries, there is widespread political ferment and a rapidly rising expectation of change and growth. The gap between popular aspirations

²It should be noted that national irredentism exists in certain parts of Africa and may become the sources of military conflicts in the future. The existence of White racialism in Africa and of states like Rhodesia and South Africa also adds to the possibility of conflicts in Africa. However, as was made clear during the crisis in Rhodesia, it is at present beyond the power of the African nations to challenge militarily even this kind of *status quo*.

³Germany—\$1,540; UK—\$1,500; France—\$1,540; Czechoslovakia—\$1,200, Belgium—\$1,460; Sweden—\$2,040, Switzerland—\$2,030; USSR—\$890; East Germany—\$1,120; Poland—\$930, and Hungary—\$890.

⁴USA—\$3,020; and Canada—\$1,940.

and governmental capacities is in fact a yawning one, and it will be a miracle if a degree of political turbulence does not continue to exist in most, if not all, Asian countries. It will be a long-term and arduous task to make Asian politics free from emotive, slogan-based, or ideology-oriented mass movements, conceived in international terms; the irrelevance of ideology is a function of affluence.

If these situations were to be tackled domestically and if they did not result in international problems, they would not create any problem of security as such. However, these facts of Asian life provide the background for vigorous action and reaction in the international field by the Asian Powers themselves and also by the non-Asian Great Powers. Many aspects of the present map of Asia appear illogical and illegitimate to a number of Asian countries, some of whom are openly committed to the restructuring of this map. There is, first, the problem of divided states and nations. Again, Pakistan hopes to unsettle the map of India's northernmost area; Afghanistan does not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan's rule over the frontier peoples; Indonesia till recently was committed to undoing the Malaysian state; and China advances its irredentist claims against a number of neighbouring countries. In short, a number of Asian countries believe in the need for changing the Asian political map and perceive the possibility of having it changed.

Secondly, quite a few of these Asian countries possess varying degrees of military capabilities to undertake the task of altering the *status quo* and influencing the environment in which they live so as to make it more compatible from their points of view. China is a formidable Power in conventional terms; its nuclear capability is being built up rapidly.⁵ India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan possess recognizable military capabilities. Formosa, South Korea, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam have also considerable armed forces at their disposal.⁶ Unlike Africa, Asia has not only a major

⁵There is no agreement among experts as to what the rate of growth of the Chinese nuclear capability will be. There have been frequent revisions of forecasts. American Defence Secretary Robert McNamara believes that China will acquire a capability which could threaten the United States in the 1970s. It has allocated considerable resources to missile development, and it will, perhaps, have operational IRBMs in the next three or four years.

⁶For the latest appraisal of the military capabilities of Asian nations, see *The*

centre of power in the form of the Chinese state but also a number of medium Powers which can create military situations in order to advance their international positions.

What makes the situation one of real and intense concern is that unlike Europe, Asia is a region where war is yet to become illegitimate and impermissible. The very fact that a war is raging in Vietnam is an indication of this reality. In Asia, the strategy of national liberation wars is confronted by the strategy of limited wars, as evolved by the Americans in Korea and Vietnam. In Europe, peace is ensured by the widely perceived threat of escalation of any small war on that continent. However grim the European situation might appear when one thinks of a nuclear war, it is clear that war and peace in Europe are a function of the balance of power between the two super Powers; and the current balance of terror has frozen the European situation. The tragedy of the present Asian situation is that as the balance between the super Powers has made global conflicts totally catastrophic, they feel free to wage such destructive wars in Asia as are unlikely to lead to a global conflict or affect the world structure. Whereas in Europe any war would threaten to escalate into a global war, in Asia war would be limited to manageable proportions and not permitted to become a global conflict. This in fact increases the chances of wars and conflicts in Asia and, perhaps, makes them legitimate. Force has been used in post-war Asia time and again to settle political issues. The calculated aloofness of the Great Powers from certain Asian conflicts, and the careful attempts to limit those in which they are themselves involved, have both contributed to this phenomenon. This is not to argue that the situation would be better only if these strategies of the Great Powers were to change or that such changes would be wise, but merely to point out one problem of Asian security.

III

If this is the broad context in which the specific problems of security faced by the Asian nations are to be viewed, it is necessary to think of both long- and short-term measures calculated to build *Military Balance, 1966-1967*, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

up a politically and militarily stable Asia. The task of economic development and social change, which alone will deny the possibility of one nation using another's adversity, is obviously a long-term task. What is also apparent is that while the Asian nations themselves must carry the main burden of such development and evolve their national ways of tackling their domestic problems, a determined effort on the part of the international community, particularly the developed countries, to help this process can be of great use in reducing the inevitable pains of growth and in rounding off the angularities in national policies which might arise if the task is undertaken on a purely national basis. A large measure of non-Asian involvement in Asian affairs is in this sense not only desirable from the viewpoint of economic development but conducive to the growth of a pattern of security in Asia. It is not possible to insert demographic redistribution as an item on the agenda of world politics, but it is not impossible that the Asian nations can be helped by others in tackling their basic domestic problem of checking the rapid rise in population. As regards political developments, again a stable political structure will be evolved in each Asian country according to its own needs and the genius of its people. What is necessary for the outside world is to recognize the inevitability of change and political turbulence in Asia and to come to terms with the desirability of such changes as promote people's welfare.⁷ Admittedly, these are long-term problems and no spectacular result can be achieved in any of these fields in a short period. But, as said above, these constitute the background of Asian security problems; even if these often tend to become acute and explosive requiring remedial measures, no short-term steps or contrivances to promote Asian security can be meaningful unless these fundamental factors are also dealt with simultaneously.

⁷Owing to a high degree of concern with communism, many Western nations, particularly the United States, had developed a mental resistance to the acceptance of even desirable changes in Asia and Africa. It is almost inevitable that in Asia the various developing nations will evolve their own political systems through a process of trial and error, and occasionally political changes may even be brought about through unconstitutional methods. If national communism has been growing in Europe, there is no reason why in Asia the Communist revolution in any country should automatically lead to an upsetting effect on the power system on the continent.

IV

The long-term search for economic growth and political stability in Asia as the real guarantees of a sense and system of security cannot be regarded as a total answer to the immediate and short-term security problems faced by various Asian nations. Before this objective is realized, it is necessary to ensure peace on this continent and the freedom of the nations in this area, big and small. It is here that military factors become important. There are some nations in Asia which are openly committed to altering the *status quo* and have not renounced the option of the use of force.

The case of China is, of course, the most relevant. It is not easy to measure the intentions and capabilities of the Chinese state. There is much in recent Chinese behaviour which can be cited as examples of its conforming to the accepted codes of international conduct, and many China specialists in the West have pointed them out in great detail. It is, however, impossible for the neighbours of China to ignore some simple and obvious, but hard, realities. In the first place, the internal situation in China is far from being so stable as to make its international behaviour predictable. The recent Proletarian Cultural Revolution has clearly indicated that a great deal of uncertainty exists about the future policies and programmes of the Chinese state. Conditions of intense poverty and population pressure constitute the background of the attempt to create a permanent revolution in that society. It is possible that in coming to terms with itself the Chinese Revolution will remain inward-looking for a very long period to come. But for those who are immediately concerned, it would be foolhardy to ignore that the same situations could lead to an entirely different pattern of external behaviour. Secondly, the People's Republic of China is yet to become a Member of the United Nations and participate in the affairs of international organizations. This situation helps China to retain a few options in its external conduct which most other nations have formally given up. A mere acceptance of China in the United Nations may not vitally affect its international behaviour but would certainly impose on it a few obligations and acclimatize it to the ways of the rest of the world.

Thirdly, whatever may be the state of the conventional capability of China, the development of a nuclear capability has entirely

changed its position in the power system of the world in general and Asia in particular. Again, it is possible that the development of a nuclear capability by China makes it inevitable that it would begin to abide by the rules of the international game, but it is also natural for neighbours of China to perceive a new security problem *vis-à-vis* China. In determining its China policy, every Asian nation is now to take note of the vast power gap that has been created by the Chinese nuclear capability. Most of the optimistic assertions regarding the possible uses of Chinese nuclear capability⁸ are based on historical experiences which point to the conclusion that a nuclear Power tends to become more constrained in its *anti-status-quo* behaviour than a non-nuclear Power. What is not taken into account in this calculation is that with all the constraints nuclear Powers *have* made use of their weapons in a political sense. Although nuclear weapons have not been used militarily by any nation after the Second World War, almost each one of the nuclear nations has made political uses of its nuclear capability. Moreover, it is not entirely logical to make projections regarding the future behaviour of nuclear China in terms of what nuclear Russia or nuclear America has done. It is also pertinent to note that the neighbours of China will always be in a state of great anxiety owing to the possibility of certain political concessions being made to China by the fellow members of the nuclear club in an attempt to accommodate it in the international political system. If by developing a nuclear capability China succeeds in accomplishing what it would have otherwise attempted through limited conventional wars, this is an equally serious security problem for other Asians.

Apart from China, there are other Asian nations which could pose a threat to the security of fellow Asian nations. In the case of India, for example, there is an obvious threat from Pakistan. Likewise, many Pakistanis see a threat from India. The Malaysians were for long under a threat from Indonesia. Many Indonesians saw a threat to their integrity in the presence of British Power in Malaysia. Cambodia sees a threat from Vietnam as well as from Thailand. The Israelis and the Arabs see threats from each other. These security problems, however, are qualitatively different from

⁸For some projects regarding China's nuclear policies and capabilities, see Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (London, 1965).

the problem posed by China. For one thing, in none of these situations is there a likelihood of the world political system ceasing to be effective in preventing a total conflict meant to achieve total victory and inflict total defeat. In the case of China, the nuclear capability of that country may neutralize the world political system when the critical tests arise and political settlements may be contrived between the Great Powers over the heads of the Asian nations. For another, all these nations are much more integrated with the international community than China and the effectiveness of political intervention by the major Powers of the world or the United Nations is likely to be much greater in other inter-Asian disputes.

There may, however, be a number of other problems in regard to these types of conflicts. It is possible that precisely because their potentiality to threaten the structure of world peace is minimal, if not non-existent, the world political system will be slow and half-hearted in its intervention in mitigating such conflicts. It may also become difficult for the major Powers, which together constitute the sword-arm of the system, to adopt an identical posture or co-ordinate their efforts to a meaningful extent. But there is no doubt that if such intervention is effective, a degree of peace and security in Asia can be enforced. A gradual assertion of their common and identical interests alone, however, would change the atmosphere and provide a stable basis of friendship and co-operation among these countries.

V

Nations have traditionally sought to promote their security in a variety of ways. The most orthodox approach to security is that of building up the national military capabilities to a level where it becomes impossible for its adversaries to use force successfully. They have also sought to promote their security through alliances with other Powers and regional security arrangements. Thirdly, security has often been promoted through removal of roots of conflict by patient efforts to negotiate settlement of disputed issues and problems and adjustment of conflicting claims. Fourthly, a sense of security is created through schemes of disarmament or arms control and through common efforts to build up a stable military situation. Lastly, the strength and efficacy of the world political

system provide a measure of security to many nations. It is necessary to analyse the relevance of all these approaches to the current Asian situation.

It is not clear what arms-control measures could be thought of to promote Asian security. It is the agreed assumption among expert analysts that no meaningful arms-control dialogue with China will be possible on the part of the Great Powers till such time as China has acquired a sophisticated nuclear capability.⁹ It is unlikely that China will ever agree to stabilize itself at a low level of nuclear capability. If ever the economic realities of China do convince a Chinese leadership that a low-level stabilization is imperative, it may then try to maximize its political gains through arms-control negotiations. But there is no indication at this moment of such a development. It is possible that one development which will underline to China the need for an early arms-control arrangement in this part of the world is a decision on the part of some other Asian nation or nations to develop a nuclear capability.

There are minor specific arms-control measures possible between China and its neighbours which would partly alleviate their sense of insecurity. For example, the creation of a demilitarized zone along the entire southern border of China would be of great help to most Asian nations. This would leave the problem of infiltration and subversion uncovered, but the use of a police rather than a military force could be thought of. As between other Asian nations whose political relations are antagonistic, arms-control measures of certain types are conceivable. The institution of a "hotline" between India and Pakistan is a pointer. But, by and large, the Asian nations are yet to possess the kind of armaments which makes it imperative to devise methods of controlling them. What is more, most of them have such a level of national military capability that the immediate problem for them is to improve this level rather than to stagnate at that point. There is a contradiction between the obvious and felt need in most Asian countries of improving their defence preparedness and their entering into meaningful arms-control dialogues at this stage. A refusal on the part of the developed nations to sell or gift arms to these countries may, however, be one way of preventing an artificial arms race in Asia.

⁹Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, *Communist China and Arms*

The problem of approaching security through a negotiated settlement of problems and disputes is also a difficult one. While all efforts should be made to promote negotiations, it is clear that if these negotiations were to convey the impression that large-scale alterations in the Asian map would be possible through power confrontations, they could indeed be self-defeating. In Asia, many of the political and territorial disputes are symptomatic of a larger movement towards a re-definition of the relative status and rôles of the Asian nations. For example, in the case of India and China, it is one thing for them to demarcate their borders on an agreed principle which involves a process of give and take; it is an entirely different matter if a border settlement becomes symbolic of the recognition by India of China's superior power.¹⁰ For it contains in itself the seeds of more demands, both territorial and political. Peace through negotiation becomes meaningful if it contributes to stability. If negotiations promote a feeling that alterations in the political map of Asia are possible because a power gap is left uncovered between one Asian country and its neighbours, it may only help to harden its attitude against the *status quo*. In the case of India, it is the fear in most Indian minds that the collusion between its two neighbours would be further strengthened if they were to gain the impression that their alliance has begun to succeed in achieving its objectives.

As for alliances and regional co-operation for defence and security, the problems in Asia are obvious. In the first place, co-operation becomes possible if all the Asian nations perceive equally and simultaneously a threat from a single source. Intra-Asian political co-operation was most seriously talked of in the immediate post-war years, when the major task before the Asian nations was to end

¹⁰Border problems between China and some smaller countries like Burma have been successfully resolved. However, it is of some importance that China has refused to have the same conciliatory attitude in regard to border problems towards the Soviet Union and India. It appears certain to Indians that the question of borders is viewed by the Chinese Government as part of a larger question of their relations with neighbouring states. So long as the problems of political co-existence between India and China are not settled, such border agreements would not be possible to arrive at. In the opinion of the present writer, the fundamental issue between India and China is that of their relative status in Asia and Africa, and unless India accepts China's pre-eminence in Asia and makes it known that it has done so, there could be no real approach to border settlements.

Western dominance in the area. The situation has considerably changed since then and most people who now advocate Asian co-operation do so on the assumption that there is a common threat to all Asian countries from China. It is obvious, however, that Chinese power is not so great as to create an equal amount of concern at the same time in all other Asian states.¹¹ Secondly, the presence of the off-shore Powers in this area creates a major problem of defining the threats to the independence and security of Asian nations. If a Western Power confronts China and makes it impossible for it to pursue expansionist designs, the rationale for intra-Asian co-operation is largely eliminated. In fact, in many Asian nations the problem of guarding their sovereignty in the face of an overt Western presence in the area becomes the first item on the list of priorities. Thirdly, because of the existence of intra-Asian disputes and the attempts on the part of non-Asian Powers to construct regional balances, e.g. between India and Pakistan on the subcontinent, the prospects of regional co-operation are receding further. It is clear that before any Asian co-operation in the sphere of defence and security becomes possible, it is necessary for the Asians (a) to perceive a common threat to their security; (b) to have the common feeling that the threat is of such an order as needs to be met by the pooling of Asian resources; and (c) to feel confident that when pooled, the resources would be adequate to meet the threats. If the military resources at the disposal of the Asian countries are not adequate to meet the threats, regional co-operation can only mean an attempt to provide legitimacy to the military presence of off-shore Powers in the region, which the Asians may find it unwise to provide. A regional security arrangement among the Asian Powers would not be credible till such time as there has been a perceptible improvement in the national capability of at least some of the Asian Powers. Again, there are some Asian countries like Pakistan which view the emergence of China as a Great Power as no threat but a positive help in advancing their interests in the regional context. Finally, for historical reasons, there is a large

¹¹China's capacity to fight wars in distant regions is almost non-existent because of the lack of mobility of its power. Should China ever develop a strong navy and acquire the capability of deploying its troops across the seas, the situation will become radically different. Chinese nuclear capability has partly changed the situation already.

measure of aversion to alliances in Asia, and it is not conceivable that there will be a change in these attitudes in the immediate future.

It may be pertinent to mention here that even if the Asian Powers may not be able to evolve any co-operative relationship intended to erect a stable power balance on the continent, it is necessary for them to function with the consciousness that their short-term policies must be directed towards facilitating the realization of this long-term goal. The position and rôle of Japan is of great significance in this context. The Japanese nation, dazed by defeat, virtually concentrated all its energies on economic reconstruction and growth in post-war years. It has already achieved remarkable success in these efforts, and its technological base is comparable to that of the most advanced nations in the world. It is natural that Japan should be considered a potential Great Power with a major rôle in the stabilization of Asia.

The problems of initiating Japan into a new rôle in Asia are not difficult to enumerate. In the first place, the rapid Westernization of Japan has, to some extent, alienated the Japanese from the rest of the Asians. Secondly, a Japanese rôle in Asia immediately brings back the memories of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; there is a historical problem of legitimacy of any Japanese rôle in Asia. These, however, are not insurmountable problems. With all its Westernization, Japan remains an Asian country and the fear which is associated with the pre-war rôle of Japan is based on a wrong assumption of continuity in Japanese aspirations. The defeat in the Second World War itself has brought about radical changes in Japanese outlook, and they must be aware that the international system today is quite different from the pre-war system.

A major question in this regard, however, would arise if a Japanese rôle in Asia is not preceded by a Japanese decision to cut off its present military links with the United States. It is necessary to note that much of the present thinking on introducing Japan in a major rôle in Asia is being done in the United States,¹² although the Soviet Union also does not seem to be averse to Japan's being given that rôle. It is obvious that a Japanese rôle in Asia,

¹²For two views on the subject, see Lucian W. Pye, "China in Context", *Foreign Affairs* (New York, N.Y.), January 1967, pp. 229-45; and Robert Scalapino, "Japan in Search of a New Role", *Encounter* (London), October-December 1966, pp. 21-27.

encouraged by the West and sanctified by Western blessings, would have an intense problem of legitimacy. It is here that the need for close Indo-Japanese and Indonesian-Japanese consultation and collaboration becomes clear.¹³

As for the world political system, it has already been noted above that it has a certain amount of efficacy in dealing with situations between those Asian nations which are integrated in the system, but many questions arise when we consider how far one can really depend on the system as a substitute for adequate national capability. In the first place, have Soviet-American relations reached a stage when there is a possibility of their adopting identical postures on Asian security problems? There have been some examples of such identity of interests and postures on the part of these two Powers, but there have been other examples of intense competition and conflict between them. Secondly, would the world political system be paralysed in critical situations and made ineffective by a sharp deterioration in Soviet-American relations? This is an important question. Thirdly, whatever may be the present realities, there is no doubt that the major long-term problem both for the Soviet Union and for America is to devise a method of co-existence with China. How far the interests of other Asian countries would be automatically taken into account or protected when a Sino-Soviet or Sino-American dialogue starts, is another problem. The military realities would become particularly difficult when China develops the capability of threatening Soviet and American cities. If both the United States and the Soviet Union build the ABM systems and nullify the possibility of the use of Chinese nuclear weapons in relation to themselves, the situation would of course be different. But in doing so, they might so disturb their mutual relations as to render the concept of a world political system unreal. Finally, there is the problem of legitimacy of the rôle of the present guardians of the world political system in Asia. China has already described it as another name for Soviet-American duopoly. Since the Powers entrusted with the management of the "system" happen to be White and European, it is not inconceivable that the introduction

¹³The Governments of India and Japan have already established the practice of periodical consultations between the two Foreign Offices.

of the system in a dominant rôle in Asia would only confirm the Chinese view of the emerging trends in the world. Before the world political system can become effective, it has to widen its base and accommodate in a proper and legitimate rôle a number of other nations—Asian, African, and Latin American. It is here that the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and the application of nuclear capability as the sole criterion of a nation's status and influence in the world limit the efficacy of the world political system.

VI

The above analysis would indicate that there is no substitute for improved national capabilities as a starting-point for building an adequate system of security in Asia. In fact, most other approaches to security could be pursued with profit when these national capabilities have come into being. An arms-control dialogue among the Asian nations can be meaningful only when they have the necessary arms; unresolved problems and disputes between Asian nations can be viewed in a different perspective when there is no fear of large-scale political changes because of an imbalance in the power system; alliances and regional co-operation can be meaningful only if some Asian nations have got the capability to erect a credible system for the security of their smaller neighbours; and, finally, the efficacy of the world political system could be vastly improved if it was not called upon to undertake frequently the rôle of a *gendarme* and intervene in small wars.

The relevant questions about national military capabilities are: (a) To what extent is a national military capability relevant in the context described above if it is only a conventional capability? (b) If nuclear capability is not to be acquired, what kind of a situation would permit the non-nuclear Powers of Asia to ignore the possession of nuclear weapons by one of the Asian Powers? (c) What kind of conventional capability would be adequate for the kind of military situations one can foresee in Asia? (d) What would be the political consequences of a division of labour between Asian and non-Asian Powers—the Asians concentrating on conventional capability and the non-Asians providing the nuclear deterrence?

The question of nuclear weapons has been discussed in detail in India and the arguments for and against are well known.¹⁴ It is sufficient to mention here that it has so far been regarded as inconceivable that there can be any balance of power between a nuclear Power and a non-nuclear Power, whatever be the latter's capability in conventional terms. The best available example of the futility of such an attempt on the part of a non-nuclear Power is China itself. It is Mao Tse-tung who regarded atom bombs as paper tigers at one stage and ordered the acquisition of a nuclear capability by China when the time became ripe. It is possible for India or Japan to ignore Chinese nuclear weapons because the possibility of their being used in a military sense is remote. But if one thinks of an Asian power balance or a security system in Asia, it is just not possible to ignore Chinese nuclear capability. All those who recommended nuclear abstention on the part of the Asian nations have in fact done so on the assumption that the non-Asian Powers will continue to deter China.

The problems in this regard are more than one. In the first place, it is an extremely difficult problem to have a specific and clearly-spelt-out guarantee by one or more Great Powers. Secondly, such a guarantee would be another form of an alliance—in fact, the lowest form because it would lack any sense of partnership which an alliance conveys. There will thus be a political problem on the part of the Asian nations in accepting such guarantees. Thirdly, a joint guarantee, which may be politically more acceptable, is militarily less credible; further it is almost impossible that such a joint guarantee should ever be given by competing Great Powers. Fourthly, even a guarantee by one Power would have a problem of credibility. If some of the NATO nations, with all their ethnic and other close relationships, could ask themselves the question if an American guarantee was credible, it is natural and legitimate that the Asians should also begin to ask the same question. The real problem about any scheme of such division of labour in Asia would be its political consequences. If the confrontation in Asia continues to be between China and America, the much-debated question of the Western rôle in Asia would tend to become a live issue in Asian politics.

¹⁴ See Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma", in Alastair Buchan, ed., *A World of Nuclear Powers* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 55-67.

There is also the question of what kind of conventional capability in the hands of a few Asian nations would ensure such a balance of power on the continent as would rule out wars. It is possible for some Asian nations to develop a conventional capability adequate to protect their own borders; but it is also necessary, in view of the existence of a number of small nations on the continent who are going to remain incapable of defending themselves, that a degree of mobile military capability exists in the hands of some Asian Powers. The possession of nuclear weapons, of course, would make this unnecessary. But if nuclear weapons are not acquired, the security of small nations would either be a function of a strategy of massive retaliation on the part of the off-shore Powers (which, of course, is not always credible) or the deployment of their forces on the Asian mainland or a capacity on the part of the Asian Powers to deploy military forces in countries far away from their borders. Economically, the cost of acquiring such a capability, not to speak of fighting such wars, would be much more prohibitive than the cost of developing national nuclear capabilities.

The question may be asked why Western nuclear capability would not be a credible deterrent for this kind of wars and Asian nuclear capabilities would be. The answer is that any Western threat of massive retaliation for the sake of the security of a small Asian country lacks credibility precisely because Western commitment to Asia will always be a matter of doubt, whereas for the Asian countries Asian situations are quite vital.¹⁵ A nuclear China may not deter aggression by a nuclear America against a small South American country, but it will certainly prevent a nuclear India from attacking Ceylon or Burma.

VII

The question essentially boils down to one of what kind of a power one envisages for Asia. It is clear that a grand Asian alliance against China is neither possible nor desirable nor even called for

¹⁵As has been pointed out by an Australian expert on defence and strategy, the United States would not take the same kind of risk for the sake of an Asian country as it did in the Cuban crisis. See T.B. Millar, *Australia's Defence* (Melbourne, 1965), p. 59.

by the nature of Chinese power. It is also clear that there is no easy way out of other intra-Asian disputes and problems which retard regional co-operation. Further, while unipolarity in Asia is a source of instability and insecurity, bipolar stability is ruled out by the simple fact that no other Asian Power can by itself hope to match the power of China.

Inevitably, one would envisage a polycentric Asia, an Asia where independent centres of power have come into existence and have learnt to co-ordinate their efforts and conduct their foreign relations in a manner that would permit a stable power balance to be evolved on this continent. The first important task, therefore, is to promote and permit the growth of a few more centres of power in Asia. India, Japan, Indonesia, and Pakistan are obviously countries which legitimately aspire to become centres of power on this continent. Any idea of regional co-operation, or co-operation among some Asian Powers to balance others, would be relevant only after they have emerged as Powers in the real sense of the term. The Asian balance of power can never be a mere political contrivance implying nothing but co-operation among a number of weak and insignificant nations. Such a political contrivance would in fact be a method of providing legitimacy to the presence of non-Asian Powers in Asia, and would not only tend to overstretch the off-shore Powers but also raise political problems in an age of intense nationalism.

This is not to suggest that what is needed is an Asian Monroe Doctrine to isolate or quarantine Asia from the rest of the world. In fact, as has been said before, in order to tackle the roots of instability and insecurity in Asia, it is necessary that the developed nations of Europe and North America should get more and more involved in the effort to resolve the acute social and economic problems in Asia. Even politically, there can be no doubt that Powers like the United States and the Soviet Union must continue to help the process of the growth of an Asian power balance in various ways, primarily by tolerating the growth of new power centres in Asia. The concept of an Asian power balance becomes relevant precisely because this contributes to the stability of the world political system. It would release the United States and the Soviet Union from embarrassing day-to-day problems of managing Asian politics and free them to address themselves to the much harder

task of economically developing the continent of Asia through international co-operation. They would, of course, always retain the power to come forward and rectify the situation if the balance in Asia is so tilted in one direction or the other that it creates conditions of serious instability and insecurity.

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P.C. CHAKRAVARTI

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

THE “age-long”, “historic”, and “eternal” friendship between India and China, which is often referred to in diplomatic notes and political and scholarly writings, is a myth. The stupendous geographical barriers, coupled with the distance intervening between the two countries, had always stood in the way of close cultural or political collaboration. It is only in the twentieth century—first in the time of Chao Erh-feng (1907-11) and then since 1950—that the presence of China as India’s next-door, northern neighbour has been felt on this side of the Himalaya. It is true that despite the distance and the geographical barriers, there had grown up in ancient times, after Buddhism had spread into China, a kind of spiritual-cultural communion between the monks and scholars of the two countries. From the end of the fourth century A.D. to about the tenth century A.D., a number of Chinese Buddhist monks, impelled by deep religious devotion, braved the hazards of the journey to India across inaccessible mountain passes, trackless deserts, or pirate-infested seas to pay their homage to the holy places of Buddhism, study in the great centres of Buddhist learning in India, and collect images, relics, and, above all, authentic texts of the Buddhist canon.

The names of Fa-hien, Hiuen Tsiang, and I-tsing are familiar to students of Indian history; but Chinese chronicles and a few Chinese inscriptions discovered at Gaya preserve the names of nearly another two hundred Chinese scholars who came to India as pilgrims during the four or five centuries mentioned above. During the same period a number of Indian monks also traversed mountains and seas to China and devoted themselves to the sacred task of translating

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Sanskrit Buddhist texts into the Chinese language or introducing some reforms in the Chinese monastic system. The names of Kumarajiva, Gunavarman, Bodhidharma, and Paramartha are often cited in this context; but the Chinese chronicles mention the names of at least twenty other Indian monks who went to China and dedicated their lives to the cause of Buddhism in that country.

The contact thus established by the monks and scholars of the two countries did not last for more than five centuries. Buddhism as an organized religion disappeared from India about the tenth century A.D., and its vestiges were wiped out of existence by the early Moslem invaders. Buddhism in China also underwent a sharp decline about the same time, and the vacuum thus created was filled by Neo-Confucianism. Moreover, Central Asia, through which pilgrims and scholars had to pass on their journey from one country to the other, was conquered by the Turks and the Mongols, and the pilgrim route between India and China was closed for all practical purposes. And in the centuries that followed, till we reach our own time, there were hardly any contacts between the two countries except for one or two insignificant trade missions and a slight, intermittent trickle of trade.

It is well to remember in this context that Buddhism which provided the medium of communication between India and China never played that dominant rôle in the evolution of Chinese culture as some of us are inclined to think. At the initial stage it found its adherents mostly among the barbarians and lower classes in Chinese society. Later, when it penetrated into the upper social strata, it was rapidly Sinified or transformed to suit Chinese taste and temperament, already conditioned by Confucian thought. In fact, it is Confucian precepts which moulded, and provided the hard core of, traditional Chinese culture, and Buddhism like Taoism played a comparatively subordinate rôle in its evolution. Even then there was a latent, persistent opposition to Buddhism on the part of the Chinese *élite* and the bureaucracy, an opposition which came into the open from time to time. Take, for instance, the two sets of proposals which were presented by Fu I, the Grand Astrologer at the T'ang Court, in A.D. 621 and 624, at a time when Sino-Indian collaboration was at its peak. The proposals were in the nature of a tirade against Buddhism and called for its suppression in the Middle Kingdom. Fu's charges against Buddhism were

that it was a "barbarian" religion, that it taught absurd and disturbing doctrines of heaven and hell, that the Buddhist clergy was celibate and therefore unproductive, and that its monastic system was nothing short of a dangerous State-within-a-State. A more celebrated charge-sheet against Buddhism was the memorial sent up in A.D. 819 by the official, Han Yu, as a protest against the honours being paid by the Emperor to the relics of the Buddha. A significant passage of the memorial reads:

Now the Buddha was of barbaric origin. His language differed from the Chinese speech; his clothes were of different cut; his mouth did not pronounce the prescribed words of the Former Kings; his body was not clad in the garments prescribed by the Former Kings. He did not recognize the relationship between prince and subject, nor the sentiments of father and son. Let us suppose him to be living today, and come to court in the capital as an emissary of his country. Your Majesty would receive him courteously. But only one interview in the audience chamber, one banquet in his honour, one gift of clothing, and he would be escorted under guard to the border, that he may not mislead the masses.

The memorials referred to above provide us with an inkling into the attitude of the Chinese *élite* towards the extra-Chinese world in general and their sullen hostility towards the teachings of the Buddha in particular. This hostility was not, moreover, always confined to non-violent verbal expression. Chinese history records at least four severe persecutions of the adherents of Buddhism—all of them during the period of Sino-Indian collaboration referred to above. These took place in A.D. 446 under Emperor Wu Tsung of the Northern Wei dynasty, in A.D. 574 under Emperor Wu Tsung of the Northern Chou dynasty, in A.D. 845 under Emperor Wu Tsung of the T'ang dynasty, and in A.D. 995 under Emperor Shih Tsung of the later Chou dynasty. Of these the third was by far the most severe. It led to large-scale destruction of Buddhist monasteries and shrines and secularization of almost half-a-million monks and nuns. In effect, it dealt a stunning blow to the Buddhist church in China, from which it never completely recovered.

Another illusion which befogged our thinking to some extent is the belief, widely held among Indian intellectuals until a few years ago, that India and China shared a common Eastern civilization based on the same or identical spiritual values. Two of the greatest Indians of this century — seer-poet Rabindranath Tagore and philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan — when they visited

China in 1924 and 1944 respectively stressed this point. Tagore's chief aim in visiting China was to reopen the highway of cultural interchange which Buddhist monks in India and China had established in the centuries past. "I shall consider myself fortunate", Tagore told his Hangchow audience, "if through this visit China comes nearer to India and India to China — for no political or commercial purpose, but for disinterested love and nothing else." "We must fight", he added, "with our faith in the moral and spiritual power of man. We of the East have never revered death-dealing generals, nor lie-dealing diplomats, but spiritual leaders. Through them we shall be saved or not at all."

But the reactions of the Chinese to Tagore and his message were varied. While they received considerable appreciation and support from the practising Buddhists, the majority of intellectuals were sceptical about his assumption that India and China shared a common civilization based on spirituality. His strongest and most vociferous critics, however, were the Left-wing youth of China. Scarcely had he landed at Shanghai in April 1924, when they began to attack him in their periodicals. One of the most prominent of those who criticized him was Shen Yen-ping, better known under his pen-name of Mao Tun, who became Minister of Cultural Affairs in China after the Communists came to power. His charge against Tagore was that he (Tagore) exalted Eastern civilization, spoke of heaven and soul, and emphasized the importance of morality and spirituality in human affairs. "It would be a misfortune", Mao Tun said, "if this man was allowed to intoxicate our youth with his ideas." Apart from Mao Tun, a number of writers published a series of articles under the caption "Oppose Tagore". A typical passage in one of these articles reads:

Some people are delighted that Mr Tagore has come to China to give us talks. To us his coming is displeasing, and we are hostile to him.... We believe that the ideas which he professes are not suited to the China of today and would have a disastrous influence on our country if we adopted them.... It is clear that those who have invited Mr Tagore to China wish to make dreamers of our students.... We advise them not to let themselves be Indianized, unless they want their coffins to rest one day in soil enslaved, like that of India, by the foreigners.¹

¹Rev. Leon Weiger, *Chine Moderne* (Shanghai, 1924), vol. 5, pp. 66-67 and 69-72.

It is clear that this tirade against Tagore was a mere echo of the old tirade against Buddhism. Both are indicative of the Chinese xenophobia, their superiority complex, and their detestation of certain values which had been exalted in this country down the ages. They, however, help to pin-point the basic differences between Indian and Chinese cultures. Whereas traditional Indian culture is basically religious and spiritual, traditional Chinese culture is essentially ethical, utilitarian, pragmatic, and matter-of-fact. One is derived from the teachings of the Upanishads, the *Gita*, and the saints and seers of India; the other from the precepts of Confucius and his disciples. But unlike the saints and seers of India, Confucius was no saint, no prophet, no religious reformer. He was a profound practical genius with an encyclopaedic knowledge, and his primary concern was the proper ordering of the world's affairs and man's relation to man. What he propounded, therefore, was no religion, but a social and political philosophy and a code of ethics. Towards religious and spiritual questions, he maintained an attitude of silence. A disciple asked Confucius how one should serve the spirits. The Master replied: "You are not yet able to serve men; how can you serve the spirits?" The disciple asked about death. The sage replied: "You do not understand life; how can you understand death?" In fact the present life was the only theatre in which Confucius sought to inspire men to act. From that day to our own times Chinese culture has borne on it a heavy stamp of Confucian thought and has remained basically anti-spiritual and fundamentally agnostic. Whereas the best minds in India have concerned themselves with the self-realization of individuals and their liberation from sorrow and pain in timeless consciousness and in bliss or have at least been speculative, metaphysical, introspective, and poetic, the best minds in China have engaged themselves in a search for collective human happiness here and now within the limitations of time and space. While the Indian has loved to roam among the clouds and soar beyond, the Chinese has preferred with unfailing constancy to remain earth-bound.

Tagore was too great a man to allow his none-too-pleasant experiences in China to deflect him from what he considered to be his duty; and on his return from China he continued his efforts to strengthen and deepen Sino-Indian understanding and goodwill on an intellectual plane. A few years later he formed a China

centre (China Bhavan) at Shantiniketan and published a series of essays on China and its civilization. Tagore's efforts in this direction were supplemented in the thirties by similar efforts on the part of the Indian National Congress on the political plane. China was then struggling for its very existence against Japanese aggression. Year after year the Indian National Congress passed resolutions expressing its sympathy with the Chinese in their struggle against a "ruthless and inhuman imperialism" and congratulating them on their heroic resistance. The Congress also organized a number of China Days in India, in which demonstrations were held all over the country and funds were collected with a view to offering financial assistance to the Chinese in their hour of distress. It also organized a boycott of Japanese goods in India and sent an ambulance corps to China as a gesture of India's goodwill. Finally, in 1939, Jawaharlal Nehru himself went on a goodwill mission to China with the blessings of Mahatma Gandhi and Gurudev Tagore "to convey the affection and sympathy of the people of India to the Chinese people". In an address to the Chinese people, broadcast from Chungking (30 August 1939), Nehru stressed the importance of Sino-Indian co-operation "for the sake of the freedom of our dearly beloved countries, for Asia, and for the world", and he returned from China with a love for that country excelled if at all, as Gandhiji put it, only by his love for his own country.

The Second World War brought about a phenomenal transformation of the political scene in Asia. India became independent in August 1947, and in mainland China the Communists captured power and established a unified, totalitarian régime in October 1949. It is significant that the new régime's attitude towards India was neither sympathetic nor friendly. Mao Tse-tung, like Joseph V. Stalin in the Soviet Union, did not believe that India had become independent. India's liberation, he emphasized, would only come when a Communist régime, whether of an indigenous or a foreign brand, was established in the country. Apart from this general misconception about India, the régime's controlled Press indulged in slanderous, vitriolic attacks against Prime Minister Nehru. He was called "the running dog of Western imperialism", "an American stooge", and "a hireling". When in October-November 1949 Nehru stated in the course of a speech before the Columbia University in America that when justice is threatened and freedom imperi-

lled we cannot and shall not remain neutral", a Chinese "cultural" journal came out with a damning article entitled "American Imperialism Lays Hands on a New Slave". Other articles published in the Chinese Press about this time declared Indian non-alignment or neutralism as a sham or a camouflage. "No nation was or could remain neutral", said Mao. "To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist. . . . Not only in China, but also in the world, without exception, one leans either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a mere camouflage and a third road does not exist." There were similar unfriendly and inflammatory comments about India's relations with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Tibet, from which it was or should have been clear that the Chinese entertained ambitions or designs in regard to these areas which were in conflict with Indian interests.²

But unperturbed by these comments or the attitude which they reflected, India deliberately decided to extend the hand of friendship to the new régime. It was the second non-Communist country in the world (Burma being the first by arrangement) to accord its diplomatic recognition to Mao's China. Nehru told the Lok Sabha that it was not a question of approving or disapproving the change, but of recognizing a major event in history and dealing with it. He had no doubt that the Communist régime had been firmly established, and that there was no force likely to supplant it.³ In other contemporary statements the ambitions and designs of the régime were underplayed, and the argument was advanced that China needed peace even more than India for its reconstruction and development and that, moreover, the maintenance of friendship with China was essential, no matter what Government was in power.⁴

To this broad policy India adhered, without flinching, for a full decade, sometimes even to the detriment of its own interests. Since the beginning of this century, the British had recognized the autonomy and neutralization of Tibet as of paramount importance to the security of India's northern frontier and had entered into a series of treaties and agreements to achieve this purpose. After

²See P.C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), pp. 146-7.

³*Lok Sabha Debates*, vol. 3, col. 1699, 17 March 1950.

⁴W. Levi, *Free India in Asia* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1952), p. 87.

Independence, the Indian Government also declared its intention to abide by those treaties and agreements and maintain the same relations with Tibet as the British had done. But irrespective of Indian wishes or interests, the Chinese invaded and conquered Tibet in 1950-51; and India, after an exchange of diplomatic notes, accepted the *fait accompli*. Any such violent alteration of the strategic advantages of a country would have led to a first-class international crisis elsewhere in the world. But Nehru was not prepared "to kick up a row" on the question of Tibet, for in his opinion Sino-Indian friendship was a *sine qua non* for Asian and world peace. Defending his position in the Indian Parliament, he stated that India must understand the Chinese, and "try as far as we can to divert them into right channels and prevent them from going into wrong ones". Restating his views in a BBC broadcast, he said that China in its new-found strength had acted sometimes in a manner which he deeply regretted, but its conduct, he declared, should be viewed against the background of the long period of struggle and frustration and the insolvent treatment it had received from imperialist Powers.

In fact, from this time it became an objective of Indian policy to wean China away from its "wrong ways" and turn it into a normal, well-behaved neighbour by offering it India's friendly assistance in abundance. Year after year India took the lead in pressing China's claim to a seat in the United Nations. After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, when a resolution was moved in the UN General Assembly in February 1951 condemning the Chinese action, India refused to identify itself with the Western view and voted with the Soviet bloc against the resolution. A few months later (18 May) it also refused to participate in the UN General Assembly vote which imposed an arms embargo on Communist China and North Korea. These and other aspects of Indian diplomacy tended to eliminate the general suspicion in the Chinese mind regarding the genuineness of the Indian policy of non-alignment, and the relations between the two countries registered a corresponding improvement. To help consolidate this improvement, India signed on 29 April 1954 a new treaty with China called "Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India" under the terms of which it agreed to surrender the rights and privileges it had inherited as a legacy from the former

Government of India. Thus it agreed (1) to withdraw within six months the military escorts of about 200 men hitherto stationed at Yatung and Gyantse for the protection of traders and pilgrims, (2) to hand over to the Chinese Government at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph, and telephone installations which it operated in Tibet as well as the twelve rest-houses which it owned there, and (3) to return to the Chinese Government all land and buildings which it used or occupied in Tibet and lease from the Chinese Government all land and buildings which it required. The Government of India subsequently (30 April 1954) announced that it had decided that "postal, telegraph, and telephone installations together with equipment operated by India in Tibet" were to be transferred "free of cost and without compensation" to the People's Republic of China "as a gesture of goodwill".

From one point of view these provisions amounted to a realistic recognition by India of the new shape of things across the Himalaya; from another, they were nothing less than a surrender to Chinese pressure, highlighted by India's agreement to name Tibet the "Tibet Region of China", thus denying to Tibet its historical and political identity as a nation. An attempt was, however, made to invest the agreement with glamour by incorporating into its preamble a statement regarding the five principles of peaceful co-existence, later to be known as *Panch Shila*. These principles, viz "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence", were loudly acclaimed and bandied about as constituting a new formula for the solution of recurring international ills and deformities and the establishment of a "climate of peace" in the world.

The five years following the conclusion of the agreement may well be described as the years of the Sino-Indian honeymoon. They were marked by "cultural exchanges" of different kinds, exchange of visits and mutual adulatory compliments by the Prime Ministers of the two countries, and considerable diplomatic collaboration between the two nations. Nehru, who visited China in 1954, stated that he was "convinced that the people of China, like the people of India, are devoted to the cause of peace". Chou En-lai, who visited India four times between 1954 and 1957, was eloquent in his appreciation of India. "The people of China", he said, "deem

it an honour to have such a great neighbour as India." About *Panch Shila* he was even more enthusiastic. "I am looking forward to the day", he declared, "when *Panch Shila* will shine over the entire universe like the sun." India invited China to an eleven-nation non-official conference in New Delhi in April 1955, in which a number of resolutions were passed demanding *inter alia* the lifting of the embargo on trade with China, its immediate diplomatic recognition by non-recognizing countries, and its inclusion in the Security Council. India, along with Burma, also sponsored Chinese participation in the twenty-nine-nation Asian-African Conference at Bandung. Here Chou En-lai played down the revolutionary ambitions of the régime which he represented, professed his unshakable faith in peaceful co-existence, and posed as a votary of Asian peace and progress. During these years India also persevered with its annual efforts to see Peking seated in the Security Council and lent its moral and diplomatic weight in support of Chinese irredentist ambitions regarding Taiwan and the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. India and China also joined hands in their opposition to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact, and the Western military alliances and in their condemnation of colonialism, racialism, and imperialism.

The period of the honeymoon was not, however, free from misunderstanding and conflict. As early as 1953 and also during the following years numerous maps were published in China showing large areas of North-Eastern India, Bhutan, and Ladakh as Chinese territory. When India protested against these maps, Peking's reply was that these were reproductions of old maps produced at the time of the Kuomintang régime and that they would be corrected as soon as the new régime had had time to do so. But instead of correcting the maps, the régime went on bringing out newer and yet newer editions showing larger and larger chunks of Indian territory as belonging to China. More or less simultaneously Peking also commenced a series of probing operations making forcible intrusions into areas along India's northern border which India had traditionally considered its own. These intrusions, which extended from Ladakh in the north-west to the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the north-east, inevitably led to protests and counter-protests and to encounters and clashes between Chinese and Indian patrols, thus turning what was for centuries a "dead" frontier into

a "live" frontier. Meanwhile, the Chinese extended and tightened their grip on Tibet, bringing the economy of the country under their complete control, building a network of strategic roads and airfields, settling a large number of Chinese colonists wherever settlement was possible and enhancing the size and quality of their armed forces, thus unmistakably transforming the "roof of the world" into a veritable base of operations. And then, when "the time was ripe", Chou En-lai revealed what he had probably in mind all these years. Writing to Nehru in January and again in September 1959, he categorically stated that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited, that the "so-called MacMahon Line" was an "illegal line", that the treaty of 1842 which delimited the Ladakh-Tibet boundary was no better than a useless scrap of paper, and that the section of the boundary consisting of Sang and Tsungha, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, was "30 or 40 years back gradually invaded and conquered by the British", and therefore "an outstanding issue left over by history". In effect, he laid claim to roughly 50,000 square miles of territory which India had, at least for decades, if not for centuries, regarded as its own.

Nehru, who had striven hard all these years to maintain and promote friendly relations with China and who had even kept back from the Indian Parliament the various violations of India's territorial integrity committed by the Chinese since 1954 in order that these relations might not suffer on account of public excitement, was stupefied by the propositions and claims put forward by the Chinese Prime Minister. He wrote back to Chou En-lai on 26 September 1959:

I must say that your letter ... has come as a great shock to us. India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China, and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region, I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we had discussed in recent years and, I thought, settled.

A first-class border dispute was thus created which reminds one of the tactics used by Adolf Hitler in creating the Sudetenland

crisis. For years the Chinese did not question the validity of the Indian maps showing the alignment of the boundary. They did not raise the boundary question in 1954, when negotiations were held between the two countries for the "Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India". In October 1954, when Nehru visited China, he mentioned to the Chinese leaders that he had seen some maps in China which showed a wrong boundary between the two countries, and added that he was not worried about it, because the boundaries of India were quite clear and not a matter of argument. We have mentioned above what the Chinese reply was. Again, in 1956, when Chou En-lai visited India, Nehru referred to the wrong Chinese maps, especially in relation to the Eastern sector. Chou En-lai then stated that he had accepted the MacMahon Line as the border between China and Burma and that he would accept this border with India also. In 1959, however, the tactics were changed. Writing to Nehru on 23 January, the Chinese Prime Minister admitted that it was true that the border question had not been raised earlier, but "this was because conditions were not ripe for its settlement". Conditions became ripe when the last remnants of resistance were liquidated and Tibet was brought under complete control, when through clandestine incursions certain strategic areas of Indian territory were already under Chinese occupation, when the Chinese army was well entrenched along India's borders, when, in other words, China was in a position to subject the issue to the arbitrament of arms. Even Hitler could not have surpassed Chou En-lai in the arts of dissimulation!

Estrangement between India and China was now well-nigh complete. Attempts were indeed still made to settle the issue by negotiation, the Chinese having made sure that they were parleying from a position of strength. Chou En-lai met Nehru in Delhi in April 1960, but the meeting only confirmed their disagreement about basic historical and actual facts regarding the border. The Prime Ministers, however, agreed that the officials of the two Governments should meet and examine relevant documents and make a joint report. The Officials' Report (or rather Reports, for there were two instead of one), published by the Government of India in February 1961 (but not by China until April 1962), put within a reasonable compass the stupendous mass of materials which the Indian side

brought forward in support of the Indian case as opposed to the scanty and sometimes contradictory evidence produced by the Chinese. But this had no effect on the settlement of the dispute. Instead, the Chinese stepped up their forward patrolling in both the Western and Eastern sectors of the boundary and followed it up by a massive invasion in October-November 1962. On 21 November, however, for reasons which are not yet quite clear, they called off the invasion, announced a unilateral cease-fire, and withdrew their forces 20 kilometres behind what they described as the "1959 line of actual control". This left them in possession of 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh. India, however, declined to accept these unilateral terms and asked for a restoration of the *status quo ante* of 8 September 1962, in all sectors of the boundary, as a condition precedent to a mutually agreed cease-fire. A stalemate ensued as the Chinese rejected the Indian proposal.

A number of attempts have since been made to break the stalemate and provide a basis for agreed cease-fire arrangements. Six Asian-African countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic) formulated certain proposals for this purpose, but while India accepted them *in toto*, China refused to accept them without reservations. In a note on 3 April 1963 and later in a letter of the Indian Prime Minister to the Chinese Prime Minister on 1 May 1963, India put forward various proposals, including international arbitration, for the purpose of resolving the dispute in a peaceful manner. The Chinese Government contemptuously rejected these proposals and accused India of having put them forward "to make negotiations impossible by setting up an array of obstacles". In 1964, on the basis of a suggestion from Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur of India made a public declaration that India would be happy to initiate negotiations with China if only China would agree to make a token gesture and withdraw from the seven civilian posts which it had constructed in the demilitarized zone in Ladakh in clear contravention of the Colombo proposals. Chou En-lai gave his formal reply to this proposal in his State of the Nation Report to the Third National People's Congress held in Peking from 21 December 1964 to 4 January 1965. "We will not withdraw a single one of these posts," Chou asserted, "and at the same time the Indian Government has to be reminded that 90,000

sq. kilometres of territory south of the so-called MacMahon Line are Chinese territory over which China never relinquished its sovereignty ... We can wait."

It seems clear that China will be satisfied with nothing less than the unconditional surrender of India to the Chinese *diktat*. The so-called border dispute is much more than a border dispute. It is a *casus belli*, a device created by the Chinese to pressurize India so as to compel it to follow the Chinese line in both its internal and external policies or risk disintegration in the process of resisting the pressure. Although stemming in part from the geopolitical situation created by the Chinese occupation of Tibet, it is also a part of the bigger multi-dimensional conflict thrust upon the free world by a totalitarian colossus out to revolutionize and reshape the world according to its own design. India has become the focus of its special attention primarily because with its size, manpower, resources, democratic traditions and institutions, and co-operative relations at once with the United States and the Soviet Union, it constitutes a major obstacle in the way of the establishment of Chinese overlordship in Asian affairs—its greatest rival for the Asian mind. This is the heart of the Sino-Indian problem. Those in India, therefore, who believe that a little more flexibility on our part and a little more willingness to make a few territorial adjustments will immediately ease the continuing tension between India and China and lay the foundations of a durable peace are, to my mind, suffering from the same delusion as those who thought in 1938 that Munich "will save peace in our own time".

10 March 1967

M.S. RAJAN

THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

THE MEMBERSHIP of the Commonwealth of Nations has increased from seven nations (bound by racial and cultural ties) before the Second World War to twenty-six (comprising nations of all races, cultures, and civilizations of the world) in 1967.¹ This almost fourfold expansion of membership would not have taken place, it would seem, but for the faith of the new, post-war members in the continuing usefulness of this unique association of nations and, furthermore, their optimism about its future. And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, precisely during the last decade, which was the period of its greatest expansion (from eight members in 1956 to twenty-six members in 1967), there has been widespread pessimism about the future of the Commonwealth. The continuing faith in the utility of the association affirmed by the July 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and the dynamism it sought to inject into what was then believed to be a stagnant association by some constructive

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¹The following were the pre-war members: the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Eire, Newfoundland, the Union of South Africa and New Zealand. Eire left the Commonwealth in 1949, and the Union of South Africa in 1961. Newfoundland was merged with Canada in 1949.

In 1967, the following were the twenty-six members (the years in brackets against the post-war members indicating the year of independence and membership): the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India (1947), Pakistan (1947), Ceylon (1948), Malaysia (1957), Ghana (1957), Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone (1961), Tanzania (1961), Cyprus (1961), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Jamaica (1962), Uganda (1963), Kenya (1963), Malawi (formerly Nyasaland, 1964), Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia, 1964), Malta (1965), Singapore (1965), Guyana (formerly British Guiana, 1966), Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland, 1966), Lesotho (formerly Basutoland, 1966), and Barbados (1966).

and even revolutionary proposals like the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat, have not altogether reversed the trend of opinion about the future of the association, in spite of active efforts by its supporters.

What are the reasons for this somewhat paradoxical situation, in which member Governments of the Commonwealth formally and publicly affirm faith in the future of the association, while within practically every member nation, there is a significant section of public opinion lacking that faith? How and why is it that the Commonwealth has shown unexpected powers of survival and resilience in the face of a series of grave crises and disappointed all its prophets of doom? What are the objective factors on the basis of which one could assess the future of the association with confidence and accuracy?

There is a preliminary point which one must make about prophesying in respect of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has changed more than and faster than any other association of nations. This is primarily because, unlike other associations, it is based not on any charter or constitution, but on certain conventions, rules, and understandings evolved and respected over several decades. The Commonwealth could not have been invented if it had not already existed, remarked K.C. Wheare once. It has, therefore, been possible to make changes in the nature, structure, and functioning of the Commonwealth much more easily than in those of associations with a charter or constitution. These changes have been necessitated by changed circumstances and the compulsion to adapt the association to them. Therefore, forecasts about the future development of the association are peculiarly difficult, and when made in the past they have had very little value.² This limitation would surely apply as much to the views of the pessimists as to

²A random example of both the difficulty and the futility of forecasting the future development of the Commonwealth is the lengthy argument of Professor J.D.B. Miller about the attitude of the Commonwealth to racial equality within the association, made as recently as 1960, i.e. a year before the Union of South Africa was forced out of the Commonwealth for refusing to accept the principle. Professor Miller had then concluded thus: "It is unlikely . . . that racial equality will be established as a basic principle." See *The Commonwealth and the World* (London, 1960), edn 2, pp. 286-8. As stated further on in the present study, racial equality was declared by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in the 1964 conference as an obligation of membership.

those of the optimists. It might, therefore, appear that all discussion about the future of the Commonwealth is essentially an exercise in intellectual futility.

On the contrary, one could validly argue that the Commonwealth, like any other association of nations created by human endeavour, is not specially exempt from the fate of all mortal creations. It would, therefore, seem only proper that those who have faith in its continuing utility should pay constant attention to its preservation as a dynamic and purposeful instrument of its members, so that it may not die a premature death by neglect or indifference. Indeed, some informed observers hold that the Commonwealth is likely to die more of neglect on the part of those who claim to be its supporters than of the denigration indulged in by its detractors. Therefore, it is not altogether a waste of time and energy to reflect on its future.

The primary reason for pessimism about the future of the Commonwealth is the widespread belief that where the traditional links of affinity and links of advantage (to use Gordon Walker's neat phrases) among members either have snapped altogether or have been seriously eroded or are rusting through disuse, no fresh links have been established and also that no efforts have been made to strengthen the old bonds and to establish new ones to supplement the traditional links in order to make the association dynamic and purposeful and the membership of it worth while. These critics do not seem impressed by the new links sought to be established by the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, perhaps because it is a little too early to say to what extent the new links would justify the hopes of their protagonists. Meanwhile, the Rhodesian crisis has acutely divided the Commonwealth and shaken every member of it. For the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, it provoked the African members of the Commonwealth to threaten to break off diplomatic relations with the *primus inter pares* of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom. Two of them, Ghana and Tanzania, actually carried out the threat, though the former has since re-established diplomatic ties with Britain.

EROSION OF LINKS OF AFFINITY

The basic, though merely symbolic, link of affinity among members is the acknowledgement, by all the twenty-six member nations, of

the British Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. In this capacity, the British Queen has no functions, duties, or privileges, and her being Head of the Commonwealth has no legal or constitutional significance, either within or without the Commonwealth. Whereas thirteen members have preferred to remain monarchies with the British Queen as their Head of State and as such owe allegiance to her, twelve other members have preferred to become republics within the Commonwealth, owing no allegiance to her. One member, Malaysia, is a monarchy with a difference: it has an indigenous, elective monarchy.

Since this link is purely of symbolic significance, no member state has objected to this last relic of imperial unity. There has, of course, been a suggestion in non-official circles that the Headship of the Commonwealth should rotate among the Heads of States of the republican members too, so that it may not remain the monopoly of only one Head of State, of a State (and that too of a monarchy) which, in the eyes of some persons among the "non-European" and republican members, is tainted by the fact of its being their former imperial ruler. This suggestion might, however, be dismissed as inconsequential and irrelevant in assessing the future of the Commonwealth.

Ties of Sentiment and Goodwill

The ties of sentiment and goodwill among members of the Commonwealth, especially between the "non-European" members on the one hand and the United Kingdom on the other, arising from varying periods of historical association and the manner of achieving independence from Britain, have been gravely eroded on both sides as a result of new generations of peoples assuming the control of affairs in practically all member states. This seems only natural, and it is only to be expected that objective compulsions of national interests rather than sentiment and goodwill would guide the attitudes and policies of Britons and Asians and Africans towards one another as sovereign, independent, and equal members of the society of nations. There seems nothing that any of the members could do to stop the erosion of the old links of sentiment and mutual goodwill towards each other. This would mean that the future of the Commonwealth can no longer be justified (as some individuals and Commonwealth statesmen still do, especially in the

United Kingdom) merely on the basis of sentiment over past association or the goodwill on both sides generated by the manner of ending British imperial rule over the other members. It would now have to be justified on the basis of concrete benefits to members or on the basis of the common purpose of maintaining and promoting peace and progress generally. In this sense, the Commonwealth has become an association for mutual benefit, and rightly so. Although there are, and will perhaps always be, some persons who regret this development and transformation of the Commonwealth—from an association bound by sentiment and allegiance to the British Crown to one based on reciprocal benefits—I would think that the Commonwealth has a better and a longer future as an association of nations based on reciprocal benefits than it would have if it were essentially based on the former links, which by their very nature are subject to erosion.

British Cultural Heritage

The largest and the most pervasive single group of links of affinity binding members of the Commonwealth is the British cultural heritage—British political ideas, ideals, and institutions. The English language is still the language of the *élite* in all Commonwealth countries, even though it has ceased to be the official language in three of the member nations—Ceylon, Malaysia, and Tanzania. In India, it is to be an associate official language. The Westminster model of democracy is no longer the sacred and universal paragon that it was till a decade ago in all Commonwealth countries, but it is still in effective operation in the vast majority of Commonwealth nations, including many “non-European” members. In particular, the parliamentary system of government has been abandoned in one Asian member (Pakistan) and in some African members, three of which (Ghana, Seirra Leone, and Nigeria) have outright military régimes. Most of the African states have become one-party states—a negation of an essential element of the parliamentary system. The patterns of administration, the English common law, the legal system and institutions, and the educational systems have escaped fundamental changes among most of the Asian-African members, so that the domestic political idiom of all Commonwealth countries has remained broadly similar, certainly when compared with that of non-Commonwealth countries. Although (one might say, natur-

ally), with lapse of time, there are bound to be departures from British ideas, ideals, and institutions among the non-British members, particularly among the "non-European" nations which belong to different races and cultural backgrounds, many of these common links of British origin seem likely to continue in varying strength in the foreseeable future—and to that extent to give the member nations of the Commonwealth (at least as compared with non-Commonwealth states) a sense of belonging to a community of shared ideas, ideals, and institutions. They will be retained, *not* because they are of British origin or for reasons of sentiment or goodwill towards Britain, but because (as in the case of the retention of English) it is in their interest to retain them, for the time being at least, in the interests of national integration, or because they cannot immediately replace them by anything better, or simply because they do not believe in uprooting the existing state of affairs without some adequate or compelling reason. From this angle, the Commonwealth seems to have many more years before it. While the departures from the common pattern and the weakening of these links have been widely publicized and made the subject of comment by the denigrators of the Commonwealth, it seems to me that most of these links would last a long time, in different degrees in different members, and to that extent, the Commonwealth, as a community of nations sharing certain ideas, values, and institutions of common British origin, seems to have a future.

Some fresh links in this field have been established. The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, which has been in operation for the last few years, and the Commonwealth Foundation, which was established recently to promote unofficial exchange among Commonwealth organizations in professional fields, seem to be quite promising in their efforts to keep the Commonwealth as much an association of peoples as of Governments. The increase, very substantial in many cases, of Commonwealth students especially in the United Kingdom and the special efforts made in some Commonwealth countries such as India to promote the English language are further evidence in this direction.

Links of Communications, Standards

The links of affinity among members of the Commonwealth in the fields of communications and the common standards in the field

of education, professional qualifications, measurement, and research as they were established during British rule have been considerably modified, perhaps even weakened. Although a good many fresh links have been established in both these fields outside the Commonwealth, some have been established within the Commonwealth too. One of these, the round-the-world Commonwealth telephone cable system (which was decided to be established in 1958) has now made very substantial progress; starting from the United Kingdom, it has so far linked Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. But, by and large, in the field of telecommunications—i.e. co-operation of Commonwealth news agencies and the Press, of broadcasting, of communications by sea and air—member nations of the Commonwealth have continued to retain many of the traditional links because of the advantages in doing so. They have not been affected by political changes within their states or in their political orientation in external relations. This is largely true of the maintenance of standards. The functioning of various Commonwealth bodies,³ and the periodical conferences convened by them have kept co-operation, co-ordination, and consultation among members of the Commonwealth at a fairly active and effective level as before Independence. The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan and the exchange of professional personnel among Commonwealth countries have sought both to reinforce existing links and to establish fresh links in the fields of communications and maintenance of common standards.⁴ One might conclude that Commonwealth links in these fields have not been weakened significantly except to the extent that members have established widespread supplementary links with non-members also, so that they no longer depend wholly on Commonwealth connexions in these fields. This would suggest that in these fields also, the Commonwealth has many more years before it.

Sense of Belonging

On the small, weak, and new members, the membership of the Commonwealth continues to confer a sense of belonging which they

³For a list of them, see *The Commonwealth Relations Office List* (London, 1965).

⁴Regular professional contacts between individuals and organizations were the "life blood" of Commonwealth relationships, remarked Duncan Sandys, British Colonial Secretary. See *Commonwealth Survey 1964* (London), p. 505.

can never get in a large association like the United Nations. The Commonwealth is an association of nations which is small enough for them to feel at home and yet so large as to give them a sense of importance. It is an association which enables them to function with equal rights and privileges and with that additional stature and prestige which they can never hope to achieve in any world-wide organization. For the relatively large and strong members, like the United Kingdom, Canada, and India, there is the reciprocal benefit of being able to use the Commonwealth forum as an additional source of influence either to promote their own causes or to modify in their favour the attitudes, policies, and actions of the other members. Even with the contraction of its world-wide interests, the United Kingdom perhaps cannot, and does not want to, do without this link of affinity, at least for the negative reason that its absence would hurt British policies and interests. Perhaps this is the significance of Britain's agreeing to attend the Lagos meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in January 1966 convened on Nigerian initiative—the first such meeting held outside London—to discuss the Rhodesian question, which is legally and constitutionally a British problem.

Many of the links of affinity have been retained by Commonwealth countries largely because they are also links of advantage. They have been retained (and, in some cases, reinforced considerably) by most member states, not because of any romantic attitude to historical ties with Britain and other Commonwealth countries, nor because of sentimental reasons, but because they also confer certain practical benefits, even if these benefits have been considerably eroded for a variety of reasons. In spite of this erosion and the vast changes in the Commonwealth, the "style of conversation" in the Commonwealth has not basically changed, largely because of these links of affinity among its members. It is these links among Commonwealth countries that collectively mark them off from non-Commonwealth states, and together constitute an "invisible frontier" (to use Gordon Walker's phrase) between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth states and, furthermore, enable peoples of Commonwealth states to feel that generally it is easier and more pleasurable to deal with each other than with non-Commonwealth states. As long as such a feeling persists—and it seems that it would for many more years to come—the Commonwealth as an

association of nations clearly has a future.

EROSION OF LINKS OF ADVANTAGE

In addition to the many links of affinity that bind members of the Commonwealth, there are certain links of advantage as such. The extent of benefit of these links naturally varies from member to member, but every member does derive some benefit or other.

Economic Links

The economic links among members of the Commonwealth have considerably weakened over the years. Whereas the trade among Commonwealth countries as well as between the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the other members, on the other, has been increasing in absolute terms, its rate of increase is much slower than the trade with non-Commonwealth countries in spite of Commonwealth Preference, which is no longer significant (except in respect of the United Kingdom) or substantial enough.⁵ The erosion of Commonwealth Preference is due not so much to lack of fellow feeling among Commonwealth nations, but to compliance with international obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.⁶ All Commonwealth countries (except Canada, which

⁵From a comparison of trade figures for intra-Commonwealth trade and Commonwealth trade with non-Commonwealth countries, it is seen that whereas during the ten years following 1954-55 intra-Commonwealth exports increased at an average biennial rate of 4.6 per cent, the exports to non-Commonwealth countries in the same period increased at an average biennial rate of 19.6 per cent. Likewise, whereas intra-Commonwealth imports increased at a modest biennial average rate of 3.9 per cent, the Commonwealth countries' imports from non-Commonwealth sources increased in the same period at an average biennial rate of 21.3 per cent. Source: *Board of Trade Journal* (London), 28 June 1963, p. 1446, Tables 1 and 2; and *ibid.*, 1 July 1965, pp. 18-19, Tables 1 and 2. According to another source, intra-Commonwealth exports as percentage of total exports of Commonwealth countries declined from 36 per cent in 1961 to 31 per cent in 1965. Likewise, intra-Commonwealth imports as percentage of total imports of Commonwealth countries declined from 32 per cent in 1961 to 29 per cent in 1965. Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, *Commonwealth Trade 1965* (London 1967), Appendix, Tables 5 and 7.

⁶But the erosion of the Commonwealth Preference is not so drastic as is often stated by the critics of the Commonwealth. See, for example, the impact of the Commonwealth Preference on British trade for the years 1937-61. *Commonwealth Survey 1966*, pp. 253 and 255, Tables 1 and 2. The benefit of the Common-

was never a member) continue to be members of the Sterling Area, but the Pound Sterling no longer enjoys the position of prestige it had in the pre-war years. Private investment from Commonwealth sources, especially from the United Kingdom, no longer occupies the same monopolistic position in Commonwealth countries as it did at the time of their Independence. Although in the case of most of the Commonwealth countries, the volume of British private investment has increased substantially, its percentage in the total foreign private investment has been gradually going down for many years because of the entry of private investment from non-Commonwealth countries.⁷ And the new links of aid (grants and loans) from advanced Commonwealth countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have been much too feeble compared with those forged by non-Commonwealth states (notably the United States and the Soviet Union) to justify any strengthening of faith in the Commonwealth or in its future, even though 85 per cent of the bilateral aid, 95 per cent of the technical assistance personnel, and 70 per cent of the training facilities offered by the Commonwealth donor countries are given to the other Commonwealth countries.⁸

The reasons for the weakening of the economic links are many, and vary from one country to another, but on the whole the links would have remained strong if they had been adequately beneficial. One important reason is the desire of the newly independent post-war members to reinforce their political independence by economic independence from traditional Commonwealth sources in the field of trade, investment, and aid. Another reason is their expecta-

wealth Preference at present has been estimated to be no more than £ 90 million for Britain and £ 115 million for the other Commonwealth countries. See Maurice Zinkin, "The Commonwealth and Britain—East of Suez", *International Affairs* (London), April 1966, p. 216.

⁷For figures of British private investment in other Commonwealth countries, see *Commonwealth Survey 1964*, p. 821. More recent figures for all Commonwealth countries are not readily or in one place available.

⁸Peter Williams, *Aid in the Commonwealth* (London, 1965), p. 12. The 85 per cent of aid by Commonwealth donors to Commonwealth recipients was only 30 per cent of the aid obtained by them from non-Commonwealth sources over the period 1960-63. The United States alone gave 83.5 per cent of bilateral aid from non-Communist sources during that period. However, more recently, Commonwealth aid donors have been increasing their aid faster than the United States and most European countries. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

tion of greater gain in diversifying their trade and not in being dependent on any particular country or bloc of countries in the matter. The third reason is basically political, namely to underline their economic non-alignment in a bipolarized world. In the matter of aid and private investment, the United Kingdom has not been able, owing to its own economic weakness, to make substantial contributions in spite of its express desire to do more in these fields. But in respect of all links, it is not the fact of belonging to the Commonwealth that has had a decisive effect on the decisions of the countries of the Commonwealth towards other members, but the factor of greater or long-term benefit to their own respective countries from non-Commonwealth sources. In this field, faith in the Commonwealth and its future has taken a subordinate place. That the overwhelming majority of the countries of the Commonwealth, which are underdeveloped or developing countries, have received more substantial economic and technical assistance from non-Commonwealth sources has naturally weakened the Commonwealth as a whole. This has been partly responsible for loss of faith in the Commonwealth among many of the economically weak members. On the other hand, the smaller and weaker of these members have received more aid from Commonwealth sources, especially from Britain and Canada, and are unlikely to receive any significant aid from non-Commonwealth sources for the reason that they are not important enough to attract the attention of non-Commonwealth countries like the United States and the Soviet Union. The same reason would hold good regarding private investment from Commonwealth sources (like the Commonwealth Development Finance Company) *vis-à-vis* non-Commonwealth sources. In respect of trade too, either because their bargaining position is weak, or because of custom and habit, or because their commercial connexions are only with Commonwealth countries, particularly with the United Kingdom, the smaller and weaker countries of the Commonwealth are likely to maintain or even increase traditional levels of intra-Commonwealth trade. Even if Commonwealth Preference disappears as a result of the United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC), their trading interests, notably with the United Kingdom, seem likely to be safeguarded, at least for some years to come. In regard to Sterling Area links among Commonwealth countries (other than Canada), they are not likely to be

snapped because the currencies of most of the members (except possibly the major dollar-earners like Malaysia, Ghana, and Zambia) are not strong enough to encourage them to leave the Area in the foreseeable future. For all these reasons, it does seem to the writer that even with weakening economic links, the vast majority of the Commonwealth countries are likely to retain at least some traditional economic links of varying strength with other members of the Commonwealth and that, therefore, there is no immediate possibility of the disintegration of the Commonwealth.

On the contrary, the proposal agreed upon in the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference for joint development projects in which some donor countries are to collaborate in the implementation of projects in recipient countries, and the investing of the Commonwealth Secretariat with the function (among others) of "advancing and obtaining support for development projects and technical assistance in a variety of fields on a multilateral Commonwealth basis as appropriate",⁹ suggests that there is still an earnest desire among the members of the Commonwealth to retain, and promote further, the traditional economic links. Both in the last Conference of Commonwealth Trade Ministers (June 1966) and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting (September 1966), it was recognized that "there was continuing scope for expansion of Commonwealth trade and the need to strengthen to this end the well-established links among Commonwealth members".¹⁰ The first report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General inspires some optimism in this respect.¹¹

Links of Defence

The traditional Commonwealth links in the field of defence have also weakened to a considerable degree, and perhaps snapped altogether in some cases. As in the case of the economic links, and perhaps more so, member countries, especially those which are

⁹*Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat*, Cmnd 2713 (1965), p. 5.

¹⁰From the text of the communiqué Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, *Commonwealth Survey 1966*, p. 984. See also the communiqué of the Conference of Commonwealth Trade Ministers. *Ibid.*, p. 682.

¹¹*Annual Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General* (London, mimeographed, 26 August 1966), pp. 10-13. This document is hereafter cited as *Annual Report*.

non-aligned, have sought to alter their overwhelming dependence for military stores and defence training facilities on sources in the United Kingdom, by going to other Commonwealth (like Canada and Australia) or non-Commonwealth (like the United States and the Soviet Union) sources for these facilities—India and Ghana being two prime examples of Commonwealth states which have done so by deliberate policy. But with the possible exception of Pakistan in the past and Tanzania hereafter, no member has altogether snapped these traditional ties of dependence on sources in the United Kingdom. Even Pakistan, in spite of its overwhelming dependence on the United States, has retained concurrent links at the higher levels of defence policy and strategy with three Commonwealth countries—the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—through common membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Malaysia has a defence agreement with the United Kingdom, with which Australia and New Zealand are associated, and British troops and bases are still located in Malaysia (and in Singapore as well). Ceylon still retains its 1947 Defence Agreement (as well as the one on external affairs) with the United Kingdom (though it seems to be non-operative in practice) in spite of its being a non-aligned country. The majority of the Asian-African and Caribbean members retain their traditional links with Britain or have established fresh links with other Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for the supply of military stores and the training of defence personnel. Although no Commonwealth country which has not had a defence agreement, or does not share common membership of a military alliance, expects, as a matter of course and by virtue of being a fellow Commonwealth country, that the United Kingdom or any other member would come to its defence in the event of external aggression (i.e. aggression from a non-Commonwealth country) or internal subversion (as it happened within the three East African members early in 1964), it would perhaps be no exaggeration to say that they are more likely to appeal to the United Kingdom first for such help (and also expect it to respond favourably) because of the traditional links with that country than to any other. From the British side, although it no longer recognizes any automatic obligation to go to the defence or support of a Commonwealth Government (unless it has treaty obligations), it is more

likely to respond to appeals from fellow Commonwealth countries in spite of the erosion of the traditional defence links and obligations. This British attitude was well illustrated by its prompt response to India's appeal for help at the time of the Chinese aggression on India in October 1962,¹² as well as the British compliance with requests by the three East African members for help to put down or prevent internal subversion in 1964. In December 1965, at the request of President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia, the UK Government sent Royal Air Force (RAF) units to Zambia to afford security against the illegal Smith régime in Rhodesia.

Exchange and Consultation

Exchange of information and consultation on matters of common interest with fellow members of the Commonwealth (which also happens to be an obligation of membership) is a traditional link of advantage which all members still greatly value, although the benefit it confers varies from country to country and has diminished in recent years, to a certain extent, for a variety of reasons. The old "European" members (the United Kingdom and Canada for many years and Australia more recently) undoubtedly value the regular opportunities of exchanging and consulting the other members, especially the new, post-war members, who have come to play a fairly important, influential, and active rôle in world affairs—partly to secure the latter's support to the causes they stand for or to influence in their favour the policies and actions of the new members.¹³ Reciprocally, the new members apparently value the

¹²See *Commonwealth Survey, 1962*, pp. 964-5. When President Kwame Nkrumah objected to British military assistance to India, Prime Minister Macmillan wrote to the former: "When the territory of a Commonwealth people is invaded, it is surely only right and natural that we should express to them our sympathy and support in their anxiety and danger..." *Ibid.*, p. 965.

See also the remarks of Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home on Britain's interest in the independence of new members of the Commonwealth and safeguard from external aggression as well as internal subversion. *Commonwealth Survey 1964*, pp. 251-2. He told the Nigerian Parliament that lack of formal military arrangements had not prevented Britain from assisting five Commonwealth countries during 1963-4. *Ibid.*, p. 396.

¹³According to Maurice Zinkin, the Commonwealth "is a set of obligations by Britain to the other members, only exceptionally matched by any obligations on their part". He adds that since the United Kingdom is "almost" the only Great Power in the Commonwealth, the association "provides one means by

intimate opportunities of exchanging or consulting with the old members (which are both richer and stronger than they themselves are), notably with the United Kingdom, which is the only Great Power (and a permanent member of the UN Security Council) with the most extensive diplomatic establishments and the longest experience. Because of the fact that the United Kingdom also happens to be the most important official and unofficial donor of economic and defence benefits, these new members have an additional reason to appreciate the importance and value of this link with the United Kingdom.

It is quite true that this particular link is no longer strong because of the somewhat differing orientations of aligned and non-aligned countries, and intra-Commonwealth disharmony (between individual members like India and Pakistan, or, until recently, between Ghana and Nigeria, or between Ghana and the United Kingdom) has also limited the value of exchange and consultation. The steady weakening of the United Kingdom both in economic and defence fields and the consequent reduction in its international stature, prestige, and influence is another reason. The British military action in Suez in October 1956 (and that without consultation with other Commonwealth countries), its desire for membership of the EEC (which, it was feared, would adversely affect the interests of the other Commonwealth nations), and its ineffective and inadequate rôle in the solution of the Rhodesian question have also tended to weaken confidence in, and respect for, Britain among the post-war members, notably among the African members of the Commonwealth—with the result that many members perhaps feel inhibited in their relations with the United Kingdom. One more reason for the weakening of this link is the feeling of some members that Britain has not been impartial in intra-Commonwealth

which the other members can obtain a strength beyond their own; if they can persuade Britain, out of Commonwealth loyalty, to shift her policy to meet their point of view, then their policy immediately has that much more chance of success. This pressure on Britain is very rarely matched by any counter-pressure from Britain." See n. 6, p. 209. This is plainly a one-sided and cynical view. For a cogent and judicious discussion on this point which comes to the conclusion that, on balance, Britain has more to gain than to lose by staying within the Commonwealth, see J.D.B. Miller, "British Interests and the Commonwealth", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (Leicester), November 1966, pp. 181-5.

disputes (like those between India and Pakistan) or disputes and questions concerning Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries.

However, with the transfer in the middle of 1965 of the functions of exchange of information and consultation from the British Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to the newly established Commonwealth Secretariat, a new and perhaps hopeful stage has arrived in strengthening this link of advantage.¹⁴ The fact that the Secretariat would be more objective and impartial, as between individuals or groups of members, than the CRO and that it has a special interest in promoting closer understanding among all members of the Commonwealth irrespective of their size, political orientation, or diversity of interests seems likely to increase both the number and extent of exchanges and consultations among all members. "By providing a continuing focus for Commonwealth co-operation, enabling the association to direct more than intermittent attention to the problem, the establishment of the Secretariat has perhaps enlarged the possibilities of the Commonwealth itself."¹⁵ In view of the possibility of members breaking off relations with the United Kingdom and others (e.g. between Pakistan and Malaysia, since resumed), the Secretariat helps in keeping Commonwealth links intact among member states.¹⁶ Also, with the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat, "it became possible to overcome the rather episodic nature of previous Commonwealth meetings and to plan collective action to carry forward the work already begun".¹⁷

OTHER REASONS FOR EROSION OF FAITH

Apart from the erosion of the links of affinity and the links of advantage among members of the Commonwealth, there have been some additional reasons for loss of faith in the Commonwealth and

¹⁴For example, the Conference of Law Ministers, Attorneys General, etc., held in London in April-May 1966, agreed to recommend to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers that a small legal section be added to the Commonwealth Secretariat to facilitate exchange of information on legislative developments and other legal matters.

¹⁵See *Annual Report*, n. 11, p. 4.

¹⁶On this point, see n. 11, p. 4.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 7.

its future. An analysis of these reasons would indicate the extent of the internal strength and weakness of the association; and an account of the nature of measures taken to remedy them and the more recent trends in the development of the Commonwealth would help us in visualizing the future of the Commonwealth with a fair measure of accuracy.

Disillusionment among Old Members

One of the reasons for a certain disenchantment mostly among three of the four senior members (the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand) with the Commonwealth is the fact that the association has ceased to be a small community of nations with racial and cultural ties and broadly similar interests and policies in internal as well as external affairs. With the post-war enlargement of membership to twenty-six, with the loss of three pre-war "European" members (of Eire in 1949, of Newfoundland in 1949, and of the Union of South Africa in 1961), with the new members being almost entirely from "non-European" racial and cultural stock (i.e. with the exception of Cyprus and Malta), and with twelve of these new members terminating their allegiance to the British monarch by becoming republics, the three old members seem to have lost their earlier proprietary interest in the Commonwealth; they seem to feel that it no longer belongs to them or that they no longer *run* the association; they are, therefore, somewhat indifferent to its present functioning and future prospects. That a leading (but anonymous) light of the British Conservative Party should have called the Commonwealth "a gigantic farce" some years ago¹⁸ is a pointer to the disillusionment among the pre-war members. Even long before this, the then Australian Prime Minister (and a leading Commonwealth statesman) had said some harsh things about the new Commonwealth, in which he did not feel quite at home.¹⁹ The British decision in 1961 to seek membership of the EEC as well as to impose legal restrictions on Commonwealth immigrants to Britain (both of which are historic reversals of the traditional British attitude to these issues) are some further indications of the erosion of faith in the Commonwealth in British official and un-

¹⁸"A Party in Search of a Pattern", *The Times* (London), 2 April 1964.

¹⁹See Nicholas Mansergh, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952* (London, 1963), vol. 2. pp. 1211-13.

official circles. They also indicate a lower priority for the Commonwealth and for the interests of the Commonwealth in Britain's foreign policy and relations than has been the case by long tradition. The attitude of unrestricted criticism by the "non-European" members, particularly the African members, of Britain's rôle in the Rhodesian crisis has further shaken the faith of many in Britain, and they seem to feel that not only has the Commonwealth ceased to promote British interests but also that it is actually harming them.²⁰ That the Union of South Africa, a founder member, should have been forced out of the Commonwealth largely as a result of pressure from the new, post-war members, is perhaps one more reason for the disillusionment of many persons among the three old member nations.

One could, however, argue that in spite of all these revolutionary changes in the composition and functioning of the post-war Common-

²⁰See n. 10. According to Lord Casey, there is very little interest in the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth. See his book, *The Future of the Commonwealth* (London, 1963), pp. 10 and 85 ff. However, according to the report of a semi-official conference held in April in the United Kingdom, no suggestions were made in the conference that the Commonwealth had outlived its life. "On the contrary, the general sense was that the Commonwealth still had within it the potentiality of being an immense force for good in the distracted world of today and that Britain as the founder member should respond to the challenge by herself showing imagination and courage and encouraging others to do so too." It added: "It was not thought that there was any substance in the criticism, often heard, that the Commonwealth was a hindrance to Britain in the pursuit of her policies either in diplomacy or commerce." *The Future of the Commonwealth A British View* (London, 1963), p. 1. However, according to Professor Miller, who has recently made a study of British opinion, the desire to make the Commonwealth more effective is widespread in Britain, though declining, and the typical approach of most people is one of benevolence to the association as it is, unaccompanied by any desire to alter the existing arrangements. See Miller, n. 13, p. 181. But the conference on the future of the Commonwealth referred to above made many proposals for British initiative to strengthen the Commonwealth. On 6 February 1964, the UK House of Commons approved a Government motion seeking to reinforce the bonds between the Governments and peoples of the Commonwealth. A few months later, in the July 1964 Prime Ministers' Conference, Britain no doubt supported all the constructive proposals for the development and strengthening of the Commonwealth. Reportedly, the proposal for establishing the Commonwealth Foundation is due to British initiative. Britain has actually contributed half of the Foundation's current budget of £ 25,000. All this is certainly confusing!

wealth, there does not seem to be any possibility of any of these members leaving the Commonwealth of their own accord in the foreseeable future. They have been gradually getting used to the changes that have come about in the Commonwealth and have even acquiesced in many of them, like, for instance, the proliferation of republics. Even Britain, the most important of them, seems to have reconciled itself to playing a subordinate rôle in Commonwealth affairs, particularly since the Suez affair, not merely because of the increase of the "non-European" membership, but also because of the decline of its own political, economic, and military power. On the other hand, the many constructive proposals approved by the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference have helped these old members to renew their faith in the Commonwealth. That the most important of these proposals, namely the proposal relating to the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat, which had been more than once made by Australian Prime Ministers in the past but rejected by some of the new members, was approved unanimously in 1964, seems to have impressed these old members and many critics of the Commonwealth among them that the new members are no mere wreckers of the ancient structure of the Commonwealth built by these old members but also constructive architects of new wings to the existing structure. One might also assume that they believe that, on balance, continued membership is of some benefit, materially or otherwise, or at least that withdrawal would hurt their standing or harm their interests.

Settlement of Intra-Commonwealth Disputes

One of the old and continuing criticisms of the Commonwealth by some of its supporters and at least by one of the member Governments (i.e. Pakistan) is that on the one hand intra-Commonwealth disputes are not permitted by convention to be brought up for discussion in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences without the consent of all the parties involved in those disputes and that, on the other hand, there is no Commonwealth machinery for the settlement of those disputes. All except three Commonwealth Governments (viz Pakistan, Uganda, and Nigeria) also exclude from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice their disputes with other Commonwealth countries. The result is that the disputes are taken to the forum of the United

Nations, where the differences and disharmony between two Commonwealth nations are exposed to the gaze of non-Commonwealth states, thereby damaging the image of the Commonwealth as a family of nations with common historical ties. These critics would like either to have the collective intervention of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers or to set up a Commonwealth Appeal Court for the settlement of intra-Commonwealth disputes. A proposal to that effect was in fact made by the representative of Ceylon in the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, but infructuously.²¹

I do not think that either of the above proposals is essential to the strengthening of the Commonwealth or to its longevity; nor does it seem practicable. As long ago as 1930, the Imperial Conference had suggested the creation of *ad hoc* Commonwealth tribunals for the settlement of disputes among the Dominions, but this proposal was never implemented. Besides, there has never been any demand from more than one or two members either for collective intervention or for any standing machinery for the settlement of intra-Commonwealth disputes. According to the report of a recent unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference, there was no widespread support for such proposals.²² More recently, the proposal to establish a Commonwealth Court of Appeal was fully discussed in the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference held at Sydney in August-September 1965, and opinion on the merits of the proposal was about evenly divided.²³ It may be noted here that the fact that the Indo-Pakistani conflict of August-September 1965 was settled on non-Commonwealth initiative is not considered by informed Commonwealth opinion as an indication of the weakening of the Commonwealth or as a reflection on its standing.²⁴

It would seem that some people are unduly disturbed by the stres-

²¹For details of the proposals, see Edmund J. Cooray, "A Commonwealth Court", *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth* (London), vol. 43 (1962), pp. 347-53.

²²See C. E. Carrington, *The Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1959* (London, mimeographed, 1959), pp. 31 ff.

²³See a summary of the discussion in *Commonwealth Survey 1965*, pp. 1057-8. A few months later, in April-May 1966, at a meeting of Law Ministers, Attorneys General, etc., the question was informally discussed and it was decided to pursue the matter further. *Commonwealth Survey 1966*, p. 575.

²⁴Arnold Smith, "The Need for Commonwealth: Resisting a Fragmented World", *Round Table* (London), July 1966, p. 225.

ses and strains imposed from time to time by intra-Commonwealth disputes or international disputes and situations involving member nations of the Commonwealth. Since members of the Commonwealth are basically members of the society of nations, in which inter-state disputes or disharmony are a perfectly normal feature, the Commonwealth as such is not responsible for any of them (as, for example, some Britons seem to think in respect of the Rhodesian question), and they would have existed even without the Commonwealth or any regional associations of which they are also members; on the contrary, the Commonwealth offers to members involved in such disputes and situations an additional forum or instrument to solve them.²⁵

Absence of Multilateral Relations

A grave weakness of the Commonwealth as it stands today is that it is like a rimless wheel. The links between each of the individual members on the one hand and the United Kingdom on the other are fairly strong and firm, but the strength and solidity of the hub itself, the United Kingdom, is becoming weaker. In the absence of cross-ties between and among members other than the United Kingdom, the so-called Commonwealth relations of individual members other than the United Kingdom would merely or mostly comprise relations with the United Kingdom. In this situation, the omissions and commissions of the United Kingdom (either in intra-Commonwealth relations or outside the Commonwealth) are apt to loom unduly large in the Commonwealth perspective (and one member's faults and failures mistaken for those of the Commonwealth as a whole) and demands made that the offended member should leave the Commonwealth: at least the faith of that member Government or among its people might be adversely affected. This has persistently happened, for example, in India for many years over the partisan attitude of the United Kingdom to the Kashmir question in the forum of the United Nations, at the time of the British misadventure in Suez in 1956, and more recently in respect of the pro-Pakistani bias shown by the United Kingdom in the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965. This would not have happened if India had equally strong and close ties with other Commonwealth countries, because, in that event,

²⁵Ibid., pp. 225-6.

withdrawal from the Commonwealth would have the effect of terminating relations not only with the United Kingdom but with some other Commonwealth countries as well. That might be too high a price to pay!

"The pre-war Commonwealth could survive and function in spite of the prevalence of merely bilateral relations between each of the members and the United Kingdom because of its smaller membership, common racial and cultural ties, and broadly similar internal patterns and external interests. The post-war Commonwealth, with its large membership and tremendous diversities, cannot survive long without the development of cross-ties, especially between the old and the new members."²⁶ Fortunately, in recent years, many of the factors inhibiting cross-ties among members such as the Cold War and colonial and racial issues (with the current exception of the Rhodesian crisis) have been removed from the scene or have at least been mitigated. As for the exception, I do not believe that the Rhodesian crisis has any grave long-term effect on the future of the Commonwealth. Like many other crises in the history of the development of the Commonwealth, it will probably resolve itself and become merely a matter of historical interest (like the Irish and South African problems). This crisis in fact illustrates the point made above. If members other than the United Kingdom had some cross-ties with countries other than the United Kingdom, they would neither threaten to leave, nor actually leave, the Commonwealth because of their dissatisfaction with the actions or inactions of just one of the members—the United Kingdom.²⁷ Fortunately, with the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat, there is some cushioning of such threats because a member country can now threaten to break off, or actually break off, relations with another member, even with the United Kingdom, without necessarily terminating their country's Commonwealth connexion with the other members. It

²⁶See the writer's chapter, "Relations between the Old and the New Members", in W.B. Hamilton, Kenneth Robinson, and C.D.W. Goodwin, eds, *A Decade of the Commonwealth 1955-1964* (Durham, N.C., 1966), p. 167.

²⁷A curious but inexplicable exception is the persistent threat of Zambian leaders to leave the Commonwealth if it did not bring down the illegal Smith régime—without even once suggesting breaking off relations with the United Kingdom, the country which is legally and constitutionally responsible for taking any action against the Smith régime.

was thus that even when Ghana and Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in 1966, they continued to function as members of the Commonwealth. Beyond this negative reason, there are certain positive advantages too, especially in the field of mutual economic assistance, in widening multilateral ties, as the Commonwealth Secretary-General has emphasized in his recent report.²⁸

There are still some factors inhibiting the establishment of cross-ties among members other than the United Kingdom—so that the rim of the Commonwealth association could be made at least as strong as the hub and the spokes: geographical remoteness of certain members (e.g. Australia and the Caribbean members); limited financial and human resources for more extensive diplomatic representation (without which it is difficult to develop any substantial relations);²⁹ and lack of specific common interests (without which, and merely because of their common membership of the Commonwealth, they cannot have much to do with each other). But with greater faith in the utility of the Commonwealth association and its future prospects generated by the recent post-1964 phase of the development of the Commonwealth, one would hope that these factors would not be insurmountable. There is some hope that it will happen. For example, in recent years, especially since the Chinese aggression in 1962, India has developed closer relations with Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand, with whom formerly its relations were minimal. In spite of geographical remoteness, India and Canada have had close relations for many years.³⁰ Similarly, the African members of the Commonwealth have established some cross-ties among themselves, though not all of them within the Commonwealth framework. And the historical ties between the new Caribbean members and Canada have been greatly strengthened in recent years.³¹ The promotion of these

²⁸See *Annual Report*, n. 11, pp. 12-13.

²⁹London is the only Commonwealth capital where *all* Commonwealth countries are represented by a High Commissioner. Likewise, the United Kingdom is the only Commonwealth country which has diplomatic missions in all the other twenty-five Commonwealth capitals.

³⁰See the writer's article, "The Indo-Canadian *Entente*", in *International Journal* (Toronto, Ont.), vol. 17 (1962), pp. 358-84.

³¹In the Commonwealth Caribbean—Canada Conference held in Ottawa in July 1966, decisions were taken to promote closer relations in many fields—

cross-ties, especially at the unofficial level, might well be accelerated by the new Commonwealth Foundation.

Britain and the EEC

One recent episode which at one time seemed to threaten the break-up of the Commonwealth has ceased to be that explosive: British application for the membership of the EEC. Firstly, there is no immediate prospect of Britain joining the EEC. According to a recent statement of Britain's Commonwealth Relations Secretary, it would be "a very long time" before Britain did so.³² Secondly, the shock of this great historic reversal in the United Kingdom's traditional attitude to any organic union with Europe has now been sufficiently absorbed by all other members, perhaps even by a member like New Zealand, which had far more to lose than any other member of the Commonwealth. They have all made the necessary psychological and economic adjustments (like the recent Australian efforts to promote increased trade and closer relations with Japan and the agreement signed on 31 August 1965 by Australia and New Zealand to establish a free trade area between themselves) and would neither feel shocked any more by, and object to, Britain's renewed efforts to join the EEC nor suffer any significant economic loss. Nigeria (which once objected to becoming an Associate member of the EEC) has already become such a member. The three East African countries would also like to be Associate members and are negotiating with the EEC for the purpose. India has established direct relations with the members of the EEC in order to protect itself from any possible damage to its economic interests by the British membership of the EEC.

Thirdly, there is no longer the immediate danger, feared in 1961-62, of the EEC becoming a political community and of Britain becoming a province of the projected United States of Europe. Thanks to the altered French attitude to the acceleration of the EEC into a political community, there does not seem to be any prospect of this happening in the immediate future. If, therefore, Britain becomes a member of the EEC, it would not be compelled to sever its (poli-

trade, economic assistance, development and investment, transport and communications, migration and cultural relations. See *Commonwealth Survey* 1966, pp. 926-9.

³²*Times of India* (New Delhi), 17 February 1967.

tical) Commonwealth ties. Were this ever to happen, it would seem that the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat would prevent any immediate break-up of the Commonwealth as a political association, because the Secretariat has taken the place of Britain as the keystone of the Commonwealth arch.³³ Even with regard to economic ties, there is hope that the likely abolition of the Commonwealth Preference between Britain and the other members as a result of Britain's going behind the Common External Tariff of the EEC, would not be as harmful to most members as was feared at first in 1961-62; it also seems likely that the EEC would show some accommodation to the economic interests of the Commonwealth nations (other than the United Kingdom) which might be adversely affected by Britain's entry.

It would seem, therefore, that we need not fear for the future of the Commonwealth in the event of the United Kingdom entering the EEC. One might add that similar fears entertained by some Commonwealth statesmen at one time in respect of similar regional pulls and ties in other parts of the world weakening and eventually eclipsing the Commonwealth, now clearly seem quite groundless.³⁴

Change in Pattern of Government

A major reason for loss of faith in the Commonwealth in recent years among many members, old as well as new, is that the parliamentary form of government and free institutions among members, which, for many years, and until less than a decade ago, were considered absolutely fundamental and, in fact, a distinguishing characteristic of members of the Commonwealth,³⁵ is no longer true. One Asian (viz Pakistan) and

³³It is not a little surprising that such an informed observer as Maurice Zinkin should have written even early in 1966: "Without Britain, there would be no Commonwealth. Britain is the lynchpin. It is the one country whose departure would by itself deprive the whole institution of meaning." Surely, this view is now dated by the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat in July 1965. This and his other remark in n. 13 above, seem to suggest that British writers, even when they write about Britain's altered rôle in world affairs (as Zinkin was doing in this case), cannot but betray, for all their objectivity, their unconscious belief that Britain continues to occupy the centre of things and is absolutely indispensable!

³⁴See, for example, Dennis Austin, "Regional Associations and the Commonwealth", in Hamilton, Robinson, and Goodwin, n. 26, pp. 325 ff.

³⁵The 1926 Balfour Report said that free institutions were the "life blood"

some African members have abandoned either or both these characteristic features of Commonwealth Governments, in form or substance. Though this will no doubt make it difficult in the short run for those members which are critical of these traditional departures from long-established Commonwealth traditions to have a close *rapprochement* with the "delinquent" members, it is unlikely that they would make any dangerous or lasting inroads on their faith in the future of the association itself. Like, for instance, the acquiescence of monarchies in the entry of republics into the Commonwealth (which, it was feared at one time, would establish two different categories of members, but in fact has not), these departures might well be accepted as a natural corollary to the admission to membership of nations which have had no racial or cultural ties with the old members. There has already been, both among Commonwealth statesmen and among scholars, some defence of these departures on the ground that the indigenous conditions in many of the new member nations are quite different from those in the United Kingdom, where these institutions evolved over many centuries.³⁶ It is possible, therefore, that this might not have any long-term effects on the future of the Commonwealth.

Changes in the Character of the Commonwealth

Certain criticisms of the post-war Commonwealth (that the membership of the association has become unmanageably large and unwieldy and has thus destroyed the earlier intimacy and

of the British Commonwealth of Nations. See A.B. Keith, *Speeches and Documents of the British Dominions 1918-1931* (London, 1948), p. 162. And the UK Central Office of Information Reference Pamphlet no. 29 entitled *Parliamentary Institutions of the Commonwealth* (London, 1959) opened with the remark: "Among the factors that link the [then] ten member states of the Commonwealth, none is more fundamental than their common possession of the institution of parliamentary government based on the United Kingdom practice."

³⁶No other than the Head of the Commonwealth said at a State banquet in Karachi given by President Ayub Khan, who had come to power by a military *coup d'état* in 1958: "It should not come as a surprise if the forms we have slowly evolved to suit our Islands on the edge of the Atlantic are found, after trial and consideration, to need modification to meet circumstances far different. The forms are not sacred, the ideals behind them are." *Dawn* (Karachi), 2 February 1961.

confidence;³⁷ that parity of status conferred on nations quite unequal in size and population would "diffuse the Commonwealth into nothingness";³⁸ that the Commonwealth should or would operate on two tiers—the old members with racial and cultural ties with the United Kingdom and owing allegiance to the British Queen and sharing, broadly, similar internal political institutions and orientation in external relations, and the new, post-war members not sharing at all or to the same extent the attachment to the features referred to above; that some members are aligned and others non-aligned with the Power blocs; that there is acute differences of opinion among members of the Commonwealth on the very character of the institution, with some members believing that the Commonwealth should seek to promote and express common collective views on international affairs, in order that it might not become what Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime Minister, once called a "coffee-house Commonwealth"; and that the Commonwealth is again divided between monarchies and republics) have been effectively answered by the actual continuance of the old members (with the sole exception of the Union of South Africa) and the increasing membership of the Commonwealth rather than by any refutation of these criticisms made from time to time in the past. Proposals to remedy some of the alleged weaknesses (like the holding of regional conferences of Commonwealth countries, or the prescription of some minimum criteria of size, area/population, economic strength, etc. for membership of the Commonwealth; or the holding of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences by rotation in various Commonwealth capitals) have all been tacitly or expressly disapproved by Commonwealth Governments. All the departures from Commonwealth traditions referred to above, while administering shocks to those who were smug and self-complacent about the strength, unity, and an assured

³⁷"Too many people, inspired by nostalgia rather than knowledge, tell us that with all these upstarts [the new, post-war members] round a great big table at Marlborough House, there can never be the intimacy and confidence experienced by the old guard European and Asian gentlemen in the Cabinet room at Number 10." This is belied by facts, according to John Holmes, who has attended some of the meetings. See his article, "A Canadian's Commonwealth", *Round Table*, October 1966, p. 338.

³⁸Zelman Cowen, *The British Commonwealth of Nations in a Changing World ...* (Evanston, Ill., 1965), p. 108.

future for the association, now seem to have merely shaken these unthinking supporters of the Commonwealth, with no lasting damage to the continuance of the institution as such. The extent of resilience of the Commonwealth was spectacularly demonstrated when it did not collapse as a result of war between two members (India and Pakistan), which a British speaker had once imagined to be "a fantastic absurdity".³⁹

The point to be emphasized, never too strongly, is that the Commonwealth is capable of absorbing more shocks and changes than any other association of nations devised by human effort, *a fortiori* because, unlike all of them, "it is not founded upon theories and principles but upon a resilient pragmatism".⁴⁰ It was not conceived of, or established, formally and suddenly: it has evolved for decades as a result of circumstances which have made the birth, growth, and effective functioning of such an association of nations highly desirable for the nations concerned. In the face of changed circumstances, it bends rather than breaks. On the other hand, the Commonwealth has developed, not by any deliberate long-term plans and designs, but by empirical modifications suggested more or less spontaneously to meet the changing needs of members and of changing circumstances of international affairs. Though nothing is certain about the future of the association, it does not seem doomed to immediate disintegration, whatever its critics or detractors might say. It is of course true that the tremendous changes that have come about the Commonwealth in the post-war years have revolutionized the association compared with its position before the Second World War and have made it, as the former Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, once said, though with misplaced regret, that it had become a "purely functional association based upon friendship and common interest".⁴¹ But what is wrong with this kind of Commonwealth? Cynical remarks that it is merely a negative association⁴² or that it is a mere "concert of convenience"⁴³ even

³⁹See P.N.S. Mansergh, *The Multi-Racial Commonwealth* (London, 1955), p. 133.

⁴⁰"The Future of the Commonwealth", *Round Table*, June 1956, p. 216.

⁴¹See Mansergh, n. 19, p. 1212.

⁴²T.R. Rees, "Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth", *International Affairs*, vol. 41 (1965), p. 462.

⁴³Miller, n. 2, pp. 275-6. Professor Miller, himself a supporter of the

by those people who claim to be its supporters cannot materially damage the Commonwealth; they can only heighten the sense of frustration and disillusionment of the critics and prolong the agony of the undertakers and grave-diggers of the Commonwealth who have stood ready and waiting for too long and in vain. It will survive and prosper as it serves the different interests and purposes of the members, even if some of them are conflicting occasionally. During the last two decades, it has weathered many a crisis, and from present evidence (and not any special astrological insight into the future), it seems reasonable to expect that it will last many years more.

What Do We Get Out of the Commonwealth?

One of the persistent criticisms of the Commonwealth is that it confers little or no benefit on members and that it is, therefore, a dying organization. "What do we get out of it?", ask the critics rhetorically. A simple but equally rhetorical reply would be: "What have we put in?" After all, as in the case of a bank account, one cannot draw more than one has deposited. And no one who is reasonably objective can claim that members have sacrificed a great deal for membership. Naturally, therefore, no one can expect too much from membership. And this is true as much of the Commonwealth as of any other association of nations—even the United Nations, for that matter. If the benefits of membership of the Commonwealth are very meagre, they are just proportionate to the meagre sacrifices made for membership. Therefore, to argue that the Commonwealth has little or no future since it does not confer any great benefits would seem to be unreasonable and illogical. The fact that membership of the Commonwealth has increased by leaps and bounds since 1947 is indication enough that the benefits of membership are not so negligible and member Governments know better than these critics that membership is worth while.

Commonwealth, has unwittingly passed into circulation this unfortunate, but quotable, phrase which he seems to have used merely in a descriptive (not condemnatory) sense. But the ignorant and unsympathetic critics of the Commonwealth have cited this phrase *ad nauseam* and sought to ridicule the association as a group of opportunist nations.

Twin Threats of Apathy and Hostility

For many years, the twin threats to the future of the Commonwealth have been the apathy of its supporters and the hostility of its critics, both within and without the Commonwealth. As for the former, one can say with some confidence that at least since the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference (which, in the view of this writer, is the second most important, indeed historic, conference held in the post-war years—the first one being the April 1949 conference), in view of the many constructive proposals made for reinforcing and developing the Commonwealth, the supporters of the Commonwealth are no longer self-complacent and indifferent to its existence or functioning. Some of the proposals of that conference have already been implemented (like the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the establishment of the Commonwealth Foundation, and the holding of the Commonwealth Medical Conference), so that the Commonwealth today is a more dynamic and purposeful body than ever before. That a special Prime Ministers' Conference should have been held in January 1966 just to discuss the Rhodesian question (which is, strictly in legal and constitutional terms, solely a matter of British concern) is another piece of evidence to prove that its members fully recognize the potentialities of the Commonwealth forum to solve one of the world's most explosive problems of today. This is not to suggest that members have suddenly decided to accord a high priority to the Commonwealth in their foreign policies and relations, but merely that they seem likely to use it far more than before as an international forum for the promotion of their own interests as well as the collective interests of the association and to continue, therefore, to have some vested interests in the future of the Commonwealth.

As for the hostility of its critics, there is very little of it in evidence nowadays. The Communist nations no longer treat it as an adjunct to the Western camp, as they used to do a decade ago. At the worst, they treat it now with indifference. And its critics in Europe and the United States have been silent for a long time; they no longer suspect that the Commonwealth is a cunning device of the British to sustain Britain's Great-Power status and influence in world affairs and to promote exclusively selfish British interests, hoodwinking the "naïve and gullible" Asians and

Africans. The worst things that they now say are perhaps due not to their hostility but to their ignorance of the nature of the association—like the remark made by former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, some years ago that it is a body “which has no political structure, or unity of strength”,⁴⁴ features which its supporters rarely, if ever, claimed that it possessed.

Since these twin threats of apathy and hostility have practically disappeared, it seems that one can be optimistic today about the future of the Commonwealth.

COMMONWEALTH SHOULD HAVE A FUTURE

The Commonwealth not only seems to have a future but *should have* a future, and this, to my mind, for two positive reasons. In the coming decades, to quote the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, “the most important, the most difficult, and if we mishandle them, potentially the most dangerous, problems in world politics, are in the broader sphere of relations between different races, different civilizations, between the industrialized countries and the developing or underdeveloped nations, between the rich and the poor”.⁴⁵ The Commonwealth is not, by itself, capable of bridging the gap between the rich and the poor nations even within itself, because of inadequacy of resources required for this stupendous job, but it could certainly help in that task. At one time, it showed the way of mutual help to the rest of the world by conceiving the Colombo Plan (1950) and the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (1960). But in the sphere of relations between a wide variety of different races and civilizations, it has proved to be a healthy and efficacious instrument in promoting inter-racial peace and understanding. It is the only association of nations which practises, at least to a greater degree than others, what it preaches on racial equality. Whereas the United Nations continues to pass (it seems endlessly) resolutions asking the Union of South Africa to conform its racial policies to the provisions of the UN Charter, and these resolutions are

⁴⁴*Vital Speeches of the Day* (New York, N. Y.), vol. 29 (1962-63), pp. 163-4.

⁴⁵*Annual Report*, n. 11, p. 3.

defiantly ignored by that Government with impunity, members of the Commonwealth brought such great pressure on it in 1961 as to force it out of the association. More recently, in 1964, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers declared that the promotion of racial equality is an additional obligation of membership.⁴⁶ In a vastly expanded and increasingly interdependent society of nations, where racial questions are likely to disturb the peace and stability of international society, the Commonwealth seems to show the way to other associations of nations. At the very least, it has reinforced the United Nations on this as on some other issues.

Secondly, with its member nations belonging to different civilizations, professing different religions, comprising White and coloured peoples of all shades, representing different stages of growth and development, and following different patterns of political thought and behaviour and, at the same time, with its freedom from contractual obligations, its flexibility, and its informality, the Commonwealth seems to be the likeliest model for the as-yet-uncertain future world order. "Stronger than treaties, less selfish than alliances, less restrictive than any other association, the Commonwealth seems... to offer the best hope in the world today of lasting peace and friendship among the peoples of the world", observed some years ago Julius Nyerere, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika.⁴⁷ In a world whose advancement to a distant and uncertain goal has been by a series of zig-zag movements of nationalism and internationalism, the habits of continuous exchange of information and consultation are likely to prevent (what the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth has called) "the neo-isolationist danger".⁴⁸ And finally, while it may not be quite "clear" to everybody, as it is to the Secretary-General, "that the Commonwealth association can prove even more important to

⁴⁶"The Prime Ministers affirmed their belief that for all Commonwealth Governments it should be the objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race, colour or creed." For the text of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué, see *Commonwealth Survey* 1964, p. 718.

⁴⁷*Commonwealth Survey* 1961, p. 753.

⁴⁸*Annual Report*, n. 11, p. 3.

world politics in the future than in the past",⁴⁹ one might well agree with the pertinent remark of a distinguished Canadian student of Commonwealth affairs that if the Commonwealth "fails to survive... it will be because the concept is too far ahead of, rather than too far behind, the times."⁵⁰

4 April 1967

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁰John Holmes, "An Open Question: Has the Commonwealth a Future?", *Optima* (Johannesburg), September 1966, p. 128.

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SHAUKAT ASHRAF AND C. ANDRADE

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA, 1947—1966: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE AMOUNT of literature about India published during the past two decades has increased very much. It is encouraging to note that many Indian scholars are now tackling problems relating to political, economic, and social developments in modern India.

The considerable quantum of official documentation now available supplements usefully the data from unofficial sources. The total picture of modern India as seen through publications can be said to emerge only if the official and unofficial sources are viewed in the same spectrum. It is indeed no exaggeration to state that authentic data, especially about the economic and social situation, are available in official sources of publication.

As far as the writings of foreigners are concerned, the contribution made by British scholars, civil servants, and journalists is comparatively small during the period owing to obvious reasons. American writings on India during the period have been, on the contrary, very substantial owing to the tremendous interest shown by American scholars in Indian developments in recent years. Some of the best works on Indian politics today are by the Americans.

Since this bibliography does not cover writings in foreign languages, and for that matter in any of the Indian languages, detailed evaluation of these writings has not been attempted. It may, however, be underlined that a considerable amount of work on India has been published in the Russian language, some of which is now available in English translation.

The bibliography is not intended to be an exhaustive one. It has attempted only a selective coverage of books, including official publications in the English language. Periodical articles and doctoral dissertations, with the sole exception of dissertations submitted to the Indian School of International Studies, have not been included to keep down the size of the bibliography. Readers interested in periodical articles on India are referred to *Documentation on Asia* (Indian Council of World Affairs), 1960— and “Bibliography on Asian Studies”, which has been published as an annual feature of *Journal of Asian Studies* since 1955.

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The imbalance in the quantum of literature presented in the bibliography is due to actual paucity in several areas. While there is so much available on topics like politics, foreign relations, and economic development, the coverage of subjects like sociology and law is rather inadequate. It is hoped that the lacunae would be rectified in course of time with the growing interest of scholars in political sociology and related areas.

The organization of literature is apparently *ad hoc*, but it is, in fact, based broadly on the Colon Scheme of Classification for all practical purposes. Some overlapping is inevitable because of the decision not to provide cross references. Literature on the Indian States has not been listed separately owing to the limited amount of publications available on them. It has instead been merged along with other entries under different heads.

A Table of Contents is provided to facilitate reference to the bibliography

Most of the literature listed herein is available in the joint library of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Indian School of International Studies at Sapru House, New Delhi.

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